

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

28 December 2018

Michael Best
MuckRock
DEPT MR 33386
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

REF: FOIA Case F-2017-00100

Dear Mr. Best:

This is in response to your request dated and received in the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on 16 March 2017. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), you requested "copies of the materials cited in the 162 footnotes of the National Reconnaissance Office Review and Redaction Guide, 2008 edition."

A thorough search of our files and databases located sixty-six NRO-originated documents responsive to your request. We also located additional document(s) that will be referred to other agencies for their review and direct response to you.

Fifty-three NRO-originated documents are being released to you in part, seven NRO-originated documents are being released to you in full, and six NRO-originated documents are being denied in full.

Material withheld from release is denied pursuant to FOIA exemptions:

(b)(1) as properly classified information under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c). To the extent that the classified information in the responsive documents is over 25 years old, we have determined that it qualifies for continued classification under Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 (b)(1);

(b)(3), which is the basis for withholding information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant withholding statute is 10 U.S.C. § 424, which provides (except as required by the President or for information provided to Congress), that no provision of law shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the NRO; the number of persons employed by or assigned or detailed to the NRO; or the name or official title, occupational series, grade, or salary of any such person;

(b) (4), which applies to proprietary information obtained from a company which, if released, would result in competitive harm to the company;

(b) (5), which applies to information that is predecisional and deliberative in nature; and

(b) (6) Which applies to records which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.

You have the right to appeal this determination to the NRO Appellate Authority, 14675 Lee Road, Chantilly, VA 20151-1715, within 90 days of the above date. You may also submit an appeal electronically through the National FOIA Portal at www.foia.gov or via email to FOIA@nro.mil. Please include an explanation of the reason(s) for your appeal as part of your submission. The FOIA also provides that you may seek dispute resolution for any adverse determination through the NRO FOIA Public Liaison and/or through the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). Please refer to the OGIS public web page at www.ogis.archive.gov for additional information.

If you have any questions, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) 227-9326 and reference case number F-2017-00100.

Sincerely,



Cynthia Allman
for FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosure:

- 1.) C05102020
- 2.) C05102022
- 3.) C05102024
- 4.) C05102025
- 5.) C05102026
- 6.) C05102027
- 7.) C05102028
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- 9.) C05102032
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53.) C05102102
54.) C05102103
55.) C05102142
56.) C05102143
57.) C05102145
58.) C05102692
59.) C05110301
60.) C05111730

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Series B cyl

NRO CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (U)

VERSION 4.0

Updated: 14 October 1995



Classify By:	J.D. Hill, DD/NRO
Reason:	(1.5 c) Intelligence Sources and Methods
Declassification On:	(X1) Intelligence Sources and Methods
Derived From:	Original Classification Authority
	Multiple Sources, see pages 19 and 20

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
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AUTHORITY

~~(S/B)~~ This Interim Release of the NRO Classification Guide is approved for use by all NRO, Intelligence Community and contractor personnel authorized to classify National Reconnaissance Program information when making BYEMAN Control Channel classification decisions.


J.D. HILL, Deputy Director
National Reconnaissance Office

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14 October 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

(U) The following changes to Version 3.0, 31 August 1995 NRO Classification Guide incorporate the provisions of Executive Order 12958. Effective 14 October 1995, the NRO changed the way it marks classified material.

(U) It is important to understand with the implementation of EO 12958 that only a limited number of individuals within the NRO will have Original Classification Authority. The remaining individuals will classify information derivatively.

(U) The NRO Classification Guide should be disseminated as widely as necessary to ensure the proper and uniform derivative classification of information.

~~(FOUO)~~ The EO mandates portion marking for all classified information. However, the NRO has been exempted from this requirement for information generated and maintained within the NRO government and contractor base. Information disseminated external to the NRO Government and contractor facilities must be portion marked and contain a document accountability number (DAN). External to the NRO is defined as beyond the direct cognizance of the Director of the NRO. Prior to disseminating the NRO Classification Guide external to the NRO, individuals must first contact the NRO Classification Guide Focal Point by phone [redacted]
[redacted]

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FOREWORD

(U) The NRO Classification Guide provides authoritative classification guidance for frequently recurring items of national reconnaissance program information. The use of an item in the Guide to classify a document is considered a derivative classification decision. Should there be discrepancies, between this guide and program classification guides or contractual specifications, then the program specific guides and current contracts take precedence. For classification decisions on information not referenced in the Guide, users must apply guidance contained in program classification guides, or the Intelligence Community sources listed on page 19 of the Guide, or contact the Classification Guide Focal Point via the mechanisms described below.

~~(S/B)~~ Procedures used for marking derivatively classified information within the BYEMAN Control Channel are explained in the ensuing pages and in the BYEMAN SECURITY MANUAL.

~~(FOUO)~~ Discrepancies or conflicts regarding classification issues need to be brought to the attention of the Classification Guide Focal Point via the appropriate program security offices in order that this guide may be properly amended. Once the program security office determines that there is cause for changing the NRO Classification Guide, those recommended changes will be brought before the Classification Guide Review Committee chaired by the Classification Guide Focal Point. Otherwise, questions or comments may be brought to the attention of the Focal Point by phone. [REDACTED]

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PREFACE

(U) This NRO Classification and Security Guidance document was prepared by the Director of Security/National Reconnaissance Office (DOS/NRO), and coordinated with NRO Program Offices and other components internal and external to the NRO. It outlines **general** classification guidance relating to National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) information and activities. Guidance on more detailed and technical information is contained in the program classification guides.

~~(S/B)~~ The overall objectives of the guide are the proper classification determinations for NRP and NRO matters and the protection of sensitive satellite intelligence sources and methods within the BYEMAN Security Control System and product control systems. The guide serves as baseline guidance for the definition of BYEMAN: "a unique DCI Security Control System which protects key, specific and fragile details of reconnaissance satellite design and operation." Such delineation of BYEMAN and non-BYEMAN information facilitates accurate determinations for access to the respective control systems. It serves to standardize categories of information in classification guides, such as common components, practices and procedures, and to promote uniform implementation of the BYEMAN Security Control System, consistent with intelligence sources and methods protection.

~~(S/B)~~ An imperative for proper classification and access determination is that user communities have sufficient technical information at non-BYEMAN levels to ensure understanding of capabilities to task satellite systems and analyze products effectively.

~~(S/B)~~ Based on senior government initiatives over the past year, including the National Reconnaissance Program Task Force Final Report (the "Woolsey Report," September 1992) and a DCI memorandum which called for a 50-percent reduction in security compartments, the DOS/NRO established a joint government industry task force that recommended a BYEMAN compartmentation restructure. This restructure, approved by the DCI on November 4, 1993, reduced operational system/integration compartments and studies into a single major compartment--BYEMAN (BYE).

~~(S/B)~~ This document incorporates applicable portions of the Security Implementation Plan for BYEMAN Compartmentation

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Restructure; the Implementation Plan For Further
Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National
Reconnaissance Office; the Classification Guide for National
Reconnaissance Imagery (Imagery Policy Series); Signals
Intelligence Security Regulations (SISRs); Security Control Manual
and Classification Guide for National Measurement and Signature
Intelligence Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series); and
current BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE security policy and procedures.
The guide has been prepared in concert with a major protection and
classification review by NRO Program Offices, with invaluable
assistance from staffs of the Central Imagery Office (CIO); SIGINT
Overhead Reconnaissance Sub-committee (SORS); SIGINT and MASINT
Committees; and Central Intelligence Agency Collection
Requirements Evaluation Staff (CIA/CRES).

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SECTION I: GENERAL**1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

~~(S/B)~~ This guide provides general security classification guidance for information, products and activities relating to satellite systems within the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). It is designed for use by NRO and other Intelligence Community personnel engaged in security classification and access determinations in the BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE and COMINT Security Control Systems. Classification determinations appear in general categories common to all NRO-operated systems. The guide acknowledges BYEMAN compartmentation restructure and serves to complement specific NRP systems classification guides and relevant imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) security control policy manuals and related classification guides. It also acknowledges intelligence information, products and activities derived from non-BYEMAN sources such as the Defense Support Program (DSP).

~~(S/TK)~~ The user should know that most non-COMINT, denied area products of satellite systems are classified at the SECRET, non-SCI, level. For example, Electro-Optical, and 99% of Operational Electronic Intelligence products are SECRET COLLATERAL. Care should be taken not to over-classify given the inherently close interrelationship between system information and information needed by the consumers of the products of these systems.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)**2. BACKGROUND**

~~(S/B)~~ On August 26, 1960, President Eisenhower approved the establishment of the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System to protect satellite reconnaissance information and products. On December 20, 1961, the BYEMAN Security Control System was established to protect information regarding sensitive reconnaissance satellite design, acquisition and operations, and formally protect certain activities of the NRP and its implementing organization, the NRO.

~~(S/B)~~ The BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control Systems were instituted to protect critical satellite reconnaissance systems and programs--through the research, development, acquisition,

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operations and exploitation phases. Selective system/sensor data, which included general capabilities of the systems, was made available in both control systems. The TALENT-KEYHOLE user community used this information for satellite tasking and intelligence product analysis, while NRO contractors needed this information at the BYEMAN level. (No product information from denied area collection is in the BYEMAN System.) To help assist in making these classification decisions, and in response to the user community, the first BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE Classification Guide was published in November 1970. The last update was issued in August 1977, April 1994, September 1994, and August 1995.

(U) Classification policy of National Reconnaissance Programs evolved as the NRP and the NRO became increasingly "overt." President Carter admitted the "fact of" satellite photo-reconnaissance in October 1978. The unclassified provisions of National Security Decision Directive-42, revised in June 1987 as a result of the Samuel Morison trial, and National Security Directive-30 on National Space Policy (November 2, 1989 updated March 8, 1995) revealed certain "facts about" satellite photo-reconnaissance. The Acting Secretary of Defense issued a Memorandum on September 18, 1992, that declassified the existence of the NRO and certain facts about its organization and the NRP.

~~(S/B)~~ The end of the Cold War and the "globalization" of space technologies also caused a broadening of U.S. national security strategy, a changed focus of overhead collection and a reassessment of the nature and scope of defense intelligence needs. These changes compelled a re-examination of the BYEMAN Security Control System.

~~(S/B)~~ One effect of these changes was the BYEMAN compartmentation restructure approved by the DCI on November 4, 1993. The BYEMAN Control System is now based on a risk management philosophy and "need-to-know" information exchange. Certain security procedures have changed and internal compartmentation has been virtually eliminated. However, the requirement to protect BYEMAN information as SCI remains. Program names remain valid only as "platform identifiers" for use in document/information management and dissemination. Exceptionally sensitive information, such as survivability and vulnerability data, may be protected separately as program/project "Special Handling" (SH). The release of BYEMAN information to foreign nationals continues in accordance with government-to-government agreements. Foreign disclosure of BYEMAN

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information beyond specific second party agreement is permissible upon approval by the DNRO and specific delegation of access approval authority.

3. RESPONSIBILITY/AUTHORITY

~~(S/B)~~ The BYEMAN, TALENT-KEYHOLE and COMINT Security Control Systems, as SCI control mechanisms for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, are statutory responsibilities of the DCI.

~~(S/B)~~ While DCI directives provide the baseline guidance for execution of the BYEMAN Security Control System, the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) is the overall BYEMAN Program Manager. His responsibilities include: Implementation of DCI directives; establishment and maintenance of security for BYEMAN activities and programs; execution of contracts; determination of what constitutes BYEMAN information and determination of classification level (TOP SECRET or SECRET) of BYEMAN information; publication of security classification guides, including this Classification Guide; and accountability for access control.

~~(S/B)~~ The DNRO is the sole approving authority for determination of "need-to-know" access requirements for BYEMAN information. This authority extends to U.S. Government, contractor, and foreign government personnel having or requiring access to BYEMAN material. Delegations of this authority are specific and in writing.

~~(S/B)~~ The DCI has delegated security policy formulation authority for the BYEMAN Security Control System to the Director of Personnel Security, CIA (DOPS/CIA). The Director of Security, NRO, (DOS/NRO) is responsible; however, for implementation and is the senior security advisor to the DNRO.

~~(S/PK)~~ The TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System is jointly managed for the DCI by the Director, Central Imagery Office (CIO); the Chairman, National SIGINT Committee; and the Chairman, MASINT Committee. Changes and modifications to the system require coordination by each Director/Chairman and approval of the DCI/DDCI. The COMINT Security Control System is managed for the DCI by the Director, National Security Agency (NSA). Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISRs) constitute the basic implementation of the system for SIGINT and SIGINT-related information. Detailed

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security and control procedures for IMINT and MASINT are contained in relevant policy series manuals.

4. CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA

~~(S/B)~~ **Assignment of Information to Control Systems.** Various information about the NRO and its systems will be exclusively BYEMAN, exclusively TALENT-KEYHOLE, or either BYEMAN or TALENT-KEYHOLE. Certain SIGINT product information may be exclusively COMINT or require COMINT Control System protection. As a general rule, "products," product characteristics and information relating to the understanding of general program capabilities for collection tasking purposes should be controlled within the TALENT-KEYHOLE and COMINT Security Control Systems. When deemed necessary, future capabilities information may be controlled within the Talent-Keyhole Control System. This information may be afforded additional protection through the use of Talent-Keyhole subcompartments to limit access to only those persons needing the information for planning purposes.

~~(S/B)~~ **BYEMAN.** BYEMAN is a security system which protects sensitive sources and methods used in the research, development and operation of space-based reconnaissance systems: budgeting and funding details; relationships; integration of launch and sensor platforms; command and control operations; key design and development details; and, survivability and vulnerability of systems.

~~(S/TK)~~ **TALENT-KEYHOLE.** Information controlled exclusively in the TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System includes specific capabilities and related collection targeting and tasking to include data, and certain products of overhead collection. Some SIGINT collection may also require compartmentation within the COMINT Control System.

~~(S/B)~~ **Either BYEMAN or TALENT-KEYHOLE.** Examples of information that can be compartmented in either control system (but not both simultaneously) are system characteristics and program capabilities. In such cases, the determination of the control system to be used will be made based upon the audience. For instance, not all contractors are accessed at the Talent-Keyhole level; therefore, certain information would need to be protected in BYEMAN channels especially when generated in company development and manufacturing facilities. However, the same information could most likely be handled in the Talent-Keyhole System when going to the Intelligence Community. For either

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audience, avoid the use of terms that would cause joint compartmentation to be required. For instance, for a TALENT-KEYHOLE audience, do not use BYEMAN "platform identifiers" when mission numbers would serve the same purpose and permit the document to be controlled only within TALENT-KEYHOLE. If information on system design is needed in a TALENT-KEYHOLE document, beyond that which is normally allowed, publish a separate BYEMAN annex to avoid restricting the distribution of the basic document.

~~(S/B)~~ **BYEMAN Special Handling (SH)**. Selective information that is critical to the NRO mission such as vulnerability/survivability data may be placed within distinct BYEMAN security controls that are termed "Special Handling." Such information is nominated by government Program Directors and approved by the DNRO or DDNRO. Program Directors have access approval authority; each program will establish its own procedures.

~~(S/B)~~ **Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (NOFORN)**. Most classified intelligence information relating to intelligence sources and methods is NOFORN. Release of NRO-related classified information to foreign governments or individuals at the COLLATERAL, COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE or BYEMAN level must be in accordance with arrangements between NRO, NSA, and CIA/Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff (CRES). Potential data release must also satisfy the applicable requirements outlined in DCID 1/7, DCID 5/6, SIRS Volumes I/II, and the Imagery Policy Series. In addition to its SIGINT responsibilities, CRES is the DCI-designated focal point for all imagery-related intelligence community disclosures to foreign officials. Release of unclassified NRO-related satellite technology is subject to export controls as established by the Departments of Commerce and State, in coordination with Department of Defense. Certain organizations/agencies have authorized memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or other agreements that permit the release of non-BYEMAN classified intelligence information to foreign nationals. Release of information is bound by the specific terms of the agreements and may supersede other caveats and restrictions.

5. SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS.

~~(S/B)~~ **Classification or Control System Resolution**. The classification tables in this guide specify the classification and/or control system for information relating to NRP systems, products and data. Where the security control system or

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classification is not readily apparent from the table or system SCGs information, products and activities will be protected at the applicable level with the most limited distribution, pending a control and classification system review by the NRO for BYEMAN issues and the respective functional program managers within the DIA, CIO, or NSA for TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT and collateral classification matters.

Executive Order 12958 "Classified National Security Information"

(U) Under the provisions of Executive Order 12958, the NRO changed the way it classifies material effective 14 October 1995. It is important to understand that only a limited number of individuals within the NRO will have Original Classification Authority. The remaining individuals within the organization will classify information derivatively.

(U) **Classification Identifier.** As part of personal accountability for classification, on the face of each classified document individuals will apply their unique six digit classification ID Number on the "Classified By" line. An example might be:

Classify By: Classification ID Number (123456)
(CL BY:)

(U) **Reason for classification.** The classifier shall identify the reason(s) for the classification decision. The classifier shall include, at a minimum, a brief reference to the pertinent classification category(ies), or the number 1.5 plus the letter(s) that corresponds to the classification category identified in Section 1.5 of EO 12958:

- (a) "military plans, weapons systems, or operations;"
- (b) "foreign government information;"
- (c) "intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;"
- (d) "foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;"
- (e) "scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;"
- (f) "United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;" or

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(g) "vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security."

CL BY: 123456
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
or
1.5(c)(e)

(U) **Declassification Instruction.** The duration of the classification decision shall be placed on the "Declassify On" line. The classifier will apply one of the following instructions.

(U) The classifier will apply a date or event for declassification that corresponds to the lapse of the information's national security sensitivity, which may not exceed 10 years from the date of the original decision. When linking the duration of classification to a specific date or event, mark that date or event as follows:

CL BY: 123456
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 14 October 2005
(DECL ON) or
DECL ON: **Completion of Operation**

(U) At the time of original classification individuals with original classification authority may determine that certain information must remain classified beyond 10 years. The classifier will apply the letter "X" plus a brief recitation of the exemption category(ies), or the letter "X" plus the number that corresponds to that exemption category(ies) in section 1.6(d) of EO 12958:

X1: "reveal an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity;"

X2: "reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;"

X3: "reveal information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system;"

X4: "reveal United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans;"

X5: "reveal foreign government information;"

X6: "damage relations between the United States and a foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or seriously undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for a

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period greater than that provided in paragraph (b);

X7: "impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and other individuals for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized;" or

X8: "violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

CL BY: 123456
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1

(U) **Derivative Classification.** Derivative classification is the act of incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the markings of the source information. On the face of each derivatively classified document the identity of a source document(s) or classification guide to include date shall appear on the "Derived From" line. An example might appear as follows:

Classify By: 123456
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DERIVED FROM: NRO SCG #4.0 14 October 1995
(DRV FROM) or
DRV From: NRO Director's Note 001, 14 October 1995

(U) When a document is classified derivatively on the basis of more than one source document or classification guide, the "Derived From" line shall appear as follows:

Derived From: Multiple Sources

(U) The derivative classifier shall maintain the identification of each source with the file or record copy of the derivatively classified document. When practicable, this list should be included in or with all copies of the derivatively classified document.

(U) The classification tables in this guide specify the classification and/or control system for information relating to NRP systems, products and data. Certain information will surface or be handled through or under collateral cover organizations. Classification authorities for those organization will derivatively classify NRP information under the authority of this

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guide. In those cases the derivative classification source will be protected and/or masked appropriately; and the related source list will be protected at the highest appropriate level and controlled with the appropriate control system(s).

(U) A document derivatively classified on the basis of a source document that is itself marked "Multiple Sources" shall cite the source document on its "Derived From" line rather than the term "Multiple Sources."

(U) For IMAGERY material under Talent-Keyhole control derived from the CIO Policy Series: DRV FROM: CIOPS 1 June 1994

~~(S/TK)~~ For information derived from the Signals Intelligence Security Regulations: DRV FROM: SISR Aug 1981

(U) For MASINT material under Talent-Keyhole control derived from the MASINT Policy Series: DRV FROM: MPS 002-88 June 1989

(U) The highest level of classified information contained in a document shall be marked in a way as to distinguish it clearly from the informational text. Conspicuously place the overall classification at the top and bottom of the front cover, on the title page, on the first page, and on the outside of the back cover. Each interior page of a classified document shall be marked at the top and bottom either with the highest level of classification of information contained on that page, including the designation "Unclassified" when it is applicable, or with the highest overall classification of the document. In the lower right corner of BYEMAN documents, include the handling caveat marking: "Handle via BYEMAN Channels Only" All documents must be dated on the front page.

~~(S/B)~~ **Portion Marking.** Each classified document being distributed to agencies, offices, and commands external to the NRO community shall, by marking, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level. External is defined as beyond the direct cognizance of NRO Security (i.e., NSA, DOE, DoD, Congress, etc.) Each portion, ordinarily a paragraph, but including subjects, titles, graphics and the like, shall be marked to indicate its classification level by placing a parenthetical symbol immediately preceding the portion to which it applies. The following are examples of portion marking abbreviations for both collateral and BYEMAN information:

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(TS) TOP SECRET

(S) SECRET

(TS/B) TOP SECRET Handle via BYEMAN Channels Only

(S/B) SECRET Handle via BYEMAN Channels Only

(TS/B/TK) TOP SECRET Handle via BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels Jointly

(U) Documents that are not portion marked may not be cited as source documents for derivative classification. These documents shall be marked "Warning-this document shall not be used as a source for derivative classification." This "warning" marking will be prominently placed on the first page of the document.

~~(S/B)~~ Information that was previously program or platform specific has been marked with a "◆" (Black Diamond) symbol in the NRO Classification Guide. When information is marked with a "◆" then the portion marking should include the applicable platform identifier. "Using the [] (i.e., "◆" Black Diamond information) an example may be:

(TS/B- []) TOP SECRET Handle via BYEMAN Channels Only

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Classified material being distributed external to the NRO, information marked with a "◆", or other technical/project data when specifically identified by the cognizant program office or directorate must possess a document accountability number (DAN)

(U) All existing programs will be reviewed annually to ensure they meet the guidelines and requirements of Executive Order 12958 and DCID 3/29, "Control Access Program Oversight Committee (CAPOC)."

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Overall classification level of document	Memo For Director, DIA Subject: Fact of Satellite Reconnaissance (U)	SECRET	BYE-XXXXXX-95 CY 1 14 October 1995
Document date	(U) Fact of near-real time satellite photo-reconnaissance.		
Portion marking	(S/B) Ground collection and planning computer software when associated with program activities.		
	(S) General description of mission.		
Classification block	CL BY: 123456		
	CL REASON: 1.5(c)		
	DECL ON: X1		
Handling caveat	DRV FROM: NRO SCG 4.0		
	14 October 1995	SECRET	Handle via BYEMAN Channels Only
			Joe Doe Chief Administrator

(U) The above example document identifies: the overall classification level of the document; identifying number of the person marking the document; reason for classification; duration of classification; and, classification authority. Since this example is a document that is going external to the NRO, it includes a document accountability number (DAN).

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SECTION II: CLASSIFICATION AND INFORMATION

~~(S/B)~~ Section II provides a series of classification tables that outline eight basic information categories that relate to satellite reconnaissance and classification determinations for such information. D/NRO is the original classification authority for BYEMAN information. Information listed as TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT or COLLATERAL derives from classification/compartmentation guides issued by the CIO, SIGINT Committee and MASINT Committee.

~~(S/B)~~ Prior to the BYEMAN compartmentation restructure, CODEWORD markings in documents were used to facilitate general need-to-know determinations as well as which data could be disseminated or transferred to certain foreign governments. There is still a need for platform or program identifiers for similar reasons. In the BYEMAN column in the following tables, information that was previously program or platform specific has been marked with a "◆" symbol.

~~(S/B/TK)~~ The user should ensure that data in these categories are marked with the pertinent program or platform identifier to set the limits of what can be appropriately released to a foreign government. For reference purposes, the Section II tables include a "SOURCE" column that reflects the original authority for the derivative classification. Unless otherwise specified, the sources are coded as follows:

- 1) Central Imagery Office (CIO) Imagery Policy Series
Interim Imagery Classification Chart
- 2) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR)
- 3) Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for
National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series)
- 4) Program Security Guides
- 5) Security Implementation Plan for BYEMAN
Compartmentation Restructure, November 18, 1993
- 6) BYEMAN/TALENT-KEYHOLE Compartmentation Guide, August
23, 1977
- 7) NRO Staff Memoranda/DNRO briefings

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- 8) The Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, 24 April 1995
- 9) Executive Order 12951, "Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, 22 February 1995"
- 10) Amendment to National Security Directive-30 regarding National Space Policy, 08 March 1995
- 11) Declassification of the terms "Talent-Keyhole" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, 23 February 1995.

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SECTION IV: DEFINITIONS

Air Force Program (AFP) Number-Unclassified number assigned by the System Program Office (SPO).

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

BYEMAN Security Control System-BYEMAN is a unique DCI Security Control System that protects key, specific and fragile details of reconnaissance satellite design and operation. Generally, information requiring exclusive BYEMAN protection includes: (1) budgeting and funding details; (2) relationships (Between Government and contractors); (3) integration of launch and sensor platforms; (4) command and control operations, (5) key design and development details; and (6) survivability and vulnerability of systems.

Classified: Information or material that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security. This material consists of three categories:

- 1) **TOP SECRET** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.
- 2) **SECRET** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.
- 3) **Confidential** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Security classification judgments must be made based on an approved System Classification Guide (SCG) or by an original classification authority, in accordance with the rules for such determinations set forth in Executive Order 12958. Confidential is not used in the BYEMAN Control System.

COMINT Security Control System: COMINT is a DCI special access Security Control System expressly authorized for handling or transmitting communications derived from satellite intelligence and other sources. COMINT categories have been established to distinguish among the classes of COMINT which differ in sensitivity and are designated by distinctive codewords.

Common Name-Name assigned to the satellite by its owner/operator. The common name appears in the unclassified Spacecom Satellite Catalogue (SATCAT). The common name is not the satellite's BYEMAN name. For example, the common names for

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Derivative classification- Means the incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classification of information based on classification guidance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: For Official Use Only (FOUO) is not a security classification. Information identified as FOUO in this guide is exempt from mandatory disclosure.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): The collection and analysis of photography and electronic imaging across the electromagnetic spectrum, to include visual, radar, infrared, and ultraviolet data.

International Designator (INT DES)-A number made up of year and chronological number of the launch for that year to include the suffix that defines each piece associated with the same launch (also known as the ID#). (b)(1)
(b)(3)

Inter-Range Operations Number (IRON)-Number assigned by CSTC/VOI at Onizuka AFB, CA for identifying satellites in the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN)

Operations Number-Number assigned by the launch agency.

Mission-The NRO mission of the satellite.

Mission Number-Number assigned to identify specific NRO satellites, e.g., [redacted] etc.

Non-Compartmented National Security Information-In instances where compartmented security controls are not warranted for added protection, classified information may be placed within a non-Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) system for safeguarding national security information. This is especially important for military users of product information.

Original classification authority-Means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): The interception, analysis and reporting of information comprising either individually or in combination, all COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. SIGINT includes both raw data and the analysis product of that data. Subsets of SIGINT include:

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1) **Communications Intelligence (COMINT)**: Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. Special Intelligence (SI) is the unclassified term which is used to identify COMINT in the unclassified environment.

2) **Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)**: Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign electromagnetic non-communications transmissions by other than intended recipients, and foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiation emanations from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.

3) **Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)**: Technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept of foreign instrumentation signals (i.e., electromagnetic emissions) associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Signals include telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, tracking/fusing/arming/command systems, and video data links:

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)-Scientific and technical intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter or sender and facilitating subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same.

(b)(3)


TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System-TALENT-KEYHOLE is a DCI special access Security Control System which protects technical data used in collection tasking, imagery processing/exploitation techniques for collected data, and intelligence products derived from overhead reconnaissance programs. Generally, TALENT-KEYHOLE protects information, products and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines: Imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)

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Authority

This Redaction Guide for Westfields Freedom of Information Act Requests is approved for use by all NRO reviewers.



(b)(3)

Director, External Relations

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**Redaction Guide
for
Westfields Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests
July 10, 1995**

POLICY: The NRO policy regarding FOIA requests is to make the "fullest responsible disclosure" consistent with the need to maintain national security and the requirement to protect other categories of information that qualify for FOIA exemptions.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this redaction guide is to consolidate pertinent extracts of existing guidance ("NRO Classification Guide", Version 2.0 dated 9 September 1994, designated by # and "Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office", dated 10 Apr 1995 and effective 24 Apr 1995) and provide additional tailored guidance, where necessary, for determining which information is classified (with appropriate exemptions), and which information is eligible under other exemptions of the FOIA to assist document reviewers in responding to FOIA requests the NRO has received regarding the Westfields Facility. Because every category of information cannot be predicted and classification changes continue to occur, this guide may be modified as we proceed with review and redaction. Modifications to this guide should be brought to the attention of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Changes to this document will be coordinated with Security, GC, ER, and MS&O and approved by the Director, ER.

(b)(3)

Information revealing:

Remarks:

Organization and Individuals:

Identities (i.e. names, partial names, initials, signatures) of Government NRO personnel (Note 1)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §425

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Identities (i.e. names, partial names, initials, signatures) of all contractor personnel (Note 1)

(b)(6)

Fact that MS&O provides consolidated support in the areas of communications, human resources management, administrative services, facility acquisition, logistics support, and facility security (Note 2)

Releasable

Fact that Air Force element was Los Angeles, CA-based and CIA and Navy were Washington-based (Note 3)

Releasable

Number of individuals assigned to each NRO office, directorate, staff, entity (Note 4)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3(a)(4)
and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §425

- When office is not identified (Note 4)

Classified (b)(1) §1.3 (a)(4)
and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §425

NRO-sponsored facilities working groups (e.g. Requirements Working Group, Facilities Working Group, Communications Sub-Working Group) and their membership

- Fact of existence (Note 5)

Releasable (unless name raises Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns, then case-by-case determination required)

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- Membership, proceedings,
processes, methodologies
(Note 6)

Classified (b)(1)§ 1.3 (a)(4)
and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §425
(names) or (b)(3) 50 U.S.C.
§403-3(c)(5) (Requires item-
by-item review.)

Miscellaneous:

Fact that Mission Support
expenditure center includes
facilities required in the NRO
reorganization, airlift
support, personnel costs,
security operations, NRO
communications and non-program
specific logistics and support
(Note 7)

Releasable (limited to this
wording)

Fact of Joint Senior Advisory
Board or National
Reconnaissance Review Board
(NRRB)(Note 8)

Releasable

Fact of Fuhrman Panel on NRO
Reorganization (Note 9)

Releasable

Fact of Geiger/Kelly Study
(Note 10)

Releasable

Fact of John McMahon and
Senior Advisor Planning
Group(SAPG)(Note 11)

Releasable

Building identification:

(#)Fact that NRO is the
sponsor of the Westfields
construction site and fact
that Westfields will be the
NRO Headquarters (Note 12)

Releasable

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(#)Fact that Westfields site is located at Route 28 and Willard Road, Chantilly, VA; size of site is 68 acres; occupancy scheduled for 1996; and an estimated 3000 (or any total number) government and contractor personnel will occupy the site (Note 13)

Releasable

Fact that 2/3 of 3000 occupancy total is NRO (government) and 1/3 are supporting contractors (Note 14)

Releasable

(#)Fact that Collins International Services Company, a subsidiary of Rockwell Corporation, is the construction management contractor for the Westfields construction project (Note 15)

Releasable

Fact that taxes were paid to the County of Fairfax by Rockwell (Note 16)

Releasable

(#)Fact that the NRO operates interim facilities (Note 17)

Releasable

- Identity or location of Interim NRO facilities (Note 18)

Unclassified but not releasable-protect as (b)(3) (no specific citation per GC)

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Number of interim NRO
facilities

-- As "several"
(Note 19)

Releasable

-- Exact number
(Note 18)

Not releasable (b)(3) (no
specific citation per GC)

- Other Rockwell or
CISCO buildings located in
Washington, D.C. area
identified as Rockwell or
CISCO

-- If used to support
NRO operations (Note 18)

Unclassified but protect as
(b)(3) (no specific citation
per GC)

-- If not used to
support NRO operations (Note
19)

Releasable (after coordination
with Rockwell or CISCO to
ensure other customers are not
revealed)

Identification of other
Rockwell/CISCO buildings or
divisions located outside the
Washington, D.C. area (Case-
by-case determination)

- If they support/reveal
other NRO operations (Note 20)

Classified (b)(1)§ 1.3 (a)(4)
and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403-
3(c)(5)

- If they do not
support/reveal other NRO
operations (Note 19)

Releasable (after coordination
with Rockwell or CISCO to
ensure other customers are not
revealed)

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~~SECRET/BIEMAN~~**Drawings/Floor plans:**

Standard construction-type blueprints, drawings, diagrams, and floor plans when not annotated with NRO office symbols or other identifiable NRO information (Note 19)

Releasable

When annotated with NRO information such as office symbols, title of the individual, special communications equipment or other NRO unique information (Note 21)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3 (a)(2) and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403-3(c)(5) or (b)(3)10 U.S.C. §425 and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403g

NRO areas, and details about these areas, within the buildings

(b)(3)

(Note 21)

(b)(3) 50 U.S.C. 403g

Alarm equipment drawings, specifications, type, number, location, wiring diagrams (previously released as unclassified)(Note 19)

Releasable

"As built" alarm equipment drawings and diagrams not previously released (Note 22)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3 (a)(2) and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403-3(c)(5)

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Security concept of operations, information revealing employment of security personnel, utilization of security devices, weaknesses, potential vulnerabilities (Note 23)

Classified (b)(1)\$1.3(a)(2) and (b)(1)\$1.3(a)(4) and (b)(3)50 U.S.C.§403-3(c)(5)

Building permits (Note 24)

Releasable

Pictures, videotapes of construction without NRO annotations (Note 25)

TBD

Budget and Cost Information:

Total cost of the Westfields project as \$301.7, \$310, \$347 or \$350 million (Note 26)

Releasable

- The cost of the building is \$153 million (Note 27)

Releasable

- The cost of the land is \$24 million (Note 27)

Releasable

- "Other Support costs" are \$124.7 million (Note 27)

Releasable

Total NRO facility budget 1993-97 as released to SSCI (Note 28)

Releasable

Financial Information:

Note: All financial information will require case-by-case review. (Note 29)

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~~SECRET/BIEMAN~~**Contract Information:**

Note: Contract information will require case-by-case review.

Fact that DCI's special authority, Section 8, or CIA contracting authority was used to procure Westfields and other NRO buildings (Note 30)

Releasable

Fact that contracts exist between the NRO and CISCO (Note 31)

Releasable

Total value of contract (Note 32)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3 (a)(4) and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403-3(c)(5)

Identity of NRO individual who signed contract (Note 33)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §425

Identity of COTR (Note 33)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §425

NRO peculiar clauses that indicate how the NRO does business (Note 34)

Case-by-case review

Fact of special banking mechanisms and transaction procedures (Note 35)

Releasable

Details about special banking mechanisms and actual transactions (Note 36)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3(a)(4) and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403-3(c)(5)

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Boiler plate clauses from the FAR that do not indicate sensitive aspects of how the NRO does business (Note 37)

Releasable

Fact that NRO contract with CISCO contains the clause "All automated information systems utilized to process project information will be operated in accordance with the requirements of "Security Policy on Intelligence Information in Automated Systems and Networks" (DCID 1/16, 4 January 1987) and the "Security Requirements for Contractor Automated Information Systems Processing Sensitive Compartmented Information," dated 1 July 1987 (Note 38)

Releasable

Fact that NRO contract with CISCO contains the clause "... all automated information systems utilized to process project information will be operated in accordance with "TEMPEST Security Requirements for Contractors Processing Sensitive Compartmented Information," dated March 1987. (Note 38)

Releasable

Fact that NRO contract with CISCO contains the clause "H-8 52.204-818, Industrial Polygraph Program" which reads

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as follows: "As a further enhancement to security measures for the protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information, the Contractor agrees to permit necessary polygraph interviews of Contractor personnel having access to such information. It is understood that the polygraph interview will be limited to counterintelligence issues." (Note 38)

Releasable

Fact of contract between Rockwell/CISCO and their subcontractors (Note 39)

TBD by CISCO

Fact that NRO does covert procurements (Note 40)

Releasable

NRO Contract Number

- Full contract number (Note 41)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3(a)(4)
and (b)(3) 50 U.S.C. §403-
3(c)(5)

- Last four digits (Note 42)

Releasable

Government deliberations during Source Selection process: (Note 43)

- regarding winning contractor

Source Selection Decision
Document releasable: remainder
might be exempt under (b)(5)

- not regarding winning contractor

Might be exempt under (b)(5)

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Source selection materials not
containing government
deliberations (Note 43)

- obtained from contractors

Coordinate with contractor:
some may be (b)(4); remainder
will depend on whether
voluntarily submitted by
contractor--voluntarily
submitted information, if of
the kind not customarily
disclosed to the public, may
be exempted--or whether
contractor can show
competitive harm if released

-inter-or intra-agency records

Presumption of releasability

Government negotiation
strategy, positions,
documentation (Note 44)

Requires case-by-case review

Security Information:

Handle Via BYEMAN Channels
Only (Note 45)

Classified (b)(1)§1.3(a)(4)
and (b)(3)50 U.S.C.§403-
3(c)(5)

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE
Channels Only (Note 47)

Line through once, without
obliterating, no citation
(unless "fact of" TK adds
information that warrants
exclusion)

Codewords (Program
identifier)(Note 46)

Classified(b)(1)§1.3(a)(4) and
(b)(3)50 U.S.C.§403-3(c)(5)

Confidential, Secret, Top
Secret

Line through once, without
obliterating, no citation

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Coversheets (Note 45)

Redact in full, unless there
are pertinent annotations.
Otherwise, non-responsive,
classified (b)(1)§1.3(a)(4)
and (b)(3)50 U.S.C.§403-
3(c)(5)and (b)(3) 10 U.S.C..
§425 (if names are included)

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Redaction Guide Notes

1. At a meeting on May 16, 1995 it was decided that all NRO Government Personnel and all contractor personnel would be redacted.
2. Public domain - Page 189 of the FY 1993 Congressional Budget Justification Book declassified and released to the SSCI
3. Public Domain - DNRO Memo with attachments to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, 17 Aug 94
4. Derived from "Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the NRO", dated 10 Apr 1995 and effective 24 Apr 1995
5. Judgement call that names of facilities working groups on Westfields would be releasable unless there was something in the name that was classified, or that would raise Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns.
6. Derived from "Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the NRO", dated 10 Apr 1995 and effective 24 Apr 1995. Each item will be looked at to determine if it is classified or warrants a (b)(3) exemption.
7. Public Domain - Page 250 of the FY 1992-1993 Congressional Budget Justification Book, Vol IV as redacted, declassified and released to SSCI. Release limited to this wording.
8. Public domain - DCI/SECDEF memo to Sen Boren, 26 Feb 1990
9. Public domain - Transcript of Proceedings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing on NRO Headquarters Project, Wednesday, August 10, 1994, page 104
10. Public domain - Stenographic Minutes, U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Full Committee Hearing, NRO Headquarters Facility, Thursday, August 11, 1994, page 30-31.
11. Public Domain - Unclassified "NRO Collocation Key Events", no date

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12. Item 1.3.1, NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994.
13. Derived from item 1.3.2 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
14. Public Domain - Transcript of Proceedings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing on NRO Headquarters Project, Wednesday, August 10, 1994, page 71
15. Derived from item 1.3.4 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
16. Public Domain - Stenographic Minutes, U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Full Committee Hearing, NRO Headquarters Facility, Thursday, August 11, 1994, page 34-35.
17. Item 1.3.3 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
18. Derived from "Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the NRO", dated 10 Apr 1995 and effective 24 Apr 1995 page 11. Part II, para C. Also, NRO/GC informed CIA/OGC of intention to use 403g as (b)(3) statute to protect identity and location of interim facilities (P. Moffett E-mail 28 Apr 95 16:10:44)
19. Judgement call
20. Derived from item 6.1.1 and 6.1.3 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
21. Derived from item 6.1.1 and 6.1.3 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994. Also, NRO/GC informed CIA/OGC of intention to use 403g as (b)(3) statute (P. Moffett E-mail 28 Apr 95 16:10:44). At the meeting on 27 Apr 1995, a discussion of the potential for an act like the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City to occur with the NRO building resulted in general agreement to keep internal NRO specific details from being released. Content will determine which exemptions apply.
22. "As built" drawings detail the actual installation of equipment and may be different than drawings filed with the County of Fairfax and available in the public domain. These "as built" drawings should be protected since they reveal specific vulnerabilities of the buildings.

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23. How the NRO intends to utilize the installed equipment may reveal vulnerabilities that need to be protected from disclosure.
24. Since building permits should already be in the public domain, they should be releasable.
25. TBD. May reveal vulnerabilities, specific uses of particular areas, or some other feature that may require protection.
26. Public domain - Transcript of Proceedings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing on NRO Headquarters Project, Wednesday, August 10, 1994, page 64
27. Public domain - "Westfields Project Current Costs" chart (2208F-94 SSCI) declassified and released to SSCI
28. Public domain - "Total Facility Budget" chart (2208F-94 SSCI) declassified and released to SSCI
29. TBD
30. Public domain - Transcript of Proceedings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing on NRO Headquarters Project, Wednesday, August 10, 1994, page 27, 91-93
31. Public domain - revealed at the hearing in Birmingham, Alabama, 20 April 1995
32. Derived from item 6.2.1, 6.2.2 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
33. Derived from "Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the NRO", dated 10 Apr 1995 and effective 24 Apr 1995 page 15, Part III, B.2.a.
34. Derived from 6.3.3 and 6.3.8 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994 Contract clauses that are indicative of how the NRO does business and may reveal classified or sources and methods information will require exemption. These clauses will be identified on a case-by-case basis.
35. The mere existence of special banking mechanisms is releasable.

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36. Derived from 6.3.3 and 6.3.8 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
37. Many of the clauses in NRO contracts are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and are not revealing of classified information or sources and methods information. These are releasable.
38. These clauses were evaluated as not requiring exemption and are included in this guide to document this decision.
39. If there is any reason to protect the relationship between CISCO and their subcontractors, CISCO should make this determination.
40. Public domain - Transcript of Proceedings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing on NRO Headquarters Project, Wednesday, August 10, 1994, page 92-93
41. Derived from 6.3.1 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
42. Based on recollection of R. Marsh and B. MacDonald.
43. Input from NRO/GC. Under the Clinton/Reno policy, the government is no longer being given the benefit of the doubt regarding (b)(5) records. Policy: release unless we can show a harm that would result from release. Because source selection documents contain a lot of predecisional, deliberative, opinion-like statements, and a lot of contractor information, these can probably be heavily redacted. But factual information must be released. Any factual information that pertains to contractors, however, must be coordinated with those contractors so that the NRO can decide whether to release or redact certain information.
44. Must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine which, if any, exemption is justified.
45. Derived from Item 8.1 and 8.6 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
46. Derived from item 8.4 NRO Classification Guide, Version 2.0, 9 Sep 1994
47. Director, Central Imagery Office memo dated 23 Feb 1995 and approved by DCI on 23 Feb 1995

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**IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
for
NRO LAUNCH DECLASSIFICATION**

March 1, 1997



WARNING NOTICE: The procedures set forth in this plan will not be divulged or implemented until all personnel have been officially notified and fully briefed on their responsibilities.

WARNING: OTHER THAN APPENDIX B, THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE USED AS A SOURCE FOR DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION.

Classified By: K.R. Hall, DDNRO
Classified Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1
Derived From: NRO SCG 4.0, 14 Oct 95

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Handle Via
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Channels Only

Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As Deputy Director (DDNRO), I have approved a concept to announce National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) launches and to declassify specific functional and administrative information relative to launch of NRO satellites. The first stage of this declassification will be an acknowledgment that the scheduled December 1996 Vandenberg AFB (VAFB) Titan IV launch carries an NRO satellite. Functional and administrative launch management information will be declassified on 1 March 1997.

This plan describes the process for acknowledging NRO sponsorship of satellites being integrated and launched and for declassifying or decompartmenting most Office of Space Launch (OSL) and Operating Division 4 (OD-4) functions - permitting most government and contractor personnel to acknowledge an affiliation with NRO launch in a less restrictive environment. It also declassifies or decompartmentes launch communication support and OSL facilities.

There will be no changes in classification policy relative to technical data and intelligence system operations. BYE protection of current and future mission capabilities, sensitive technologies, and sensitive operations locations is maintained. And, even though certain activities such as launch and early on-orbit operations, command and control, and health and status will be evident, the NRO will observe a strict 'No Comment' policy relative to mission operations.

Acknowledging NRO launch and further declassification of the NRO OSL is a calculated risk management decision based on analysis of present and future launch operational profiles, open-source information availability, NRO mission objectives and critical capabilities, and the on-going move towards more openness in government.

A transition period between the December launch acknowledgment and full launch declassification will allow for the completion of appropriate education and training, both NRO internal and external, to achieve effective implementation. The fact that the scheduled December 1996 VAFB Titan IV launch carries an NRO satellite will be declassified concurrent with the launch, currently scheduled for 18 December. The effective date for declassification of specified functional and administrative information is 1 March 1997.

APPROVED BY:

Keith R. Hall
Deputy Director

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PART I - BASELINE

1. **Objective.** The intent of this initiative is to announce most present and future NRO launches and to declassify specific functional and administrative information relative to NRO launch activities.

2. **Scope.** This declassification affects all NRO offices, directorates, and contractors involved in and supporting integration and launch of NRO satellites. OSL and OD-4 sites and personnel identified in this plan will be declassified or decompartmented, and will follow implementation procedures. Other NRO Directorates and offices will provide support and services needed to ensure an efficient implementation. Non-NRO agencies and personnel that support the NRO launch process (e.g. CIA, CMO, DOC, DOS, DOT, JCS, SAF, NASA, NIMA, NSA, AFSPACE, SMC, and DIA) will be informed of the action and involved in implementation as necessary.

3. **Criteria.**

- a. The fact of certain NRO launches will be officially released.
- b. The OSL must be able to openly function as the NRO launch agent.
- c. The Onizuka (OAS) sited NRO assets will not be identified as NRO. OD-4 will openly support NRO launches but will not be openly identified as part of the NRO. OD-4 may be acknowledged as an NRO element at the collateral SECRET level.
- d. The Information Technology Group (ITG) affiliation with the NRO will remain protected; however, support to NRO launch may be acknowledged.
- e. Satellite mission, technical data, intelligence system operations data, and past launch activities will remain classified and compartmented.
- f. The ability to conceal appropriate technology, organizations, and operations, and to preserve cover arrangements consistent with sources and methods techniques will be maintained.
- g. OPSEC or similar measures will be taken to minimize publicity and/or the operational profile of NRO launch-related facilities, personnel, operations, and activities.
- h. NRO launch declassification must be based on a plausible, easily understood, and executable concept.

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Part II - APPROACH

1. General.

a. NRO launch declassification will occur in two stages.

1) Concurrent with the December 1996 VAFB Titan IV launch, Stage I will declassify and release the fact that the launch carries an NRO satellite. All other launch related information including organizations, personnel, and locations remains classified. The satellite's intelligence mission, technical data, operational intelligence data, tasking, data collection, downlinks, operational data, data processing, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] remain classified and compartmented, as appropriate.

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2) Stage II will declassify the fact that Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) and Onizuka (OAS), as well as VAFB, support NRO integration and launch. Certain details relating to the OSL, including personnel, facilities, and contracts at Los Angeles AFB (LAAFB), VAFB, and CCAS will also be declassified. Certain details relating to OD-4, including personnel, facilities, and contracts at OAS will be decompartmented.

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b. A transition period between Stage I and Stage II will allow for the completion of appropriate education and training, both NRO internal and external, to achieve effective implementation.

2. Classification Concept.

a. The classification tables in Appendix B (on page 24) provide interim guidance until appropriate classification guidance is implemented. In the event of a conflict, this plan takes precedence over the currently approved NRO Security Classification Guide (SCG), Program SCGs, and Air Force Program (AFP) SCGs. Many classification policy decisions are TBD, however, Appendix B should provide a framework that is adequate to address most situations and aid in identifying those areas where additional guidance is needed.

b. Integration and operations information that is currently classified due to 'content' and not because of association will remain classified unless specifically identified for change in the classification table in Appendix B.

c. Integration and operations information that is ONLY classified because of NRO, SAF/SP, or other organizational association (i.e. guidance states 'unclassified when not associated with') will be evaluated and decompartmented/declassified with the objective of ensuring the NRO - SAF/SP association is protected.

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3. Organization.

a. Effective 1 March 1997, the OSL Deputy Director (DD/OSL) position will be declassified and added to the released NRO organization chart.

b. Effective 1 March 1997, the entire OSL structure will be declassified but not added to the released NRO organization chart. Though not released this information is permitted to become known through daily operations and correspondence.

1) SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO launch related organization, structure, functions, responsibilities, contracts, obligations, budgets, etc. will transition to the NRO OSL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLX or IMO functions, contracts, etc. that are unclassified will remain so. Functions, contracts, etc. that are classified will remain so. Contracts will be evaluated for possible re-classification upon re-issue or modification.

2) OD-4 organization, structure, functions, responsibilities, etc. will be identified as NRO at a Secret collateral classification level. OD-4 support for NRO launch and on-orbit command and control functions will be declassified. This information will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but is permitted to become known through daily operations and correspondence.

3) ITG organization, structure, functions, responsibilities, etc. providing communications support to the OSL and OD-4 will remain unchanged. ITG Detachments at each location will not be declassified but may acknowledge support of NRO launch and/or mission. This information will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but is permitted to become known through daily operations and correspondence.

c. Functions and offices that co-use or are sited with OSL or OD-4 units will be evaluated for classification on a case-by-case basis, with decisions being based on parent organization directions and implementation processes.

4. Personnel.

a. Effective 1 March 1997, NRO government personnel assigned to LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB, except those assigned to specifically exempt elements (see Part III paragraph 2.d., page 11), may acknowledge their NRO affiliation for official purposes. NRO government personnel assigned to OD-4 at OAS may acknowledge their NRO affiliation at a SECRET Collateral level.

b. Effective 1 March 1997, support contractors may acknowledge their affiliation and NRO support in a manner/degree consistent with corpo-

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rate and NRO contract relationship policy, their contracting instrument and as it appears on unclassified OSL or OD-4 organization charts and mission statements.

c. The names of personnel declassified under this action will not be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but are permitted to become known through daily operations and correspondence. NO personnel declassified under this action (other than the DD/OSL) will be officially identified as occupying a specific NRO organizational position.

e. Individuals who are no longer supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997 are not included in this declassification effort.

5. **Facilities.** Effective 1 March 1997, the association of the NRO with specified NRO managed or occupied facilities at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB will be declassified. The association of the NRO with specified NRO managed or occupied facilities at OAS will be decompartmented to Secret collateral. This information will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but is permitted to become known through daily operations and correspondence.

6. **Operating Sites/Locations.**

a. Effective 1 March 1997, the fact that the NRO has personnel, facilities, and/or assets stationed at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB will be declassified. Effective 1 March 1997, the fact that the NRO has personnel, facilities, and/or assets stationed at OAS will be decompartmented to Secret collateral. Although NOT released at the 1 March 1997 effective date declassified information is permitted to become known through daily operations and correspondence.

b. Effective 1 March 1997, the fact that NRO assets will be located at Falcon AFS, CO will be decompartmented.

c. All other MGS and sensitive sites/operations locations remain compartmented.

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PART III - IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE

1. Classification Policy.

a. The only information declassified concurrent with the scheduled December 1996 Vandenberg AFB Titan IV launch is the fact that the launch carries an NRO satellite. Note: This information was declassified on 18 Dec 96 by the Deputy Director's Note 30 and in conjunction with the NRO/PA (sic) generated press package. See Appendix F (on page 47)

b. Specified functional and administrative information becomes collateral SECRET effective with approval of this plan. Affected information is identified in the classification table in Appendix B (on page 24). Other than specific personnel responsible for briefing or training non-NRO personnel, this information will continue to be treated and handled as SECRET BYE until it becomes unclassified or decompartmented concurrent with full implementation on 1 March 1997.

c. Personnel who interface with launch support organizations may become aware of or exposed to speculations related to NRO functions and operations as a result of the December 1996 Vandenberg AFB Titan IV launch acknowledgment. Individuals should not comment nor become involved in confirming nor denying any speculations. However, if confronted prior to the 1 March 1997 effective date, individuals may acknowledge their NRO affiliation under guidelines in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. Organization.

a. Declassification Scope.

1) Effective 1 March 1997, the unclassified NRO organization chart is revised to acknowledge the DD/OSL position and incumbent.

2) Effective 1 March 1997, the entire OSL structure will be declassified but not added to the released NRO organization chart. The personnel, organizations, missions, and functions of elements declassified under this action will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but may be acknowledged, as necessary, in the normal course of business. This means these elements will become known as NRO assets through daily operations, activities, relationships, and correspondence. See Appendix C (on page 33) and Appendix D (on page 38) for the unclassified organization charts and mission and function statements. "Figure E.1. Administrative Changes" on page 42, graphically summarizes these changes.

3) Effective 1 March 1997, the OD-4 [redacted] organization will be decompartmented to the Secret collateral level. See Appendix C (on page 33) and Appendix D (on page 38) for the unclassified organization charts and mission and function statements. "Figure E.1. Administrative Changes" on page 42, graphically summarizes these changes.

4) Effective 1 March 1997, the ITG Detachments located at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, and OAS may acknowledge that they support the NRO and the

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NRO launch process. The fact that the Detachments occupy space in NRO managed facilities may be acknowledged but should not be highlighted. ITG personnel are reminded that the AF Comm Element cover story remains in place and that they are AF Comm personnel assigned to support the NRO - only one of ITG's many customers.

5) Unclassified organization structure, with personnel names, is For Official Use Only (FOUO) and may be made available upon request to those who officially interact with the NRO. See Appendix C and Appendix D for the unclassified organization charts and mission and function statements.

6) The NRO Office of Corporate Communications staff will use the material in Appendix C, WITHOUT personnel names, and Appendix D to respond to inquiries from the public.

b. Officially Released Elements. Effective 1 March 1997, the DD/OSL office will be included on the NRO organizational chart and may function, operate, and correspond as an NRO asset.

c. Declassified Elements.

1) General. Organizational elements and personnel currently assigned to SAF/SP elements declassified under this action will transition to SAF/SL, SAF/SO, SAF/ST, or Unless noted below, existing operating location designations (i.e. OL QPS, OL VNBG) will continue, though may be restructured. These offices are NOT included on the NRO organizational chart and will continue to function, operate, and correspond as identified. Correspondence will normally be on OSAF letterhead. Although SAF/SL is the office of assignment for USAF personnel, it is not and will not be used as the operational office designator. SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO will functionally cease operations although they will not formally 'stand-down'. Memoranda of Agreement will be reaccomplished as SAF/SL units vice SAF/SP units.

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2) Unclassified. Effective 1 March 1997, the existence of and relationship of the NRO with the following elements and operational activities become unclassified.

a) LAAFB

(1) Launch Program Office (LPO) (formerly SMC/CLX or SMC/IMO)

Note: Fact that ITG support the NRO and the NRO launch process may be acknowledged; however, ITG's NRO affiliation remains compartmented.

b) CCAS

(1) OL QPS

Note: Fact that ITG provides communications support to the NRO launch process may be acknowledged; however, ITG's NRO affiliation remains compartmented.

c) VAFB

(1) OL VNBG

Note: Fact that ITG provides communications support to the

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NRO launch process may be acknowledged; however, ITG's NRO affiliation remains compartmented.

d) OAS - none

Note: Fact that OD-4 and ITG support the NRO and the NRO launch process may be acknowledged; however, the OD and ITG NRO affiliation remains compartmented.

3) **Non-NRO.** Association of the NRO with the following offices that are not part of the NRO but are located at or use NRO sponsored facilities at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, or OAS become unclassified. Depending upon parent organization direction, personnel assigned to these offices may acknowledge the fact their office is located in the same building as an NRO office.

a) LAAFB

(1) National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA, formerly DDPO)

(2) Space Applications Program Office (SAPO)

(3) MILSATCOM Joint Program Office

b) CCAS- none

c) VAFB- none

d) OAS- none

d. Classified Elements.

1) **Collateral.** Personnel, organizations, missions, and functions of the following NRO elements located at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, and OAS remain classified but are decompartmented to SECRET collateral. Personnel currently assigned to SAF/SP in these elements will transition to SAF/SL, SAF/SO, SAF/ST, [REDACTED]. All government personnel/positions will be appropriately annotated in MS&O/HRMG records. See classification guidance in Appendix B (on page 24).

a) LAAFB - none

b) CCAS - none

c) VAFB - none

d) OAS

(1) OD-4

(2) OD-4 Comm Support

2) **Compartmented.** Personnel, organizations, missions, and functions of the following NRO organizational elements located at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, and OAS remain classified and compartmented. Personnel currently assigned to SAF/SP in these elements [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All government personnel/positions retaining classification will be appropriately annotated in MS&O/HRMG records. Managers, in conjunction with HRMG, are responsible for informing their incumbents and/or incoming personnel of the classified/unclassified position status. The process for identifying positions will be completed by the 1 March 1997 effective date. See classification

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guidance in Appendix B (on page 24).

a) LAAFB

- (1) Document Control functions
- (2) ITG Detachment 9 (Det 9)
- (3) Los Angeles Operations Security Support Office (LAOSSO)
- (4) MS&O Courier functions
- (5) OSA
- (6) West Coast Security Center (WSC)

b) CCAS

- (1) ITG Detachment 5 (Det 5)

c) VAFB

- (1) ITG Detachment 1 (Det 1)
- (2) Mobile Communications (MCOM)

d) OAS

- (1) ITG Detachment 7 (Det 7)

Note: [REDACTED]

3) Non-NRO. Association of the NRO with the following offices that are not part of the NRO but are located at or use NRO sponsored facilities at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, or OAS remains classified and/or compartmented. See parent organization for direction on degree of association acknowledgment.

a) LAAFB- none

b) CCAS

[REDACTED]

c) VAFB- none

d) OAS- none

3. Personnel.

a. Government.

1) **Assigned Element.** All SAF/SP personnel and elements will be transferred to other OSAF elements. OSL personnel assigned to SAF/SP elements at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB and that are declassified under this action will administratively transfer to SAF/SL. Personnel assigned to SAF/SP elements at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB that remain classified and non-OSL personnel will administratively transfer to [REDACTED] or SAF/ST with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OSL SAF/SP personnel assigned to OD-4/DL will administratively transfer to SAF/SL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All other SAF/SP personnel assigned to OAS OD-4 will administratively transfer to SAF/SO [REDACTED]

Personnel at SAF/SP MGS locations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] or SAF/SO [REDACTED] "Figure E.1. Administra-

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tive Changes" on page 42, graphically summarizes these changes. HRMG will establish office assignment codes and general procedures to properly annotate all career briefs, evaluations, unit manning documents, etc., in order to accurately reflect NRO affiliation.

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2) NRO Affiliation.

a) **Official Contacts.** In general, NRO government personnel at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB, except for those assigned to elements that remain classified, may acknowledge that they are assigned to/affiliated with the NRO. NRO government personnel at OAS may acknowledge that they support the NRO in an FOUO environment and may state they are assigned to the NRO in a SECRET collateral environment. ITG personnel may state that they are part of an AF Comm element assigned to support the NRO. Personnel may also state they support the NRO in a manner/degree as it appears on the unclassified organization charts and to the extent described in unclassified mission statements. Additionally, personnel may acknowledge the generic nature of their work, e.g., analyst, integrator, engineer, secretary, security officer, etc. Such disclosures shall not confirm the existence of an NRO classified and/or compartmented project, information, technology, application, or operations facility. See Appendix C and Appendix D for the unclassified organization, mission, and function statements. Also see Appendix H (on page 63) for Questions and Answers with additional guidance on how personnel may identify themselves in various situations.

b) **Unofficial Contacts.** Personnel whose affiliation with the NRO has been declassified may choose to disclose their affiliation to family, close friends, and neighbors based on a personal need-to-know judgment. This acknowledgment must not inadvertently reveal classified or compartmented information or relationships with other personnel whose NRO affiliation has not been declassified. Likewise, personnel should not acknowledge their NRO affiliation gratuitously in response to casual social or other inquiries, and are urged not to make indiscriminate admissions of NRO affiliation. The first response to any social inquiry about a person's place of employment should be the employing organization, i.e. [redacted] NRO affiliation will not be acknowledged during personal travel and other similar outside activities. Personnel must also be aware that, by their own admission of NRO affiliation, TDY travel to domestic or foreign

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locations could reveal those locations to friends and family as NRO. Travel to covert destinations must be protected appropriately. See Appendix H for Questions and Answers with additional guidance on how personnel may identify themselves in various situations.

c) **NRO Logo-ed Items.** Personnel assigned to elements that remain classified are NOT authorized to publicly wear or display NRO logo-ed items (e.g. T-shirts, mugs, notebooks). Personnel assigned to elements that become unclassified on 1 March 1997 may wear or display NRO logo-ed items. Operating location designations (i.e. LPO, OL QPS, OL VNBG, OD-4) will be used as organization identifiers in intramural-like activities.

3) **Office of Assignment.** Organizational positions will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but may be used in the normal course of business. This means personnel assigned to unclassified elements will become known as NRO assets through daily operations, activities, relationships, and correspondence. See Appendix H (on page 63) - Question and Answer Supplement for additional guidance on how personnel may identify themselves in various situations.

5) **Performance Reports/Assignment History.** Military and civilian personnel whose support to the NRO has been declassified may have their NRO support reflected within their unclassified assignment histories and their performance evaluations after the effective date of 1 March 1997. Care must be taken to ensure that descriptions do not reveal information about classified NRO locations, information, technology, capabilities, or applications. Affiliation and roles may be acknowledged consistent with unclassified functional element mission statements. Individuals who are no longer supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997 are NOT included in this declassification effort.

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6) **Resumes.** Starting 1 March 1997, affiliation with the NRO may be stated on resumes for those government personnel whose support has been declassified as long as classified information is not revealed. Assignment histories and resume entries covering periods that start before the effective date of 1 March 1997 will NOT show NRO affiliation and support even if the individuals' functions have not changed and were in support of launch activities. Care must be taken to ensure that skill and function descriptions do not reveal information about classified NRO locations, information, technologies, capabilities, or applica-

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tions. Individuals who are no longer supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997 may NOT identify NRO affiliation on assignment histories and resume entries.

b. Contractors.

1) **NRO Affiliation.** Pending review and approval, and consistent with NRO and corporate policies, contractor personnel employed on existing unclassified SMC/CLX or SMC/IMO contracts may acknowledge their affiliation with the NRO or support to the NRO, to include being known as an "NRO launch support contractor", after the effective date of 1 March 1997. Appendix G (on page 60) lists contracts that will allow contractors to acknowledge an NRO affiliation. The NRO will NOT announce any declassified contractor affiliations, but may acknowledge the affiliation once the company in question has announced it. Contractor personnel on instruments that are NOT declassified will contact their Contracting Officer prior to acknowledging their NRO association. Consistent with NRO and corporate policies, contractor personnel employed on existing unclassified OD-4 contracts may acknowledge their NRO affiliation at the collateral SECRET level. Acknowledgment will be in a manner/degree consistent with the contracting instrument and as it appears on unclassified NRO organization charts and mission statements. Additionally, contractor personnel may acknowledge the generic nature of their NRO related work, e.g., analyst, integration, engineer, secretary, security officer, etc. Care must be taken to ensure disclosures do not reveal classified NRO locations, information, technologies, capabilities, or applications. Contractors who are no longer supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997 are NOT included in this declassification effort.

2) **Performance Reports/Assignment History.** Contractor assignment histories and performance evaluations may NOT show NRO affiliation.

3) **Resumes.** Contractors are NOT permitted to identify NRO affiliation or support on resumes, cover letters, or job applications. As long as classified information is not revealed, contractor personnel may make statements concerning the generic nature of their NRO related work, e.g., analyst, integration, engineer, secretary, courier, security officer, etc. in a manner/degree consistent with their contracting instrument and as it appears on unclassified organization chart and mission statements.

4) **Correspondence.** SETA or CAAS contractors located in government facilities may utilize the same correspondence (unclassified official mail) and courier (classified documents) addresses as their government sponsor.

c. Protocol and Senior Management Visits. The site commander will determine protocol procedures on a case-by-case basis for senior NRO or contractor management visits to LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, or OAS. The host base or location may acknowledge the VIP presence to the extent the operating location or site is acknowledged and to the extent the individual's relationship with the NRO is acknowledged.

d. Former Personnel. Only those government and contractor personnel

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who are assigned to the positions supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997 may be declassified. Individuals whose organization of record (SAF/SP, SAF/SS, SAF/ST) does NOT change as part of declassification, or who are no longer supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997, are not included in this declassification effort. Exceptions will be managed through the DNRO on a case-by-case basis.

4. Facilities.

a. **Westfields.** The fact that the OSL HQ is in Westfields is unclassified and acknowledged.

b. **LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB.**

1) Effective 1 March 1997, most NRO managed or occupied facilities at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB will be declassified. The following NRO sponsored Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) remain classified. Facilities are listed as part of the classification tables in Appendix B (on page 24). See that appendix for classification guidance on facility relationships.

a) LAAFB - none

b) CCAS

(1) McDonnell Douglas Astronautics SCIF (Titusville, FL)

c) VAFB

(1) LM Federal Systems SCIF (Santa Maria, CA)

(2) NRL Facility, Bldg 660.

2) Location of a declassified facility is For Official Use Only and will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but may be identified in the normal course of business. This means NRO used facilities will become known as NRO assets through daily operations, activities, relationships, and correspondence.

3) Personnel working in facilities at the time of declassification must exercise good judgment in acknowledging their actual work location in an unclassified setting. Disclosure of the actual location of OSL facilities should be judged on a need-to-know basis.

c. **OAS.** Effective 1 March 1997, OAS NRO managed or occupied facilities will be decompartmented but remain SECRET collateral when identified as NRO.

5. Administrative Arrangements.

a. **Message Traffic.** The preferred routing for message traffic continues to be via Special Operations Communications (SOCOMM); the NRO Special Security Office (SSO); and the NRO government and contractor wide-area networks (GWAN & CWAN). Administrative traffic from other Intelligence Community activities which do not have access to SOCOMM may be transmitted via the Defense Special Security Communications Systems (DSSCS) using routing instructions to be provided by the Communications

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Office, or via the Intelligence Community E-mail (ICE) system. General Service (GENSER) messages will use routing addresses provided in Appendix E (on page 41).

b. Telephones/Facsimile/E-Mail/Internet.

1) The NRO's secure red phone system and the STU-III voice phones remain the preferred telephone system for all official calls, whether classified or unclassified. Telephone answering procedures remain unchanged.

2) Classified and sensitive as well as compartmented information will continue to be transmitted over a secure facsimile. E-mail and facsimiles between unclassified locations will no longer need to be classified or handled as classified simply because of NRO association. Unclassified e-mail messages and facsimiles to or between classified facilities will be appropriately classified and protected.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3) Personnel may continue to use existing unclassified e-mail systems or Internet account addresses. Use remains unclassified as long as the routing indicator does not reveal classified information, [redacted]

4) Do not enter classified or For Official Use Only information on the Internet or in the local unclassified e-mail systems. Good OPSEC practices must be followed.

c. Courier. The NRO courier system or the Defense Courier Service remain the preferred method of transporting documentation.

d. Correspondence. Personnel will use OSAF letterhead for official classified and unclassified correspondence. Letters on NRO letterhead must be signed by D/OSL or DD/OSL. A memorandum without letterhead will be used in those cases where unclassified NRO association is not possible. See Appendix E (on page 41) for examples of letterhead and approved signature blocks.

e. Subscriptions. MS&O will continue to be responsible for official-use paid subscriptions. The unclassified address in Appendix E will be used when a subscription is ordered for a declassified element.

f. Business Cards.

1) Government personnel may be authorized NRO business cards by the D/OSL or DD/OSL on a case-by-case basis.

a) Those government personnel whose positions have been declassified and who have a justifiable need are generally considered eligible for NRO business cards. Business cards will be purchased at the individuals's own expense and used only for official business. NRO business cards will not be used during travel to sites or locations that remain classified.

b) Requests for NRO business cards must be submitted in writing to the approving authority. Upon approval, the component security officer will ensure that classified information is not revealed on the card and that the appropriate telephone numbers and addresses are indicated. NRO business cards may identify actual work telephone number, to

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include red numbers. GWAN/CWAN e-mail addresses will not be included. The business card shouldn't draw attention to the red number.

c) See Appendix E (on page 41) for examples of approved government NRO business card formats.

2) Contractor business cards will not contain any NRO related information, i.e. NRO logo, NRO Directorate, GWAN/CWAN addresses, etc. Contractor business cards may identify actual work telephone number, to include red numbers. However, the business card shouldn't draw attention to the red number.

g. Travel.

1) **Travel Orders.** Declassification of NRO launch-related information does not affect the travel reservation and accounting processes declassified personnel may use. Any SAF/SP blanket travel orders will be cancelled [REDACTED]

2) **NRO Travel Office.** Personnel may continue to use existing arrangements or may use the NRO Travel Office provided Travel Reservations and Processing System (TRAPS) system currently used by acknowledged NRO Headquarters personnel. Elements at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, and OAS will identify an official authorized to approve all TRAPS provided travel. Furthermore, all four nodes will develop and submit travel profile sheets for all personnel the NRO Travel Office will support.

3) **Foreign Travel.** Regardless of which of the two processes is used, any travel to foreign ground stations will be coordinated with the site being visited, owning Directorate, or the NRO Cover & Liaison Staff prior to traveling.

6. Program Control.

a. Budget.

1) The NRO budget remains classified and compartmented. The NRO's current comptroller arrangements and budgeting methods and techniques will be preserved to allow for covert activities when necessary.

2) Comptroller arrangements managed through or by other NRO offices but that support declassified locations will continue, without revision or change unless specifically identified.

3) All existing classified and unclassified SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO launch related comptroller arrangements, budgets, and purchase requests (PR) will administratively become NRO budgets and PRs, without revision or change unless specifically identified. OL QPS and OL VNBG will investigate assuming management functions for NRO Job Order Number (JON) funds currently managed by the host organization and the establishment of OL JONs. Otherwise existing SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO fund site numbers will remain in force and existing funding commitments, PRs, and administrative processes will continue.

4) The fact that budgets have 'transitioned' to the NRO is unclassified but will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but may be acknowledged, as necessary, in the normal course of business.

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This means unclassified and collateral budget information will eventually become officially recognized as NRO through administrative actions, award fee reviews, contract changes, budget actions, and general correspondence.

b. Contracting.

1) There is no change to current NRO contracting policies. The practice of issuing companion BYE contracts for OSL collateral contracts will continue for an indeterminate period. The OSL Contracting Officer will assess the need to continue this practice after launch declassification is fully implemented.

2) All existing classified and unclassified SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO launch related contracts will administratively become NRO OSL contracting instruments, without revision or change unless specifically identified. Contracts will not be novated nor replacing instruments issued unless specifically required. The OSL Contracting Officer, working with OSL Security, will issue contracting letters notifying the contractors of the administrative change, providing a letter change to the applicable DD Form 254, and directing that no contractor action is required. Existing SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO contract numbers will remain in force and will remain legally binding documents. Existing funding commitments and administration processes will continue.

3) The fact that contracts have become NRO instruments is unclassified but will NOT be released at the 1 March 1997 effective date but may be acknowledged, as necessary, in the normal course of business. This means these contracts will eventually become officially recognized as NRO contracts through administrative actions, award fee reviews, contract changes, budget actions, and general correspondence.

7. Operations.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. Effective 1 March 1997, OD-4 as an NRO organization will be classified SECRET Collateral. OD-4 as an organization that supports the NRO will be FOUO. AFSCN support to the NRO is FOUO.

c. NRO mission ground and/or spacecraft on-orbit operations will NOT be declassified and remain compartmented.

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(b)(3)

8. Legacy/History.

a. All SAF/SP personnel will be administratively transferred to [] [] SAF/SL, SAF/SO, or SAF/ST and SAF/SP will be deactivated at a future date. The NRO-SAF/SP relationship and SAF/SP's operational history remains classified and, as appropriate, compartmented.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. History/Past Missions. NRO past missions remain classified. Classification of and display of existing historical or legacy items (e.g. plaques, pictures, nameplates, etc.) are unchanged and are not to be affected by NRO launch declassification. However, good OPSEC practices and care should be taken to avoid creating linkages between past missions and the NRO or future missions.

9. Training.

a. An AIG 711 SOCOMM message will be released announcing the NRO Launch Declassification effort approximately one week prior to Stage I and Stage II implementation. A [] message will be released in parallel notifying the collateral launch support community.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. OSL Security in conjunction with the NRO Security Policy and the Training Branch will prepare introductory briefings for all NRO personnel on the NRO Launch Declassification effort. OSL and OD-4 Security will contact and brief key AFSPC, USSPC, SMC, and contractor personnel prior to the 18 Dec 1996 and 1 March 1997 implementation dates.

c. A RED phone hotline [] has been established for comments and questions relative to the NRO Launch Declassification effort. The OSL declassification team will monitor this voice mailbox and, as appropriate, respond to specific queries. Also, as appropriate, questions and responses will be incorporated into the Questions and Answers appendix to this plan.

(b)(3)

d. A GWAN mailgroup (declass-launch) has been established for routing of comments or questions related to the launch declassification effort. The OSL declassification team will monitor this mailbox and, as appropriate, respond to specific queries. Also, as appropriate, questions and responses will be incorporated into the Questions and Answers appendix to this plan.

e. The Implementation Plan for NRO Launch Declassification and the Public Affairs Plan will be available for general access in the GWAN.

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Library/References/Security/Launch/Declass_Plan folder. The plan will also be available for CWAN/GWAN WWW access via links established on the NRO WWW 'What's New' page and OSL home page. The plan will be available directly at the [REDACTED] address. Comments and queries should be e-mailed to the declass-launch mailgroup.

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Appendix A

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Classified. Information or material that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 12958 or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security. There are three levels of classification: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. (EO 12958)

Compartmented. Classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes. Such information requires protection within a special access program or control system established by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Information handled within a DCI established special compartmented security control channel is identified as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). See 'Special Access Program' definition below.

Declassification. The authorized change in the status of information from classified to unclassified. (EO 12958)

Declassified. Information or material that, although formerly classified by proper authority, no longer requires protection as stipulated in the pertinent EO and DCI Directives (DCID) and becomes unclassified. (EO 12958)

Decompartmented. Classified information that formerly was handled within formal access control system established by the DCI and which has been formally removed from those systems. Decompartmentation refers only to removal of classified information from SCI control systems, and does not pertain to its classification level. Decompartmented information may remain classified.

Downgrading. A determination by a declassification authority that information classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level. (EO 12958)

For Official Use Only. "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) is official government information that does not meet EO 12958 requirements for classification but still requires protection - either because of operational sensitivities or privacy/administrative concerns. The purpose of FOUO is to limit the dissemination of information to official channels. This control marking may be used whenever unclassified intelligence information does not warrant a national security classification but does require some limitation in dissemination. FOUO is not a classification and should not be used as a substitute for classification.

Special Access Program. A program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access require-

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ments that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level. The BYEMAN security control system is a special access program. (EO 12958)

Unclassified. Information or material that, pursuant to EO 12958 or any predecessor order, has been determined to NOT require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that will NOT be designated as classified. Certain unclassified information may be withheld from public release pursuant to statute or other applicable authority.

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Appendix B**CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE**

Operations:			
Information Revealing association of NRO with	Prior to K-13 Launch	After 1 March 1997	Comments
2. A satellite or launch vehicle:			
2.1 Launched before Dec 1996.	S-BYE	S-BYE	The NRO has announced that 145 CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD satellites were launched from Van- denberg AFB between 1960 and 1972.
2.2 Launched on K-13.	S-BYE	U	Fact of NRO sponsorship was declassified with release of the K-13 Launch Announcement.
2.3 To be launched after Dec. 1996.	S-BYE	U	Unclassified unless D/NRO or other appropriate authority determines that fact of NRO sponsorship is classified.
3. A program's:			
3.1 Program name/code- words.	S-BYE	S-BYE	
3.2 AFP designator:			
3.2.1 Fact that some NRO SVs are integrated, launched, and oper- ated under Air Force Program designators.	S-BYE	U	

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Operations:

Information Revealing association of NRO with	Prior to K-13 Launch	After 1 March 1997	Comments
3.2.2 Fact that AFP 104, 141, 259, 326, 465, 475, 557, 580, 623, 732, 774, 843, 868, 878, and 946 are NRO satellite programs.	S-BYE	U	True of all currently operational and future AFPs unless D/NRO or other appropriate author- ity determines that fact of NRO sponsorship is classified.
	S-BYE	S-BYE	(b)(1) (b)(3)
3.2.4 Fact that AFP 162, 241, 622A, and 846 were the AFP designa- tors for launches other than Corona, Argon, and Lanyard.	See Remark	See Remark	This information will be handled IAW the NRO Declassification Guide for CORONA, ARGON, LAN- YARD Programmatic Data.
3.2.5 Fact that AFP 162, 241, 622A, and 846 were the AFP designa- tors for Corona, Argon, and Lanyard launches.	See Remark	See Remark	This information will be handled IAW the NRO Declassification Guide for CORONA, ARGON, LAN- YARD Programmatic Data.
4. The launch Manifest for a/an:			
4.1 Program name/code- words.	S-BYE	S-BYE	

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Operations:

Information Revealing association of NRO with	Prior to K-13 Launch	After 1 March 1997	Comments
4.2 AFP.	S Collateral	S Collateral 1.5(a) X1,4	No AFP information or documentation is explicitly declassified as part of this transition.
4.3 Satellite when identified by 'NRO' with no further elaboration.	S-BYE	U	Unclassified unless D/NRO or other appropriate authority determines that fact of NRO sponsorship is classified. NOTE: Inclusion of more than one planned 'NRO' launch on an unclassified manifest is FOUO.
4.4 LV.	S-BYE	U	
5. Launch vehicles, i.e.			
5.1 Fact NRO will use any viable US launch system including Titan IV, Atlas II, EELV, Taurus, and others.	U	U	
5.2 Fact NRO satellites have been launched by the Space Transportation System (STS).	S-BYE	S-BYE	
5.3 Fact the STS supported intelligence missions.	C	C 1.5(c) X1	
6. IRON:			
6.1 Assigned for launch.	S-BYE	U-FOUO	
6.2 Assigned for flight command and control.	S-BYE	S Collateral 1.5(a), (c), (e) X1	
7. Space Cargo Transportation System (SCTS).	S-BYE	U	

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Organization:

Information Revealing association of NRO with	Prior to K-13 Launch	After 1 March 1997	Comments
	S-BYE	S-BYE	
	n/a	S-BYE 1.5(a), (c), (e) X1,3,4	
3. SAF/SL as assignment element for AF person- nel attached to the NRO.	n/a	U	
4. SAF/SP as assignment element for AF person- nel attached to the NRO and as integration and launch OCAs for NRO sponsored AFPs.	S-BYE or TK	S Collateral 1.5(a), (c), (e) X1,3,4	
5. SAF/SO as assignment element for AF person- nel attached to the NRO.	n/a	U	Location of SAF/SO <input type="text"/>
6. SAF/SS:			
6.1 As assignment element for AF personnel attached to the NRO.	S-TK	S-TK	
6.2 As integration and launch OCAs for NRO sponsored AFPs.	S-TK	S Collateral 1.5(a), (c), (e) X1,3,4	
7. SAF/ST as assignment element for AF person- nel attached to the NRO.	U	U	
8. CLX/IMO.	S-BYE	U	
9. OL-QPS.	S-BYE	U	
10. OL-VNBG.	S-BYE	U	
11. OD-4 and:			
11.1 Fact of NRO element.	S-BYE	S Collateral 1.5(a), (c), (e) X1,3,4	

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
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Figure C.4 OL VNBG

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Appendix D

MISSION AND FUNCTIONS

NRO

(U) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is as an agency of the Department of Defense and is funded through a program known as the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). The NRO manages this single, national program to meet US government intelligence needs through spaceborne and airborne reconnaissance.

(U) The mission of the NRO in the 21st century is to enable the U.S. Government and military information superiority, during peace through war. The NRO is responsible for the unique and innovative technology, large scale systems engineering, development and acquisition, and operation of space reconnaissance systems and related intelligence activities needed to support global information superiority.

(U) The NRO's vision statement is:

Freedom's Sentinel in Space:

One Team, Revolutionizing Global Reconnaissance

(U) The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has the ultimate responsibility, which is exercised in concert with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), for the management and operation of the NRO. The director of the NRO reports to the Secretary and to the DCI. The DCI establishes collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the frequency of coverage; approves, along with the SECDEF, the NRP budget; provides security policy guidance for the NRP; and guides and participates in the formulation of the NRP through the Director of the NRO. The Director of the NRO has responsibility for executing NRO programs, which the Director accomplishes in conjunction with the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.

SPACE LAUNCH OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE ASST. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(SPACE) (SAF/SL)

(U) TBS

SPACE OPERATIONS OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE ASST. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(SPACE) (SAF/SO)

(U) TBS



(U) TBS

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OFFICE of SPACE LAUNCH

(U) The NRO Office of Space Launch exists to support the NRO Spacecraft program Offices and the NRO Mission Director in ensuring the successful launch and deployment of an operating spacecraft into its proper orbit. Put simply; put good hardware into the right orbit. It manages all aspects of launch for the NRO to include launch vehicle procurement, spacecraft/launch vehicle integration, launch related systems safety, and launch operations. It manages common launch services and generic hardware, coordinates program unique requirements within the NRO, and represents all NRO launch requirements to outside agencies.

DIRECTOR, OSL

(U) The Director, Office of Space Launch, is primarily responsible to the assistant secretary of the Air Force (space) for assisting the secretary in discharging responsibility for the direction, supervision, policy, security and control of space systems. He is also responsible for operating and directing space launch activities for national space systems supporting the Department of Defense and he maintains liaisons with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other governmental agencies' space matters.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OSL

(U) TBS

LAUNCH MISSION DIRECTOR

(U) TBS

LAUNCH OFFICE

(U) TBS

CCAS OPERATING LOCATION (OL QPS)

(U) OL QPS manages all aspects of launch processing at Cape Canaveral Air Station for the Space Launch Office, Office of the Asst. Secretary of the Air Force (Space), to include spacecraft/launch vehicle integration, launch related systems safety, and launch operations. OL QPS manages launch services and generic hardware, coordinates program unique requirements within the SAF/SL, and represents all SAF/SL launch requirements to CCAS agencies.

VAFB OPERATING LOCATION (OL VNBG)

(U) OL VNBG manages all aspects of launch processing at Vandenberg AFB for the Space Launch Office, Office of the Asst. Secretary of the Air Force (Space), to include spacecraft/launch vehicle integration, launch related systems safety, and launch operations. OL VNBG manages launch services and generic hardware, coordinates program unique requirements within the SAF/SL, and represents all SAF/SL launch

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requirements to VAFB agencies.

OPERATING DIVISION 4 (OD-4)

(U) OD-4 provides operations and launch support for classified national level space programs supporting individual military services, unified commands, the Department of Defense, and Cabinet level decision makers.

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Appendix E

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS

1. Assignment/Office Codes. HRMG will establish office assignment codes and general procedures to properly annotate all career briefs, evaluations, unit manning documents, etc., in order to accurately reflect NRO affiliation. All SAF/SP personnel and elements will be transferred to other OSAF elements. OSL personnel assigned to SAF/SP elements at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB and that are declassified under this action will administratively transfer to SAF/SL. Personnel assigned to SAF/SP elements at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB that remain classified and non-OSL personnel will administratively transfer to [redacted] or SAF/ST with [redacted] OSL SAF/SP personnel assigned to OD-4/DL will administratively transfer to SAF/SL with assignment location data masked. All other SAF/SP personnel assigned to OAS OD-4 will administratively transfer to SAF/SO [redacted]. Personnel at SAF/SP MGS locations, including OD-4 personnel assigned to Whitesands, NM, remain compartmented and will transition to [redacted] or SAF/SO [redacted]. *Figure E.1. Administrative Changes* on page 42, graphically summarizes these changes. HRMG will establish office assignment codes and general procedures to properly annotate all career briefs, evaluations, unit manning documents, etc., in order to accurately reflect NRO affiliation.

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(b)(3)

2. Unclassified Addresses

a. OSL

- 1) The unclassified OSL HQs address is:

Office of Space Launch
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

- 2) The unclassified DD/OSL address is:

Office of Space Launch
2420 Vela Way, Suite 1467
Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4659

b. LAAFB

- 1) The LPO unclassified and FEDEX address is:

SAF/SL
Launch Program Office
2420 Vela Way, Suite 1467-A5
Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4659

- 2) The LPO General Service (GENSER) address is:

SAF/SL LAAFB, CA

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
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
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(b)(3)

Figure E.1. Administrative Changes

3) All other elements sited in A-5 will use their unclassified organization identifier, e.g. LAOSSO, Contracts, Det 9, etc. as the first address line.

2420 Vela Way, Suite 1467-A5
Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4659.



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Cape Canaveral AS, FL

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

d. VAFB

- 1) The OL VNBG unclassified address is:

OL VNBG
P.O. Box 5354
Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437-5354

- 2) The OL VNBG FEDEX address is:

Attn: _____
Building 2500
32nd Street
Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

e. OAS

- 1) The OD-4 unclassified and FEDEX address is:

OD-4
Onizuka Air Station
1080 Lockheed Way Box 036
Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1234

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

3. Signature Blocks.

- a. The unclassified signature block for D/OSL and DD/OSL is:

HOWARD J. MITCHELL, Brig Gen, USAF
Director, Office of Space Launch

[Redacted]

- b. The unclassified signature block for the LPO and OL personnel will not reflect NRO affiliation. LPO and OL personnel will normally use Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (OSAF) letterhead or blank memoranda. Unclassified signature block examples are:

[Redacted]

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
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c. Senior Rater signature block on all declassified OSL Air Force military personnel performance reports will be:

HOWARD J. MITCHELL, Brig Gen, USAF Director, Office of
SAF/SL (ELM) Space Launch, NRO
Washington, D.C.


d. Senior Rater signature block on performance reports for OSL Air Force military personnel remaining classified will be:

HOWARD J. MITCHELL, Brig Gen, USAF Director
SAF/ST (ELM)
Washington, D.C.

e. Senior Rater signature block on all decompartmented OD-4 Air Force military personnel performance reports will be:



(b)(3)



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(b)(3)

4. Letterhead.

a. Only the OSL Director and Deputy Director will normally use NRO letterhead. Correspondence on NRO letterhead by all other personnel will be FOUO at a minimum.

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 <p>NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE</p> <p>MEMORANDUM FOR :xxxxxxx</p> <p>FROM: Deputy Director, Office of Spec Launch 2420 Vela Way, Suite 1467-A5 Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4688</p> <p>SUBJECT: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</p>

b. All LPO, OL and OD-4 personnel will normally use OSAF letterhead or blank memoranda. OD-4 personnel will NOT use NRO letterhead except for classified correspondence.

 <p>DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON DC</p> <p>OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY</p> <p>MEMORANDUM FOR :xxxxxxx</p> <p>FROM: Launch Program Office 2420 Vela Way, Suite 1467-A5 Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4688</p> <p>SUBJECT: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</p>	 <p>DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON DC</p> <p>OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY</p> <p>MEMORANDUM FOR :xxxxxxx</p> <p>FROM: OL VNSG P.O. Box 6384 Vanlandingham AFB, CA 90437-6384</p> <p>SUBJECT: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx</p>
--	---

5. Sample Business Card Layouts.

a. D/OSL and DD/OSL may openly identify their NRO affiliation on personal business cards.

 <p>NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE</p> <p>2420 Vela Way, Suite 1467 Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4688</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 150px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 150px;"></div>
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b. Personnel may purchase business cards at their own expense. Cards may reflect NRO affiliation for those persons assigned to elements that have been declassified. Local organization designators (e.g. OL QPS) may be reflected on business cards for persons in declassified elements or in elements that remain classified.

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

	<div data-bbox="522 351 784 400" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 150px;"></div> <div data-bbox="527 395 643 412">Mission Integrator</div>
2420 Vele Way, Suite 1467 Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4659	<div data-bbox="584 421 836 542" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 50px; width: 150px;"></div>

	<div data-bbox="1047 357 1318 406" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 150px;"></div> <div data-bbox="1060 402 1175 419">Mission Integrator</div>
Launch Office 2420 Vele Way, Suite 1467 Los Angeles AFB, CA 90245-4659	<div data-bbox="1117 421 1393 549" style="border: 1px solid black; height: 50px; width: 150px;"></div>

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

Appendix F

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE and ANNOUNCEMENT MESSAGES

1. The following is the tentative schedule for development and implementation of the NRO Launch Declassification initiative.

- a. Oct 11 - Brief DD/NRO for concept approval and 'go ahead'
- b. Oct 28 - Notify AFSCN and AFSPC of international support issue
- c. Nov 18 - Brief D/OSL for implementation approach approval
- d. Nov 18 - Release DD/NRO letter notifying the DCI and SECDEF
- e. Nov 18 - Release letter(s) notifying CMO, DOC, DOS, DOT, JCS, SAF, NASA, NIMA, NSA, AFSPACE, SMC, and DIA
- f. Nov 19 - Release initial Implementation Plan draft
- g. Nov 21-29 - Notify and brief AFSPC, SMC, and SW of plans
- h. Dec 2 - Release D/OSL letter notifying contractors
- i. Dec 2 - Release final coordination Implementation Plan
- j. Dec 11 - Brief DD/NRO for approval to proceed
- k. Dec 12 - Notify and brief 30 SW PA and Protocol
- l. Dec 12 - Release SOCOMM [] announcement messages
- m. Dec 20 - Declassify fact of 'NRO satellite'
- n. Dec 20 - D/OSL attend post-launch press event
- o. Jan-Feb - HRMG complete actions creating and transferring personnel to SAF/SL, SAF/SC []
- p. Feb 11 - NRO-wide VTC briefing to all NRO personnel and contractors
- q. Feb 12 - Briefing charts, video tapes, and scripts distributed to all locations
- r. Mar 1 - Declassification implemented without press release

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2. The following page contain various letters, memorandum, and messages announcing the NRO satellite launch acknowledgment.

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March 1, 1997

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

Deputy Director's Note

Number 30

18 December 1996

NRO LAUNCH DECLASSIFIED

I am pleased to inform you that effective today the following information has been declassified: 1) that the December Vandenberg AFB Titan IV launch carries an NRO payload; 2) that the satellite supports the NRO's mission; 3) that the NRO intends to launch future payloads on Titan, Atlas, and Evolved Expendable launch vehicles from Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL, and Vandenberg AFB, CA; and 4) that the NRO will consider the use of any available launch vehicle, including Shuttle, that meets its mission requirements and is cost effective. No other facts are being declassified; all information concerning the payload mission and operations remains classified.

This declassification decision officially acknowledges something which is already obvious. Moreover, efforts such as this to declassify "open secrets" are aimed at strengthening the credibility of the security system by protecting only that information which requires protection.

For those that are acknowledged NRO employees, this means that you can acknowledge to your families and friends that you are part of the team that places vital national systems into space, and that the launch from Vandenberg is such a system. We may receive national media attention for this historic NRO event.

All media queries should be referred to the Public Affairs Staff at (703) 808-1015. Personnel are reminded that they are not authorized to speak for the organization. Questions regarding security and classification issues should be referred to Office of Space Launch security officers or to NRO Security Policy.

//SIGNED//

Keith R. Hall
Deputy Director

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March 1, 1997

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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Declassification of National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Launches

~~(S)~~ This letter is to inform you of my intent to declassify and downgrade certain limited functional and administrative information relating to future NRO launches and the NRO Office of Space Launch (OSL). This is a calculated risk management decision based on analysis of both present and future launch operational profiles, open-source information availability, NRO mission objectives and critical capabilities, and the ongoing move towards openness in government. Although this action has been under consideration for some time, the Jeremiah Panel's recommendation for "aggressive action on further declassification" adds an additional impetus. These actions will not affect classification policy relative to technical data and intelligence system operations.

~~(S/TK)~~ The declassification will occur in two stages. Concurrent with the December 1996 Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) Titan IV launch, the NRO will declassify and release the fact that the booster carried an NRO satellite. I emphasize that we will not declassify the satellite's mission, technical data, or operational intelligence data. Prior to initiating Stage I, my staff will notify the various congressional delegations and intelligence committees, Departments of State and Commerce, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, appropriate Defense agencies (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency), and other members of the Intelligence Community.

~~(S/TK)~~ The fact the NRO uses VAFB and Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) for launch and launch support will be declassified during Stage II. Stage II will also formally declassify details

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CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: NRO SCG 4.0
14 Oct 95

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

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relating to the NRO OSL, to include OSL personnel and facilities at Los Angeles AFB, VAFB, and CCAS. Other activities, such as launch and early on-orbit operations, command and control, and health and status will be evident, due to the unclassified operation and the acknowledgement the NRO uses the Air Force Satellite Control Network. However, the intelligence mission, tasking, data collection, down-links, operational data, data processing, [] will not be revealed. The OSL will undertake an aggressive campaign to educate all USAF offices and other agencies supporting the NRO launches on the details of the declassification prior to implementing Stage II on 1 March 1997. If we discover any problems with the anticipated declassification, we can adjust the details accordingly.

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~~FOI~~ Based on facts already publicly available, deductions on specific launches belonging to the NRO are logical; therefore, this declassification does not result in a significant increase in risk. However, there may be an increase in adversarial attention to launch and related activities and organizations due to the publicity and high visibility of the launch event. I believe that enhancing the efficiency of launch operations outweighs the risks imposed by this declassification action.

//SIGNED//

Keith R. Hall

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

From: [] On Dec 13 00:03:50 GMT 1996
Cite: 788I
Dtg: 130002Z Dec 96
To: Alg-711
Prec: PRIORITY
Cprec: PRIORITY
Subjld: SECUR
Security: ~~SECRET~~ BYEMAN
Subject: NRO LAUNCH DECLASSIFICATION
Decl: X1

INFO: KWCONCH []

[]
KWUNITE []

SUBJECT: NRO LAUNCH DECLASSIFICATION

TO: SENIOR MANAGERS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES NOTICE OF FURTHER DECOMPARTMENTATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO). PLEASE PROVIDE THE WIDEST DISSEMINATION TO BYE BRIEFED PERSONNEL.

2. THE RELEASE OF THE K-13 NRO PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS NOTIFICATION PACKAGE WILL DECLASSIFY THE FACT OF NRO LAUNCH AND THE FOLLOWING ASSOCIATED INFORMATION: 1) THAT THE TITAN IV K-13 BOOSTER CARRIES AN NRO SATELLITE, 2) THAT THE SATELLITE SUPPORTS THE NRO'S INTELLIGENCE MISSION, AND 3) THE NRO INTENDS TO LAUNCH FUTURE MISSIONS ON TITAN, ATLAS, AND EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH SYSTEMS FROM CAPE CANAVERAL AIR STATION AND VANDENBERG AFB.

A. DECLASSIFICATION WILL OCCUR NO EARLIER THAN THE MORNING OF 16 DECEMBER. NO OTHER FACTS WILL BE DECLASSIFIED AT THAT TIME. NO FURTHER DETAILS ARE TO BE CONFIRMED EVEN THOUGH THE DOD LAUNCH COMMUNITY WILL BE KNOWN TO SUPPORT THE NRO LAUNCH PROCESS AND OTHER INFORMATION MAY APPEAR EVIDENT.

B. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN CLASSIFICATION POLICY RELATIVE TO TECHNICAL DATA, INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OPERATIONS, MISSION CAPABILITIES, SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES, AND SENSITIVE OPERATING LOCATIONS. THIS INFORMATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE CLASSIFIED/COMPARTMENTED. EVEN THOUGH CERTAIN ACTIVITIES SUCH AS LAUNCH AND EARLY ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND HEALTH AND STATUS WILL BE EVIDENT, THE NRO WILL NOT DISCUSS MISSION OPERATIONS.

C. TRAVEL BY DECLASSIFIED PERSONNEL REMAINS UNCHANGED, E.G., GOVERNMENT TO CONTRACTOR OR CONTRACTOR TO GOVERNMENT TRAVEL WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT NRO AFFILIATION. SIGN IN PROCEDURES ALSO REMAIN UNCHANGED.

D. NRO [] OTHER SENSITIVE SITES REMAIN CLASSIFIED AND COMPARTMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

E. THIS INITIATIVE IS A CALCULATED RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION BASED ON ANALYSIS OF BOTH PRESENT AND FUTURE LAUNCH OPERATIONAL PROFILES, OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND NRO MISSION OBJECTIVES AND CRITICAL CAPABILITIES. THIS IS ALSO IN RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES FOR INCREASED OPENNESS WITHIN GOVERNMENT. THE JEREMIAH PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

"AGGRESSIVE ACTION ON FURTHER DECLASSIFICATION" ADDS AN ADDITIONAL IMPETUS.

3. FURTHER DECLASSIFICATION OF THE NRO LAUNCH PROCESS WILL OCCUR AT A LATER DATE. SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING AND GUIDANCE, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO THE NRO, WILL BE PROVIDED DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN THE DECEMBER LAUNCH ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND FURTHER DECLASSIFICATION UNDER THE NEXT STAGE. THIS WILL ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION.

5. IN SUMMARY, THE FACT THAT THE SCHEDULED DECEMBER 1996 VAFB TITAN IV LAUNCH CARRIES AN NRO SATELLITE WILL BE DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED JUST PRIOR TO THE LAUNCH.

6. ALL MEDIA QUERIES SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE USAF OR NRO PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE AS APPROPRIATE. SHOULD YOU RECEIVE SUCH INQUIRIES PLEASE ADVISE THE NRO PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF AT SECURE [REDACTED] PERSONNEL ARE REMINDED THAT THEY ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK FOR THE NRO. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EVERYONE ACT JUDICIOUSLY AND CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER THE "NEED-TO-KNOW" PRINCIPLE.

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[REDACTED] 1.5(c)/X1/NROSCG 4.0, 14Oct95

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March 1, 1997

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
COMMANDER, AIR FORCE MATERIAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER
COMMANDER, 14TH AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Declassification of National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) Launches (U)

(C) This letter is to inform you of my intent to declassify and decompartment certain limited functional and administrative information relating to future NRO launches and the NRO Office of Space Launch (OSL). This is a calculated risk management decision based on analysis of both present and future launch

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CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: NRO SCG 4.0
14 OCT 95

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

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operational profiles, open-source information availability, NRO mission objectives and critical capabilities, and the ongoing move towards openness in government. Although this action has been under consideration for some time, the Jeremiah Panel's recommendation for "aggressive action on further declassification" adds an additional impetus. These actions will not affect classification policy relative to technical data and intelligence system operations.

~~(S/TK)~~ The declassification will occur in two stages. Concurrent with the December 1996 Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) Titan IV launch, the NRO will declassify and release the fact that the booster carries an NRO satellite. I emphasize that we will not declassify the satellite's mission, technical data, or operational intelligence data.

~~(S/TK)~~ The fact that the NRO uses VAFB and Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) for launch and launch support will be declassified during Stage II. Stage II will also formally declassify details relating to the NRO OSL, to include OSL personnel and facilities at Los Angeles AFB, VAFB, and CCAS. Other activities, such as launch and early on-orbit operations, command and control, and health and status will be evident, due to the unclassified operation of the Air Force Satellite Control Network. However, the intelligence mission, tasking, data collection, down-links, operational data, data processing, and mission ground stations will not be revealed.

~~(S)~~ Based on facts already publicly available, deductions on specific launches belonging to the NRO are logical; therefore, this declassification does not result in a significant increase in risk. However, there may be an increase in adversarial attention to launch and related activities and organizations due to the publicity and high visibility of the launch event. I believe that enhancing the efficiency of launch operations outweighs the risks imposed by this declassification action.

Keith R. Hall

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NRO Launch Declassification

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 - 5 - Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 - 6 - Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 - 7 - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - 8 - Secretary of the Army
 - 9 - Secretary of the Navy
 - 10 - Secretary of the Air Force
 - 11 - Chief of Staff, US Army
 - 12 - Chief of Staff, US Air Force
 - 13 - Chief of Naval Operations
 - 14 - Commandant of the Marine Corps
 - 15 - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
 - 16 - Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 - 17 - Director, National Security Agency
 - 18 - Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
 - 19 - Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space
 - 20 - Commander, Air Force Space Command
 - 21 - Commander, Air Force Material Command
 - 22 - Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center
 - 23 - Commander, 14th Air Force

INTERNAL COPIES:

- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 - DDNRO/Mr. Hall | 1 - D/OSA/R. Pattishall |
| 1 - DDNS/M. Munson | 1 - DD/ODI [redacted] |
| 1 - DDMS/BGen Baker | 1 - D/OSO/D. Wells |
| 1 - DDMS/MSS [redacted] | 1 - Launch [redacted] |
| 1 - ROM/LL [redacted] | 1 - DDMS [redacted] (b)(3) |
| 1 - D/IMINT/R. Larned | |
| 1 - IM [redacted] | |
| 1 - IM [redacted] | |
| 1 - D/SIGINT/D. Fitzgerald | |
| 1 - PDD/SIGIN [redacted] | |
| 1 - SI- [redacted] | |
| 1 - SIGINT [redacted] | |
| 1 - SIGINT [redacted] | |
| 1 - SIGINT [redacted] | |
| 1 - D/P&A/J. Grant | |
| 1 - D/COMMS/M. Mitchell | |
| 1 - COMM [redacted] | |

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NRO OSF

NO DDI: SOA/

NRO//DIR//

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INFO JOINT STAFF//J2/J3/J35/J38/DSOL/J6//

SSO DIA//DR/CL-1C//

USCINACOM//CC/J2/J3/J5/NRO LNO/NRO TSR//

SSO CINCENT//CC/J2/J3/J5/NRO TSR//

SSO USEUCOM//CC/J2/J3/J5/NRO LNO/NRO TSR//

USCINCPAC//CC/J2/J3/J5/NRO LNO/NRO TSR//

USSOUTHCOM//CC/J2/J3/J5//

USCINCSpace//CC/J2/J3/J5/NRO TSR//

SSO CINCSOC//CC/J2/J3/J5/NRO TSR//

SSO STRATCOM//CC/J2/J3/J5//

SSO USTRANS//CC/J2/J3/J5//

SSO USFK//CC/J2/J3/J5//

NRO//DDMS//

SUPEL//OPS//

OSO//DIR/OPS//

~~SECRET HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY~~

USAF
OFFICE OF SPACE LAUNCH

KEITH R. HALL, DDNRO,

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Implementation Plan
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March 1, 1997

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NO DDI: SOA/

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

OOOQ

SUBJ: NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO) NOTIFICATION MESSAGE

NUMBER 101 - DECLASSIFICATION OF NRO LAUNCHES (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ THIS MESSAGE IS TO INFORM YOU OF MY INTENT TO DECLASSIFY AND DECOMPARTMENT CERTAIN LIMITED FUNCTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION RELATING TO FUTURE NRO LAUNCHES AND THE NRO OFFICE OF SPACE LAUNCH (OSL). THIS IS A CALCULATED RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION BASED ON ANALYSIS OF BOTH PRESENT AND FUTURE LAUNCH OPERATIONAL PROFILES, OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, NRO MISSION OBJECTIVES AND CRITICAL CAPABILITIES, AND THE ONGOING MOVE TOWARDS OPENNESS IN GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THIS ACTION HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SOME TIME, THE JEREMIAH PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR "AGGRESSIVE ACTION ON FURTHER DECLASSIFICATION" ADDS AN ADDITIONAL IMPETUS. THESE ACTIONS WILL NOT AFFECT CLASSIFICATION POLICY RELATIVE TO TECHNICAL DATA AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OPERATIONS.
2. ~~(S/TK)~~ THE DECLASSIFICATION WILL OCCUR IN TWO STAGES.
CONCURRENT WITH THE DECEMBER 1996 VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE (VAFB)

[] USAF

OFFICE OF SPACE LAUNCH

KEITH R. HALL, DDNRO, []

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Implementation Plan
NRO Launch Declassification

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March 1, 1997

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03 04 111800Z DEC 96 PP PP SSSS NRO OSP
NO DDI: SOA/

TITAN IV LAUNCH, THE NRO WILL DECLASSIFY AND RELEASE THE FACT THAT THE BOOSTER CARRIES AN NRO SATELLITE. I EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL NOT DECLASSIFY THE SATELLITE'S MISSION, TECHNICAL DATA, OR OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DATA.

3. (S/TK) THE FACT THAT THE NRO USES VAFB AND CAPE CANAVERAL AIR STATION (CCAS) FOR LAUNCH AND LAUNCH SUPPORT WILL BE DECLASSIFIED DURING STAGE II. STAGE II WILL ALSO FORMALLY DECLASSIFY DETAILS RELATING TO THE NRO OSL, TO INCLUDE OSL PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AT LOS ANGELES AFB, VAFB, AND CCAS. OTHER ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS LAUNCH AND EARLY ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND HEALTH AND STATUS WILL BE EVIDENT, DUE TO THE UNCLASSIFIED OPERATION OF THE AIR FORCE SATELLITE CONTROL NETWORK. HOWEVER, THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION, TASKING, DATA COLLECTION, DOWN-LINKS, OPERATIONAL DATA, DATA PROCESSING, [REDACTED] WILL NOT BE REVEALED.

4. (S) BASED ON FACTS ALREADY PUBLICLY AVAILABLE, DEDUCTIONS ON SPECIFIC LAUNCHES BELONGING TO THE NRO ARE LOGICAL; THEREFORE, THIS DECLASSIFICATION DOES NOT RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN RISK. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE AN INCREASE IN ADVERSARIAL ATTENTION TO LAUNCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS DUE TO THE

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[REDACTED] USAF
OFFICE OF SPACE LAUNCH
KEITH R. HALL, DDNRO, [REDACTED]

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PUBLICITY AND HIGH VISIBILITY OF THE LAUNCH EVENT. I BELIEVE THAT
ENHANCING THE EFFICIENCY OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS OUTWEIGHS THE RISKS
IMPOSED BY THIS DECLASSIFICATION ACTION.

5. (U) THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE JOINT STAFF.
QUESTIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE JOINT STAFF/J-35, NATIONAL
SYSTEMS SUPPORT [REDACTED]

CL: [REDACTED], 1.5(C), X1, NRO SCG 4.0, 14 OCT 95

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[REDACTED] USAF
OFFICE OF SPACE LAUNCH

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KEITH R. HALL, DDNRO, [REDACTED]

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March 1, 1997

Appendix G

SMC/CLX & SMC/IMO CONTRACTS

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Table G.1: Contracts Approved for Unclassified NRO Affiliation

Contractor		Division/Mgr	Description
Analex (-)			Atlas II IV&V
Econ Logistic Mgt. (-)			Bldg A5 Movers
L&V Movers (-)			Bldg A5 Movers
LM Astronau- tics (DUNE)			Atlas Launch Vehicle Integration
LM Astronau- tics (DUNE)			SLC-3 Construction/Activation
LM Federal Systems (MAYOR)			Mission Director Support
LM Missile and Space (GANTRY)			Launch Site Ops Support (LSOS) com- panion & SLC-3E Comm Activation
LM Missile and Space (GANTRY)			Launch Site Processing Support (LSPS)
McDonnell Dou- glas Astronau- tics Co. (HYMN)			Dual Integration

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Contractor		Division/Mgr	Description

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Contractor		Division/Mgr	Description
None			

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Appendix H

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Relating to Decompartmentation/Declassification of NRO Launches

Organization

Effective 1 March 1997, the OSL Deputy Director (DD/OSL) position will be declassified and added to the released NRO organization chart. Also effective 1 March 1997, the entire OSL structure will be declassified but not added to the released NRO organization chart. The SMC/CLX and SMC/IMO launch related organization and functions will transition to the NRO OSL. OD-4 will become NRO at a Secret collateral classification level. Communication support to the NRO will be acknowledge but otherwise ITG organization and functions remain unchanged. Functions and offices that co-use or are sited with OSL or OD-4 units will be evaluated for classification on a case-by-case basis, with decisions being based on parent organization directions and implementation processes.

1. Can you show me an organization chart that reflects what is unclassified on 1 March 1997?

Yes. The charts in Appendix C contain functions which will be unclassified. If names are listed with the functions, the chart is For Official Use Only (FOUO) and may be distributed after 1 March 1997 for business purposes.

2. Are there unclassified mission statements for those elements shown on the organization chart?

Yes. These statements have been developed for use in the conduct of official business in unclassified settings. The unclassified mission and function statements are printed in the Implementation Plan. Your program security officer has a copy. NRO Office of Corporate Communications will be the single entry point for all contacts from the public and media.

3. May I publish an unclassified NRO site phone list?

Yes. But the list should not be labeled 'NRO'. All personnel rosters and telephone lists are FOUO and may be distributed after 1 March 1997 for business purposes.

4. What happens to the government organizations that provide support to the NRO launch process?

SAF/SP will be disbanded and all personnel and elements transferred to other OSAF elements. Personnel assigned to SAF/SP elements at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB and that are declassified will administratively transfer to SAF/SL. Personnel assigned to SAF/SP elements at LAAFB, CCAS, and VAFB that remain classified will administratively transfer to SAF/ST with data masked assignment location. OSL SAF/SP personnel

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assigned to OD-4/DL will administratively transfer to SAF/SL with data masked assignment location. All other SAF/SP personnel assigned to OAS OD-4 will administratively transfer to SAF/SO

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Central Intelligence Agency

Office of Development & Engineering (OD&E) remains the office within the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology through which the CIA assigns personnel to the NRO. The fact of OD&E as an NRO support mechanism is unclassified. The CIA Directorate for Administration (DA) also provides assignees to the NRO in various support roles, an unclassified fact, but the DA is not a dedicated support mechanism to the NRO and, as such, has no place on the NRO organizational chart.

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Personnel

The association between the NRO and personnel at LAAFB, CCAS and VAFB, except for those few who are specifically exempted, is unclassified. The association of OAS personnel with the NRO is SECRET collateral. The fact that OAS supports the NRO is FOUO. Although declassified, the identity of no NRO personnel will be officially released as occupying a specific NRO organizational position. Military and civilian personnel whose support to the NRO has been declassified will have their NRO support reflected in their unclassified assignment histories.

5. Can I say I work for a particular launch component (i.e., safety, operations) in an unclassified setting?

If the component is one of those included on the unclassified organization chart - yes.

6. When is it appropriate for me to talk about my NRO affiliation? What can I tell my family, friends and neighbors?

It is appropriate to disclose your NRO affiliation to facilitate NRO customer/user interfaces. Personnel may choose to disclose their NRO affiliation to family, close friends and neighbors provided this acknowledgment does not inadvertently reveal classified or compartmented information and relationships. However, NRO personnel should not acknowledge their NRO affiliation gratuitously in response to casual social or other inquiries, and are urged not to make indiscriminate admissions of NRO affiliation.

7. What can I say about who I work for, where I work, what I do, my work address and phone number? Can you give me an example?

Examples: I am an AF service member. I'm an engineer, security officer, contracts officer, etc. I am assigned to the NRO Launch Office. See Appendix E for official addresses.

8. Can you give me an example of a generic NRO job description that I could provide to family or friends?

A typical generic job description/title would be an "engineer" or "analyst" providing support to NRO launch. Any description that you use should be short and non-revealing of classified information.

9. How can a uniformed member of the military services describe their association with the NRO?

I am an active duty member of the (Army, Navy, Air Force) detailed/assigned to the NRO.

10. How should I respond to a question from an uncleared individual concerning the association of SAF/SS or SAF/SP to SAF/ST or SAF/SL?

There is no association between SAF/SS or SAF/SP or SAF/ST and SAF/SL. They are separate Air Force organizations with different missions.

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12. What can I put on a resume about my present employer and any past assignments with the NRO? What can I say about past NRO assignments?
- Your present employer is your parent organization/agency, i.e., CIA, AF, Navy, etc. Resumes prepared by NRO launch office personnel whose support to the NRO has been declassified should be reviewed by their supervisors in coordination with the component security officer to ensure that classified information is not revealed. As a rule, if your past NRO assignment ended prior to 1 March 1997 your past affiliation with the NRO remains classified. Only present and future assignments are subject to the new rules herein. Exceptions will be handled on a case-by-case basis through the DNRO.
13. Can NRO employees identify past or present NRO coworkers in unclassified settings?
- NRO personnel may identify present co-workers, after 1 March 1997, if those co-workers do not retain classified status. It is incumbent on all personnel to protect the affiliation of those employees whose position has not been declassified. Questions of this nature should be addressed to your BCO or to your component security officer.
14. Will the policy for wearing uniforms at NRO launch facilities change?
- There is no change in the policy with regard to the wearing of military uniforms.
15. What can I say about the NRO during business travel?
- You may acknowledge your NRO affiliation as needed. However, you should not discuss your NRO affiliation in non-business settings. Relationships between the NRO [] and sensitive operations/support sites remain classified and must be protected.
16. How should I sign in at contractor sites? Military bases?
- No change - use the same procedures as before. Sign in as "self" or with military identification if appropriate.
17. Will material with an NRO logo (certificates, memorabilia) be treated as unclassified?
- If your affiliation with the NRO is unclassified after 1 March 1997, NRO affiliation with your name will be treated as unclassified and may be used on certificates, etc. bearing the NRO logo.
18. Can I wear NRO memorabilia and past NRO launch logos at the same time?

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While not classified, it is not good OPSEC practice to wear indicators that can reveal or lead to classified information, i.e. past NRO launches.

19. Currently, courier id's and letters authorizing "hand carries" are not affiliated with the NRO, will this change?

There is no change in current travel procedures. Courier letters will not reflect NRO affiliation.

20. Are NRO business cards authorized?

NRO representational business cards may be authorized by management on a case-by-case basis, for those NRO personnel whose positions have been declassified, and whose jobs include official NRO contact with customers and/or the user community. Business cards will be purchased at the individuals' own expense and used only for official business. Private use of official business cards is prohibited. Requests for business cards must be submitted in writing and justify why official NRO business cards are needed. Approving officials will ensure that classified information is not revealed on the card, and that the appropriate telephone numbers and addressees are indicated. NRO business cards will not be used when visiting classified NRO locations, i.e., MGS and sensitive sites. They may be used when interfacing with non-NRO government agencies, i.e., AFSPC, SMC, etc.

21. What changes will occur to my Performance Appraisal or military performance report (OPR/EPR)?

Air Force

The only change is the job title, location and PAS code description. Your senior rater will be signing with an NRO title for all declassified NRO launch office personnel.

CIA

No change, although more direct reference to the NRO will be permitted.

22. Can my supervisor be more forthcoming regarding NRO activities as he/she is writing my performance report?

Yes - if your performance report is classified. No - if your performance report is unclassified. The text of performance reports should be consistent with the overall classification of the report, i.e. if the report is unclassified, as in military OPRs/EPRs, then the text must be unclassified.

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24. How does this downgrading affect the performance reports and awards for OD-4 personnel? Can the NRO be acknowledged?

Statements relating general support for NRO launch and early on-orbit configuration may be included. Care must be taken to ensure wording indicates 'support for' rather than 'assigned to.'

25. How do I handle meetings where NRO acknowledged personnel and non-acknowledged personnel are in attendance?

There is no change in procedure from the past where non-acknowledged NRO personnel (i.e. SVC, [redacted]) must remain covert. Both parties must take care not to expose the relationship. Yet it is perfectly acceptable for the acknowledged person to represent his/her affiliation with the NRO. OD-4 personnel will have to take extra care in how they represent themselves at external meetings, how they sign in, and how they represent NRO interests.

26. Who do I say I work for? OD-4? SAF/SP? SAF/SL? SAF/SO? [redacted] or the NRO?

It depends on the audience and situation. For day to day activity, use your normal organization title. Normally you will not refer to yourself as NRO or SAF/SL or SAF/SO.

27. What can I say when confronted by unbriefed co-workers, family, etc., about the NRO launch and who I work for:

OL VNBG contractors: I work for (Contractor name) on contract to support the OL VNBG an AFELM of SAF/SL

OL VNBG Personnel: I am assigned to OL VNBG an AFELM of SAF/SL

Comm personnel: I am assigned to Det 1 supporting OL VNBG

SVCs: I am an ASC.

Ground Stations and Operational Sites/Locations

28. How do I travel to covert locations if I am acknowledged as NRO?

Current procedures will continue to be used. Personnel will still travel in civilian clothes, use SATO travel arrangements, ensure their destinations are blurred through good OPSEC, and protect their association with the NRO.

29. What information can I discuss as a result of the 18 Dec launch acknowledgment?

The only information declassified and officially released concurrent

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with the December 1996 launch is the fact that the launch carries an NRO satellite. Personnel who interface with launch support organizations may become aware of or exposed to speculations related to NRO functions and operations as a result of the December 1996 Vandenberg AFB Titan IV launch acknowledgment. You should not comment nor become involved in confirming nor denying any speculations. However, if confronted prior to the 1 March 1997 effective date, you may acknowledge your NRO affiliation to the extent you would be able to after the 1 March 1997 effective date.

30. What can I tell people about where I work if I'm assigned to or visiting [] or other classified NRO facility?

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31. Is there a way that I can identify myself as an NRO employee in an unclassified venue even though I work at a []

General policy dictates that you do not reveal your affiliation with the NRO. Exceptions will be considered on a case by case basis.

32. Will performance evaluations for people assigned to sensitive sites contain references to the NRO?

No. NRO affiliation will not be mentioned; OPR/EPRs remain unchanged in format, content, and rating official.

ITG

ITG's affiliation as part of the NRO remains SECRET BYE. The Detachments at LAAFB, CCAS, VAFB, and OAS may acknowledge that they provide support to the NRO, including for the NRO launch process. ITG elements at other locations remain compartmented.

33. What can I discuss about ITG's relationship with the NRO?

The fact that the ITG is part of the NRO structure remains SECRET BYE and will not be discussed outside those channels. However, the fact that Detachments known as ITG provide support to the NRO may be acknowledged. An example of supporting the NRO would be the launch support and interfaces provided by the on-site Detachments under the Launch Comm Office label.

34. Can I, as a Comm Det staffer, tell people the building I work in?

Yes. However, the fact you work in an NRO occupied/managed building should not be portrayed as being a member of that organization. You are assigned to an AF Comm element that supports the NRO at your location.

35. How do I travel to covert locations if I am acknowledged as supporting the NRO?

Current procedures will continue to be used. ITG Det personnel will still travel in civilian clothes, use SATO travel arrangements,

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ensure their destinations are blurred through good OPSEC, and protect their association with the NRO. In other words, nothing should change.

OD-4

OD-4 elements at OAS organization will become NRO at a Secret collateral level. OD-4 elements stationed at [] remain compartmented.

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36. What can I discuss about OD-4's relationship with the NRO?

Effective 1 March 1997, OD-4's relationship with the NRO will be decompartmented. The fact that OD-4 supports the NRO will be FOUO but the fact that the OD-4 is the NRO will be SECRET collateral. An example of supporting the NRO would be the launch support and interfaces provided by OD-4/DL.

37. Does the OD-4 decompartmentation affect ITG Det 7?

Yes. Det 7 will follow the same guidelines for decompartmentation as OD-4. Support for the NRO is FOUO while 'as the' NRO is SECRET collateral.

38. Can I, as an OD-4 staffer, tell people the building I work in?

Yes. However, the association of the NRO to our facilities is SECRET collateral.

39. How do OD-4 personnel represent themselves on the telephone or on the internet when they are in a 'support' role?

It is important for all OD-4 personnel to use caution when conversing on the open telephone or internet. Only unclassified terminology will be used; i.e. OD-4 [] etc. when referring to OD-4 activities. References to NRO are strongly discouraged when using open lines.

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40. Does the U.S. Government use overseas tracking stations that are part of the AFSCN to 'support' the NRO?

Details and particulars of NRO operations remain classified.

41. What is the real mission of the AFSCN as it relates to the NRO?

The primary mission of the AFSCN is to collect positional and velocity data on military and civil satellites as well as the space shuttle for the purpose of determining their orbit, a function that is important for the operation and safety of all spacecraft. Further details are classified.

42. Did the NRO operate the tracking systems for CORONA?

No.

43. What other kinds of missions has the NRO used the AFSCN for over the years between Corona and now?

That information is classified.

44. How do I travel to covert locations if I am acknowledged as NRO at the SECRET collateral level?

Current procedures will continue to be used. OD-4 and Det 7 personnel

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will still travel in civilian clothes, use SATO travel arrangements, ensure their destinations are blurred through good OPSEC, and protect their association with the NRO.

45. What information can I discuss as a result of the 18 Dec launch acknowledgment? Especially related to OD-4?

Those OD-4 and Det 7 personnel supporting the K-13 launch may acknowledge that they supported the launch. Other OD-4 personnel may not acknowledge a relationship with the NRO.

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47. Does downgrading of NRO relationship to OD-4 change the classification of the relationship to

No. remain SECRET BYE or TK. The External Control System (ECS) associations also remain SECRET BYE.

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48. Will OD-4 IRONS be acknowledged as NRO?

No. The relationship of a flight IRON to the NRO will be SECRET collateral. Relationship of the pre-flight or launch IRON with an acknowledged NRO launch will be FOUO.

49. Will IRON based information be classified?

No. Information used to configure the RTSS will remain unclassified.

50. What information can I discuss in the interim period between 18 Dec and 1 Mar when OD-4 will be acknowledged at the SECRET collateral level?

Those OD-4 personnel that supported the 18 Dec launch can acknowledge their 'support' but any information beyond that remains classified. The standard response for queries into on-orbit operations or AFSCN support for on-orbit operations will be "We do not discuss on-orbit or system operations and activities."

Mission and Functions

Generic (non-revealing) mission and functions statements for NRO launch elements are unclassified.

51. To what office should public inquiries regarding these changes be referred?

All FOIA, media and other public affairs inquiries should be referred to the appropriate USAF or NRO Office of Corporate Communications staff.

52. Is the NRO's security control system affected by these changes?

No, the control system is not affected. However, these changes will

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be reflected in the BYE NRO and collateral AFP classification guides.

Facilities

The location of the NRO launch facilities is FOUO.

53. Can I tell my family, friends, and neighbors my actual work location?

Upon implementation of this plan, the NRO launch facilities (i.e., Building A-5 at LAAFB, CCAS facilities, VAFB facilities) will be declassified. However, the identity and location of these facilities will be FOUO. Disclosure of actual location of the facilities for other than business purposes, i.e. family, friends, neighbors, etc. should be judged on a need to know basis.

54. What can I divulge with respect to my actual work locations for canvasses, school contact information, publications, etc.?

NRO personnel with school age children or other dependents should indicate the name and address (i.e., building) of their parent organization (e.g. Air Force, CIA, Navy), and their non-secure telephone number at their work location to facilitate prompt notification in case of an emergency. NRO personnel may provide their home address and telephone number and, if requested, their affiliation with their parent agency rather than their NRO affiliation in response to various types of canvasses frequently made to obtain information for school, community, church, social organization, or alumni/alumnae directories, etc.

55. Since the launch facilities will be declassified, can I answer the non-secure phone "NRO"?

There will be no change in procedures concerning how people answer nonsecure telephones. Practice good operational security.

56. When is it appropriate to have unclassified mail sent to me at the NRO launch facilities? How do I do it?

You can have unclassified mail sent to you at the official local facility address. Personnel remaining in classified positions will continue to use their home address or the address of their parent organization (CIA, USAF/SAF/SP) for official unclassified mail.

57. Can launch office personnel tell vendors they are ordering items for the NRO?

Vendor relationships and contracting means will vary depending on the item being ordered and the location of the delivery. Refer questions to your local contracting officer and/or security officer for specific guidance.

58. After 1 March 1997, may I acknowledge the fact that I'm visiting Westfields in DC and if TDY with my spouse, may I take her to lunch in Westfields facility?

Yes.

59. What about other unacknowledged facilities in the DC area?

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Yes.

Launch Activities

60. What happens if I get a question regarding NRO assets and operations from the media?

Refer all such questions to the appropriate USAF or NRO Office of Corporate Communications staff.

61. Does this declassification effort affect a program office's support to NRO launches?

No. All program support to launch activities will remain compartmented and affiliation with the NRO is protected.

62. What is the classification of NRO flight hardware being stored in the HSF/SSFB?

There is no change in launch integration processing procedures. Hardware movements and storage areas remain SECRET collateral.

63. What is the level of classification for the "fact of" an NRO satellite being currently processed in the SPIF?

There is no change in launch integration processing procedures. The satellite vehicle may be acknowledged as being on-pad after mate to the launch vehicle. Prior to that, hardware movements and processing locations remain SECRET collateral.

64. Will we still have to pay attention to SATRAN's during hardware movements?

Yes. There is no change in launch integration processing procedures.

Contractor Associations/Relationships

Consistent with NRO and corporate policies, contractor personnel employed on unclassified SMC/CLX, SMC/IMO, or OD-4 contracts may acknowledge their affiliation with the NRO or support to the NRO, to include being known as an "NRO launch support contractor". Acknowledgment will be in a manner/degree consistent with their contracting instrument and as it appears on unclassified NRO organization charts and mission statements. Contractors who are no longer supporting the NRO as of 1 March 1997 are NOT included in this declassification effort.

65. Can SETA personnel working on site acknowledge their NRO affiliation?

Yes, if the work performed is on an open contract.

66. How should contractors handle introductions and questions of affiliation when their work involves assisting their government client in representing the NRO?

SETA contractors who attend meetings outside the NRO and sit alongside the customer may be known, if necessary, as an "NRO launch support contractor" to those at an unclassified meeting.

67. What can I write about my NRO experience on a resume or say in a job

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interview if I am working on an open contract for the NRO?

Reference to NRO experience cannot be written into a resume, but can be mentioned in an interview if asked.

68. Can I admit it to friends/family?

Contractors in unclassified positions may choose to disclose their NRO affiliation to family, close friends, and neighbors provided this acknowledgment does not inadvertently reveal classified or compartmented information and relationships. However, NRO contractor personnel should not acknowledge their NRO affiliation gratuitously in response to casual social or other inquiries, and are urged not to make indiscriminate admissions of NRO affiliation.

69. Can a contractor with an open relationship with the NRO, and with current NRO contracts after 1 March 1997 admit that relationship in an unclassified proposal?

No.

Public Affairs

The following questions are excerpted from the Public Affairs plan for the December launch.

70. Is this satellite a [code name or intelligence type] satellite?

We are acknowledging only that this is a reconnaissance satellite, designed, acquired and to be operated by the National Reconnaissance Office. The satellite's specific mission remains classified.

71. What are its orbital elements/technical data?

The launch vehicle's azimuth is 190 degrees; its launch period is from 0830 PST until 1100 PST. All other information related to the satellite is classified.

72. Aren't those elements indicative of a [code name or intelligence type] satellite?

That statement would be speculative. We will not comment on the satellite's specific mission, other than to say it is a reconnaissance satellite.

73. How many NRO satellites have been launched on Titans [III, 34-D, IV]?

145 CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD photo reconnaissance satellites were launched from Vandenberg AFB by Thor boosters between 1960 and 1972. With the exception of CORONA, all past NRO launch operations remain classified.

74. Past launch manifests have listed certain Titan launches as carrying "DoD classified payloads." Were these NRO satellites?

Some were; some were not. The phrase "DoD payload" does not necessarily equate to NRO satellite.

75. Have NRO satellites been launched from/by the Space Shuttle?

Other than CORONA, all previous launch operations remain classified.

76. What other launch vehicles have been used to launch/orbit NRO satel-

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lites?

Past operational matters like this remain classified. As to the future, however, NRO satellites could be launched by any vehicle in the U.S. space launch inventory, to include Titan IV, Atlas II, EELV and any other viable space launch vehicle.

77. Will future NRO launches be unclassified?

Our intent beginning, Friday, 20 December 1996, is to declassify most NRO launches.

78. What is the total number of NRO satellites launched during the organization's existence?

Other than today's launch and the 145 CORONA launches previously mentioned, all other NRO launches remain classified.

79. Have NRO satellites been launched from Cape Canaveral?

Yes, in the past the NRO has launched from the Cape, but previous launches, other than CORONA, remain classified. In the future, it is the NRO's intent to use both Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral.

80. Does this mean that the launch of some NRO satellites could remain classified?

Possibly, but again, the term "classified DoD payload" does not necessarily equate to an NRO satellite.

81. When is the next NRO launch?

We expect to announce future launches ahead of time.

82. Are there any hazardous/nuclear/radioactive components aboard this satellite?

No.

83. Have any animals been used in testing for this satellite?

No. The NRO does not have any animals associated with its programs.

84. Will any other information be declassified regarding NRO launches?

Additional declassification efforts are under consideration and the information will be released as appropriate.

85. Does the NRO have personnel at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral?

Yes, we deploy personnel in support of launch activities.

86. What are the offices/Who are those people?

This information is classified.

87. Are there NRO contractors at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral?

We deploy personnel in support of launch activities.

88. Who are those contractors?

As a standard practice, the NRO does not discuss the nature of its contractor/business relationships.

89. How many U.S. Government people, assigned to the NRO, are located at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral?

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- The number of people who support launch activities is classified.
90. How much money has the NRO spent at Vandenberg AFB and/or Cape Canaveral?
The NRO's budget is classified. The NRO has always provided the funds to support its launch operations and infrastructure.
91. How does the NRO arrange for the Air Force to launch its satellites?
Launch vehicle acquisition is arranged through the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) of Air Force Material Command in Los Angeles. Launch operations are arranged through the 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg AFB, CA. Organizational details beyond this remain classified.
92. What contractors build the NRO's satellites?
That information is classified.
93. At what contractor facilities are the satellites manufactured?
That information is classified.
94. How are the satellites transported to the launch bases?
Operational matters like this remain classified.
95. Is SLC-4 East the only launch pad used by the NRO at Vandenberg?
No. The NRO also uses SLC-3 East.
96. What amount did the NRO contribute to SLC-3 East's refurbishment?
The NRO's budget is classified, but it did provide substantial funding to refurbish SLC-3 East.
97. What is the cost of this launch? Will the NRO reimburse the Air Force for that amount?
The NRO budget is classified. The NRO has a cost-sharing arrangement with the Air Force at Vandenberg for the costs associated with launching NRO satellites.
98. Why are the NRO and Air Force acknowledging the fact that the 18 December 1996 Titan launch will be/is/was an NRO satellite?
As part of a continuing review of security requirements, policies and procedures, it was determined by NRO officials that the fact that NRO satellites are launched at both Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral no longer needs to be classified.
99. Who is the official ultimately responsible for the declassification decision?
Keith Hall, Acting and Deputy Director of the NRO.

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~~TOP SECRET//TK//RSEN/NF~~**(U) Appendix F - CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD****Note (Effective 10/13/03):**

1. (U) Information in this appendix has been incorporated from the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD (CAL) Declassification Guide and more recent instruction. The DNRO approved the CAL Guide in May 1996 as part of a systematic declassification review (SDR). That SDR was completed in November 1997.
2. (U) As a result of incorporating it into the RRG, the CAL Declassification Guide no longer has to be consulted as a stand-alone document for 25-year-old CAL related information.¹⁰³

1. DEVELOPMENT**Redact:**

(U) See paragraph 2 below.

Release:

- a. (U) "Facts about" the CORONA program concept that called for first concealing the program with its overt cancellation as an ostensibly experimental part of the umbrella project WS-117L, only to be followed by its covert resurrection.
- b. (U) Fact of and details about the CORONA program cover attributing an animal-carrying purpose to DISCOVERER missions.
- c. (U) fact that in April 1962 the Air Force changed the CORONA program cover from that of DISCOVERER being experimental satellites to the announcement that further launches involved secret military satellites. At the same time, the Air Force announced a new directive classifying all information regarding military satellites and eliminating series designations for DISCOVERER, SAMOS, and MIDAS.
- d. (U) Details about the design and operation of the Itek panoramic and frame cameras used in the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD satellites (KH-1 through KH-6).
- e. (U) Any other information not specifically identified for redaction below.

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2. PARTICIPANTS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Redact:

- a. (U) Any tradecraft details concerning cover arrangements used by the CIA, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company (LMSC), and Hiller Helicopter Corporation for the leasing, staffing, and operation of the Hiller Helicopter plant in the CORONA Program.¹¹⁸ (Effective 9/16/04)
- b. (U) Except as identified below, any references to a CIA covert procurement relationship with any contractor.
- c. (U) Names of NRO contractor personnel unless they are identified under a. Release below or acknowledged in Appendix B.

Release:

- a. (U) Names of elected or presidentially-appointed Government officials guiding CAL development or using its product. When reflected in the context of being users of the CAL product, military flag officers are considered to be presidentially-appointed Government officials whose names can be released. (e.g., CINCSAC or CINCPAC articulating opinions about the value of CORONA to their operational planning). Names of flag officers assigned to the NRO or otherwise involved in system development or operation will not be released unless they are acknowledged in Appendix B.
- b. (U) Fact of CIA's management role in CORONA for classified procurement and maintenance of security.
- c. (U) Fact of and non-security-related details about the roles of following contractors:
 - Aerospace Corporation
 - Lockheed Missile and Space Company
 - Itek Corporation
 - Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corporation
 - General Electric

~~TOP SECRET//TK//ROSEN/NF~~ 176

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- Douglas Aircraft Corporation
 - Space Technology Laboratories (STL)
 - (U) Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL). BTL had a contract with the Pacific Missile Range to provide radio guidance commands to all first stage burns from VAFB (Thor, Atlas, Titan, and possibly Delta).
 - (U) Eastman-Kodak Company and its roles in film technology research and processing the CAL mission film at its Hawkeye facility in Rochester, NY.
 - (U) Autometric as an ARGON contractor
- d. (U) Fact that the Hiller Helicopter plant, also known as the Advanced Projects Integration Facility, or Advanced Projects Facility (APF, or simply AP), in Palo Alto, California, served until 1969 as a cover in which the CORONA second stage Agena satellites, Itek cameras, EKC film, and General Electric reentry capsules were assembled and tested before shipment to Vandenberg AFB.¹¹⁸ (Effective 9/16/04)

3. FUNDING

Redact:

(U) All other information not identified for release below.

Release:

(U) Fact that the CORONA program started with initial funding of \$7M from the CIA.

(U) Funding figures for the DISCOVERER Program (CORONA's cover project) found in Air Force (but not Program A) documents included additional items such as the care and feeding of chimpanzees. DISCOVERER Program funding was presented to Congress each year for approval, appear in congressional records, and may be released.

4. OPERATIONS - GENERAL

~~TOP SECRET//TK//RSEN/NF~~ 177

~~TOP SECRET//TK//RSEN/NF~~Redact:

a. ~~(S//TK)~~ Information in a fact of context that indicates or implies a small "piggyback" ELINT detection package (called SOCTOP) was carried on board DISCOVERER XIII.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. ~~(S//TK)~~ Information indicating or implying in a "fact of" context that any other SIGINT or vulnerability detection piggyback payloads were carried on CAL missions.

c. ~~(S//TK)~~ Fact of and details about

d. ~~(S//TK)~~ Methodology used by agents to retrieve mission hardware on foreign soil.

Release:

a. (U) AFP numbers associated with the CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD imaging satellite programs:⁹⁶ - 162, - 241, - 622A, - 846, and specific CAL mission numbers in the following blocks: 1000, 1100, 8000, 9000.

b. (U) Fact that CORONA carried color and infrared film on some missions.

c. (U) Fact that CORONA carried a payload called OSCAR (Orbiting Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio), and other scientific "piggyback" payloads such as radiometric experiments for MIDAS and X-Ray and Gamma Ray sensors tested for VELA HOTEL that were not directly related to intelligence operations. The fact of "piggyback" payloads in general can be acknowledged since these were registered with the UN. [CAUTION: see redaction guidance below.]

d. (U) All CAL spacecraft ephemeris data.

e. (U) Health and status data for all CAL spacecraft.

f. (U) Spacecraft system lifetimes for all CAL missions.

g. (U) CAL spacecraft maneuverability data.

~~TOP SECRET//TK//RSEN/NF~~ 178

~~TOP SECRET//TK//RSEN//NF~~

- h. (U) Fact that the DISCOVERER II capsule might have been recovered by the Soviets after reentering and returning to earth on Spitzbergen Island, and fact that Norwegian authorities may have provided credible evidence of that possibility.
- i. (U) Fact of the resemblance of the loss of the DISCOVERER II capsule, and its probable recovery by the Soviets, to the book Ice Station Zebra by Alistar MacLean and the movie of the same name.
- j. (U) Fact that an individual formerly possessing CORONA access was the technical advisor to the movie "Ice Station Zebra."
- k. (U) Details about procedures for film capsule recovery by air or on the water.
- l. (U) Fact that Corona film was flown from Hawaii to Rochester, New York, and, after it was developed at EKC, from Rochester to NPIC in Washington, D.C.
- m. ~~(S)~~ Details about the recovery from Venezuela of an errant CORONA mission 1005 capsule in summer 1964, except any information dealing with CIA agent recovery methodology.
- n. (U) Computer Programs/OSP/relating to CORONA satellite operations:¹¹¹ (Effective 03/31/04)
 - 1) (U) CORONA Target Program (CTP): orbit-by-orbit camera operation selection based on weather (WX) forecasts and on displays of operational information and accomplishments.
 - 2) (U) CALICO: determined camera operations and displayed operational information.
 - 3) (U) CACTUS: listed target locations for photo-interpreting.
 - 4) (U) COMET: determined orbit selections.
 - 5) (U) LETHAL: program for automatic command and control of the satellite.

Refer:

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(U) Proposed releases about the internal operations of the 6594th Recovery Group and 6593rd Test Squadron should be referred to Air Force Space Command.

5. OPERATIONS - MGS and RTS

Redact:

a. ~~(S//TK)~~ Redact specific details about the Mission Ground Station (MGS) or Remote Tracking Station (RTS) commands that were uplinked to the satellite, i.e., orbit adjustment, deorbit, camera operations, SIGINT payload operations, etc.

Release:

a. (U) See RRG section 1.9.1 regarding release of locations of MGS associated with CAL missions.

b. (U) Fact that the following U.S. remote tracking stations supported DISCOVERER (CORONA) and/or SAMOS reconnaissance satellite programs.¹⁹ (Note: CORONA/DISCOVERER 19 carried a non-recoverable MIDAS radiometer to collect earth radiation background data. Three additional remote tracking stations supported this radiometric mission and are releasable: Cape Canaveral, Ascension Island, and Woomera, Australia.)

- 1) Annette Island, Alaska
- 2) Fort Greeley (aka Donnelly Flats), Alaska
- 3) Fort Stevens, Oregon
- 4) Kaena Point, Hawaii
- 5) Kodiak (aka Chiniak), Alaska
- 6) New Boston, New Hampshire
- 7) Ottumwa, Iowa
- 8) Palo Alto, California
- 9) Point Mugu, California

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10) Vandenberg AFB, California

11) Christmas Island

12) Guam

c. (U) The fact of and names of tracking ships and aircraft can be released in association with CAL launches.

d. (U) References to the generic command function of the AFSCF or the dedicated MGSs. For example, information that mentions explicitly or in context the fact that an unspecified MGS or RTS provided and/or relayed uplink commands to a satellite vehicle would not be considered sensitive. [CAUTION: See related redaction element above.]

6. TRAJECTORY, TRACKING, TELEMETRY

Release:

~~(S)~~ Any data associated with the trajectory, tracking, and telemetry of the CAL program's boosters and satellite vehicles. [CAUTION: In accordance with RRG section 1.9.1, do not betray location of any RTS that might have processed such data.]

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Washington, D.C. 20505

15 SEP 1992

15 SEP 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Declassification of Specified Information
Relating to the National Reconnaissance
Office

1. Pursuant to the last proviso of Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 and Section 4.2(a) of Executive Order 12356, I have determined that the following information relating to the National Reconnaissance Office no longer requires, and therefore no longer shall have, protection under a designated special access control system:

(a) There is a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) organized as an agency of the Department of Defense and funded through a program known as the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), which is the single, national program to meet U.S. Government intelligence needs through spaceborne and assigned airborne reconnaissance.

(b) The mission of the NRO is to ensure that the U.S. has the technology and spaceborne and airborne assets needed to acquire intelligence world-wide, including to support such functions as monitoring of arms control agreements, indications and warning and the planning and conduct of military operations. The NRO accomplishes the mission through research and development, acquisition, and operation of spaceborne and airborne data collection systems.

(c) The Secretary of Defense has the ultimate responsibility, which is exercised in concert with the Director of Central Intelligence, for management and operation of the NRO and the Director of the NRO reports to the Secretary. The Director of Central Intelligence establishes the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the frequency of



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CL BY: Signer
DECL: Unclassified When
Final Declassification
Action is Taken by DCI
and Secretary of Defense

BUE-123284-2006

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TOP SECRET

**SUBJECT: Declassification of Specified Information Relating
to the National Reconnaissance Office**

coverage, approves along with the Secretary of Defense the NRP budget, provides security policy guidance for the NRP, and guides and participates in the formulation of the NRP through the Director of the NRO. The Director of the NRO has responsibility for executing the NRO's programs, which the Director accomplishes through the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.

(d) The Director of the NRO is Martin C. Faga. The Deputy Director of the NRO is Mr. Jimmie D. Hill. The Deputy Director of NRO for Military Support is Rear Admiral Daniel P. March, USN.

(e) The mailing address of the Director of the NRO is:

The Honorable Martin C. Faga
Director
National Reconnaissance Office
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301 - 1000 .

2. I recommend that we declassify the above information. In my judgment, disclosure of the information would not cause damage to the national security.


Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

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BVE-123284-2600

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702-1-A

Data Communications Group Classification Guide

**Version 1.0****26 September 1997**

Classify By: Howard J. Mitchell, Brig Gen, USAF
Reason: (1.5c) Intelligence Sources and Methods
Declass. On: (X1) Intelligence Sources and Methods
Derived From: Original Classification Authority

1 of 33

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I. Executive Summary (U)

(U) Introduction and Purpose: This Data Communications Group (DCG) Classification Guide describes the security classification and control system determinations for various elements of National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) COMM Directorate information. The objective of the guide is to:

- 1) Provide general guidance on the relative national security value and sensitivity of the NRO Relay Satellite Program;
- 2) Establish appropriate classification determinations for the relay satellite program; and
- 3) Aid in establishing a baseline for program protection efforts in the NRO and the COMM Directorate.

~~(FOUO)~~ Determining the appropriate security classification level to assign to information, technology or a product is not a simple process. Numerous factors, based on the Executive Order 12958 criteria for classification must be considered. A comprehensive review was conducted by senior program technical officers on the existing protection provided to the relay satellite programs acquisition, schedules, ground operations, research and technology development. These officers concluded that the security classification philosophy would be focused on the protection of the following key elements:

- 1) The user mission;
- 2) Cryptography;
- 3) System survivability;
- 4) System vulnerabilities; and
- 5) Advanced technologies.

Certain information in this classification guide when standing alone is unclassified; however, this information may become classified when associated with overhead reconnaissance or the National Reconnaissance Office.

(U) Approval: Effective this date, the DCG Classification Guide is approved for use by all personnel authorized access to NRO Relay Satellite Program information.


/ S /

HOWARD J. MITCHELL, Brig Gen, USAF
Director, Communications Systems
Acquisition and Operation

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II. Overview (U)

(U) Changing National Security Environment: The analytic process used to produce this guide took a number of complex factors into account. Principal among these was the end of the cold war. In short, an era passed thus prompting a reexamination of long standing secrecy requirements. It is important to note that this reexamination, which is ongoing, does not imply that basic security tenets are no longer needed. Policy makers and users of the NRO product will accept secrecy requirements as long as they are justified and supported by facts. The provisions of Executive Order (EO) 12958 on the classification of national security information, signed by the President on 17 April 1995, illustrates this point. Moreover, the EO formed the basis for evaluating the information listed in the guide. Other factors that influenced the effort to produce the guide included the declassification of the NRO organization, the disclosure and release of obsolete NRO systems and products (i.e., CORONA), US sponsored technology transfers, the commercialization of space technology, and the need to make NRO assets more readily available to warfighters and other users such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Lastly, the process took into account the fact that much of our relay technology has evolved into a mature capability.

~~(FOUO)~~ **Exposure Analysis:** A key part of the analytic process used to produce the guide involved an exposure analysis of relay satellite information available through open sources. The objective of the exposure analysis was to provide a reference point to measure NRO information loss. The exposure analysis took into account information published on NRO programs and systems in 76 open source documents published between 1984 and 1995. The exposure analysis also took into account some of the information losses resulting from inadvertent exposure of relay satellite information, as well as information losses from official releases. The scope of exposure nearly covers the relay satellite program end-to-end i.e., from launch integration, to orbits, to mean mission duration and to ground stations.

(U) Analytic Tool: A classification/compartmentation decision tool, based on EO 12958 criteria was developed and used to analyze the various items of the Relay Satellite program. As shown in attachment 1 the tool is essentially a decision model that aids the Original Classification Authority (OCA) in the process of:

- 1) Assessing the impact of exposure.
- 2) Determining whether to classify (i.e., does the information meet EO 12958 criteria)
- 3) Determining a classification level.
- 4) Determining whether to compartment.
- 5) Determining which compartment.

The classification/compartmentation decision tool does not produce right or wrong answers. It is not a matter of simply pouring a question into the top of the tool and turning a handle to produce a result. The process of reaching a classification decision is highly subjective. It is a process that is dependent upon the expertise, judgement and facts available to the OCA making the decision. Recognizing this, the tool, through a series of questions, forces a uniform analysis based on available data and accepted fact(s). Documented supporting data and facts are essential in order to formulate answers to the questions in the tool. In addition, the questions are structured to facilitate the elimination of intuition, and/or anecdotal information that may introduce bias or

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unduly influence a classification decision. Essentially, the tool aids the compilation and organization of data in order to establish why an item of information is either classified or not. The tool also aids in minimizing variances in classification determinations made by individuals who have different levels of subject matter expertise. Lastly, the tool forces one to document how and why a determination meets the criteria in EO 12958. As a matter of security policy, the tool was adopted NRO-wide to aid in the development of classification decisions.

(U) Executive Order 12958 Classified National Security Information: This EO has had a significant impact on how and why national security information is classified. And as mentioned previously, the EO formed the basis for the classification/compartimentation decision tool that was used to evaluate information in the guide. Under EO 12958 information may not be considered for classification unless it falls under one or more of the following categories:

1. Military plans, weapons systems, or operations.
2. Foreign government information.
3. Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods or cryptology
4. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States including confidential sources.
5. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security
6. United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities.
7. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to national security.

(U) Classification Levels: The EO further states that information may only be classified at one of the three levels: Top Secret, applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security; Secret, applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security; and, Confidential, applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Any release of classified information to non U.S. persons must be coordinated with the program office.

(U) Classification Authority: It is important to understand that with implementation of EO 12958, only a limited number of NRO officials have Original Classification Authority. All remaining NRO personnel have the authority to classify information derivatively. In establishing the information categories and classification levels of an item of information, the EO further directs that the Original Classification Authority must be able to identify or describe why unauthorized disclosure would result in either damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage to the national security. In cases where there is serious doubt or debate about the classification level of an item of information, the EO states that the item of information in question shall be classified at the lower level.

(U) For Official Use Only (FOUO): FOUO is not a classification marking. Originators should mark information when they create it to call attention to FOUO content. An FOUO marking does not imply the information will be automatically withheld under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, an FOUO marking will ensure

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a review of a requested record. FOUO information should be destroyed in a manner that would preclude reconstruction of the material.

~~(S/B)~~ **Information Categories:** This guide contains four categories of information

- 1) Classified information compartmented BYEMAN (BYE);
- 2) Information that is classified and compartmented TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK);
- 3) Information that is classified collateral; and
- 4) Unclassified information.

It is important to understand that an item of information listed in the guide as SECRET is no less classified than an item of information labeled SECRET BYE or SECRET TK. The SCI designators BYE and/or TK do not imply a higher level of classification, only a higher level of protection as prescribed by the Director Central Intelligence Directive (DCID). The Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) designator simply limits access to the information on the basis of need-to-know.

~~(S/B)~~ **Designation of SCI:** Various items of information in the guide have been designated either exclusively BYE or exclusively TK. For the most part, the information that has been designated as BYE deals with survivability and vulnerability of systems, subsystems and/or components, budget, some command and control operations, classified relationships and sensitive sources and methods used in the research, development and operation of systems. The information in this guide that has been designated TK, for the most part, includes information on new systems and or modifications to current ones that the user community needs for planning purposes, certain capabilities relating to tasking, ground station locations and sensitive/perishable product capabilities. **UNDER no circumstance is it permissible for a single item of information to be listed as both BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE simultaneously.** The determination of the control system to be used will be made based upon the audience. For instance, not all contractors are accessed at the Talent-Keyhole level; therefore, certain information would need to be protected in Byeman channels especially when generated in contractor development and manufacturing facilities. However, the same information could be handled in the Talent-Keyhole system when going to the Intelligence Community.

(U) Classification Sources: For reference purposes the classification guides in Section II include a "Source" column that lists numbers that identify the original classification authority for the item of information. As one will note, most of the items of information in the guide pertain to the NRO Relay Satellite program. As such, many classification determinations were made and source number 4 (Original Program Classification Guides) and number 5 (Existing Program Security Guidelines) are frequently listed. For completeness, a number of items of information are listed in the guide that deal with programs outside the management cognizance of the Director of Communications. These items were derivatively classified and the appropriate source number(s) listed. The sources, preceded by their corresponding number, are as follows:

- 1) Central Imagery Office (CIO) Imagery Policy Series.
- 2) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR).
- 3) Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).

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- 4) Original Program Classification Guidelines
- 5) Existing Program Security Guidelines
- 6) Security Implementation Plan for Compartmentation Restructure, November 18, 1993.
- 7) DNRO briefings and Staff Memoranda.
- 8) Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, April 24, 1995.
- 9) Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, February 22, 1995.
- 10) Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49 regarding National Space Policy.
- 11) Declassification of the terms "Talent-Keyhole" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, February 23, 1995.

(U) **Reason for Classification:** Under the provisions of EO 12958, the reason(s) for a classification decision must be documented. To meet this requirement, the EO specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category(ies) described in Section 1.5 of EO 12958 plus the letter(s) that correspond to the category(ies) should be listed (e.g., 1.5 (a) equates to: Military plans, weapons systems, or operations). The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are listed below:

- (a) "Military plans, weapons systems, or operations."
- (b) "Foreign government information."
- (c) "Intelligence activities (including special activities), sources or methods, or cryptology."
- (d) "Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources."
- (e) "Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security."
- (f) "United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities."
- (g) "Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security."

(U) **Declassification Instructions:** With regard to declassification, EO 12958 specifies that the original classification authority will apply a date or event for declassification that corresponds to the lapse of the information's national security sensitivity. And, the date should not exceed 10 years. Individuals who have original classification authority, however, may determine that certain information must remain classified beyond 10 years. In this case, the information must be annotated with the letter "X" plus a numerical designation that corresponds to a specific exemption category or set of exemption categories described in Section 1.6 of EO 12958 (e.g. X1 equates to: Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity). The X markings and corresponding declassification exemptions are as follows:

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- X1 Reveals an intelligence source method, or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity.
- X2 Reveals information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction.
- X3 Reveals information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system.
- X4 Reveals United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans.
- X5 Reveals foreign government information.
- X6 Would damage relations between the United States and a foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or seriously undermine diplomatic activities that reasonably are expected to be ongoing for period greater than 10 years.
- X7 Would impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and or other individuals for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized.
- X8 Would violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

(U) Portion Marking: The EO mandates that all classified information carry an appropriate portion marking. The NRO has been granted a limited exemption from this requirement. The NRO does not have to portion mark information generated and maintained within the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally, however, must be portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the management cognizance of the Director of the NRO. Prior to disseminating this classification guide to an organization external to the NRO, individuals must first contact the DCG Security Staff.

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Attachment 2

Classification
(As appropriate when form filled in)

DCG Classification Guide Change Request

Change Request No.:
(Assigned by DCG Security Staff)

Originator:
(Name, Organization, Functional
Activity)

Contact Information:
(Address, Phone and FAX Numbers)

Date:

Proposed Change:

New Item ___ Modification ___ Classification ___ Other ___

Item/Listing:
(Guide Section, Item Number, Page)

Change Description:
(Detailed to include other items
affected)

Rationale:

Action:
(To be completed by DCG Security)

Classification

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NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (NRO Launch IPG) (U)

20 June 2004



**National Reconnaissance Office
Office of Space Launch**

This guide supercedes the NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (NRO Launch IPG),
20 July 1999 and Change 1, 7 April 2000

LOCAL REPRODUCTION AUTHORIZED

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Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors for administrative and operational use. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the NRO Office of Space Launch.

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NRO Launch IPG

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20 June 2004

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20 June 2004

(U) Change Record

<u>Change Number</u>	<u>Date of Change</u>	<u>Initials (Incorporated by)</u>	<u>Date Incorporated</u>
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20 June 2004

(U) Foreword

1. (U) **Description:** National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Satellite Vehicle (SV) programs must be given security protection to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on mission objectives, capabilities, operational configurations, and vulnerabilities; schedules and manifests revealing replenishment needs or strategies; program and SV plans or requirements; and constellation health and system needs. All program documents, whether classified or unclassified, including this Information Protection Guide (IPG), shall be given minimum distribution consistent with operational requirements, need-to-know, and sound security practices.
2. (U) **Derived Classification:** Classification guidance provided is either from Original Classification Authority (OCA) of the Director, NRO Office of Space Launch (OSL), or derived from guidance provided/documented in the National Space Policy, dated 14 September 1996, the *NRO Classification Guide*, Version 5.1, dated 1 May 2000, and other applicable documents.
3. (U) **Supersession:** This IPG supersedes and rescinds integration and launch (I&L) classification guidance contained in the *NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (NRO Launch IPG)*, dated 20 July 1999, with Change 1, dated 7 April 2000. Clarification guidance issued since Change 1 is listed in Section VI, Clarification Letters, and the current status of each letter is given.
4. (U) **Purpose:** The NRO Launch IPG provides a single source of protection requirements for the integration and launch process of NRO SVs on various families of launch vehicles. Contact the OSL or applicable Contracting Officer prior to implementing this IPG if increased costs are anticipated.
5. (U) **Authority:** This guide is issued under authority of the Director, NRO, and NRO Directive 82-1a, *NRO Space Launch Management*.

APPROVED BY:


EDWARD G. ZAKRZEWSKIColonel, USAF
Director, Office of Space Launch
National Reconnaissance Office~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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(U) SECTION I

(U) General Instructions

1. (U) **Purpose:** This NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (IPG) provides protection strategies and guidelines for the protection of NRO information and assets that require protection in the interest of national security. Security requirements and classification guidance provided in this document are intended to serve as a baseline for all NRO launches and their associated elements and components.
2. (U) **Scope:** NRO SV programs must be given security protection to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on mission objectives, capabilities, operational configurations, and vulnerabilities; schedules and manifests revealing replenishment needs or strategies; program and SV plans or requirements; and constellation health and system needs. Information protection requirements specified in this guide are consistent with the security objectives set forth in Executive Order (EO) 12958, *Classified National Security Information*, dated 17 April 1995, as amended; *National Space Policy*, dated 14 September 1996; *DoD Space Policy, Directive 3100.10*, dated 9 July 1999; and applicable Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) Directives and NRO Policies. This section contains general instructions including implementation approaches. Specific classification requirements are provided in Section III. Clarification guidance issued since Change 1 is listed in Section VI, Clarification Letters, and the current status of each letter is given.
3. (U) **Office of Primary Responsibility:** This guide is issued by the NRO Office of Space Launch (OSL). The OSL is the cognizant office for the integration and launch of NRO satellites. The OSL Program Security Office (PSO) is the focal point for integration and launch (I&L) classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV System Program Offices (SPOs) for resolution. Address inquiries to:

Office of Space Launch
Program Security Office

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

(b)(3)

4. (U) **Supersession, Classification Authority, and Applicability:**
 - a. (U) This IPG supersedes and rescinds I&L classification guidance contained in the *NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (NRO Launch IPG)*, dated 20 July 1999, and Change 1, dated 7 April 2000.
 - b. (U) This guide will be cited as the classification authority for material generated in connection with the integration and launch of Air Force Programs (AFPs), experimental and developmental programs, and NRO Launches (NROLs) listed in Section II, Category Assignment Table. Information and material requiring protection based on other efforts which support NRO launches will be classified in accordance with (IAW) the appropriate classification guide. The provisions of this IPG do not cover launches occurring prior to Dec 1996 and the classification guidance for those launches remains in effect. Questions on applicability of this IPG to any other past and/or present NRO launches should be referred to the OSL.
 - c. (U) This guide applies to all participants, contractor and government employees, involved in the integration and launch of NRO SVs. NRO participants include, but are not limited to, SV SPOs, Satellite Vehicle Contractors (SVCs), and OSL operations at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Los Angeles Air Force Base (LAAFB), Onizuka Air Force Base (OAFB), Schriever Air Force Base (SAFB), and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). Other organizations and

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agencies supporting NRO launches include, but are not limited to, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), AFSPC's Space Wings, Space Launch Squadrons, and Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), Air Force Space Command's Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Launch Vehicle Contractors (LVCs), Launch Service Contractors (LSC), Launch Vehicle Integration Contractors (LVICs), and Launch System Integration Contractors (LSICs). Prime or associate contractors are responsible for ensuring that their subcontractors are aware of and contractually obligated to comply with the requirements of this guide.

5. **(U) Approach:** The Launch IPG is developed for use by organizations or agencies supporting NRO launches and provides guidelines for the protection of NRO information and assets during I&L processing. The integration and launch process begins when initial launch requirements are provided to launch service providers and ends with post-launch turnover of the SV to the applicable control node. The following definitions apply to NRO information in the I&L environment:
 - a. **(U) SV Operations Data** - Information that is not required by LV mission planners will not be released. This includes information that describes the SV operations in terms of:
 - (1) **(U) SV mission, objectives, capabilities, operational limitations, and vulnerabilities;**
 - (2) **(U) Priorities and plans for space-based intelligence activities;**
 - (3) **(U) Critical, unique to program, advanced state-of-the-art hardware technology;**
 - (4) **(U) Satellite constellation health, system needs, and replenishment strategies; and**
 - (5) **(U) NRO operational infrastructure, elements, and control nodes.**
 - b. **(U) SV Descriptive Data** - Information that describes the SV's shape, mechanical characteristics, and structural dynamics. Information required by the LV mission planners to successfully integrate and launch a satellite will only be released at the NRO's discretion.
 - c. **(U) Planning and Scheduling Data** - Information that provides insight into the operational planning and requirements of a launch flow.
 - d. **(U) Launch Mission Profile Data** - Information that describes the LV mission requirements, e.g., target orbit, predicted injection accuracy, LV orbital mechanics, attitude, roll rates, coast maneuvers, SV separation point, state vector, orbit options, etc. In other words, this information describes LV operations.
6. **(U) NROL Categories:** Three launch classification policy baselines have been established as launch categories based on existing national security requirements to identify the levels of protection for each NRO launch. The specific launch category is established and assigned by the SV SPO at program introduction and explicitly identified in the Program Requirements Document (PRD), Operational Directives, etc. SVs may be re-categorized if the SV SPO determines that an SV's requirements have changed and that a category change is appropriate. SVs are listed by category in Section II. Protection requirements for each launch category are set forth in Section III. The three launch categories are:
 - a. **(U) Category A** - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and Planning and Scheduling Data, to include information that reveals reflight associations/relationships. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection. This category is most restrictive in protection requirements.
 - b. **(U) Category B** - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and information that reveals reflight associations/relationships. This

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
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category is less restrictive in the protection of Planning and Scheduling Data. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection.

- c. (U) Category C - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, but do not require protection of most SV Descriptive Data, Planning and Scheduling Data, or Launch Mission Profile Data. Information that reveals reflight associations/relationships is to be protected. This category is the least restrictive in the protection of these types of information.
7. (U) **NRO Launch Designators:**
 - a. (U) NROL designators identify NRO launches and are the official NRO launch identifier. An NROL designator will be used only once.
 - b. (U) New programs will be assigned an NROL designator and a category as they are manifested. This IPG includes AFP classification determinations to provide classification guidance for historical documents.
 - c. (U) In the past, the NRO used several mechanisms, including AFP numbers, to protect information related to multiple NRO launch activities, reflight, constellation size, and NRO SV identifiers. AFP numbers are no longer official launch designators. Information classified under those AFPs will be remarked in accordance with guidance contained in paragraph 22 of this section.
 - d. (U) Since the AFP numbers were used for more than one launch integration flow, associating them with information in the I&L community may have revealed a launch date, number of launches, launch rate, or planned constellation size, requiring protection of the association with the designator. Associating an NROL designator with information in the I&L community is an acceptable risk; therefore, information content and not the association drives the classification.
 - e. (U) One of the primary uses of the NROL designator is on UNCLASSIFIED launch manifests. The manifests bring order to a process where NRO, DoD, commercial, and civil missions are competing for range availability. Due to the various organizations, SV requirements, constraints, funding, etc. involved, manifest planning must begin many years prior to launch. For example, the National Mission Model (See Definitions) covers a 13-year forecast of government launches. Other formal manifests are the Space Launch Manifest (See Definitions) and the Current Launch Schedule (CLSRB) (See Definitions), which is developed by the Current Launch Schedule Review Board (CLSRB) (See Definitions). For manifest classification guidance, see Section III, item 37. Below is a depiction of the manifest process:



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8. **(U) Launch Vehicle Designators:** Launch vehicle/launch service activities are unclassified unless they reveal information specifically classified under this IPG or other applicable classification guidance. References or designators for specific launch vehicles/launch services, launch vehicle configuration or integration efforts, e.g., Titan IV B-36, Atlas II MLV-10, Delta IV 4.2, Atlas V AV0002, do not inherently identify an SV program or payload. However, SV characteristics and mission planning information may drive LV planning or mission analyses to become classified. The classification tables identify these circumstances. Re-use or reflight of an LV configuration or hardware set becomes classified if it positively confirms a reflight association or relationship between two or more SVs.
9. **(U) Need-To-Know Information:** All classified or For Official Use Only (FOUO) information must be controlled on a basis of strict "need-to-know" (See Definitions). Dissemination must be made on the basis of a positive determination, by the holder of the information, that the intended recipient has a demonstrated requirement for the requested information. Dissemination of classified official launch information outside the Launch Office will be made only with the approval of the Director, OSL. Requests should be forwarded to the OSL PSO.
10. **(U) Substitute Identifiers:** Substitute identifiers are used to avoid association and classification issues related to identifying a particular activity or operation. A substitute identifier may be any combination of numbers, letters, or an unclassified name. With the implementation of the NROL system, the unclassified NROL designator will be used to identify the NRO launch activity, making the use of substitute identifiers for launch unnecessary. The SV SPO governs the assignment, classification, and use of substitute identifiers for the SV.
11. **(U) NRO Satellite Vehicle (SV) Information:** NRO SV information is derived from satellite vehicle technical data. Therefore, NRO SV SPOs, as originators of the information, control dissemination of the information. Any classification call within the IPG that is marked/highlighted as "SCI", "SCI - See Remark", or "See Remark" refers the reader back to this paragraph. These annotations mean:
 - a. **(U) SCL Information** that is identified as "SCI" (Sensitive Compartmented Information) is NOT needed for integration and launch purposes and will NOT be decompartmented nor provided to the integration and launch community. All such requests shall be denied. Anyone discovering this information, either directly, deduced, or implied, will protect it at a minimum of SECRET, 25XI, and immediately notify OSL through secure channels. The NRO will determine the corrective actions or requirement for limited distribution, or any system, facility or personnel access needs.
 - b. **(U) SCI - See Remark.** Information that is identified as "SCI - See Remark" and IS needed for integration and launch purposes may be decompartmented and/or declassified at the NRO's discretion and documented by a clarification letter. Requests for decompartmentation or declassification of this information should be forwarded to OSL.
 - c. **(U) See Remark.** Information that is identified as "See Remark" has various classification levels or protection requirements (either SCI, collateral SECRET, or FOUO) depending on specific NRO SV SPO determination. Requests for the classification level of a specific "See Remark" item should be forwarded to OSL. Requests for decompartmentation or declassification of this information should also be forwarded to OSL and, if approved, will be documented by a clarification letter.
12. **(U) For Official Use Only Information:** Information that is not classified but can provide insight into NRO SV requirements, characteristics, and operations is designated as "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" or "U//FOUO". FOUO information will be afforded protection in

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(U) SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)

accordance with the FOUO handling instructions in Section IV. NRO organizations/contractors must follow NRO Directive 50-12 and NRO Instruction 50-9, both titled *NRO Use of "For Official Use Only" Dissemination Control Marking*.

13. (U) **Internet/Intranet Use:** Under no circumstances will any NRO information (classified or unclassified) be posted to the Internet without specific prior approval of OSL. Unclassified NRO information may be posted on an organization's Intranet, the computer network internal to an organization if the Intranet is behind a protective firewall. Any classified information inadvertently placed on an unclassified network is STILL considered classified. Upon discovery, immediately contact your program security representative. Posting of NRO FOUO information to an organization's Intranet will be handled IAW the instructions in Section IV.
14. (U) **Public Release of Information:** The NRO is responsible for and will manage its space launch system planning, acquisition, security, public affairs, and operations. NRO Office of Corporate Communications (NRO/OCC) is the lead agency for NRO public affairs activities. Public release of any information regarding the NRO, regardless of classification, will be at the determination of the DNRO, DD/NRO, or NRO/OCC. Unilateral public release of information pertaining to the NRO and its programs, operations, and I&L activities is prohibited. Only NRO spokespersons may make statements or comment on NRO activities. All NRO related material proposed for public release, whether Government or Contractor originated, must be coordinated with the NRO prior to release. For NRO integration and launch activities, OSL will serve as the primary interface for processing material proposed for any public releases.
 - a. (U) The high visibility of NRO launches generates considerable interest by the media and requests for release of NRO information. NRO information is defined as any information, classified or unclassified, pertaining to the integration and launch of an NRO SV, regardless of the organization which generates the information. Information relating to the integration and launch of an NRO satellite includes, but is not limited to:
 - (1) (U) **Public Affairs Plan.** Public Affairs (PA) Plans are developed for each NRO launch. PA Plans for NRO launches must be coordinated with the OSL at least 60 days prior to the scheduled event. PA Plans are defined to include, but are not limited to, launch narratives, scripts, news releases, and announcements regarding launch delays, mishaps, etc.
 - (2) (U) **Memorabilia:** See Section I, paragraph 16, for guidance on launch memorabilia.
 - (3) (U) **Booster Telemetry Data.** NRO satellite data that is interleaved with launch vehicle telemetry data will not be released without approval of OSL.
 - (4) (U) **Animation.** Computer animation of launch vehicle ascent and upper stage events e.g., Satellite Tool Kit (STK), Ground Representation of Kinematics (GROK), can depict NRO satellite deployment. The use of animation or any other similar software will first be approved by OSL prior to its release and subsequent use. OSL review will be limited to the level of detail of the depiction of the SV. A classification review will occur to ensure any information or software intended for use on unclassified systems does not infer classified information. Any animation material intended for use on unsecure/unclassified systems will be reviewed prior to its use on or by unclassified systems. See Section III, item 49, for additional guidance.
 - (5) (U) **On-board Video Instrumentation.** The use of on-board video instrumentation will be approved by the cognizant SV SPO in coordination with OSL.
 - (6) (U) **Launch Mishap.** Only the appropriate Space Wing Public Affairs Officer will release information regarding a launch mishap and the associated investigation to the media. All

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information will be coordinated with the NRO Mission Director, or his/her representative, NRO/OCC, and the appropriate NRO Security representatives prior to release. Personnel involved in the recovery operations will defer all public statements to the respective Space Wing Public Affairs offices and the designated NRO/OCC spokesperson.

- b. (U) IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*, members or employees of the Air Force are responsible for obtaining the necessary review and clearance before releasing any proposed statement, text, or imagery to the public. This includes any digital products being loaded on an unrestricted web site.
 - c. (U) Information being considered for release to the public about a launch involving an NRO SV will be forwarded to the NRO Mission Director for approval prior to planned release. The Director, NRO Office of Space Launch, or his/her representative, serves as Mission Director, and serves as the senior NRO representative at launches of NRO satellite vehicles. In addition, a representative from NRO Office of Corporate Communications will deploy to the launch base in sufficient time to assist the appropriate Space Wing Public Affairs Officer as well as the appropriate LVC.
15. (U) **Disclosures to Foreign Interests:** Information about NRO programs and activities, whether classified or unclassified, will NOT be shared with international organizations, foreign nationals, foreign interests (See Definitions), or representatives of foreign interests (See Definitions) unless it has been approved for release by the NRO. Any organization or person who has a need to disclose and/or release NRO information to foreign interests will ask the OSL PSO for instructions on submitting a request for disclosure. Any person who becomes aware of a possible or actual intentional or inadvertent disclosure of NRO information to foreign interests that are not authorized to receive that information must report the incident immediately to the OSL PSO.
16. (U) **Memorabilia:** Memorabilia (See Definitions) is often used to inspire esprit de corps and morale within organizations. The design that is created for use as memorabilia must follow a set of criteria to avoid (1) the perception of, or actual release of, classified information; (2) any representation that would be inappropriate in the workplace, or (3) the creation of those designs that would infringe upon copyrighted material. NRO organizations/contractors will protect all memorabilia designs as classified information until they receive NRO approval. No activity toward the funding and/or production of items containing those designs may be undertaken until the design has been approved. Sale and/or distribution of the memorabilia may not take place until approved by the NRO. All changes to the design after NRO approval must also be approved by the NRO. The following guidelines shall be followed by organizations/contractors considering creating memorabilia:
- a. (U) NRO organizations/contractors must follow NRO Directive 50-6a, *NRO Memorabilia*.
 - b. (U) It is requested that non-NRO organizations coordinate the design for any memorabilia to be used in conjunction with an NRO I&L activity with OSL. OSL would like the opportunity to review to ensure that there is no inadvertent or purposeful inclusion of sensitive/classified information in the design of specific memorabilia as well as to ensure that the compilation of all memorabilia for a specific NRO launch does not reveal sensitive relationships or associations.
17. (U) **Risk Management:**
- a. (U) The Director, NRO, and the Director, OSL, as Original Classification Authorities (OCAs), have established a risk management-based classification system and program protection process. The ultimate goal is effective and, where deemed appropriate, selective application of security

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- countermeasures to protect essential program information, technologies and systems while avoiding significant impacts that may be associated with traditional regulatory requirements.
- b. (U) Numerous factors affect the degree of damage to national security that the compromise of classified information may cause. Also, different elements of information within the same classification level can result in different impacts. Even the time in which classified information is either declassified, downgraded, or compromised during the integration and launch flow can be a significant factor.
 - c. (U) Users are not only encouraged, but are expected, to identify system and operational conditions that may be reducing the effectiveness of security protection measures. Early recognition of such conditions may indicate where the risk management process would enhance NRO security programs. These system and operational conditions should be identified to the OSL PSO. (See paragraph 25 of this section.)
 - d. (U) From time-to-time it may be necessary for the I&L community to submit a request for waiver from the classification requirements of this IPG. Rationale for a waiver request will be closely scrutinized and will only be approved (1) if the security infrastructure is not in place to protect information as required, (2) if the program would incur undo cost or schedule impacts to enhance the security infrastructure, and (3) if the NRO determines that assets are not exposed to unacceptable levels of security risk by granting the request for waiver.
 - (1) (U) All requests for waiver shall be directed via secure means to the OSL PSO and shall include (a) a reference to the classification call in question, (b) rationale for the requested waiver, (c) an explanation of proposed security methods to be implemented in lieu of the original security requirement, and (d) a security risk analysis that includes a description of the security measures that will be implemented to ensure an acceptable level of security risk.
 - (2) (U) Requests for waiver must be submitted with sufficient time prior to an operational or implementation requirement, a minimum of 90 days, to allow for coordination with the appropriate NRO SV SPO. Users must comply with all provisions of this IPG until a request for waiver has been granted, in writing, by the OSL or other appropriate authority.
18. (U) **Operations Security (OPSEC):** An important part of the NRO's risk management philosophy is the application of OPSEC principles to reduce system vulnerabilities to an acceptable level. OPSEC is the methodology for protecting unclassified operational, administrative, and logistical activities that may reveal classified I&L information. A key element of OPSEC in the I&L environment is the identification and control of unclassified indicators and observables which could provide an adversary with insight into classified NRO SV activities, plans, or operations.
- a. (U) The NRO I&L risk management philosophy includes an OPSEC approach to:
 - (1) (U) Identify NRO I&L activities that, if observed by knowledgeable adversaries, could compromise classified information or that expose high value hardware to an unacceptable level of risk.
 - (2) (U) Determine the indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive classified information in time to be useful to adversaries.
 - (3) (U) Select and implement measures that mask or obscure selected NRO I&L activities to prohibit or reduce the likelihood of adversary observation.
 - b. (U) The OSL requires all participants in NRO launch related activities to establish a sound security program that incorporates an OPSEC approach consistent with government regulations,

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the Contract Security Specification (DD Form 254), or other contract security guidance as applicable to their organization. Questions related to I&L OPSEC requirements or implementation measures should be directed to the OSL PSO.

19. (U) **Classification Marking:** Classification designations, time limits, and derivative marking procedures are applied IAW EO 12958, as amended.
20. (U) **Classification/Declassification Instructions:** Classification designations specified in this guide are identified with "S" for SECRET, and "U" for UNCLASSIFIED. Information handling instructions, such as "SCI" for Sensitive Compartmented Information (see paragraph 11) and "U//FOUO" for UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (see paragraph 12), are also used. Classification tables in Section III assign classification level, identify the appropriate classification reason, and provide declassification instructions.
 - a. (U) The classification reason is identified as "1.4" (for the amended EO 12958 Section 1.4) plus the letter(s) corresponding to the appropriate classification category in the amended EO 12958, e.g., 1.4(b). Acceptable categories or reasons for classifying information are:
 - 1.4(a) Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information;
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
 - 1.4(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; and
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction.
 - b. (U) Declassification instructions are either identified as a specific event/activity or an exemption category if the information has been exempted from automatic declassification. If the product is exempt from automatic 25 year declassification or Manual Review (MR), the classifier will apply the letter "25X" plus the number that corresponds to that exemption category(ies) from Section 3.3 of EO 12958, as amended. Manual Review (MR) may only be used when the declassification date is an event or in cases where EO 12958 requirements are superseded by statute, treaty, or other agreement. Allowable exemptions are information that would:
 - 25X1 Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method;
 - 25X2 Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
 - 25X3 Reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
 - 25X4 Reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a United States weapons system;
 - 25X5 Reveal actual United States military war plans that remain in effect;
 - 25X6 Reveal information, including foreign government information, that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
 - 25X7 Reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other

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(U) SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)

- protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized;
- 25X8 Reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating to the national security;
- 25X9 Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
- c. (U) Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information. Unauthorized disclosures will be reviewed by the OSL PSO to determine appropriate and/or necessary course(s) of action.
21. (U) **Contractor Proprietary Information:** When a contractor releases proprietary information to the Government, the contractor shall mark the information appropriately and, if necessary, inform the recipients of required protection measures. The Government has the responsibility to protect the information in accordance with federal laws and regulations.
22. (U) **Previously Generated Information:** This IPG changes the classification requirements for some information items. Archived documents that were created and classified under previous guidance, prior to the effective date of this IPG, need not be remarked. Any newly created documents, including extractions, changes, revisions, and/or updates of documents classified under previous guidance, must have current classification markings, to include use of this IPG as the classification authority.
23. (U) **Compilation of Information:** A compilation or aggregation of items of information which are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association, relationship, or piece of information that meets the standards for classification under the tables contained in this guide and is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. For example, certain information referenced in this IPG when standing alone is unclassified; however, this information may be classified or FOUO when associated with intelligence community overhead reconnaissance or the NRO. It is the individual's responsibility to make compilation classification determinations. When necessary, the OSL PSO will assist with any compilation classification decisions.
24. (U) **Classification Recommendations:**
- a. (U) IAW EO 12958, as amended, users of NRO information who, in good faith, believe that its classification is improper are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of the information. Recommended classification changes should be submitted in writing to the OSL, who will coordinate with the applicable NRO SV SPO. Assistance in maintaining current, effective and adequate classification criteria is solicited of all participating government and industrial organizations. See paragraph 17d in this section for guidance on one-time waivers.
- b. (U) The OSL PSO shall be notified when the accuracy of an assigned classification is questioned. Information shall be protected IAW this guide pending reply to the inquiry. The information shall not be regraded or declassified unless so directed by the OSL, which will coordinate with the applicable NRO SV SPO.
25. (U) **Reporting Program Vulnerabilities and/or Weaknesses:** Individuals who believe they have identified a potential vulnerability or weakness to an NRO SV program will assign a tentative minimum classification of SECRET, 25X8, to the information and immediately contact, via secure communications, the OSL PSO for further guidance. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV SPOs for resolution. The NRO will

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(U) SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)

- evaluate the validity of the concern, assign a classification, reason for classification, and downgrading instructions to the information and take other actions as necessary.
26. **(U) Reporting Elicitations:** Participants in the integration and launch of NRO SVs shall report all direct, purposeful, or probing elicitations by any individual, regardless of nationality, to gain insight into classified, FOUO, business proprietary, or non-releasable technical information regarding NRO programs, activities, or operations beyond the scope of their need-to-know. Elicitation attempts may be made by visitors to any of the organizations under the auspices of this guide or when I&L participants are visiting other organizations, either foreign or domestic, or attending symposia, seminar, exhibitions, conferences, etc. The report to the OSL PSO must include the name(s), position, area(s) of interest, date, and place of occurrence, as well as the name and telephone number of the reporting individual.
27. **(U) Classification Conflict Resolution:** This IPG is applicable to the integration and launch of those activities identified in Section II, Category Assignment Table. Conflicts between this and any other guides will be addressed to the OSL PSO. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV SPOs for resolution. Pending resolution of the conflict, information will be protected at the highest classification given.
28. **(U) Reproduction and Dissemination:** Local reproduction of this guide is authorized. All program documents, whether classified or unclassified, including this IPG, will be given minimum distribution consistent with operational requirements, need-to-know, and sound security practices.
29. **(U) Classification Currency:** The OSL will make revisions to this guide by distributing corrected pages for insertion in place of superseded pages or issuing pen and ink changes. Such changes will be posted on page 3, Change Record. When considered appropriate, a completely revised guide will be issued.
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
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(U) SECTION II

(U) Category Assignment Table



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(U) SECTION IV

(U) For Official Use Only Handling Instructions

1. (U) Responsibilities.

a. (U) In accordance with NRO Directive (NROD) 50-12 and NRO Instruction (NROI) 50-9, both titled "*NRO Use of 'For Official Use Only' Dissemination Control Marking*", all personnel supporting NRO activities are responsible for protecting NRO FOUO information within the following guidelines. These procedures apply to the use of the FOUO marking in hardcopy documentation as well as its application in electronic media and information systems.

2. (U) Definitions.

a. (U) Dissemination Controls. Markings that identify the expansion or limitation on the distribution of information. These markings are in addition to and separate from the levels of classification defined by Executive Order 12958.

b. (U) For Official Use Only (FOUO). A dissemination control marking for information that has not been given a security classification pursuant to an Executive Order, but which may be withheld from the public because disclosure would cause a foreseeable harm to an interest protected by one or more FOIA exemptions. Marking information FOUO ensures that the information will be reviewed by the originating Government agency prior to release, however, it does not guarantee the information will be withheld from release.

c. (U) DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program. The DoD FOIA program ensures that a record requested by a member of the public who follows rules established by proper authority in the DoD shall not be withheld in whole or in part unless the record is exempt from mandatory partial disclosure under the FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552).

d. (U) Locked Facility. An NRO or NRO contractor building that has U.S. Government (USG) or Government-contractor internal building security to prevent unrestricted access by the general public.

e. (U) NIPRNET. N (Unclassified but sensitive) Internet Protocol Router Network. The network used primarily by DoD, modeled after the World Wide Web, for unclassified but sensitive interchange. One of two types of IP routers owned by the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN).

3. (U) General.

a. (U) FOUO is official government information that does not meet requirements for classification but still requires protection. As such, FOUO is an administrative marking that is used to limit dissemination of certain categories of unclassified information from public disclosure.

b. (U) Official government information needed by selected recipients outside the NRO in furtherance of the NRO's mission may be released at the discretion of the individual holding such information. Such release does not constitute authority for its publication and a disclaimer to that effect should be attached, such as: "The information contained herein is for the exclusive use of (name of recipient) and is not for further distribution." Ultimate responsibility for the protection of FOUO information from public release lies with the user, who will be held accountable.

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(U) SECTION IV - For Official Use Only Handling Instruction (Continued)

- e. (U) Certain classified material will be downgraded by the Original Classification Authority to UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO. When classified material approved for declassification to U//FOUO is used, extracted, reissued, transmitted and/or updated, it must be reviewed and appropriately marked.
5. (U) **Transmission/Dissemination/Storage:** Authorized contractors, consultants and grantees may transmit/disseminate FOUO information internally, to each other and U.S. Government components and officials of U.S. Government components who have a legitimate need for the information. FOUO information shall be physically transported in a manner that precludes disclosure of the contents. Typically, this would involve any opaque cover such as an envelope, lock bag, or briefcase. The following guidelines apply:
- a. (U) Personnel shall use existing classified information systems to process, transmit and store FOUO information, when available.
- b. (U) FOUO information shall be discussed using classified communication systems (e.g., classified telephone systems, STU III, STE, cellular STU III), when available to both parties. If a classified communication system is not available, FOUO information may be discussed on landline or cellular telephones. FOUO information should not be discussed on portable (wireless) telephones. If it is necessary to discuss FOUO information on a non-secure phone, personnel must exercise caution and employ sound operational security measures to reasonably prevent unauthorized disclosure.
- c. (U) FOUO information shall be sent over secure facsimile (FAX) when available to both parties. If an unclassified FAX is used, distribution should be to an authorized recipient who has been notified in advance and is in attendance during transmission/receipt (personnel are reminded that this latter procedure does not preclude electronic interception of the transmission).
- d. (U) FOUO information may be sent by first class mail or in bulk fourth-class shipments as long as the shipping package is not marked as containing FOUO material.
- e. (U) FOUO information may be resident on government or contractor owned unclassified information systems (e.g., laptops, networks, stand alone systems, personal electronic devices [PEDs], Government Furnished Equipment), including those with Internet connections, only if pre-approved by the OSL Program Security Office (PSO) and the Office of Security [redacted] (b)(3)
[redacted] (OS [redacted]) For information systems not covered by an existing security plan, requests for authorization/approval require submission of a justification statement to the PSO – the PSO may require a security plan be written and submitted for approval. FOUO information is prohibited from being downloaded to, or stored on personally owned information systems (e.g., laptops, PEDs). *Users are cautioned that dialing into government or contractor unclassified information systems to access FOUO information for read purposes only may automatically download the information to their hard drive as a consequence of read access.* Holders will not use user-all, general, broadcast or universal mail addresses to distribute FOUO information. FOUO information will not be posted on the Internet on home pages, bulletin boards, or any other public forums. FOUO information may NOT be used with personally owned Internet accounts. See Item 8 below for approval requirements.
- f. (U) FOUO information may be reproduced on unclassified copiers or within designated government or contractor reproduction areas.
- g. (U) During working hours, FOUO information shall be used in a manner that limits access by persons who do not have an official need for the information. During non-working hours and when internal building security is provided, FOUO material should be stored in a manner precluding review by an unauthorized observer, and may be filed with other unclassified records in unlocked files or desks. When there is no internal building security, locked buildings or rooms will provide adequate

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(U) SECTION IV - For Official Use Only Handling Instruction (Continued)

after-hours protection or the material can be stored in locked receptacles such as file cabinets, desks, or bookcases.

h. (U) FOUO information may only be removed for official purposes. Unauthorized personnel shall not be allowed to view FOUO information. FOUO, by designation, is to be used solely for official purposes, which generally precludes work at a residence or other non-official location. Under exigent circumstances FOUO may be removed for brief, operationally driven requirements (e.g., an emergency notification phone tree, emergency procedure SOP, etc.) to non-official areas such as a residence, hotel room, airplane or other private location where it is in control of the bearer. When the FOUO information cannot be sanitized; the bearer of the information must validate the need to remove the material based upon (1) criticality and (2) duration of removal.

6. (U) Disposition.

a. (U) When no longer needed, FOUO information should be disposed of in a manner to hinder reconstruction, e.g., by shredding or tearing each sheet into pieces and placing in a recycle or trash container or by initializing, degaussing or shredding magnetic media.

b. (U) FOUO material may be recycled. Safeguard the FOUO documents or information until recycling. Recycling contracts must include agreements on how to protect and destroy FOUO material.

c. (U) Removal of the FOUO status can only be accomplished by the government originator. The OSL PSO will review and remove, or authorize the removal of, FOUO status for information.

7. (U) **Unauthorized Disclosure.** Government and Contractor personnel must act to protect FOUO information under their control from unauthorized disclosure. Government and Contractor organizations must inform the OSL PSO of any unauthorized disclosures of FOUO information. Unauthorized disclosure, intentional disregard or gross negligence in the handling of FOUO information does not constitute a reportable security violation. However, the responsible organization should take appropriate administrative action to assign responsibility for unauthorized disclosure of FOUO information and, when substantiated, take appropriate disciplinary action. Unauthorized disclosure of FOUO information containing Privacy Act information may also result in civil or criminal sanctions against responsible persons.

8. (U) **Implementing Instructions for FOUO on Unclassified Systems:** Organizations who receive NRO FOUO information from external sources (e.g., email) yet don't want it to reside on their systems, should delete the received data and contact the sender to request they cease FOUO transmissions. In the event NRO FOUO information is to be resident on an unclassified system or network, the requestor will submit written justification and supporting protection plan to the OSL PSO for approval. The plan will detail how FOUO information will be protected from unauthorized access and / or release while resident on the unclassified system. The Protection Plan will include:

a. (U) Description. General size and description of the network / unclassified system.

b. (U) Location of Network.

c. (U) Controlling Authority. Description of Entity controlling network elements.

d. (U) Access Controls Employed. Description of administrative procedures, as well as technical mechanisms, used to restrict access to FOUO files/information to authorized users. Note: The network must provide Identification & Authentication mechanisms to uniquely identify and authenticate the users. The network structure must define and control access between named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs).

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(U) SECTION IV - For Official Use Only Handling Instruction (Continued)

e. (U) Internet Connectivity. Description of any connections and controls employed. FOUO information is permitted on government networks that use the Internet as a carrier if the network has been approved for FOUO (e.g., NIPRNET). NRO personnel are not required to get PSO and OS [] approval to send FOUO information across USG networks that are already approved for FOUO information. Note: FOUO data must be encrypted during transmission over the Internet by using PSO & OS [] approved commercially available encryption or other similar methodology (if approved by PSO & OS [] that can be reasonably expected to prohibit the data from being obtained (hijacked) by unauthorized users.

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f. (U) Description of Audit features. Auditing is not a requirement, but describe features if used.

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(U) SECTION V

(U) Definitions

(U) AF	Air Force.
(U) AFI	Air Force Instruction.
(U) AFP	Air Force Program.
(U) AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network. The AFSCN controls over 80 communication, navigation, missile warning, and meteorological satellites and other missions for DoD, NASA, and the United Kingdom. It consists of (1) two operational control nodes located at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, and Onizuka Air Force Base, CA; (2) 17 TT&C antennas at nine geographical locations worldwide; (3) a communications calibration site at Camp Parks, CA; (4) space vehicle checkout facilities at CCAFS, FL, and VAFB, CA; and (5) communications connectivity among these locations.
(U) AFSPC	Air Force Space Command.
(U) AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment. Any electrical (EAGE) or mechanical (MAGE) ancillary equipment to support the flight hardware. This may include test sets, battery conditioners, or adapters. All equipment, excluding Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE), necessary to support a spacelift system throughout production processing and launch operations.
(U) Applicable Control Node	The spacecraft command and control element that assumes responsibility for the command and control of the spacecraft after launch.
(U) ASE	Aerospace Support Equipment. The ASE consists of the hardware and software that provides the physical and functional interface of the SV and the LV.
(U) BLI	Budget Line Item.
(U) BV	Booster Vehicle.
(U) Category A	The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and Planning and Scheduling Data, to include information that reveals reflight. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection. This category is most restrictive in protection requirements.
(U) Category B	The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and information that reveals reflight. This category is less restrictive in the protection of Planning and Scheduling Data. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection.
(U) Category C	The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, but do not require protection of most SV Descriptive Data, Planning and Scheduling Data, or Launch Mission Profile Data. Information that reveals reflight is to be protected. This category is the least restrictive in protection requirements.
(U) CCAFS	Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

(U) CCAM	Contamination/Collision Avoidance Maneuver.
(U) COMSEC	Communications Security - the protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons' access to information derived from telecommunications of the United States Government related to national security.
(U) Current Launch Schedule (CLS)	A 15-month executable launch schedule with de-conflicted dates for government and commercial launches and planned maintenance. Maintained by the respective space wings and re-baselined quarterly at the CLSRB. The CLS is a subset of the Space Launch Manifest and reflects the most current launch scheduling information.
(U) Current Launch Schedule Review Board (CLSRB)	A quarterly scheduling forum chaired by Space Command and attended by senior officers, program managers and commercial representatives from the launch community. The purpose of the CLSRB is to review and approve the Space Launch Manifest and identify any conflicts that would limit the ability to execute the CLS. The CLSRB formally re-baselines the three-year launch schedule by approving the executable CLS, launch queue for months 16 - 36 of the Space Launch Manifest, and releasing excess capacity for use by commercial launch operators.
(U) DCI	Director, Central Intelligence.
(U) DISN	Defense Information Systems Network.
(U) DoD	Department of Defense.
(U) DD	Department of Defense.
(U) DDNRO	Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office.
(U) DNRO	Director, National Reconnaissance Office.
(U) EAGE	Electrical Aerospace Ground Equipment.
<div></div>	
(U) EELV	Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.
(U) EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility.
(U) EMI	Electromagnetic Interference. Any EM disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics or electrical equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of electronic warfare, or unintentionally, as a result of spurious emissions and responses, intermodulation products.
(U) EO	Executive Order.
(U) External View	See SV Launch Configuration.
(U) FAX	Facsimile.
(U) FFO	Funds From Others.
(U) FMH	Free Molecular Heating.
(U) FOIA	Freedom of Information Act. The FOIA requires that Executive Branch agencies respond to requests for information from the public. Requests

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

submitted to the NRO are processed through MS&O/IARC.

- (U) Foreign Interest Any foreign government, agency of a foreign government, or representative of a foreign government; any form of business enterprise or legal entity organized, chartered, or incorporated under the laws of any country other than the US or its possessions and trust territories, and any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. (See Representative of a Foreign Interest).
- (U) FOUO For Official Use Only.
- (U) GeoLITE Geosynchronous Lightweight Integrated Technology Experiment.
- (U) GROK Ground Representation of Kinematics.
- (U) GSE Ground Support Equipment. Ground equipment required to perform spacelift mission operations and maintenance. Consists of AGE and RPIE. GSE can be either common use (e.g., range GSE) or dedicated (e.g., Titan).
- (U) IAW In Accordance With.
- (U) I&L Integration and Launch.
- (U) IARC NRO Information and Access Release Center.
- (U) ILC Initial Launch Capability.
- (U) IP Internet Protocol.
- (U) Internet A set of computers that are networked together throughout the world.
- (U) Intranet A set of computers that are networked together behind an organization's firewall.
- (U) IPG Information Protection Guide.
- (U) IRON Inter-Range Operations Number - a four-digit number used to schedule and identify AFSCN support for booster, launch, and/or on-orbit operations.
- (U) LAAFB Los Angeles Air Force Base.
- (U) Launch Date Date when a space launch is/was scheduled to occur; year, quarter, month, week or day.
- (U) Launch Mission Profile Data Information that describes the LV mission requirements, e.g., target orbit predicted injection accuracy, LV orbital mechanics, attitude, roll rates, coast maneuvers, SV separation point, state vector, orbit options, etc. In other words, information that describes LV operations.
- (U) Launch Time The planned launch time is usually the opening of the launch window.
- (U) Launch Period A time span (that envelopes the launch window) during which an LV launch is intended to occur. Used to define the beginning and end of area clear and advance warning notices when ships, aircraft, trains, and personnel are prohibited from the restricted hazardous area or zone.
- (U) Launch Window A specified period, including duration and/or time, during which a space launch must occur to satisfy technical constraints and requirements. The launch window is based on LV capabilities and/or SV requirements.

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

(U) LCO	Launch Communications Office.
(U) LON	Launch On Need.
(U) LSC	Launch Service Contractor.
(U) LSIC	Launch Systems Integration Contractor.
(U) LV	Launch Vehicle - consists of the entire space delivery system including, as appropriate, the booster, core vehicle, upper stage, and the payload fairing.
(U) LVC	Launch Vehicle Contractor.
(U) LVIC	Launch Vehicle Integration Contractor.
(U) MAGE	Mechanical Aerospace Ground Equipment.
(U) MCC	Mission Control Center.
(U) Memorabilia	NRO items such as logos, patches, coffee mugs, clothing, plaques, coins, and the like that display an association with the NRO or an NRO program, project, mission, payload, etc., and which may or may not enter the public domain.

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(U) Mission Director	Director, OSL, as the Mission Director, is the final authority for all NRO space launch systems Commit to Launch. The Mission Director is accountable for SV launch processing & operations during the launch countdown and successful SV deployment.
(U) MR	Manual Review.
(U) NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(U) National Mission Model	A 13-year projection of launches for DoD, commercial and civil missions. The model is the result of coupling initial launch requirements (facilities and range dates) with launch base capacities, range availability, funding constraints, and acquisition profiles (satellite and booster).
(U) Need-To-Know	A determination made by an authorized holder of classified or FOUO information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized function.
(U) NIPRNET	<u>N</u> (Unclassified but sensitive) <u>I</u> nternet <u>P</u> rotocol <u>R</u> outer <u>N</u> ETwork.

(b)(3)

(U) NRO	National Reconnaissance Office.
(U) NROD	National Reconnaissance Office Directive.
(U) NROI	National Reconnaissance Office Instruction.
(U) NROL	National Reconnaissance Office Launch. As used in this document, the term includes both NRO launch activities and the NROL designator. NROL designators are used to identify an NRO launch, NOT an NRO satellite vehicle.

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

- (U) NRO/OCC National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Corporate Communications. The only office within the NRO with the authority to publicly release unclassified information related to NRO activities.
- (U) OAS Onizuka Air Force Base.
- (U) OCA Original Classification Authority. An individual, authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.
- (U) OD-4 Operating Division 4, a user of the AFSCN and operator of several AFSCN MCCs.
- (U) OPSEC Operations Security.
- (U) OS NRO Office of Security (b)(3)
- (U) OSL NRO Office of Space Launch; the OCA for the NROL IPG.
- (U) OSL Cape OSL Operating Location at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida.
- (U) OSL Vandenberg OSL Operating Location at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
- (U) PA Public Affairs.
- (U) Pathfinder A test to verify the compatibility of the LV elements with each other, ground facilities, and AGE.
- (U) Payload The hardware item(s) carried into space by the SV to perform an operational, research, or test mission.
- (U) Planning and Scheduling Data Information that provides insight into the operational planning and requirements of a launch flow.
- (U) PLF Payload Fairing - an aerodynamic shell used for environmental protection of the SV during ascent.
- (U) POCC Payload Operations Control Center.
- (U) PRD Program Requirements Document.
- (U) Program The facilities, equipment, hardware, software, funds, personnel, and activities involved in a concerted effort to achieve a predetermined mission/objective.
- (U) PSO Program Security Office. Also Program Security Officer.
- (U) Public Access Information Open source information is publicly available information (i.e., any member of the public could lawfully obtain the information by request or observation), as well as other unclassified information that may have limited public distribution or access. Open source information also includes any information that may be used in an unclassified context without compromising national security or intelligence sources and methods. If the information is not publicly available, certain legal requirements relating to collection, retention, and dissemination may apply.
- (U) Real-Time Refers to the data collected as an event occurs. The resulting data is thereafter referred to as actual or real-time versus planned or theoretical data.
- (U) Reflight Any verbal or written reference to a relationship between one or more launches that provides a definitive statement that two launches carry the same type of

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

SV. Examples of definitive statements are: "NROL- XX SV is the same as of NROL-YY SV" or "The K-XX SV is a reflight of the SV flown on B-25". An LV that consists of a similar configuration (hardware software, procedures, processes, ASE, GSE, etc.), and that may be supported by the same personnel, as a previously flown LV is an example of LV reflight. Certain acquisition activities in the EELV era may preclude protection of the "fact of" an SV reflight if the LV remains the same; however, in those instances where "fact of" is FOUO, the association between an NRO SV and its predecessor remains classified SECRET.

(U) Representative of a Foreign Interest	A citizen or national of the United States, who is acting as a representative of a foreign interest. (See Foreign Interest).
(U) RPIE	Real Property Installed Equipment.
(U) RF	Radio Frequency.
(U) S	SECRET classification.
(U) SAFB	Schriever Air Force Base.
(U) SAF/SL	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Space Launch.
(U) SAF/SO	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations.
(U) SAF/ST	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Science & Technology.
(U) SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information.
(U) SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System.
(U) Sensitive Information	Any information, the loss, misuse, or modification of which, or unauthorized access to, could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal Programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 USC 552a (the Privacy Act), but which has not been specifically authorized under criteria established by an EO or Act of Congress to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
(U) SGLS	Space Ground Link Systems.
(U) SMC/CL	Space and Missile Systems Center, Launch Programs Office; the SPO for Titan and Atlas LVs.
(U) SMC/EV	Space and Missile Systems Center SPO for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.
(U) SOC	Spacecraft Operations Center.
(U) Space Launch Manifest (SLM)	A 3-year projection of launch plans integrating executable launch dates for the first 15 months (CLS) and a reserved queue of launch opportunities for months 16 - 36. The SLM includes launch dates, forecasted launches, commercial and civil missions, and spacelift operational capabilities and constraints. Space Command maintains months 16 - 36 of the Space Launch Manifest for all DoD, commercial and civil space launch requirements.
(U) Spacecraft	See SV.
(U) Specific LV/launch	A launch vehicle/launch service identified by serial number or sequence

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

service	number, e.g., Titan IV B-36, Atlas II MLV-10, Delta IV 4.2, Atlas V AV0002, or any other identifier.
(U) Specific SV	See SV Identity.
(U) SOP	Standard Operating Procedure.
(U) SPIF	Spacecraft Integration Facility.
(U) SPO	System Program Office.
(U) STE	Secure Telephone Equipment.
(U) STEX	Space Technology Experiment.
(U) STK	Satellite Tool Kit.
(U) STS	Space Transportation System. Also known as the Space Shuttle.
(U) STU	Secure Telephone Unit.
(U) Substitute Identifier	Any randomly selected name, number, or other designator used to avoid classification issues related with identifying the SV program.
(U) SV	Satellite Vehicle - the spacecraft bus and its mission-enabling payloads.
(U) SV Chargeables	"SV chargeables" is a term used to bookkeep the weight of launch vehicle hardware that impacts launch vehicle performance and is used to satisfy mission unique requirements. Typically, the launch vehicle will advertise a nominal performance capability to a given orbit assuming a "standard" launch vehicle. This nominal performance capability must be greater than the sum of the weight of the SV plus the SV chargeables. Alternatively, the nominal performance capability of the LV minus the weight of the SV chargeables must be greater than the weight of the SV. Examples of SV chargeables may be LV/SV separation devices, additional payload fairing acoustic blankets, pick-up antennas in the payload fairing, mission unique adapters, GN2 lines, thermal blankets, SV destruct systems, mechanical support equipment, etc. Typically, SV chargeable items are provided by the launch vehicle contractor.
(U) SV Descriptive Data	Information that describes the SV's shape, mechanical characteristics, and structural dynamics. Information required by the LV mission planners to successfully integrate and launch a satellite will only be released at the NRO's discretion.
(U) SV Envelope	Dimensions of a non-SV shape revealing "box" used to determine the volume that the SV uses or displaces within the payload fairing.
(U) SV Launch Configuration	The SV in its final mechanical state and ready for encapsulation.
(U) SV Profile	An outline drawing of the SV that conforms to the SV shape and reveals its physical shape or specific dimensions.
(U) SV Identity	The NRO SV program identity or name. Also see NROL.
(U) SVC	Satellite Vehicle Contractor.
(U) SV Operations	Information that is not required by LV mission planners and will not be

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(U) SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

Data	released. This includes information that describes the SV operational mission in terms of: (1) SV mission, objectives, capabilities, operational limitations, and vulnerabilities; (2) Priorities and plans for space-based intelligence activities; (3) Critical, unique to program, advanced state-of-the-art hardware technology; (4) Satellite constellation health, system needs, and replenishment strategies; and (5) NRO operational infrastructure, elements, and control nodes.
(U) TIPS	Tether Physics and Survivability Experiment.
(U) Trailblazer	A test to verify the compatibility of the SV and its interfaces with the BV, upper stage, PLF SV ASE and AGE.
(U) TT&C	Telemetry, Tracking, and Control.
(U) U	UNCLASSIFIED.
(U) US	United States.
(U) USAF	United States Air Force.
(U) USC	United States Code.
(U) USG	United States Government.
(U) VAFB	Vandenberg Air Force Base.
(U) Vulnerability	A weakness, shortfall, or uncorrected deficiency that could be exploited to degrade or defeat the effectiveness of a system.

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(U) SECTION VI

(U) Clarification Letters

Date	Subject	Old Item	New Section III Item/ Status
6 Jun 00	(U) Classification change to SV Characteristics for NROL 24 and NROL 27	11.2	
30 Aug 00	(U) Classification change to SV Characteristics for NROL-1, 10, and 12	11.2	
21 Dec 00	(U) Classification change to SV Characteristics for MLV-10 (NROL-13)	11.2	
21 May 01	(U) Classification change regarding Launch Time and Onboard Video Instrumentation for NROL-13 (MLV-10)	56, 59.2	Letter rescinded by Item 56 and Item 59.1 Remark.
3 Jan 02	(U) Classification change to SV Characteristics for MLV-14 (NROL-18)	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
22 Jan 02	(U) Classification change to SV Characteristics for MLV-15 (NROL-23)	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
18 Apr 02	(U) Classification changes for B-36 (NROL-19)	56, 57	56, 57 Remark
7 Nov 02	(U) Launch Classification Baseline Change for NROL-24 and NROL-27	Section II	Letter rescinded by change in Section II.
7 Nov 02	(U//FOUO) Clarification regarding the "fact that [redacted]"	40.2	40.2 Remark
2 Dec 02	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-30	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
5 Dec 02	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-22	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
5 Dec 02	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-28	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
5 Dec 02	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-34	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
6 Dec 02	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-36	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.3, 11.4.4.2, 11.5.2.2
7 Jan 03	(U) Classification Change to SV Physical Shape Characteristics for NROL-36	11.1	11.4.7.1
8 Jan 03	(U) Classification Change to SV Physical Shape Characteristics for NROL-18	11.1	11.4.7.1
10 Jan 03	(U) Classification Change to SV Physical Shape Characteristics for NROL-34	11.1	11.4.7.1

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(U) SECTION VI - Clarification Letters (Continued)

Date	Subject	Old Item	New Section III Item/ Status
14 Jan 03	(U) Classification Change to SV Physical Shape Characteristics for NROL-23	11.1	11.4.7.1
16 Jan 03	(U) Classification Change to SV Physical Shape Characteristics for NROL-30	11.1	11.4.7.1
19 Feb 03	(U) Classification change regarding Launch Time and Onboard Video Instrumentation for NROL-18 (MLV-14)	56, 59.2	Letter rescinded by Item 56 and Item 59.1 Remark.
4 Mar 03	(U) Classification change regarding Launch Time and Onboard Video Instrumentation for NROL-23 (MLV-15)	56, 59.2	Letter rescinded by Item 56 and Item 59.1 Remark.
18 Mar 03	(U) Classification change regarding Launch Window for NROL-18 (MLV-14)	57	Letter rescinded by Item 57 Remark.
7 July 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-25	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.2, 11.4.7.2; 14.2, 50.1, 21.1
14 July 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-29	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.2, 11.4.7.2, 14.2, 50.1, 21.1
8 Sep 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-39	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.2, 11.4.7.2
9 Sep 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-41	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.2, 11.4.7.2
10 Sep 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-43	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.2, 11.4.7.2
12 Sep 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-45	11.2	11.1.1, 11.5.1.2, 11.4.7.2
31 Oct 03	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Characteristics for NROL-21	11.2	11.1.1, 11.2.5.1, 11.5.1.3
26 Mar 04	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Contamination Requirements for NROL-25	11.2	11.4.4.2
7 Jun 04	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Contamination Requirements for NROL-39	11.2	11.4.4.2
10 Jun 04	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Contamination Requirements for NROL-41	11.2	11.4.4.2
16 Jun 04	(U) Classification change to Satellite Vehicle Contamination Requirements for NROL-45	11.2	11.4.4.2

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
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(U) SECTION VIII

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
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


AN HISTORY

A History
of the
Military Polar Orbiting
Meteorological Satellite Program

R. Gargill Hall

**A HISTORY OF
THE MILITARY POLAR ORBITING
METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Cargill', is positioned above the printed name.

R. Cargill Hall

September 2001

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
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Preface

In 1961, at the height of the Cold War, a director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) authorized the construction and launch of a small meteorological satellite to support CORONA and other film-limited imaging satellite systems. Though undertaken as an "interim" measure while awaiting completion and launch of a national weather satellite, in the months that followed the NRO spacecraft would incorporate so many desirable features and perform so admirably that it became the template adopted for all American civil and military low altitude meteorological satellites. I researched and wrote the first installment of this history, which covered these actions and events, using available classified records while assigned temporarily to NRO headquarters in the mid 1980s. After returning to the NRO as its historian in the late 1990s, and upon declassification of the original work and endnotes in February 2000, I shared it with the early program participants and completed the story through the turn of the Millennium and the consolidation of American military and civil meteorological satellite programs into a National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).

People act. They make decisions that trigger events. To the extent practical, this brief history turns on the people who shaped the story, particularly for the early NRO years when the effort was highly classified, handled in compartmented channels, and little known even to those who received and used the meteorological products. The people on which I focused in this story, the successive program directors and their immediate associates, brought to the meteorological satellite enterprise different technical skills and management approaches all of them operating in a bureaucratic framework that changed with organizational realignments. Over the years, as the program moved from the NRO to the regular Air Force, and eventually to the Department of Commerce, they found themselves dealing with more federal regulations, more officials whose approval they required before choices and actions could be made or taken, and much more Congressional oversight. That they acted to identify and select the best outcome for this national effort I think goes without saying. That the choices made often produced outcomes that departed markedly from initial expectations is likewise apparent.

The scope of this work, limited primarily to the program itself, did not permit its treatment in the larger political and social context. I touch on but do not explore and analyze the

In terms of its social and economic ramifications, for example, nighttime images of the Earth furnished by

program's interactions with the major contractors, with officials in other federal agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, or with Congressional representatives and their staffs who, by the mid 1970s, largely determined how many and what kinds of meteorological satellites would best serve the country. A comprehensive history remains to be written. In that effort, I hope the historian of record will find in this work a useful building block. Not all readers will agree with my interpretation of events, or with my skepticism about the outcome of a cost-effective, combined military-civil NPOESS. Noteworthy military attempts to specify and contract for "one size fits all," except perhaps for certain hosiery, mostly have failed in terms of meeting diverse performance requirements on a fixed schedule and at a reduced cost. I would be pleased, however, if the NPOESS team overturns precedent. Any errors of fact that remain are mine.

R. Cargill Hall
September 2001

defense meteorological satellites (such as Fig. 16, in this monograph), permitted geographers and social scientists to make informed estimates of population densities in various regions. Cf., C. D. Elvidge, K. E. Haugh, E. A. Kihn, and F. R. Davis, "Mapping City Lights with Nighttime Data from the DMSP Operational Linescan System," *Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing*, Vol. 63, No. 6, 1997, pp. 727-734; Paul Sutton, Dar Roberts, Chris Elvidge, and Hank Meij, "A Comparison of Nighttime Satellite Imagery and Population Density for the Continental United States," *Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing*, Vol. 63, No. 11, 1997, pp. 1303-1313; and Paul Sutton, "Modeling Population Density With Nighttime Satellite Imagery and GIS," *Computer, Environment, and Urban Systems*, Vol. 21, No. 3/4, 1997, pp. 227-244.

Successful operation of overhead photoreconnaissance satellites, the RAND Corporation had warned the Air Force in the mid 1950s,¹ depended on accurate and timely meteorological forecasts of the Sino-Soviet landmass. Such forecasts would make possible cloud-free photography over areas of interest. Indeed, pictures of clouds retrieved from a film-limited spacecraft cost dearly—a fact made plain in 1960-1961 by the images returned from early CORONA missions. When an interdepartmental study of the subject ended in April 1961, however, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA, received the U.S. franchise to establish requirements and develop meteorological satellites for both the Departments of Commerce and Defense in the National Meteorological Satellite Program. This program, its proponents contended, would avoid duplicated effort and produce at less cost a single National Operational Meteorological Satellite System (NOMSS) to meet all civil and military forecasting needs, including presumably those of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).²

But in the Pentagon in 1961, Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk, who also headed the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), remained unconvinced. NOMSS, at best two or three years away, also was supposed to support international meteorological data exchanges, an objective inconsistent with contemporary NRP requirements for secrecy. Moreover, the television camera of NASA's first experimental, "wheel-mode" TIROS weather satellite, spin stabilized to inertial space and launched the year before on 1 April 1960, viewed only an oblique swath of the Earth's surface occasionally in each orbit instead of once each time it revolved. Charyk knew that NASA officials did not believe a spin-stabilized weather



Fig. 1. TIROS Experimental Weather Satellite, 1960
(Note the vidicon lens at bottom left on the satellite.)

satellite that would keep its spin axis perpendicular to its orbit plane could be developed soon—and certainly not inexpensively and in time to furnish strategic meteorological forecasts for reconnaissance satellite flight operations in 1962.” He therefore acted to create an “interim” meteorological satellite program for the NRO. In the event, that program also would fashion the technology and flight operations for what would become the polar orbiting, low altitude national weather satellite system administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

A Temporary Meteorological Satellite Program

On 21 June 1961, Charyk spoke with Major General Robert E. Greer, Director of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Special Projects (SAFSP) in El Segundo, California. He asked Greer to prepare a “minimum” proposal for four “Earth-referenced” wheel-mode weather satellites to be launched on NASA Scout boosters. Greer responded with just such a plan for a 22-month program, one that specified a small fixed budget and a first launch in ten months. The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved it, and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Harold Brown, made available to the NRO the necessary funding. On 27 July 1961 Greer’s deputy, Colonel Harry Evans, appointed Lt. Colonel Thomas O. Haig the first director of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).[†] Haig, a meteorologist and electrical engineer, accepted the assignment on condition that he would *not* have to use the resident “systems engineering and technical direction” contractor; could select his own small staff, and could use fixed price, fixed delivery contracts under his direct control throughout the program. Evans added a “kill switch” of

[†]TIROS (Television Infrared Observation Satellite) had emerged from the Air Force WS-1171 reconnaissance satellite competition back in 1956. After Lockheed won the primary contract, RCA officials, whose proposal had not been selected, sold the concept of a television infrared weather satellite to the Army Signal Corps at Belmar, New Jersey, which, along with the Advanced Research Projects Agency, funded further work. After NASA began operating in October 1958, it acquired TIROS along with a number of the key Signal Corps personnel. As the 1960s began, plans called for equipping TIROS with infrared horizon sensors that would determine horizon crossings and trigger picture taking of the scenes below.

This program, needless to say, had a succession of numeric and alphabetic names, including Program II, P-35, 69XBU, 417, and Defense Systems Applications Program (DSAP). In order to avoid confusion, the current designation DMSP is used throughout this history.

To Haig’s view, an SE&TD contractor could only justify its existence by introducing changes. Since changes involved time and cost money, SE&TD support was incompatible with fixed price, fixed delivery contracting. See Thomas O. Haig, “Technical Direction: Outmoded Management Concept?” in *Perspectives in Defense Management*, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, May 1967.

his own: if the first launch could not be met on schedule or if costs appeared certain to exceed the fixed budget, he instructed Haig to terminate the program and recover government funds immediately without further direction.

In the months that followed, the DMSP effort operated on NRP funds under the NRO security blanket, but located physically outside the NRO Special Projects Office in El Segundo for purposes of cover and ease of operations.⁴ Haig divided the work among those he initially selected: three officers and Renell Lafan, "a very busy secretary." He invested his own time in program management, with special attention paid to a contract he negotiated with RCA for the weather satellite. Captain Stephen Dvorchak, joined later by Captain Richard Geer, was assigned the Scout launch vehicle: a small, four-stage, solid propellant rocket built by Chance Vought and procured under NASA direction. To meet program performance requirements, Dvorchak substituted a high acceleration Lockheed Propulsion Company MG-18 solid-propellant motor in place of the standard Scout fourth stage Altair motor. Captain Luin Ricks handled ground support, tracking, command, and readout at the Air Force ground stations operated by the Lockheed Missiles and Space Division (LMSD). Finally, Major Charles Croft oversaw contract management at all the various firms involved, novel contracts that were "fixed price" instead of the customary "cost plus fixed fee." The RCA fixed-price, fixed-delivery contract proved itself in December 1961 when a major structural member of the weather satellite, the base plate, failed during tests and company officials requested a three month delay for redesign. Croft, after discussion with Haig, advised RCA that it had ten days to produce a fix or the contract would be terminated under procurement regulations "at no cost to the government." The



Fig. 2.1.1. Col. Thomas O. Haig,
First DMSP Program Director

⁴ By the end of 1962 the program office staff had increased to five officers and two secretaries, including Fritz Holt. Three or four SAC officers also were assigned at that time, involved primarily with the Scout launch vehicle and ground support. This small number grew to about 15 military and civilians by the mid-1960s, when the program transferred from the NRO to Air Force Systems Command.

RCA program manager appeared three days later with revised internal schedules that met the original launch date.

Neither the Scout booster nor the RCA satellite mounted redundant equipment, and a failure anywhere in the system meant the loss of a mission. All of those involved regarded the enterprise as a single purpose, minimum cost, "high-risk" program. Smaller and lighter than the original TIROS, the 100-pound TIROS-derived RCA satellite was shaped like a 10-sided polyhedron, 23-inches across and 21-inches high. A spinning motion, introduced on injection into orbit, was maintained on the early NRO weather satellites at about 12 rpm by small spin rockets. By adopting a concept advanced by Haig and Lt. Ralph Hoffman, however, the spin axis was maintained perpendicular to the orbit plane by torquing the satellite against the Earth's magnetic field, the forces supplied through a direct-current loop around the satellite's perimeter. A ground command would cause the electric current to flow in the desired direction to generate the torque. Those few NASA officials who knew about it viewed the NRO-Air Force program as a no-risk test of a modified four-stage Scout with an "Earth-referenced" wheel-mode weather satellite."

If it operated correctly, the RCA shuttered television camera (a photosensitive vidicon tube) would be pointed directly at the Earth once each time the satellite rotated. At the programmed interval, when infrared horizon sensors indicated the lens was vertical to the Earth, the vidicon would take a picture of an 800-mile-square area of the surface below, with the image recorded on tape as an analog signal for later transmission to the ground. Launched into a sun-synchronous 450 nautical mile circular polar orbit, the RCA television system would provide 100 percent daily coverage of the Northern Hemisphere at latitudes above 60 degrees, and 55 percent coverage at the equator. Readout of the tape-recorded pictures was planned to occur on each pass over the western hemisphere; at the ground stations, the video pictures of cloud cover over the Eurasian landmass would be relayed to the Air Weather Service's Air Force Global Weather Central collocated with Headquarters Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB, near Omaha, Nebraska.

Haig's "blue suit" program team met its ten-month schedule, although, as the high-risk aspects of the effort suggested, without immediate success. The polar-orbiting DMSP satellites were to be launched from the West Coast range on Point Arguello, at Vandenberg AFB, located near the town of Lompoc, California. As events transpired, a standard four-stage Scout booster carrying an NRO GRAB satellite was first in line, and was viewed as a system test by the DMSP office. This vehicle, launched on 25 April 1962, ended in a Scout booster failure within sight of those in the blockhouse. The temperamental Scout booster, this time with an MG-18 fourth stage, failed again during launch




Fig. 3. First DMSP Launch, 23 May 1962

of the first NRO weather satellite on 23 May when the vehicle self-destructed towards the end of second stage ignition. The second DMSP launch on 23 August 1962 resulted in success, although the Lockheed ground-control team failed at first to track the weather satellite. Each day at high noon the vehicle took pictures as it transited the Soviet Union. Weather pictures of the Caribbean returned by this vehicle two months later in October also proved crucial during the "Cuban Missile Crisis," permitting effective aerial reconnaissance missions and reducing the number of aerial weather-reconnaissance sorties in the region.*

Lt. Colonel Haig reported to General Greer at the NRO Special Projects Office in El Segundo, but Joseph Charyk took a personal interest in the affairs of the weather satellite program initiated to satisfy NRP requirements.⁵ That program now possessed the first U.S. military satellite

*The DMSP Program Manager normally briefed Charyk monthly at NRO Headquarters in the Pentagon, and then back-briefed General Greer on his return regarding any directions he had received from the DNRO.



Fig. 4. Joseph V. Charyk,
Under Secretary of the Air Force

to be commanded and operated on orbit on a daily basis over an extended period of time. (The first spacecraft ultimately ceased transmissions on 23 March 1963.) At the Pentagon on the morning of 24 September 1962, Charyk advised Haig that NASA's planned Nimbus weather satellite, or NOMSS, would be delayed, and that he should plan one additional year for the interim NRO meteorological satellite program. Haig, who had guessed as much, had next year's budget charts ready. Lockheed claimed a major part of the total budget for ground-support operations, but, the Lt. Colonel insisted, he could build two ground stations

and a control center, man them with blue-suiters, and operate the weather satellites in support of the NRP for one-eighth the amount bid by the contractor.⁹

Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director Charyk approved the cost-saving proposal on the spot. Then he picked up the phone and called Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis E. LeMay and arranged for an appointment. That afternoon at the Pentagon, Haig explained to the Chief of Staff how Air Force personnel could man and operate two weather satellite ground stations and a control center. The general listened intently and, when Haig left an hour later, "it was with a promise of all the people I needed from the Strategic Air Command [SAC] and, 'if anybody gets in your way, call me!'" from LeMay. At the General's direction, Haig boarded an airplane bound for Omaha and, next day at Headquarters SAC, briefed CINCSAC General Thomas S. Power and his staff. SAC's leaders promptly committed to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program all the personnel it required.¹⁰

During the ensuing weeks, program personnel worked at all hours, every day. They found surplus Nike anti-aircraft rocket sites in the states of Maine (near Loring AFB), and Washington (near Fairchild AFB), procured six large van bodies from Norton AFB in San Bernardino, located two abandoned antenna mounts on Antigua Island in the Caribbean, and wrote a

fixed-price contract with Radiation Incorporated for two 40-foot radar dishes and associated electronic gear. In between, they helped screen SAC military personnel "until we had two groups of very good men" to operate the tracking stations. In July 1963, ten months after go-ahead, the program office transferred DMSP satellite ground tracking and readout from Lockheed to its own stations in Maine and Washington. About the same time, a command and control center for the DMSP manned by SAC personnel began operating one floor below Air Force Global Weather Central in Building D, the old Martin bomber plant, next door to SAC Headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska.¹¹



Fig. 5. Air Force Surplus Antenna Mount with 40 ft. Diameter Reflector Adapted for DMSP

The first DMSP weather satellite to be controlled at the ground stations manned by Air Force personnel was flight number three launched on 19 February 1963. At Vandenberg AFB, another Air Force team, the Systems Command 6595th Aerospace Test Wing, conducted launch operations.¹² In this instance, the Scout booster upper stages again malfunctioned and placed the satellite in an orbit unsuited to strategic weather reconnaissance operations for more than a few months at best. In late April, the satellite's primary tape-recorder control circuit failed and with it the storage of primary data for later commanded transmission, although direct vidicon readout continued for a few weeks more. A new experiment, however, continued to function nicely for

¹¹ A few years later, when the Thor booster replaced Scout as the DMSP launch vehicle, launch duties transferred from the 6595th ATW to SAC's 4300th Support Squadron, which had experience with Thor rocket launches: "It was a source of great pride to SAC," Richard Geer recalled, but the transfer proved "galling to some in the 6595th." Moreover, officer reasoning held, "SAC" would not tolerate launch failures."

many months: an infrared radiometer that registered the Earth's background radiation and indicated the extent of nighttime cloud cover. At Global Weather Central, the 3d Weather Wing used computer programs written by Air Weather Service personnel to produce crude operational maps of the cloud cover at night over the regions observed until January 1964. Indeed, the infrared experiment proved so successful that it was mounted on all DMSP satellites through Block 4, eventually also providing measurements of cloud height and the Earth's heat balance.¹²

The fourth and fifth DMSP launches on 26 April and 27 September 1963 resulted once again in Scout booster failures. The gap in weather reconnaissance that began in May 1963 would continue until January 1964. And, despite appeals for changes in design and testing that the program office requested to improve reliability, NASA officials who procured Scout vehicles for the NRP refused to make them. After considering other booster prospects,




Fig. 6. Night Launch of the Third DMSP, 19 February 1963

on 23 October 1963 Colonel Haig, with the approval of Joseph Charyk's successor, Air Force Undersecretary Brockway McMillan, cancelled the last two Scout vehicles on the original LTV contract and all six of them on a follow-on order. He followed that action by terminating completely all NASA Scout-related activities on 25 October.¹³ Five launches in two years had yielded three Scout booster failures and increasing NASA intransigence. In the National Reconnaissance Program, the space agency and its erratic Scout booster had struck out.

Since the fourth Scout launch, Haig and Richard Geer actively had sought a replacement booster that would provide improved reliability and at least equivalent weight-lifting capacity. They knew that a number of liquid-propellant SM-75 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles, returned

¹²David S. Johnson, at that time manager of the TIROS weather satellite program in the Weather Bureau and one of the few persons there cleared to know about DMSP, referred various experiments to the NRO-Air Force program including a novel one conceived by Vernor Suomi at the University of Wisconsin that weighed about six ounces, including a tiny wire recorder, and produced coarse but useful data on the radiated heat of cloud cover, from

a few months before from England as part of the U.S. concession in the Cuban Missile Crisis, were stored in San Bernadino. They also were acquainted with an FW-4S solid-propellant rocket motor produced by the United Technology Corporation. This rocket was cast in the same motor casing as the Scout fourth stage, and, mounted on the Scout spin table, would comprise the second stage of what would become known as the "Burner I" launch vehicle. For this launch vehicle, Douglas Aircraft replaced the IRBM inertial guidance system with a Bell Telephone Laboratory guidance package and added a cold gas coast attitude control section on top of the Thor to keep the axis of the FW-4S injection stage properly aligned.¹⁴ Approved by the NRO director McMillan in December 1963, and by CINCSAC General Thomas S. Power (SAC personnel would now launch the new vehicle and control the weather satellite on orbit) in January 1964, DMSP personnel set to work ordering and testing the Burner I components. A few months later, in March, the Program Office received approval to plan for a new second stage, to be called "Burner II," for a Thor-based launch vehicle. Late in the year, a source selection board chose Boeing to produce the all-new self-guided solid-propellant upper stage. The more powerful Thor/Burner II combination, which eventually employed an additional solid-propellant third-stage to increase the weight-lifting capacity, continued to be used in the program until the early 1980s.¹⁵

Before any "Thor/Burner" mission could be mounted, and to close gaps in strategic weather coverage of the Eurasian landmass after the final Scout launch failure of 27 September 1963, Brockway McMillan also had approved acquisition of two Thor-Agena launch vehicles as interim replacements. Huig's program office pressed them into service. The liquid-propellant Thor-Agena booster combination, also used to launch the CORONA film recovery satellites, was larger and more expensive than needed for DMSP, but it could carry two of the RCA weather satellites into orbit simultaneously. On 19 January and 17 June 1964 Thor-Agenas did just that, successfully placing a total of four DMSP satellites into orbit. In the months that followed, members of the National Reconnaissance Program and SAC had all the meteorological data that they wanted. A Burner I, meanwhile, ascended properly in its first launch on 18 January 1965, but failed to place its satellite in orbit when the nose fairing refused to separate. Nonetheless, the DMSP Thor/Burner combinations in succeeding months and years achieved an enviable 86 percent launch success

which the heat balance of the Earth could be determined.

With the latitude this presented, in December 1964 Huig requested SAC operations personnel to program DMSP picture-taking on passes over Antarctica and have the Air Weather Service send the pictures to the Program Office. Cut and pieced together, the office produced a complete map of the Antarctic Continent that was

record before the Atlas booster succeeded it in the 1980s.

At first extended from year to year awaiting the arrival of NASA's NOMSS, by mid-1965 the NRO's "interim" weather satellite effort looked and acted like a formal military space program. As its primary mission, DMSP furnished the NRP daily strategic (morning coverage, primarily, during the first few years) meso-scale observations of cloud distribution and organization over the Eurasian landmass. Beginning in 1965 two DMSP polar orbiting, sun-synchronous weather satellites would normally function in circular orbits at 450 nautical miles altitude. One, a morning bird, passed over the Soviet Union about 0700 local time and relayed weather conditions at first light. A second, late morning (but called a "noon") bird began the same track about 1100 local time, showing the change in cloud cover with the increase in atmospheric heating during the day.




Fig. 7. Night Launch of First Thor-Burner I, 18 January 1965

Reflecting on the accomplishment many years later, Haig counted four early DMSP contributions to astronautics. First, the novel management scheme made possible a small program office that exercised technical direction without the "assistance" of a systems engineering contractor, and its members could get a decision at the NRO and act quickly. The office used fixed-price, fixed delivery contracts, all blue-suit operations, and achieved an excellent success record at an annual cost less than one half that of equivalent NASA weather satellite development programs. Second, because the spin axis of the RCA wheel-mode satellite was maintained perpendicular to the orbit plane by electrically torquing it against the Earth's magnetic field, Haig reasoned that one also could control and maintain a constant spin rate electrically, driving it like the rotor of a direct

subsequently presented to NRO director Brockway McMillan who, by all accounts, was most taken with it.

See Tables 1 through 8, DMSP Launch Record.

current motor. That would eliminate the solid rockets that produced a spin rate that varied with time and made it difficult to determine the location of the cloud pictures. Written into RCA's second-year contract for an additional four Block 1 satellites, the concept worked in space. Third, when the DMSP ground stations were assembled in 1963, the program office eliminated the costly "boresight tower" used routinely to determine a tracking/readout antenna's pointing vector and a transmitter used to check the receiving system sensitivity during operation. Program personnel substituted instead a technique of scanning the sun to establish the pointing vector with a hermetically sealed low-energy transmitter in the center of the antenna reflector used to check receiving sensitivity. The DMSP station test procedures worked just as accurately and at far less cost; they became standard practice for nearly all tracking/readout systems. Finally, DMSP altered established Air Force techniques of satellite tracking. Captain Luin Ricks refused to believe that the tracking problem was as arcane and costly as Lockheed personnel made it appear. Working with SAC personnel, Ricks prepared a much simpler tracking program* thereafter used with great success by the DMSP ground stations and adopted by the ground stations of other satellite programs.¹⁰

When in April 1965 Colonel Thomas O. Haig stepped down as the program director, DMSP had eclipsed all other overhead meteorological endeavors. Initial NASA skepticism notwithstanding, DMSP had pioneered the space technology so well, so quickly, and so inexpensively that the space agency, prodded firmly by the Department of Commerce, at that time embraced carbon copies of the DMSP wheel-mode Block 1 satellite, called the TIROS Operational System (TOS), as an interim polar-orbiting weather




Fig. 8. TIROS Operational System (TOS).
Based on the DMSP Block 1 Satellite
(Note the vidicon pointing radially to take pictures on each revolution of the vehicle.)

*A single set of punched paper tapes at each ground tracking station eliminated the requirement to transmit an antenna programming tape before each pass. Every pass by a DMSP satellite in any orbit between 250 and 550 nautical miles altitude could be supported by the tape set with a maximum antenna pointing error of 1.5 degrees.

satellite.* And besides the strategic weather reconnaissance furnished to the NRP, the defense meteorological satellites also had begun to provide tactical weather reconnaissance of pre-selected regions to a transportable ground station overseas, with significant effects on military operations in Southeast Asia.¹⁷

Toward a Permanent Program: From Strategic to Tactical Applications

Strategic weather reconnaissance recorded for the NRP might command the primary mission of the DMSP, but American military services wanted tactical weather data to meet a variety of operational needs. By 1963 it was plain that NASA's sophisticated, three-axis stabilized, low altitude Nimbus-NOMSS satellite would be extensively delayed and, when finished, likely too complex and expensive to satisfy Defense Department and NRP meteorological requirements tactical or strategic.* On 23 January 1963 Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, requested a reassessment of tactical requirements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Would the National Meteorological Satellite Program and its planned NOMSS, Brown inquired, meet them? The JCS replied in the negative; its leaders urged that the Defense Department build and operate a commanded direct-readout weather satellite able to relay high-quality, day-and-night tactical meteorological data to transportable ground and shipboard terminals "ASAP."¹⁸

But the political and bureaucratic climate in 1963 did not favor an all-military tactical weather satellite system. All of the military meteorological satellite requirements would continue to be furnished to NASA and the Department of Commerce for the NOMSS.² To assess and combine those requirements, in early 1964 the Defense Department established in the Air Staff a Joint Meteorological Satellite Program Office (JMSPO). After further agitation by the military services, however, the Defense Department and the NRO approved a test of the defense meteorological

*The Weather Bureau had launched and tested TIROS 9, the first wheel-mode copy of the DMSP, in January 1965. The first of the TOS built to this standard, called ESSA-1, was launched a year later, in February 1966. Nine of these civil meteorological satellites were launched between 1966 and 1969 for the parent agency at that time, the Environmental Science Services administration.

¹A Nimbus first launch scheduled in June 1962 had slipped to 1964; in fact, these vehicles would eventually be directed to research purposes, never to become the NOMSS.

²The Bureau of the Budget issued BOB circular A-62 on 13 November 1963 that reaffirmed and established policy for Defense Department participation in the National Meteorological Satellite Program.

satellite applied to tactical operations in the 1964 Strike Command Goldfire exercise at Fort Leonard Wood in southwest Missouri. Air Force Global Weather Central at Offutt AFB relayed weather reconnaissance pictures directly to the Army and Air Force users supporting ground and paratroop exercises at the fort, and for the deployment of fighter aircraft on a transatlantic flight. Later in the year, between 24 and 26 November, Global Weather Central furnished tactical weather data over Central Africa to the Military Airlift Command, which proved crucial in the successful airlift of Belgian paratroopers from Europe to Stanleyville in the Congo, where hostages seized in an uprising were freed. The weather data proved to be of considerable value in these tactical operations, analysis revealed, but improvements were needed. Coverage had to be received daily at local ground stations before meteorologists could depend on a satellite as a primary source of data, and a resolution at the surface better than the three nautical miles provided by the DMSP Block-I satellites was judged "extremely desirable."¹⁰



Fig. 9. Program 417 (DMSP) Military Members at Dining-In, Late 1964
Back Row, Left to Right: Lt. Clifford B. Stearns, Capt. John B. Ricks, Lt. Col. Thomas Haig, Lt. Col. Melvin Weinstein, Capt. Richard L. Geer, Lt. Edward R. Foechterle, Lt. Ralph Hoffman, Capt. James F. Roberts, Capt. Calvin H. Markwood.
Front Row, Left to Right: Capt. Melvin F. Chubb, Jr., Capt. C. Neale Elsby, Capt. Harold E. Wabitsch, Robert Anderson (guest speaker), Maj. Richard Turner, Lt. Col. Jim Wayne, Maj. Tom Jones

In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, Radio Hanoi ceased broadcasting local weather observations in September 1964, and Air Weather Service Detachment 14 in Saigon faced forecasting with limited and unreliable data. When U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam commenced in February 1965, Det-14 personnel found themselves unable to meet the demand for weather information from the 2d Air Division and the Studies and Observation Group of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), which conducted clandestine operations against North Vietnam. In response, the Air Force, with Defense Department and NRO approval, on 18 March 1965 launched a noontime military meteorological satellite that could be programmed to record and readout specific weather data in Southeast Asia to support tactical operations in the theater. In one of his last official acts in support of that effort, in January Haig planned and laid out the DMSP ground station at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, in South Vietnam. The new station was erected and began operating in time to support the satellite launched in March. It furnished to military users, within 30 minutes of receipt, complete cloud-cover data for North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and parts of Laos, China, and the Gulf of Tonkin.²⁰

All three military services and MACV put to immediate use the DMSP tactical meteorological data retrieved by Det-14.^{*} In the spring of 1965 commanders could scrub, delay, or recall aerial sorties, or divert them to secondary targets based on hard weather information. The Naval Advisory Group and the MACV Studies and Observation Group used DMSP-generated forecasts to schedule the operation of their fleets of small boats that operated along the coast of the Indo-China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. Before long, mobile, air-transportable DMSP ground terminals were installed at Udorn AB, Thailand, and Osan AB, South Korea. Another fixed site, like the original one at Tan Son Nhut, appeared at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Finally, on 20 May 1965 at Vandenberg AFB, SAC personnel launched a special defense meteorological satellite reserved exclusively for tactical meteorological applications. Weather data from this satellite so improved the timeliness and accuracy of forecasts in Southeast Asia that the military services, in October 1965,

^{*}The TOS civil meteorological satellites could not be programmed to observe and record specific areas in Southeast Asia for later readout. They did carry Automatic Picture Transmission (APT) equipment that allowed anyone with receiving equipment to acquire television and infrared images of the Earth as they were being taken. But APT did not provide pictures farther north than its line of sight. DMSP satellites, however, operated in three modes: direct readout, like APT; programmed picture taking of selected regions, with the sequence stored in a tape recorder for readout by a local ground station; and preprogrammed picture taking over the Eurasian land mass. Thus, Det-14 personnel did not use TOS.

cancelled all daily, routine aerial weather-reconnaissance sorties.²¹

These impressive results were enough to prompt action from Defense Department officials who now sought to break the NASA/Department of Commerce franchise on a NOMSS and pursue openly a separate military weather satellite program for strategic and tactical applications. On 22 June 1965, Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director Brockway McMillan advised General John P. McConnell, incoming Chief of Staff, USAF, that the DMSP would transfer from the NRP to USAF funding and direction, effective 1 July 1965 (the beginning of FY 1966). The DMSP program office in El Segundo would move from NRO Program A, the Air Force Special Projects Office, to the Space Systems Division next door, in Air Force Systems Command, with Headquarters USAF and Systems Command assuming overall management responsibility for what McMillan termed an "ongoing development/operational program." The Strategic Air Command would continue to launch the satellites and operate the DMSP control center and ground terminals in the continental United States; Air Weather Service would man the direct readout terminals overseas, while continuing to operate Air Force Global Weather Central and process DMSP strategic weather data at Offutt AFB. This program, McMillan observed in closing, "has been entirely a 'blue suit' effort. The cost has been remarkably low; the results have consistently exceeded expectations." Perhaps anticipating an excess of public affairs enthusiasm on the Air Staff, he regretted to say that security restrictions precluded any public recognition of DMSP accomplishments.²²

This change introduced a more complex dual-management chain. On the Air Staff, overall management responsibility devolved to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development because the DMSP was programmed and budgeted as an advanced development line item. The director of the NRO retained a strong interest, monitoring DMSP through Air Weather Service personnel assigned to his staff. Operational requirements flowed from the NRO through the Air Weather Service to the West Coast program office. Technical guidance now came from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development through Air Force Systems Command to the program office. The program office, the focal point in Space Systems Division, exercised authority for planning, directing, contracting, and system engineering.

Making the change to a permanent program complete, a few months later, on 28 September 1965, officials of the Defense Department and the Department of Commerce signed an agreement that eliminated the requirement for prior coordination of "aeronomy" and

"meteorological reconnaissance programs." Thereafter, except for periodic reassessments demanded by the Bureau of the Budget (later the Office of Management and Budget) and Congress, the Defense Department all but withdrew from the NOMSS concept, and NASA leaders converted Nimbus into a research and development test bed.²³ A few years later, in December 1972, DMSP meteorological data also began to be furnished routinely to the Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its National Weather Service at Suitland, Maryland. At that time, security restrictions on DMSP tactical applications were removed.[†] A few months later in March 1973, Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director John L. McLucas publicly announced the existence of DMSP in a Pentagon press conference.²⁴

Back in 1964, when tests began of the meteorological satellite applied to tactical military operations at home and abroad, the NRO approved modification of three additional satellites for direct readout. These 160-pound vehicles, identical in size and shape to their 100-to-120 pound Block 1 predecessors, also mounted improved infrared radiometers and were known collectively as Block 2. Launched during 1965 and 1966, two of them attained Earth orbit and provided tactical meteorological data for operations in Southeast Asia. A fourth satellite, the one equipped and launched expressly for tactical uses on 20 May 1965, came to be called Block 3. The reason for this curiosity, a "one-vehicle block," involved efforts to distinguish it from its Block 2 cousins that also supported the primary strategic cloud cover mission for the NRP. Shortly before he stepped down as DMSP director and control of the DMSP passed to the Air Force Systems Command, in early 1965 Colonel Haig secured permission to begin the design of a more powerful military meteorological satellite that met more completely the demands of its customers.²⁵

The Block 4 satellite, slightly larger than those in Blocks 1 and 2, was 30 inches in diameter, 29 inches high, and weighed 175 pounds. Still spin-stabilized, the satellite nonetheless provided improved weather coverage. Previously, the single 1/2-inch focal length RCA vidicon television camera in Block 1 and 2 satellites furnished a nadir resolution of 3-to-4 nautical miles (nm) over an 800-nm swath, with significant gaps in coverage of the Earth at the equator. Block 4

[†]For example, in November 1979 President Jimmy Carter, overriding OMB protests, reaffirmed the positions of the departments of commerce and defense that favored maintaining separate civil and military polar orbiting weather satellite programs until future block changes were adopted. Even that restriction was removed by President Reagan in his 4 July 1982 National Space Policy.

²⁴With the use of DMSP tactical weather data in Southeast Asia, knowledge of the program became widespread. In early 1969 word of this program linked to its tactical applications appeared in the open literature. Practical adjustments that acknowledged at least that part of the enterprise could no longer be avoided. (See "Industry Observer."

vehicles carried two one-inch focal length vidicons canted at 26 degrees from the vertical that provided global coverage of the Earth (contiguous coverage at the equator), along a 1,500-nm swath. The resolution varied from 0.8 nm at the nadir to 3 nm at the picture's edge. Besides a multi-sensor infrared subsystem, Block 4 also incorporated a high-resolution radiometer that furnished cloud-height profiles. A tape recorder of increased capacity stored pictures of the entire northern hemisphere each day, while the satellite furnished real-time, direct local tactical weather coverage to small mobile ground or shipboard terminals.²⁶




Fig. 10. DMSP Block 4 Satellite

Under the guidance of a new program director and graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Major John E. "Jack" Kulpa, Jr., eight Block 4 defense meteorological satellites were delivered and seven successfully launched between 1966 and 1969.²⁷ Because of the 1965 change in command relationships, however, Kulpa found himself reporting to four bosses instead of two. Not only did the new NRO director Alexander Flax want to be kept advised, his subordinate, the director of the NRO's Air Force Special Projects Office also expected that courtesy, especially since Kulpa had just completed an assignment there directing a research subsatellite program. At Headquarters Air Force Systems Command, General Bernard Schriever took a personal interest in DMSP, while his subordinate, the commander of the Space Systems Division, became the general officer presumably responsible for DMSP. In the event, Kulpa later recalled, "each of them thought that one of the others was my real reporting official, and I was left pretty much alone to prosecute the effort."²⁷ But the program director could no longer claim the same NRO exemptions from the Air Force -375 series of procurement regulations, and his office staff found itself encumbered increasingly with "operational requirements," "development plans," and other accoutrements of the formal Air Force acquisition process.

Shortly after assuming command, Kulpa began work on the next series of weather

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 January 1969, p. 13.)

²⁷ All seven successfully achieved orbit. The eighth vehicle, not needed for operational requirements, was

satellites, DMSP Block 5. He delegated instrument requirements and design of the spacecraft to two able subordinates, Captain Richard Geer who had previously shepherded launch vehicles, and Major James Blankenship, who had previously supported Haig while acting chief of the Technical Services Branch, Headquarters Air Weather Service (AWS). Blankenship had just returned from the Royal University in Stockholm where he had completed a Ph.D. thesis on Atmospheric Photo Chemistry. Brilliant with an eminently practical turn of mind, he played a predominant role in the payload design that made Block 5 especially user-friendly, such as formatting of the imagery to standard AWS weather chart scales. Moreover, Geer recalled, he possessed "excellent long-range vision, seeing data applications, technology solutions, and political ways and means far into the future. His expertise in weather phenomenology, his aggressive attitude, his persuasiveness, and a unique [NRO access via the AWS] . . . combined to make him arguably the most powerful person in the SPO [system program office]."²⁵



Fig. 11. Col. John E. "Jack" Kulpa,
DMSP Program Director 1965-1968

Indeed, the revolutionary Block 5 spacecraft that resulted from the efforts of Geer and Blankenship took the form of an integrated system: it departed entirely from the TIROS-derived technology of its predecessors. The two men visited meteorologists at work, and then examined what the industry could produce. Instead of starting with a sensor in space and determining what it might tell the user about the weather, these two based the Block 5 design on the users' wish to receive a product in a form that approached as closely as possible the weather charts and maps that they, the meteorologists, employed. Moreover, the product furnished the albedo of each scene, not its brightness, which varied enormously from full sunlight to partial moonlight.²⁶ A survey of the industry and new technologies revealed line scanning sensors and advances in highly sensitive visible light and infrared point (as opposed to array) detectors. Instead of using complicated

donated to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry.

electronics to scan the raster of a TV camera, they reasoned, one now could let the motion of the satellite provide the scanning along the line-of flight. That would require a spacecraft that always "looked down," rather than one that wheeled along its orbit. But a satellite stabilized on three axes would make possible acquiring a strip of imagery of indefinite length, imagery that could be rectified at will.³⁰

Some 200 hours of flight tests of experimental sensors, conducted by Captain Melvin F. ("Nick") Chubb in a T-39 aircraft, produced line scan images that a newly promoted Lt Colonel Kulpa used to secure the approval of the Block 5 design from his superiors in Systems Command. After a source selection competition in May 1966, Westinghouse won the contract to furnish the constant resolution oscillating telescope sensor and ground display equipment, and RCA won the



Fig. 12. Left to Right: Maj. James R. Blankenship and Captain Melvin F. "Nick" Chubb, Jr. at Block 5 Design Review

contract to provide the spacecraft bus. The Westinghouse

"Operational Line Scanner" (OLS), as it came to be called,

provided images of the Earth and its cloud cover in both the visual and infrared (IR) spectral regions.

With this system, nadir visual-imaging resolution at the Earth's surface improved to 0.3 nm during daytime and 2 nm at night through quarter-moonlight illumination levels. The higher

resolution (less than 0.5 nm) now satisfied the requirements of

tactical users. The infrared subsystem furnished 2-run resolution at the surface day and night, as well as cloud-height profile and identification of all clouds above or below a selected altitude, and heat-balance data. Complete global coverage was transmitted over encrypted S-Hand digital data

³⁰Originally called the "Oscillating Line Scanner," the name was changed by NRO-DMSP personnel who, about to present the case for it at the Pentagon, were advised that the military "good word of the day" was "operational." The OSL thus was sold for development with the new, "operational" name. (James R. Blankenship, letter to the author, 23 September 2000.)

links. Block 5 simultaneously satisfied the meteorological needs of the military commander in the field for tactical support, while it met completely the "strategic" requirements of the National Reconnaissance Office. In the months that followed, Blankenship took "shameless advantage of that fact, telling tactical and strategic customers, in turn, that Block 5 had been designed entirely for them. It was true enough."³¹

To achieve the pointing accuracy required for the Block 5 line scan sensor, the spacecraft employed a novel momentum-bias attitude-control system. It consisted of a momentum wheel and horizon scanner, and magnetic coils. The wheel and scanner controlled the pitch axis, while the magnetic coils controlled the roll and yaw axes, replacing the momentum dissipated by friction in the bearing between the momentum wheel and the main body of the spacecraft. The slab-sided, tube-shaped Block 5 satellite remained 30 inches in diameter, but its height increased to 48 inches and its weight rose to 230 pounds. Positioned horizontally on orbit, it closely resembled an overturned garbage can. Three Block 5A spacecraft were built before military demands for greater tactical meteorological support dictated further changes.³²

In 1969, all three military services looked forward to still more tactical weather support from the improved DMSP, and all three sought to obtain it on a daily basis. To that end, the three service assistant secretaries for research and development agreed on a "joint-service utilization plan" for DMSP.³³ On 29 March 1969, John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, approved the plan and the funds needed to improve Block 5 spacecraft to ensure receipt of DMSP weather data on terminals on board ship.³⁴ The result was Block 5B and -C. Longer, at 84 inches in height, and heavier, at 425 pounds, these spacecraft exclusively required use




Fig. 13. DMSP Block 5A Satellite

³²The joint-service DMSP use plan would be revised and updated in June 1973, and again in June 1976. Shipboard readout terminals had by the mid 1970s been installed on-board the aircraft carriers *USS Constellation* and *USS Romach* assigned to CINCPAC and CINCLANT, respectively.

of the uprated booster called Thor/Burner II-A. Block 5B spacecraft added a large sunshade on the "morning birds," a more powerful 20-watt traveling-wave-tube amplifier (TWTA) transmitter that radiated ample power for receipt of the signal on board ships (though it was never used for this purpose operationally), a second primary data recorder, and a gamma-radiation detector. Block 5C added a vertical temperature/moisture profile sensor and an improved IR sensor that now achieved a resolution of 0.3 nm at the Earth's surface.³⁵

In all, three Block 5A, five Block 5B, and three Block 5C satellites were built and launched between February 1970 and February 1976.³⁶ Collectively they furnished the strategic (global, stored) and tactical (direct readout) weather coverage required by the NRO and the JCS, although their operational life expectancy on orbit averaged at best about ten months. Meanwhile, Kulpa had departed the program for another NRO assignment in 1968; Lt. Colonel Wilbur B. Botzong served as his replacement for the next six years, until 1974. Subsequently, a succession of




Fig. 14. DMSP Block 5B Satellite

program directors followed him, often in rapid order. Beginning in the mid 1970s, the DMSP staff at the Space Systems Division in El Segundo matured, expanded numerically, and adopted a more lethargic pace of operations. Its early peripatetic activity and corner-cutting solutions to bureaucratic and technical problems became things of memory. Transferring the military meteorological satellite program to Air Force Systems Command in 1965 had reduced security restrictions, to be sure, but it also had introduced bureaucratic layering (absent Colonel Haig's first rule, the Aerospace Corporation now provided systems engineering and integration

support). It had returned the program to conventional Air Force contracting and procurement practices, and it had markedly increased the number of program personnel involved in decision-making. Bespeaking these less salutary changes, the program office authorized launch of

the last Block 5C satellite on 19 February 1976 with incorrect weight-to-propellant-loading calculations. Launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Thor/Burner II booster rose majestically through the atmosphere, reached the edge of space, exhausted its propellant, and the DMSP satellite whistled back to Earth—a total loss.¹⁷

Fine-Tuning the DMSP

The 10-sided, tub-shaped Block 5 polar-orbiting weather satellite had reached the end of its growth potential by the early 1970s. Moreover, this design, which took advantage of spin-stabilization for internal thermal control, was ill suited to Block 5 operation in a "de-spun" three-axis-stabilized attitude. An entirely new design tailored entirely to Earth-oriented orbital flight, one that met the demands of its military and civilian clients for increased pointing accuracy and more growth potential, appeared necessary. Indeed, beside offices of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Suitland, Maryland, that began routinely to receive DMSP weather data in late 1972, a digital facsimile system had been installed in September 1972 at the National Military Command Center to receive weather data transmitted from Air Force Global Weather Central to the JCS. Shortly thereafter, a second digital facsimile system was installed at Headquarters Tactical Air Command at Langley AFB, Virginia, and a third at the Army's White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, for its use in environmental research.¹⁸

Another reason for starting a new Block 6 military meteorological satellite derived from the short lifetimes on orbit of the Block 5 series. A larger, heavier machine would furnish space and power for redundant components. If one component failed, another could be activated in its place. Studies of the Block 6 satellite, which proceeded in the late 1960s on the basis of a mean-mission lifetime on orbit of 16 months minimum, began in earnest in the early 1970s under DMSP Program Director Botzong.¹⁹ But DMSP Block 6 with that designation was not to be. In the partisan realm of Washington politics, a new block number meant "a new start." At best it would entail special justification before Congressional Committees and involve unusually close scrutiny in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). And officials in OMB favored combining the civil and military

¹⁹ Colonel Botzong would see this work completed before he retired in August 1974. Subsequently, he went to work for RCA.

polar orbiting meteorological satellite into one program that met everyone's needs. At worst, a Block 6 would fail to receive approval and spark an effort to merge the two programs. Air Force officials therefore elected to term the new spacecraft a modification: DMSP "Block 5D." For those acquainted with the nomenclature, the earlier Roman numerals used to identify DMSP blocks now converted to an Arabic numeral, which signified a block change. In Washington, politicians unacquainted with its significance appropriated funds for five of the "modified" Block 5D spacecraft in fiscal year 1972.

The program office, however, had introduced a requirement for an Earth-oriented pointing accuracy much greater than the one imposed on its predecessor Block 5C. In the design competition for the new spacecraft conducted between Boeing and RCA, only the latter firm was judged able to meet completely that requirement. A contract for five Block 5D satellites, signed with RCA in the fall of 1972, set a required launch date for the first of them in the fall of 1974. But the greater pointing accuracy and a complement of additional instruments also had increased the projected cost of these spacecraft compared with their predecessors, and it introduced the risk of delays in development.³⁹

Whatever its pointing accuracy, and the numerical sleight-of-hand for "Block 5D" notwithstanding, in November 1972 the OMB requested that the Departments of Commerce and Defense reexamine a consolidated civil and military polar orbiting meteorological satellite program, and the possibility of using a single spacecraft to satisfy the demands of both. Either action could be expected to result in substantial dollar savings, and a steering group composed of representatives from NOAA, the Defense Department, and NASA was formed once again to consider these questions. Since the technical capability of the existing Block 5C already exceeded the capability of a planned NOAA successor, TIROS-N, the group's report, issued in mid-1973, concluded that the greatest savings would be realized in a single national meteorological satellite system managed by the Air Force, using a standard DMSP Block-5D satellite. This uncivil solution was quickly rejected by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Advisor, who argued that it would violate the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which dictated a separation of military and civil spacefaring, and by officials made uneasy in the Department of State, who warned of adverse international repercussions. Subsequent interagency deliberations led by Air Force Under Secretary James W. Plummer, the director of the NRO, resulted in an agreement in July 1974 to achieve major cost savings by adopting a variant of the DMSP Block-5D military satellite for use in both the civil

(replacing TIROS-N) and military polar-orbiting, low-altitude, meteorological space programs. The larger, joint-use version needed by the NOAA to support additional sensors, was identified as Block 5D-2. The five original Air Force-RCA spacecraft thus became DMSP Block 5D-1.⁴⁰

The Block 5D-1 design that had emerged back in the early 1970s resembled in appearance conventional Earth-oriented satellites of this period. Sized to fit the space taken by the Burner IIA solid-propellant upper stage on the Thor, it was five feet in diameter and 20 feet long. The 5D satellite built by RCA consisted of three sections: a square precision-mounting platform on the forward end supported the sensors and other equipment required for precise alignment; in the center, a five-sided equipment-support module contained the bulk of the electronics and featured one or two pinwheel louvers on four sides for thermal control; and, at the aft end, a circular reaction and control-equipment support structure housed the spent third stage solid-propellant rocket motor and contained reaction-control equipment. A deployable, 6-by-16 foot sun-tracking solar array was also mounted aft, on this section. With its complement of additional sensors, the



Fig. 15. DMSP Block 5D-1 Satellite

spacecraft weighed 1,150 pounds, making it more than twice as massive as its Block 5C predecessors. To heft the additional weight into orbit, the program office contracted with Boeing for a new, larger, solid propellant second stage. The original Burner-IIA second stage, now adapted as a third stage and fixed to the satellite, was used during ascent to inject the vehicle into its circular, sun-synchronous 450 nautical mile Earth orbit.⁴¹

Once in orbit, the 5D-1 RCA spacecraft had to point and control the optical axis of the primary imaging sensor to within .01 degree, in effect making the satellite "a spaceborne optical bench." This was achieved by automatic momentum exchange between three momentum wheels

one each positioned in the yaw, roll, and pitch axis—and magnetic coils that interacted with the Earth's magnetic field and prevented the accumulation of wheel secular momentum. The wheels and coils were coupled with three orthogonal gyroscopes that measured short-term changes in attitude, and a star sensor that updated attitude position to bound the effects of gyro drift. A backup system, composed of an Earth sensor that furnished pitch and roll information, and a sun sensor that provided yaw information, ensured attitude control about one-tenth as accurate as the primary system. The software programs for both systems were stored in two redundant central computers and processing units.⁴³

Besides performing spacecraft-control functions autonomously on orbit, the integrated 5D computers and attitude-control system also controlled the Thor booster and its upper stages during ascent and orbit injection. A pre-set (but reprogrammable in orbit) software code contained in both of the central computers made possible the autonomous orbital operations. All of these control and maintenance functions were directed to a single purpose: support of the primary imaging sensor, an improved Westinghouse electro-optical Operational Linescan System (OLS). The OLS consisted of a scanning optical telescope oscillated in a sinusoidal (side-to-side) motion by counter-reacting springs and a pulsed motor. In a nominal orbit, the OLS covered a swath width of 1,600 nm and furnished a nadir resolution at the Earth's surface of 0.3 nm in the visual and infrared spectra, with a resolution of 0.5 nm at the edges. The OLS also could produce "smoothed" images with a constant resolution of 1.5 nm across the scan. The visual and thermal data acquired on cloud cover and cloud-height profiles could be stored in three tape recorders for transmission on command to Earth in an encrypted, digital format. Direct readout, of course, also was available to tactical users.⁴⁴ The increased amount of data that could not be effectively transmitted over the leased land lines used previously, began to be relayed from the DMSP ground stations to Air Force Global Weather Central at Offutt AFB via commercial communications satellites beginning with the first launch of a Block 5D.

A variety of secondary sensors, some judged as "nice to have," appeared in different combinations on Block 5D-1 missions. Five of them frequently appeared on the spacecraft. An atmospheric density sensor measured the major atmospheric constituents (nitrogen, oxygen, and ozone) in the Earth's thermosphere on the daylight portion of each orbit. A precipitating electron spectrometer counted ambient electrons at various energies. A scanning infrared radiometer furnished vertical temperature profiles, vertical water vapor profiles, and the total ozone

concentration. A passive microwave-scanning radiometer profiled global atmospheric temperatures from the Earth's surface to altitudes above 30 kilometers. Finally, a gamma-radiation sensor furnished by the Air Force Technical Applications Center detected nuclear detonations as part of the ongoing Integrated Operations NUDET Detection System.⁴⁴



Fig. 16. DMSP Nighttime Image of the Aurora Borealis Taken by the First Block 5A Satellite in 1971
(Note lighted cities from Canada through Central America.)

The complexity of the new satellite and design changes introduced along the way, as some had feared, increased costs and delayed the first Block 5D-1 flight from 1974 until 1976. Air Force Systems Command dispatched an Inspector General's team to examine the program at Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO, formerly the Space Systems Division) in El Segundo in January 1975. At Systems Command headquarters, Major General Nick Chubb, who years before had first flight tested the OLS for DMSP, found one of the findings most alarming: given the life expectancy of the Block 5C spacecraft already on orbit, the two year delay in launching Block 5D-1

could be expected to produce a significant gap in meteorological satellite coverage at the end of the decade. Worse, there was all but nothing that could be done to avoid it.⁴⁶

The value of autonomous flight operation nonetheless was demonstrated during the first launch of the first Block 5D-1 on 11 September 1976. The spacecraft unexpectedly tumbled end-over-end in space. A few months later, intermittent communication with the tumbling satellite was established and ground controllers reprogrammed the computers. The attitude-control system thereafter slowed the rate of tumbling until the satellite stabilized on three axes and began operating properly. A flexible Block 5D design had made possible the recovery of a mission at first believed lost.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, as the inspector general team had warned in 1975, the degraded performance of the remaining 5C spacecraft on orbit, the delay in launching the first 5D-1 vehicle, and the unanticipated loss of the last Block 5C at launch in February 1976 combined to produce poor DMSP weather coverage between 1975 and 1977. The program office was forced to change DMSP status from fully operational to partially operational. Then matters got worse. The second 5D-1 satellite, launched on 5 June 1977, vaulted into a drifting orbit and by the spring of 1978 it had moved so far out of position that most of the OLS data was all but useless to the National Reconnaissance Office. The third and fourth vehicles, launched from Vandenberg AFB on 30 April 1978 and 6 June 1979, respectively, fared better. With these two meteorological satellites operating on orbit, the last 5D-1 vehicle was held for launch as a replacement, when needed.⁴⁷

While the Block 5D-1 enterprise moved ahead, work on the joint-use Block 5D-2, contracted with RCA in 1975, proceeded slowly. Technical changes introduced by the civilian and military co-users, and prolonged studies of the proper booster for the 5D-2, brought more delays and increased costs. In El Segundo, the DMSP program office at the Space and Missile Systems Organization found it necessary to slip the first 5D-2 launch from 1980 to 1982.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, between 1975 and 1980, a succession of six DMSP program directors arrived, were reassigned, and left. The era when a Tom Haig or a Jack Kulpa guided DMSP activity for several years at a time appeared to be a thing of the past. In Washington D.C., as the decade drew to a close, the sharp rise in cost of the new Block 5D-2 weather satellite moved cost-conscious members of OMB and Congress in 1979 to reduce the number on order for the Air Force from 13 to 9. Nine long-life follow-on satellites, according to those addressing the question in Washington, were more than enough for the country.⁴⁹

The electronic components of the follow-on satellites remained essentially the same as those in 5D-1, but the 5D-2 structure increased in length from 20 to 22.5 feet. The extension increased the downward-facing sensor-mounting area and lengthened the equipment-support module amidships. That module now contained a second 25.5-amp-hour battery and sported two or three pinwheel temperature control louvers on four of its five sides. The solar array mounted on the aft reaction control equipment-support structure also increased in size to 10-by-16 feet, furnishing increased electrical power. Two important sensors were added to those in the 5D-1 complement: a topside ionospheric sounder provided detailed global measurements of the electron distribution in the Earth's ionosphere, and a microwave imager (flown on the last few 5D-2 satellites) defined the extent of sea ice and sea-state conditions (wave height and patterns) on the world's oceans. Withal, these changes increased the weight of the Block-5D-2 spacecraft to 1,792 pounds—a sum too great for the Thor/Burner booster combination. Heated debates took place between officials in the program office and Aerospace Defense Command, the launch agency at that time,



Fig. 17. DMSP Block 5D-2 Satellite

about adapting Thrust Augmented Thors to the task, just to keep a "blue suit" launch squadron. Ultimately, however, the launch vehicle selected for the 5D-2 meteorological satellite in 1980—after 16 months of vacillation—was the General Dynamics Atlas E, an improved version of the liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile deployed briefly in the early 1960s. The solid-propellant Burner IIA upper stage, fixed to the aft end of the satellite, was retained, again used at altitude to drive the vehicle into a circular 450 nautical mile polar orbit.⁵⁶

A Change in Time and Circumstance

A conjunction of events precipitated successes and failures in late 1979. For some around the world, their time had arrived. In mid-October the Pittsburgh Pirates won the World Series in seven games. On 3 November in Tehran, Iran, Shiite militants seized the American Embassy, imprisoned the staff, and dared the United States to do anything about it. A few weeks later, on Christmas Day, the Soviet Union began airlifting military forces into nearby Afghanistan, intent it seemed on securing a vassal state. But for others time had run out. In September 1979 the first of the Block 5D-1 polar-orbiting satellites, which had begun to fail earlier in the year, ceased all effective operations. The third satellite failed to operate on orbit at the beginning of December 1979. Shortly after the New Year began, in March 1980, the second satellite used for tactical weather support in a drifting orbit, also failed. The fourth vehicle, meanwhile, encountered electrical problems, began to falter, and experienced a total telemetry system failure. On 29 December 1979 ground controllers placed it in a "backup mode." The fifth and last Block 5D-1 satellite held in reserve was quickly readied for flight and shipped to Vandenberg AFB. Now, officials in the DMSP program office could only hope for the best. With Block 5D-2 vehicles delayed in development, a first launch could not occur at least until 1982—two years in the future. The sputtering fourth DMSP satellite, to be joined now by the new fifth Block 5D-1 spacecraft, had therefore to function on orbit for an extended period if the nation's strategic and tactical military meteorological needs were to be met completely.⁵¹

On 15 July 1980, at Vandenberg AFB in California, a Thor/Burner launch vehicle carrying the last 5D-1 satellite roared to life and ascended skyward. For the first time in many years, a Thor/Burner combination failed. The second and third stage solid rockets apparently did not separate, and the satellite fell into the South Pacific. Four weeks later in August, high above the Earth, the fourth and last 5D-1 satellite completely ceased to function. Back in the mid 1970s the program had temporarily operated with a single satellite in orbit. Not since the early 1960s, however, had the program faced an absolute gap in military meteorological coverage. An investigation of DMSP by Air Force Systems Command identified funding cutbacks and program management fundamentally weakened by a rapid turnover of program directors to be the principal contributing causes. The requirement for an extreme pointing accuracy and the much-increased

complexity of these machines, which contributed to spiraling costs and launch delays, appeared to escape notice. The deficiencies cited might be rectified by 1982; in the meantime, however, the military services and the NRP would have to rely on NOAA satellites and other programs for tactical and strategic meteorological coverage.⁵²

Having to rely on NOAA for satellite meteorological data was a bitter pill for Air Force officials to swallow. For years they had defended DMSP before Congress and the public as "indispensable" to military decision-makers, especially in times of conflict.⁵³ To be sure, since the mid 1970s, data from NOAA weather satellites had been received on the East Coast and transmitted to Air Force Global Weather Central over an automated weather network, where it could be combined with information from the DMSP satellites and other ground and aerial observations obtained throughout the world. Between mid-1980 and 1983 these data, less that of the military weather satellites, would meet most military needs. Although the NOAA spacecraft were not designed specifically to satisfy fully the high-resolution visual and infrared strategic meteorological requirements of the National Reconnaissance Program, it would no longer be possible for Air Force leaders to claim that these civil spacecraft would not do at all.

At Air Force Global Weather Central, DMSP high-resolution data had permitted its meteorologists to assess the cloud cover over the Eurasian continent and issue rapid forecasts that predicted the percent probability of obtaining cloud-free photography over areas about to be transited by reconnaissance spacecraft. These time-critical forecast probabilities of cloud-free conditions had been the key determinants in directing camera operations and film expenditure.⁵⁴ By mid 1980, however, many years accumulation of cloud-cover data from all sources permitted statistical modeling and forecasting. Combined with the NOAA weather satellite data, cloud-cover now could be predicted beforehand and that estimate used to direct overhead imagery operations.

Back in 1963-1964, only 50-to-60 percent of CORONA reconnaissance satellite photographs proved to be cloud-free *with* the support of DMSP meteorological satellites. Part of the difficulty stemmed from meteorologists at the NRO's Satellite Operations Center in the Pentagon who at first failed to properly define cloud cover in terms of the relative viewing angle to the target. Part of it stemmed from the differing terminology used by the intelligence customers who submitted target requirements to the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX). In 1966 COMIREX adopted as a single standard the World Aeronautical Chart and its subdivisions, called World Aeronautical Grid Cells, or WAG Cells. Each WAG Cell was a uniform 12-by-18

nautical miles on a side around the world. Intelligence customers thereafter submitted target requests to COMIREX identified by WAG Cell location and sorted by ephemeris—whichever satellite orbital trace crossed a particular WAG Cell and at what time. At Offutt AFB, the Air Weather Service's Air Force Global Weather Central began work on a three-dimensional cloud analysis. The program merged all overhead imaging and civilian weather reports into a global cloud analysis with a spatial resolution of 25 nm on a polar stereographic grid, by date and time of day. By the late 1960s, employing a software program devised by the Air Weather Service, Air Force Global Weather Central could estimate the probability of cloud-free access on any day and time throughout the year for any required target.⁵⁷



Fig. 18. DMSP Image of the Western United States and Mexico at 1/3 Nautical Mile Resolution, early 1970s

This effort assumed increased importance in 1972 when operation of a new imaging satellite began. The early morning "scout" military weather satellite furnished weather conditions over the Soviet Union at first light. These data, used in the cloud analysis and forecast system, provided cloud-cover estimates that were transmitted from Air Force Global Weather Central to the Satellite Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon and used as a short-term forecast to program satellite camera operations in the reconnaissance satellites that trailed the weather scout. The late morning "assessment" weather satellite told how accurate the cloud forecast had been, determined whether target requirements had been satisfied, and also contributed data to the weather model. Finally, personnel in the Defense Mapping Agency scanned the film returned by reconnaissance satellites and reported actual cloud cover to Air Force Global Weather Central afterward, further contributing to the weather model data base.⁵⁸ By the late 1970s a high percentage



Fig. 19. DMSP Image of the Red Sea at 1/3 Nautical Mile Resolution, early 1970s (Mediterranean Sea at the top of the image.)

of satellite pictures taken of the Earth were free of cloud cover. Without these weather forecasts, only 38-to-40 percent of the imagery returned would have been cloud-free. Probabilities of cloud cover generated by the weather analysis model combined with low-altitude NOAA satellite data thus met minimum NRP strategic weather forecast requirements during the 1980-1982 DMSP interregnum.⁵⁷

In December 1982 the first of the Block 5D-2 military weather satellites, a morning bird, was launched successfully atop an Atlas booster. The second and third satellites followed the first one into orbit in November 1983 and June 1987, respectively. These military meteorological satellites once again supplied the global coverage needed by the country's three

military services and the NRP and did so for many months. Indeed, the primary OLS on the first 5D-2 satellite did not cease functioning until mid-August 1987, providing nearly five years of effective operation, while the second ceased in November of that year; the third satellite OLS continued to function until mid-August 1991. In the meantime, Defense Department and NOAA officials made plans for another improved version of what would become the standard U.S. civil and military low-altitude weather satellite; Block 5D-3.⁵⁸

Design studies of a still larger and heavier Block 5D-3 satellite began in the late 1970s, but funds for the military version were not appropriated until mid-1980. The 5D-3 satellites, though

⁵⁷ To meet separate NOAA weather modeling needs, a primary NOAA polar-orbiting satellite crossed the Soviet Union at about 2430 local time, while a second one followed at 0830 in the morning. These times and unavoidable delays in relaying weather data to Air Force Global Weather Central did not mesh well with NRP forecast requirements.

⁵⁸ Air Force officials briefly considered calling this series of DMSP satellites Block 6, but abandoned the idea when President Jimmy Carter issued a directive in late 1979 that specified military and civil meteorological satellite programs would continue to be conducted separately until the next satellite block change. (Presidential Directive 54,




Fig. 20. DMSP Block 5D-3 Satellite

initially designed to be compatible for launch on NASA's Space Shuttle and be laser-hardened, ultimately would be launched on an unmanned expendable rocket. This satellite mounted an improved Westinghouse OLS and a larger combination of secondary sensors. The length of the satellite increased from 22 to 24 feet, while the weight rose to 2,278 pounds. The

RCA spacecraft consisted of the same basic components as its immediate predecessors, but included a larger solar array, three 50-amp-hour batteries, and a redesigned sunshade. The center section now sported four pinwheel temperature control louvers on four of its five sides. These and other design improvements combined to give the 5D-3 an anticipated mean mission lifetime on orbit of five years (60 months). The first of six 5D-3 spacecraft was scheduled to be delivered to the Air Force in June 1990. Following the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986, however, all of them were rescheduled for launch atop modified Titan-II intercontinental ballistic missiles.

After the introduction of the DMSP Block 5D-1 satellites, Air Force leaders realigned the organization and operation of the program. Responsibility for launching DMSP spacecraft transferred in the mid-1970s from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the Aerospace Defense Command, and then to the Air Force System Command's Space Division. When the Air Force established a Space Command in September 1982, the new organization gained from SAC responsibility for operating the ground stations in Maine and Washington State,² and the DMSP Command and Control Center at Offutt AFB. Following the disruption that occurred with the gap in

²Civil Operational Remote Sensing," 23 November 1979.)

In 1979-1980 the DMSP program also had arranged for data readout and relay of weather data from a third site, the Air Force Satellite Control Facility tracking station in Hawaii.

satellite coverage during the early 1980s, and despite the inter-command politics that attended the organizational realignment, in 1987 the operational DMSP received the management attention it deserved, met its strategic and tactical commitments, and could be judged reasonably fine-tuned.

Fine-tuned or not, between 1962 and 1994 the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program had sparked a revolution in overhead meteorology. It introduced the "wheel-mode" operational satellite, novel attitude-control systems, new satellite-tracking programs, and the operational use of infrared imagery to the field of meteorology. Beginning in 1966 it acquired a tactical as well as strategic capability and furnished the needed weather support for both activities. Indeed, DMSP significantly increased the image-search system effectiveness of NRO reconnaissance satellites and of SAC SR-71 and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, while it markedly reduced the number of aerial meteorological sorties. The integrated Block 5 introduced the first systems approach that turned on the user's requirements. All the while, the mean mission lifetime on orbit of the military meteorological satellites increased from 90 days in Block 1, to five years on the most recent Block 5D-2 flights. These successes were tempered in the 1970s by the layering of management and the introduction of increasingly complex spacecraft that brought with them program delays, increased costs, and, ultimately, the gap in weather coverage that occurred in the early 1980s.

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, certainly during the early years and at least until the early 1970s, made do with less. In those years, DMSP development and production was accomplished with fewer personnel and at less than one-half the cost of equivalent NASA and Department of Commerce efforts.⁵⁴ Pushed to operational status within 24 months, the DMSP demonstrated remarkable technical performance for both strategic and tactical applications. Considering its cost and performance in the mid-1960s, Commerce Department leaders told their counterparts at NASA that they would adopt the DMSP wheel-mode spacecraft in place of Nimbus as the standard for low-altitude, polar-orbiting meteorological applications. That choice was made formal in the mid 1970s when the DMSP Block 5D three axis-stabilized spacecraft also was selected for use in both programs. But the choice of a common spacecraft bus highlighted the near identical content of the civil and military low altitude meteorological satellite programs.

Afterword

Early in 1993, once again prompted by the Office of Management and Budget and Congressional committees to justify separate military and civil polar orbiting meteorological satellites, representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce's NOAA, and NASA reconvened to study the issue. Members of this group most likely were unacquainted with the interdepartmental study conducted by their predecessors thirty-two years before in 1961, a study that had produced plans for a National Operational Meteorological Satellite System. Because of security restrictions only recently lifted, they surely were unacquainted with the most significant aspects of the history that you have just read. But unlike events in 1961, the technology for space-based meteorological observation now was well developed, the international sensitivity associated with overhead reconnaissance had all but disappeared, and weather satellites were in operation in orbit around the clock. Hardly to anyone's surprise, and with much greater assurance, members of the 1993 study reached conclusions similar to those of 1961: a single program would eliminate the need for duplicate satellites and ground stations, it would reduce the number of people involved along with the corresponding costs, and it could be made to satisfy both civil and military requirements for "operational, space based, remotely-sensed, environmental data."⁴⁶ But this last proposition remains open to question. If history is any guide, attempts to acquire advanced weapon systems (e.g., the TFX/F-111) that will do everything for everyone more often than not have failed to achieve that goal, and have cost more in the bargain.

Nevertheless, the 1993 interdepartmental study, after appropriate departmental coordination and approvals, led later that year to the preparation of a "tri-agency" plan to combine the two weather satellite programs into one. But the word "combine," would not be used. Perhaps it suggested bureaucratic foot-dragging, if not myopia, and a substitute was selected in its place — one that implied a new initiative. On 5 May 1994 President William Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive announcing the choice,⁴⁷ and, coincident with it, the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and NASA released the "Implementation Plan for a Converged Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellite System." The plan created an Integrated Program Office that would develop, acquire, and operate the converged National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). It formed an Executive Committee composed of senior officials from all three government agencies that would serve as a board of directors and ensure that the NPOESS

indeed met the requirements of each. And, under the terms of the plan, each agency shared responsibility for different elements of NPOESS. The NOAA held "overall responsibility for the converged system," including operating the satellites on orbit and representing the program to the various civil and international communities involved. The Defense Department became responsible for contracting and acquiring the new meteorological satellites and for launching them. Finally, reminiscent of the division of labor in 1961 that produced Nimbus, NASA assumed responsibility for "facilitating the development and incorporation of new cost-effective technologies into the converged system."⁶¹

The NPOESS program office, located at a NOAA facility in Silver Spring, Maryland, opened its doors on 3 October 1994. Four years later, in May 1998, the NPOESS program director assumed responsibility for controlling DMSP satellites, along with the NOAA polar orbiting satellites. On 11 June the Air Force Space Command 6th Space Operations Squadron, which had previously operated DMSP satellites from a control center near the old SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, inactivated. It brought to a close an effort begun in secret to meet the meteorological needs of the National Reconnaissance Office and its National Reconnaissance Program nearly four decades before, in 1961. After May 1998, civilians at the NOAA's Satellite Operations Control Center in Suitland conducted space flight operations for all polar orbiting U.S. weather satellites, though the Air Force established a backup satellite operations center, manned by USAF Reserve personnel, at Schriever Air Force Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado. Sometime late in the first decade of the new Millennium, NPOESS satellites will become available as replacements for the current Block 5D-3 DMSP and NOAA satellites, as they expire on orbit.⁶² But that is another history in the making.

Acknowledgments

When in early 2000 the NRO declassified its meteorological satellite history, it became possible for me to share an early version with some of the original participants who had left the program and, along with it, their security clearances many years before. On receiving word of the declassification, several of them also corresponded with me, sent unclassified documents that they possessed, and two prepared written memoirs. Altogether, they corrected errors of fact and added details not otherwise found in NRO and Air Force documents, and in the process

contributed mightily to this work. Among those who furnished vital records or recollections, I am most especially indebted to Thomas O. Haig, Richard L. Geer, Ronald E. Mintz, James R. Blankenship, John E. (Jack) Kulpa, and John D. Cunningham. At one time or another, each one of them were eye witnesses to and played active roles in the story; indeed, John Cunningham, who first served DMSP as an Air Force officer in the 1970s and 1980s, is currently the System Program Director for the Integrated Program Office/NPOESS. Finally, special thanks are owed to my colleague Matthew Doering who researched and prepared the DMSP Launch Record tables, and placed carefully the illustrations that appear in this work.

Table 1 DMSP Launch Record Scout Rocket					
DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
5-23-62	Scout V-112	PALC SLC-5	DMSP Block 1	0%	Failed to Orbit; 2 nd Stage Exploded *
8-23-62	Scout V-117	PALC SLC-5	DMSP Block 1	50%	Success; EMD 6-11-63
2-19-63	Scout V-126	PALC SLC-5	DMSP Block 1	66.6%	Improper Orbit; First DMSP with Infrared System
4-26-63	Scout V-121	PALC SLC-5	DMSP Block 1	33.3%	Failed to Orbit; 3 rd Stage Exploded *
9-27-63	Scout V-132	PALC SLC-5	DMSP Block 1	16.6%	Failed to Orbit; 3 rd Stage Failure

Abbreviations: DMSP – Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD – End of Mission Date; PALC – Point Arguello Launch Complex; SLC – Space Launch Complex

* An investigation after the V-121 failure revealed that the Range Safety Officer (RSO) turned off the Command Destruct (CD) transmitter when the Range was pronounced "Clear" from any debris that might result from a catastrophic malfunction. What the RSO failed to consider was that with the CD transmitter turned off, the Scout receiver, equipped with an automatic gain control onboard the rocket, began searching for the next strongest signal. The next strongest signal turned out to be a radio station broadcasting music in the Los Angeles basin. Based on the investigation, when a male vocalist enunciated the consonant "p" the receiver interpreted it as the coded destruct signal.

Table 2					
DMSP Launch Record					
Thor-Agena D Rocket *					
DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
1-19-64	Thor- Agena D	VAFB SLC-1W	Two DMSP Block 1 satellites	100%	Success; EMD 7-10-64 & EMD 3-17-65
6-17-64	Thor- Agena D	VAFB SLC-1W	Two DMSP Block 1 satellites	100%	Success; EMD 2-16-66 & EMD 10-15-65

Abbreviations: DMSP – Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD – End of Mission Date; SLC – Space Launch Complex; VAFB – Vandenberg Air Force Base

* The Thor-Agena launch vehicle carried two DMSP satellites simultaneously.

Table 3
DMSP Launch Record
Burner I Rocket

DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
1-18-65	Burner I	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 1	0%	Failed to Orbit; Payload shroud failed to separate
3-18-65	Burner I	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 1	50%	Success; EMD 6-15-65
5-20-65	Burner I	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 3	66.6%	Success; EMD 2-16-67
9-9-65	Burner I	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 2	75%	Success; EMD 9-22-66
1-7-66	Burner I	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 2	60%	Failed to Orbit; Upper stage failed to ignite
3-30-66	Burner I	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 2	66.6%	Success; EMD 5-3-68

Abbreviations: DMSP – Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD – End of Mission
Date: SLC – Space Launch Complex; VAFB – Vandenberg Air Force Base

Table 4					
DMSP Launch Record					
Thor/Burner II Rocket, Block 4 Satellites					
DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
9-15-66	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4A	100%	Success; EMD 11-3-68
2-8-67	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4A	100%	Success; EMD 5-18-67
8-23-67	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4A	100%	Success; EMD 3-13-68
10-11-67	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4A	100%	Success; EMD 6-23-68
5-23-68	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4B	100%	Success; EMD 5-26-69
10-22-68	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4B	100%	Success; EMD 9-19-70
7-22-69	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 4B*	100%	Success; EMD 3-19-71

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base

* One Additional DMSP Block 4B satellite was manufactured, but not launched. The satellite, also known as 4B-4, was donated to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry.

Table 5					
DMSP Launch Record					
Thor/Burner II Rocket, Block 5A & 5B Satellites					
DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
2-11-70	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5A	100%	Success; EMD 3-19-71
9-3-70	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5A	100%	Success; EMD 2-15-71
2-17-71	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5A	100%	Success; EMD 3-3-73
10-14-71	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5B	100%	Success; EMD 4-27-72
3-24-72	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5B	100%	Success; EMD 2-23-74
11-9-72	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5B	100%	Success; EMD 5-22-75
8-17-73	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5B	100%	Success; EMD 1-24-77
3-16-74	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5B	100%	Success; EMD 5-27-76

Abbreviations: DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD - End of Mission
 Date: SLC - Space Launch Complex; VAFB - Vandenberg Air Force Base

Table 6					
DMSP Launch Record					
Thor/Burner II Rocket, Block 5C & 5D1 Satellites					
DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
8-9-74	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5C	100%	Success; EMD 12-1-77
5-24-75	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5C	100%	Success; EMD 11-30-77
2-19-76	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5C	94.4%	Failed to Orbit; Improper fuel loading
9-11-76	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5D1	95%	Success; EMD 9-17-79
6-5-77	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5D1	95.2%	Success; EMD 3-19-80
5-1-78	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5D1	95.5%	Success; EMD 2-28-84
6-6-79	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5D1	95.7%	Success; EMD 8-29-80
7-15-80	Thor/Burner II	VAFB SLC-10W	DMSP Block 5D1	91.7%	Failed to Orbit; 4 th Stage Failure

Abbreviations: DMSP – Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD – End of Mission Date; SLC – Space Launch Complex; VAFB – Vandenberg Air Force Base

Table 7

DMSP Launch Record**Atlas E Rocket**

DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
12-21-82	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 8-24-87
11-18-83	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 10-17-87
6-20-87	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 8-13-91
2-3-88	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 2-24-92
12-1-90	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 2-8-95
11-28-91	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 8-30-00
8-29-94	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD 4-28-97
3-24-95	Atlas E	VAFB SLC-3W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD N/A

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD - End of Mission Date; SLC - Space Launch Complex; VAFB - Vandenberg Air Force Base

Table 8					
DMSP Launch Record					
Titan II Rocket					
DATE	LAUNCH VEHICLE	LAUNCH SITE	PAYLOAD	PERCENT SUCCESS	REMARKS
4-4-97	Titan II	VAFB SLC-4W	DMSP Block 5D2	100%	Success; EMD N/A
12-12-99	Titan II	VAFB SLC-4W	DMSP Block 5D3	100%	Success; EMD N/A
11-14-01	Titan II	VAFB SLC-4W	DMSP Block 5D3		Projected Launch Date

Abbreviations: DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD - End of Mission Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base

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1. Any photography of the Earth's surface from space, RAND reminded the Air Force, had to occur when "weather permits ground observation." Robert M. Salter, Jr., James E. Lipp, and Richard S. Wehner, *Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-217, April 1951), p. 80. See also, W. R. Cartheuser, *Weather Degradation of Reconnaissance* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, D-4003, 10 December 1956). The first serious evaluation of a meteorological satellite and what it could be expected to do for synoptic weather analysis, needless to say, also took place at RAND at the same time. See Stanley M. Greenfield and William W. Kellogg, *Inquiry into the Feasibility of Weather Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-218, April 1951). See also, Karl R. Johannessen, *The Meteorological Factors Affecting Photographic Reconnaissance from Very High Altitudes*, Air Weather Service Technical Report 154, May 1961. An informed review of early meteorological satellite developments can be found in David S. Johnson, "Evolution of the U.S. Meteorological Satellite Program. Some Reminiscences," *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*, Vol 75., No. 9, September 1994, pp. 1705-1708.
2. Lt Col James B. Jones, "The National Weather Satellite Program: Its Utility as a Contribution to Military Weather Support and as a Peaceful Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy," Research Report prepared for the Air War College, Air University, 1965, pp. 1-2. The National Reconnaissance Program, created in 1961 by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, included all United States "satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert." The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), headquartered in the Defense Department, managed the NRP.
3. Ltr., Thomas O. Haig to Lt. Col. Richard Dickover, HQ AWS/DOD, no subject, 13 Nov 1984, p. 1. See also, Robert Perry, *A History of Satellite Reconnaissance*, Volume IIA SAMOS, 1972, pp. 211-215.
4. Richard L. Geer, "Comments on the Early Years of U.S. Space Programs: Recollections of a Participant," 1999, p. 3.
5. Ltr. Haig to Dickover, p. 2.
6. Ralph B. Hotlinan and Thomas O. Haig, "Space Uses of the Earth's Magnetic Field," Space Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, October 1964; also, Robert L. Perry, *A History of Satellite Reconnaissance*, Vol IIA, SAMOS, pp. 223-224. The term "wheel-mode" meant a spin-stabilized satellite that took a picture of the Earth each time it revolved.
7. Perry, Vol IIA, pp. 221-222.
8. Rpt. Program 417 - Military Meteorological Satellite System, HQ AWS/OP, 1 June 1966, p. 7.



9. Ltr. Haig to Dickover, p. 2; Perry, Vol IIA, p. 254.
10. Ltr. Haig to Dickover, p. 3. SAC leaders had wanted for some time to get into the space business and the meteorological satellite operation, which was of particular interest, meshed nicely with that desire and with the command's requirements for world-wide weather data. See Ltr. General Thomas S. Power, CINCSAC, to General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, regarding TIROS weather satellite, 1 December 1960 (Thomas D. White Papers, Library of Congress, Box 34, 2-15SAC.).
11. Interview. Thomas O. Haig with the author, the Pentagon, 6 October 1995.
12. Perry, Vol IIA, pp. 268-70. The Block 5 satellites would mount vastly improved sensors, with the IR and visual line scanner viewing the Earth through a beam splitter, operating simultaneously. The resulting images thus could be overlaid.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.
14. Captains Richard L. Geer, James F. Roberts, and Calvin H. Markwood, "Development of the Bumer Space Launch Vehicles," Space Systems Division Air Force Systems Command, 1966. Also, Geer, "Comments on the Early Years," pp. 8-9. Officials of the Douglas Aircraft Company that manufactured the Thor rockets put the new launch vehicle combination "on the front burner." Thus the name "burner (number) 1."
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
16. Ltr. Haig to Dickover, pp. 2-3.
17. "Weather Bureau Rejects Nimbus for Operational Satellite Program," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 7 Oct 1963; DOC/USWB-NASA News Release 63-220, "NASA-Weather Bureau Announce Nimbus Agreement," 4 Oct 1963. For a description of NASA's NRO-derived TOS, see NASA News Release 64-125, "Operational Weather Satellite Study Completed, Contract to be Negotiated for TIROS Operational System," 28 May 1964; for its appearance as an operating weather satellite, see James F. W. Purdom and W. Paul Menzel, "Evolution of Satellite Observations in the United States and Their Use in Meteorology," in James R. Fleming, ed., *Historical Essays on Meteorology, 1919-1995* (Boston: The Diamond Anniversary History Volume of the American Meteorological Society, 1996), pp. 107-109; see also, Ltr. David S. Johnson, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce (DOC), to Col. Thomas O. Haig, 29 June 1965, regarding Program 417 (DMSP) contributions to the NOMSS.
18. Rpt. *Meteorological Satellite Background*, HQ AWS/OP, June 1963, p. 2.
19. Rpt. *AFSC/AWS Ad Hoc Report on Meteorological Satellite Programs*, Appendix A, U.S. Meteorological Satellite Programs, 1 May 1966, p. A-13.

20. Rpt. *AFSC/AWS Ad Hoc Report on Meteorological Satellite Requirements and Systems*. Appendix F. Use of Program 417 Data in Military Operations. 1 May 1966, pp. F-1 F-2.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. F-2 F-3; Rpt. *Program 417*, no author indicated. 8 April 1969, p. 1; and Rpt. *Program 417-Military Meteorological Satellite System*. HQ AFSC/MSFL, June 1966, pp. 11-12.
22. Memorandum, from Brockway McMillan, Under Secretary of the Air Force, to General John P. McConnell, CSAF, "Program 417 Management," 22 June 1965; preliminary planning in Memo, Brockway McMillan, Undersecretary of the Air Force, to Chief of Staff, USAF, "Program 417 Program Management," 22 June 1965.
23. Rpt. *Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417*, NRO document 77896-72, p. 35.
24. John L. McLucas, "A New Look From USAF's Weather Satellites," *Air Force Magazine*, June 1973, pp. 64-67.
25. Rpt. *A Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417*, NRO document 77896-72, p. 10.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10; also, Rpt. *Program 417 Military Meteorological Satellite System*, HQ AFSC/MSFL, June 1966, p. 6.
27. John E. Kulpa, telephone interview with the author, 27 July 2000.
28. Geer, "Comments on the Early Years," p. 17.
29. Brightness varies by many orders of magnitude and posed a data link capacity problem. The user, however, wasn't as much interested in the brightness of a scene as he was in its albedo—its reflectance. As Geer described the solution: "We devised a simple scheme. We placed a suitably shaped light sensor on the spacecraft to 'look over its shoulder' to determine sun (or moon) illumination. What the satellite sees roughly corresponds to the illumination on the scene below. By dividing the brightness signal from the primary earth-facing sensor by the brightness signal from the illumination sensor, the albedo of the scene is left. Since albedo only varies over one order of magnitude (1.0 to 0, perfectly reflective to perfectly black), the [data] link problem was solved." *Ibid.*, p. 20.
30. Ltr. James R. Blankenship to the author, 23 September 2000; also, Geer, "Comments on the Early Years," p. 18.
31. Kulpa, telephone interview; Geer, "Comments on the Early Years," p. 19.
32. Paper, "Program 417 (U)," no author indicated. 8 Apr 1969, p. 3; Rpt. *A Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417*, NRO document 77896-72, p. 10.

33. Memorandum from Alexander H. Flax (Assistant Secretary of the Air Force), Robert A. Frosch (Navy), and Charles L. Poor (Army), to John S. Foster, Jr., DDR&E, Subj: "Program 417," 5 March 1969.
34. Memorandum, John S. Foster, Jr., DDR&E, to the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (R&D), "Program 417," 29 March 1969.
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36. See DMSP Launch Record, Tables 5 and 6.
37. Interview, Lt. Col. Richard F. Picanso, DMSP Program Element Monitor, with the author, the Pentagon, 12 August 1987.
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39. Hist. Directorate of Space, DCS/Research and Development, 1 July 1972-31 December 1972, p. 63; Geer, "Comments on the Early Years," p. 22.
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44. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.
45. Geer, "Comments on the Early Years," p. 23.
46. Blankenship and McGlinchey, p. 30.
47. Hist. Air Weather Service, 1976, Vol I, pp. 207-209; Hist. Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 January 1977-31 December 1977, Vol I, p. 185.
48. Ltr. John D. Cunningham to the author, 18 September 2000, with comments on draft manuscript.
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50. Hist. Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 October 1979-30 September 1980, Vol I pp. 212-213; Blankenship and McGlinchey, p. 306; RCA Chart, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, n.d.; and Letter, Cunningham to the author, 18 September 2000.
51. Hist. Air Weather Service, 1979, Vol I, pp. 192-196.
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53. See, for example, Maj. Ernie R. Dash and Maj. Walter D. Myers, "The Meteorological Satellite: An Invaluable Tool for the Military Decision-Maker," *Air University Review*, Vol 24, No. 3, March-April 1978, pp. 15-24.
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This Publication Is
UNCLASSIFIED





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

5 December 1997

Dear Special Projects Alumni and Associates:

On 6 December 1997, I announced the declassification of the association between Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Special Projects (SAFSP) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and certain limited facts about that association. Based on this declassification, for the first time since its inception in 1961, we are now able to acknowledge certain Special Projects' support to the NRO. This note is intended to provide alumni, government, and industry associates with guidance on the limits of this declassification.

The following information outlines the significant aspects of what is now declassified: SAFSP assignments to Los Angeles Air Force Base, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, the Satellite Control Facility, Sunnyvale, or the Pentagon. All other locations that support the NRO remain classified. The generic description of your SAFSP role in support of NRO activities is now unclassified, to include involvement in engineering, launch, contracting, security, administration, etc. This description must not reveal information concerning operations, technologies, or methodologies. There is additional, specific guidance for those associated with CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD programs which are the only systems declassified as of this date. All other information concerning SAFSP activities and locations remains classified.

In this Fiftieth Anniversary Year of the Air Force, I am very pleased that we are now able to provide this initial, but long overdue acknowledgement of the contributions by those who have served with SAFSP. If you have any questions please contact our security office at 1-800-306-6990 extension 3636. If you receive requests for interviews or for information from media or historians concerning SAFSP, we strongly encourage you to contact us so we can assist with your response.

Sincerely,

Keith R. Hall
Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force (Space)

NEWS RELEASE
PLEASE NOTE DATE**HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL LAUNCH****NO 929-61
OXford 75131****SEP - 9 1961
FACT SHEET
SAMOS III****GENERAL INFORMATION**

Project SAMOS is a research and development program to determine the capabilities for making observations of space, the atmosphere and the globe from satellites. The program is under the executive management of the Secretary of the Air Force.

TEST OBJECTIVE

SAMOS III was launched from a USAF launch pad at the Naval Missile Facility, Point Arguello, California, over the Pacific Missile Range to place the vehicle in a near circular, polar orbit. A major objective of the test will be to further determine the reliability of the ATLAS/AGENA B combination.

Another purpose of the flight is continued component testing to establish the feasibility of obtaining an observation capability from an orbiting satellite.

CONFIGURATION

SAMOS III employs the AGENA B as its second stage. It is boosted out of the atmosphere by a modified Air Force ATLAS and placed into orbit by the AGENA.

First Stage

Height	Approximately 80 feet (with adapter section).
Launch Weight.	Approximately 262,000 pounds.
Thrust	Approximately 368,000 pounds (includes two booster engines which produce 154,500 pounds thrust each and are jettisoned after about two minutes of flight; the sustainer engine, rated at approximately 57,000 pounds; and two small vernier engines at 1,000 pounds of thrust each).

MORE

Orbital Stage

Height Approximately 25 feet (about 3 feet of the aft section fit inside the ATLAS adapter ring, making the total mated vehicle height 102 feet).

Weight Approximately 18,000 pounds at launch. Orbital weight after fuel exhaustion will be approximately 4200 pounds.

Thrust Approximately 15,000 pounds.

Instrument Package. Test photographic and related equipment.

TRACKING, TELEMETRY AND COMMAND

- a. Primary tracking, telemetry and command during orbit will be performed by:

 Vandenberg Tracking Station, Vandenberg AFB, California
 Hawaiian Tracking Station, Kaneohe, Oahu, Hawaii
 Kodiak Tracking Station, Kodiak, Alaska
 New Boston Tracking Station, New Boston, New Hampshire
- b. Ascent guidance (booster)

 GS Mod II, Vandenberg AFB, California
- c. Ascent tracking and telemetry

 Vandenberg Tracking Station, Vandenberg AFB, California
- d. Downrange Telemetry and Tracking Ship

 To be announced
- e. Ascent Radar and/or Optical Tracking (ROR)

 Point Arguello, California
 Point Mugu, California
 Saint Nicholas Island, California
- f. USAF Satellite Test Center, Sunnyvale, California

 Control Center receiving all orbital data and exercising command control of SANDS.

CONTRACTOR PARTICIPATIONATLAS

Assembly and Test General Dynamics/Astronautics

Systems Engineering and
 Technical Direction. . . Space Technology Laboratories

Guidance . . . General Electric Company, Burroughs Corporation
 (ground based computer)

Propulsion . . . Rocketdyne Division of RCA

AGENA

Prime Contractor . . . Lockheed

Propulsion Bell

Ground-Based Communications . . . Philco

END
-2-

~~SECRET~~

61. ~~(S)~~ OS/Security Policy e-mail to MSO/IDRC [] (b)(3)
[] 31 July 2000, SUBJECT: "Impact of
Declassification of the Helms Paper." This E-mail reads in
part, "Attached is a summary of the specific information
which is now declassified as a result of the determination
by the DNRO that the subject paper is declassified."
(emphasis added) The paper attached to the E-mail reads:
"For your reference and action as required, the DNRO has
declared as unclassified NRO related information in the
Helms paper. Key areas of information declassified by this
decision which must be considered in responding to FIOA,
Mandatory Declassification, Prepublication, and IRDC
reviews are listed below:

- The fact that Hughes made the relay satellite, and
that Tony Iorillo was the principal architect.
- The 19 December 1976 first launch of the near real-
time electro optical imagery satellite (the name
KENNEN is still classified SECRET), and the fact
that a successful link-up occurred with the relay
satellite over the then USSR.
- Fact that Charles Roth was the program manager for
the first near real-time imaging satellite system.
- Fact that President Ford declared the system
operational on 20 January 1977."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

At the request of the following message is posted for your information:

(b)(3)

5/21/01 11:19:42 AM EST

Subject:

Declassification of Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems and Office of Missile and Satellite Systems, National Reconnaissance Office Relationship

Message:

15 May 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: (U) Declassification of Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems and Office of Missile and Satellite Systems, National Reconnaissance Office Relationship

(U) This memorandum recommends the declassification of the "fact of" and certain "facts about" the association of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems (SAFSS) and its predecessor Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (SAFMSS). This declassification effort furthers NRO compliance with intent of Executive Order 12958 and is in accordance with current NRO classification criteria and risk mitigation measures to protect sensitive and classified information.

~~(C)~~ From 1961 to April 1995, SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS was the unclassified designator for the staff element of the NRO and performed staff functions for the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO. Personnel assigned to these offices also provided support to the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space) on aircraft reconnaissance and space reconnaissance systems. SAFSS Air Force military

and civilian personnel and contractors supporting them, have protected the "fact of" their association and assignments with the NRO as BYEMAN information for over 30 years.

(U) The role of the SAFSS/SAFMSS as the Headquarters staff of the NRO can be declassified now with minimal impact on continuing NRO classified elements, operations, and locations as they are not associated with currently classified NRO information. Ample justification exists to declassify the SAFSS and SAFMSS role within the NRO as a result of the gradual phasing out of SAFSS as an organizational assignment mechanism for NRO personnel. Since 1995 there have been no NRO personnel

**SUBJECT: (U) Declassification of Secretary of the Air Force,
Office of Space Systems and Office of Missile and
Satellite Systems, National Reconnaissance Office
Relationship**

assigned to SAFSS. Further, SAFSS has no current organization, mission, or function within the Air Force Staff structure.

~~(C)~~ Identification of SAFSS and its personnel as the NRO Headquarters staff no longer constitutes a risk to NRO activities. However, a presumption on the part of persons knowledgeable of SAFSS that all information concerning SAFSS and its role in the NRO is now declassified presents a certain element of risk that should be mitigated. Therefore, to reduce the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of classified NRO operations or locations, we have constructed a list of information about SAFSS that is now UNCLASSIFIED (see attachment). This information on the limits of the declassification will be made available to personnel knowledgeable of SAFSS operations, including SAFSS alumni (military, civilian, and contractors).

(U) Recommend the declassification of the role of SAFSS as the staff element of the NRO as a normal progression of NRO declassification efforts. Also, request your signature on the attached letter to SAFSS alumni and associates.

**Kenneth W. Renshaw
Director of Security**

Attachment

APPROVED:

Keith R. Hall
Director, National Reconnaissance Office

The following "facts about" the association of SAFSS and the National Reconnaissance Office are proposed as unclassified:

- **The association between the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems (SAFSS) and its predecessor, the Air Force Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (SAFMSS).**
- **Fact that SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS was the staff element of the NRO and performed staff functions for the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO.**
- **Fact that personnel assigned to SAFSS and SAFMSS provided support to the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space) on aircraft reconnaissance and space matters.**
- **Identities of all former SAFSS and SAFMSS Directors.**
- **Identification of main organizational elements of SAFSS and SAFMSS, e.g., SS-1, SS-2, etc.**
- **Identities of key SAFSS and SAFMSS personnel assigned to the major staff offices and elements of SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS, such as chiefs of the key divisions, comptroller, technical advisor, etc.**
- **Fact of individual assignment to SAFSS and SAFMSS (from 1961 to April 1995) including unclassified duty and staff title, generic description duties (i.e. engineering, technology, comptroller, security, administration, etc.), and period of performance.**
- **Fact of and individual's assignment to SAFSS and SAFMSS at Los Angeles Air Force Base, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral Air Force**

Station, Satellite Control Facility, Sunnyvale, and The Pentagon. These are the only locations to be declassified as associated with SAFSS and SAFMSS.

- **General association of SAFSS with CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD, and GRAB.**

- **General description of SAFSS operations and support functions not associated with currently classified NRO information.**

There is no Attachment with this Posting

~~**SECRET//X1**~~

Approved for Release: 2018/12/21 C05102040
~~TOP SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

COORDINATION SHEET

TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE	GRADE	DATE	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE	GRADE	DATE
OS (Security Policy)	Coord								
				14					
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URN OF ACTION OFFICER AND GRADE: 24/01 SYMBOL: IDRC PHONE: TYPIST: SUSPENSE DATE: 6 June 2001

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review, Case Number E01-0011

DATE: 24 May 2001

SUMMARY

BACKGROUND: The NRO Historian has requested the attached NRO History (Management of the National Reconnaissance Program 1960-1965) be reviewed for declassifying as much information as possible that had been deleted from its earlier printing. The Information Declassification Review Center (IDRC) has applied the NRO Review and Redaction Guide for 25-Year-Old Information (RRG) as last updated on 27 March 2001.

DISCUSSION:

Handwritten, red text within the document represents the previously deleted information which the Historian Office desires to be declassified. Such text highlighted in red is designated for continued redaction per the RRG and can be found at the pages with red-tabs. All other handwritten, red text is recommended for release.

Please note that attached to this coordination sheet is a list of names in the document recommended for release. These names currently are not authorized for release per the RRG. However, IDRC believes the overall imperative for protecting these people's association with the NRO either appears no longer applicable given recent policy decisions, or staffing is already underway to adjudicate the release of their names. IDRC requests OS concurrence not only on the recommended release of these names with the intended reprint of this document, but also specific authority for IDRC to immediately incorporate them as releasable in the RRG.

REC SEC
INITIALS:

ACTION NUMBER:

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~~TOP SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

See page 36 of the main body RE our recommendation to release the codewords CENTURY and MBRELLA.

Note that we also have included four attachments to the history document (orange tabs). These attachments contain retreated documents that are to be inserted in the main body (orange tab 1), or are re-treatments of documents that were included as Appedendixes with the original publication. Text identified by IDRC for continued redaction is marked by gray highlight.

Please indicate your concurrence by returning your signed coordination sheet and the action document to IDRC. If you disagree with hand-written text recommended for declassification, please circle that text in red. Strike through any name on the attached list if you non concur with its release.

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact

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Attachments


- .. Names From Perry History (Vol V) Proposed for Release
- .. Marked up NRO History Document, Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960-1965
- // 4 attachments

WHEN SEPARATED FROM ITS ATTACHMENTS
THIS COORDINATION SHEET IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

FN 70

27 June 2001



(b)(3)


RE: ~~RRG~~ Case E01-0011

I agree with the release of Perry "NRO History, Management of the NRP 1960-1965. The IDRC release of individual and corporate names and the redaction of others is done in a rational manner. i.e., redaction of the names when a system being discussed is still classified.

I concur on the release of the names of the individual names on the attached sheet (which are also released in the document and the attached picture (tab 1) of the original NRO staff.) These names are of personnel assigned to SFASS which has now been declassified to include names of staff members.

I also concur in the release as redacted of the historical documents (tabs 2-4).

Recommend you sign the coordination sheet and I will get it back to the IDRC.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Names From Perry History (Vol V)
Proposed for Release**

Berg, R. A. Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 116, footnote citation 36. Listed as Deputy Director, SAFSP. Later became Director, SAFSS. The DNRO recently declassified names of all SAFSS Directors.

Carter, D. L. Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 122, footnote citation 110. Carter is cited as a member of the NRO Staff. The DNRO recently declassified several facts about the SAFSS association with the NRO. One of these declassified facts strongly implies that any individual who served on the NRO staff can be acknowledged as long as there is no connection to still-classified activities. There is no classified context associated with Col Carter in this document.

Curtin, Richard M. Brig Gen, USAF. Rationale: Curtin was the first Director, SAFSS (NRO Staff). The DNRO recently declassified all the names of the SAFSS Directors.

Stopped
↓
Donovan, A. F. Rationale: See page 61, footnote at bottom of the page. Mr. Donovan is mentioned in the context of being a member of the Purcell Panel. In this regard, his association with the NRO appears indirect and nonsensitive.

✓ Gorman, Frank B. CAPT, USN. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

Heran, Paul Col, USAF. Rationale: See pages 68, 99, and 100. The general association with the NRO and the specific context of this individual's association with NRO programs at the page references no longer appear sensitive.

✓ Herron, T. J., Lt Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

✓ Howard, Henry C. Maj, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

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✓ Istvan, Edwin J. Lt Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

✓ James, Clifton E. Maj, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

✓ Leach, (NFI) Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 118, footnote citations 53, 54, and 62. Leach is cited as a member of SAFSP. SAFSP's role in the NRO and general facts about it have been declassified. Time appears to have diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" association of this individual with the now declassified SAFSP.

✓ Linz D. P. Rationale: See page 61, footnote at bottom of the page. Mr. Linz is mentioned in the context of being a member of the Purcell Panel. In this regard, his association with the NRO appears indirect and nonsensitive.

✓ Lisciotti, Francis L. Capt, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

✓ Pietz, John Maj, USAF. Rationale: See page 115, footnote 17. Pietz is cited as a staff member of SAFSP. SAFSP's role in the NRO and several general facts about it have been declassified. Time appears to have diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" association of this individual with the now declassified SAFSP.

✓ Ruebel, J. H., Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 41 and page 116, footnote 36. Reubel is cited as a staff member of SAFSP. SAFSP's role in the NRO and several general facts about it have been declassified. Time appears to have diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" association of this individual with the now declassified SAFSP.

✓ Ruzeck, Charles COL, USA. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

Seay, J. S. Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 123, footnote 110. Seay is cited as a staff member of SAFSP. SAFSP's role in the NRO and several general facts about it have been declassified. Time appears to have diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" association of this individual with the now declassified SAFSP.

Sides, Jack Lt Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

Sinex, Charles H. Lt Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

✓ Stewart, James T. Brig Gen, USAF. Rationale: Stewart was a Director, SAFSS (NRO Staff). The DNRO recently declassified all the names of the SAFSS Directors.

✓ Truax, R. C. CAPT, USN. Rationale: See page 7. In addition to the context here, Truax was an original member of the Air Force WS-117L staff and later SAFSP. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the role of this early contributor to the development of reconnaissance satellites.

Van Mater, Robert A. Lt Col, USAF. Rationale: See page 38. Time has diluted any sensitivity surrounding the "fact of" NRO association of this initial member of the now declassified SAFSS.

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(b)(3)

To: [redacted] Cohen Randal
Cc: [redacted] Moffett Page; policy-admin; csnr-all
Subject: Declassification: "Fact of" NRO Use of the Shuttle ---~~SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: INCG dated 20120213
Declassify On: 25X1, 20671231
=====

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For All:

1. This is to inform you that on 30 August 01, the DNRO approved the proposal from the Office of Policy Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance(CSNR) to declassify the "fact of" the NRO use of the Space Shuttle as a launch vehicle.
2. Implementation of this declassification action will be in accordance with para 6.0 of the attached Policy Decision Risk Assessment(PDRA). This specifies that when approved the Office of Policy will coordinate with appropriate offices (Office of Security (OS), Information Declassification Review Center (IDRC) and Office of Corporate Communications (OCC), to ensure that necessary personnel are notified and updates are made to the NRO Classification and Redaction Guides.
3. It should be noted that this declassification applies to "fact-of" only and that affiliated programmatic data (Engineering, Operational and Management) require continued classification. Until completion of implementation actions as noted above this "fact-of" should not be used as unclassified without checking with appropriate organization security officers.

The POC in OP/CSNR is [redacted] sec [redacted]

Robert A. McDonald. Chief.

OP/CSNR

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By [redacted]
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By [redacted]
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

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Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By [redacted]
CL Reason: 1.5(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMANTALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

COORDINATION SHEET

NRO-02-0338

	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE, DATE		TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE, GRADE, DATE	
1	SI	COORD	8 April 2002	14	OP	COORD		
2	IM	COORD	16 April 2002	15	OHR			
3	COMM	COORD	9 April 2002	16				
4	AS&T	COORD	12 April 2002	17				
5	MS&O			18	CSNR/OP	COORD	Bob McDonald 8 April 2002	
6	OSL			19	DDSE			
7	OS	COORD	8 April 2002	20	DDMS		(b)(3)	
8	OCC			21	DDNS			
9	CI	COORD	15 April 2002	22	DDROM			
10	OC	COORD	16 April 2002	23				
11	IG			24	COS	APPR	31 May '02	
12	GC	COORD	25 April 2002	25	DDNRO			
13	EEO			26	DNRO			
NAME			SYMBOL		PHONE		TYPYST	
			OP/CSNR					
SUBJECT							DATE	
Declassification of NRO/Stanford Electronic Laboratory Association							26 April 2002	

Background: The Office of Policy's Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) seeks COS approval for the declassification of the historic relationship between the NRO and Stanford University's Electronic Laboratory (SEL). Upon COS approval, this relationship will be acknowledged in the unclassified Pioneer recollection book.

During the 1960s, SEL developed SIGINT receivers for the NRO. In 1969, the university severed all contracts with the government because of student protests.

Our intention to seek declassification of the NRO/SEL association has been thoroughly coordinated, and we anticipate no negative consequences arising from the declassification of this historical association. We do not intend to consult with Stanford since this relationship ended 33 years ago and the fact that the NRO has no formal classified relationship with Stanford. We may inform Stanford professor Sid Drell that this historic relationship will be acknowledged in the book because Dr. Drell also has a chapter in the book.

Action: Approve declassification of the historic relationship between SEL and the NRO.

EXEC SEC
INITIALS:

ACTION NUMBER:

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2002 9:08 AM
To: McDonald Robert A. (CSNR/POL); [redacted]

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Gc: [redacted]
Subject: Release of Government and Contractor Names Mentioned in Pioneer Memoirs
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Per [redacted] Chief, Security Policy, OS, the names of government and contractor personnel mentioned in the Pioneer Memoirs can be released at the unclassified level.

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[redacted]
OS Security Policy
[redacted]

(b)(3)

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

Number 2002-17

16 August 2002

Director's Note

**NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PIONEER RECOGNITION PROGRAM
HONOREES FOR 2002**

I have accepted the recommendations of this year's Pioneer Selection Board, and selected three individuals to receive the honor of National Reconnaissance Pioneer for 2002. Each of these individuals has made a lasting and significant contribution to national reconnaissance, and has helped to set the stage for future National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) successes and today's U.S. global information supremacy.

The names and contributions of the Pioneers for 2002 are:

Vance D. Coffman, Ph.D.

Dr. Vance Coffman led the development of a new satellite attitude control capability needed to provide major improvements in producing large quantities of geographically accurate, highly-detailed maps from satellite-collected images.

Career in national reconnaissance: 1971-present

Lee M. Hammarstrom

Mr. Lee M. Hammarstrom's concepts and developments for satellite, ground station, and processing systems greatly improved the accuracy, timeliness, and volume of NRO ELINT products. Hammarstrom served as the head of the NRO's Technology Office, and as the NRO's Chief Scientist.

Career in national reconnaissance: 1962-2002

Robert L. Paulson, Colonel, USAF (Ret)

Colonel Robert L. Paulson served as the Air Force Program Manager for a multi-agency IMINT satellite system program. He successfully led his program office and operations team through

the critical design, development, and testing of the system, and developed its complex ground architecture.

Career in national reconnaissance: 1973-1989

The Pioneer Recognition Ceremony will be held at NRO Headquarters in the Jimmie D. Hill auditorium on 24 September 2002 at 2:00 pm, followed by a reception in the Atrium. I encourage all NRO employees to attend the ceremony or to tune in to the live feed of the event on the NRO Channel. The ceremony will also be videotaped and may be seen in outlying locations via VTC.



Peter B. Teets

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NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (NRO Launch IPG)

**20 July 1999
(Includes Change 1, 7 April 2000)**



**National Reconnaissance Office
Office of Space Launch**

See Section I, paragraph 4, for supersession, applicability, and classification authority.

LOCAL REPRODUCTION AUTHORIZED

This document contains information EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(5) apply.

Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors for administrative and operational use. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the NRO Office of Space Launch.

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NRO Launch IPG

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20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000

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NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000**Change Record**

<u>Change Number</u>	<u>Date of Change</u>	<u>Initials (Incorporated by)</u>	<u>Date Incorporated</u>
1	7 April 2000	<input type="text"/>	7 April 2000
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.NRO Launch IPG

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20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000

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NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000**Foreword**

1. **Description:** National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Satellite Vehicle (SV) programs must be given security protection to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on mission objectives, capabilities, operational configurations, and vulnerabilities; schedules and manifests revealing replenishment needs or strategies; program and SV plans or requirements; and constellation, health and system needs. All program documents, whether classified or unclassified, including this Information Protection Guide (IPG), will be given minimum distribution consistent with operational requirements, need-to-know, and sound security practices.
2. **Derived Classification:** Classification guidance provided is either from Original Classification Authority (OCA) of the Director, NRO/Office of Space Launch, or derived from guidance provided/documented in the National Space Policy, dated 14 September 1996, the NRO SCG, dated 14 October 1995, and other applicable documents.
3. **Supersession:** This IPG supersedes and rescinds integration and launch classification guidance contained in the *Security Classification Guide for the Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems*, dated 8 April 97, the *Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Programs A-F on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System*, dated 8 April 97, *Space Technology Experiment Security Classification Guide*, dated 8 April 97, the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Launch-1*, dated 26 February 1998, and the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Request for Proposal*, dated 21 October 1998.
4. **Purpose:** The NRO Launch IPG provides a single source of protection requirements for the integration and launch process of NRO SVs on various families of launch vehicles. Contact the OSL or applicable Contracting Officer prior to implementing this IPG if increased costs are anticipated.
5. **Authority:** This guide is issued under authority of the Director, NRO; NRO Directive 82-1, *NRO Space Launch Management Directive*; and DoD 5200.1-R/AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Regulation*.

APPROVED BY:

/s/

STEPHEN A. WOJICKI
Colonel, USAF
Director, Office of Space Launch
National Reconnaissance Office

NRO Launch IPG

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20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000

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NRO Launch IPG

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Change 1, 7 April 2000

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20 July 1999
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Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION I

General Instructions

1. **Purpose:** This NRO Launch Information Protection Guide (IPG) provides protection strategies and guidelines for the protection of NRO information and assets that require protection in the interest of national security. Security requirements and classification guidance provided in this document are intended to serve as a baseline for all NRO launches.
2. **Scope:** NRO SV programs must be given security protection to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information on mission objectives, capabilities, operational configurations, and vulnerabilities; schedules and manifests revealing replenishments needs or strategies; program and SV plans or requirements; and constellation health and system needs. Information protection requirements specified in this guide are consistent with the security objectives set forth in Executive Order (EO 12958, *Classified National Security Information*, dated 17 April 1995; *National Space Policy*, dated 14 September 1996; *DoD Space Policy*, dated 4 February 1987, as amended; and applicable DCI Directives and NRO Policies. This section contains general instructions including implementation approaches. Specific classification requirements are provided in Section III.
3. **Office of Primary Responsibility:** This guide is issued by the NRO Office of Space Launch (OSL). The NRO/OSL is the cognizant office for the integration and launch of NRO satellites. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV System Program Offices (SPOs) for resolution. Address inquiries to:

Office of Space Launch Security

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

4. **Supersession, Classification Authority, and Applicability:**
 - a. This IPG supersedes and rescinds classification guidance contained in the *Security Classification Guide for the Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems*, dated 8 April 97; the *Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Programs A-F on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System*, dated 8 April 97; the *Space Technology Experiment Security Classification Guide*, dated 8 April 97; the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Launch-1*, dated 26 February 1998; and the *Interim Security Guidance for National Reconnaissance Office Request for Proposal*, dated 21 October 1998.
 - b. This guide will be cited as the classification authority for material generated in connection with the integration and launch of AFPs, Programs A...G, experimental and developmental programs, and NROs listed in Section II, Category Assignment Table. Information and material requiring protection based on other efforts which support NRO launches will be classified in accordance with (IAW) the appropriate classification guide. The provisions of this IPG do not cover launches occurring prior to Dec 1996 and the classification guidance for those launches remains in effect. Questions on applicability of this IPG to any other past and/or present NRO launches should be referred to the OSL.
 - c. This guide applies to all participants, contractor and government employees, involved in the integration and launch of NRO SVs. NRO participants include, but are not limited to, SV SPOs, Satellite Vehicle Contractors (SVCs), and OSL operations at Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS), Los Angeles Air Force Base (LAAFB), Onizuka Air Station (OAS), Schriever Air

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**

Force Base (SAFB), and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). Other organizations and agencies supporting NRO launches include, but are not limited to, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), AFSPC's Space Wings, Space Launch Squadrons, and Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), Air Force Material Command's Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), Launch Vehicle Contractors (LVCs), Launch Vehicle Integration Contractors (LVICs), and Launch System Integration Contractors (LSICs). Prime or associate contractors are responsible for ensuring that their subcontractors are aware of and contractually obligated to comply with the requirements of this guide.

5. **Approach:** The Launch IPG is developed for use by organizations or agencies supporting NRO launches and provides guidelines for the protection of NRO information and assets during I&L processing. The integration and launch process begins when initial launch requirements are provided to launch service providers and ends with post-launch turnover of the SV to the applicable control node. The following definitions apply to NRO information in the I&L environment:
 - a. **SV Operations Data** - Information that is not required by LV mission planners and will not be released. This includes information that describes the SV operational mission in terms of:
 - (1) SV mission, objectives, capabilities, operational limitations, and vulnerabilities;
 - (2) Priorities and plans for space-based intelligence activities;
 - (3) Critical, unique to program, advanced state-of-the-art hardware technology;
 - (4) Satellite constellation health, system needs, and replenishment strategies; and
 - (5) NRO operational infrastructure, elements, and control nodes.
 - b. **SV Descriptive Data** - Information that describes the SV's shape, mechanical characteristics, and structural dynamics. Information required by the LV mission planners to successfully integrate and launch a satellite will only be released at the NRO's discretion.
 - c. **Planning and Scheduling Data** - Information that provides insight into the operational planning and requirements of a launch flow.
 - d. **Launch Mission Profile Data** - Information that describes the LV mission requirements, e.g., target orbit, predicted injection accuracy, LV orbital mechanics, attitude, roll rates, coast maneuvers, SV separation point, state vector, orbit options, etc. In other words, information that describes LV operations.
6. **NROL Categories:** Three launch classification policy baselines have been established as launch categories based on existing national security requirements to identify the levels of protection for each NRO launch. The launch category is defined by the SV SPO at program introduction and explicitly identified in the Program Requirements Document (PRD), Operational Directives, etc. SVs may be re-categorized if the NRO determines that an SV's requirements have changed and that a category change is appropriate. SVs are listed by category in Section II. The three launch categories are:
 - a. **Category A** - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and Planning and Scheduling Data, to include information that reveals reflight. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection. This category is most restrictive in protection requirements. Specifics are identified in Section III.

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- b. Category B - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, SV Descriptive Data, and information that reveals reflight. This category is less restrictive in the protection of Planning and Scheduling Data. Launch Mission Profile Data does not require protection. Specifics are identified in Section III.
- c. Category C - The NRO programs in this category require protection of SV Operations Data, but do not require protection of most SV Descriptive Data, Planning and Scheduling Data, or Launch Mission Profile Data. Information that reveals reflight is to be protected. This category is the least restrictive in the protection of these types of information. Specifics are identified in Section III.

7. NRO Launch Designators:

- a. NROL designators are now used to identify NRO launches and are the official NRO launch identifier. An NROL designator will be used only once. To assist those integrating and launching multiple programs at one given time, NROL designators may include the category identifier; e.g., NROL-#(A).
- b. New programs will be assigned an NROL designator and a category as they are manifested. NRO SV programs currently in a launch flow that were introduced as AFP or Program A...G may continue with their current identifier or may change to the NROL designator at an event or time as determined by the SV SPO-LSIC launch team. This IPG includes AFP and Program A...G classification determinations to assist users in the transition from AFP/Program A...G usage to the NROL system.
- c. In the past the NRO used several mechanisms, including AFP numbers and Programs A...G (formerly Programs A-F), to protect information related to multiple NRO launch activities, reflight, constellation size, and NRO SV identifiers. AFP numbers and Programs A...G are no longer official launch designators. Information classified under Programs A...G or those AFPs will be remarked in accordance with guidance contained in paragraph 20 of this section.

Since the AFP numbers and Programs A...G were used for more than one launch integration flow, associating them with information in the I&L community may have revealed a launch date, number of launches, launch rate, or planned constellation size, requiring protection of the association with the designator. Associating an NROL designator with information in the I&L community is an acceptable risk; therefore, information content and not the association drives the classification.

- 8. **Launch Vehicle Designators:** Launch vehicle activities are unclassified unless they reveal information specifically classified under this IPG or other applicable classification guidance. References or designators for specific launch vehicles, e.g. Titan K-18, mission B-26, AC-109, do not inherently identify an SV program or payload. Likewise, references or designators for LV configuration, e.g., Titan 401, Atlas AC-109, and Delta IV do not reveal an SV program or payload. However, SV characteristics and mission planning information may drive LV planning or mission analyses to become classified. The classification tables identify these circumstances. Re-use or reflight of an LV configuration or hardware set becomes classified if it positively confirms that it is relaunch of an SV or SV payload. Inferences or speculation related to indicators of reflight is not classified, but is handled as For Official use Only (FOUO) information (see Section I, paragraph 12).
- 9. **(U) Need-To-Know Information:** All classified or FOUO information must be controlled on a strict "need-to-know" basis. Dissemination must be made on the basis of a positive determination, by the

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holder of the information, that the intended recipient has a demonstrated requirement for the requested information. See Definitions.

10. (U) **Substitute Identifiers:** Substitute identifiers are used to avoid association and classification issues related to identifying a particular activity or operation. A substitute identifier may be any combination of numbers, letters, or an unclassified name. With the implementation of the NROL system, the unclassified NROL designator will be used to identify the NRO launch activity, making the use of substitute identifiers unnecessary. Information relative to SV mission, capability, vulnerability, and operations may NOT be declassified through disassociation or by use of a substitute identifier.
11. (U) **Special Access Information:** Items in this guide addressing information that is Special Access are identified with a remark. The NRO, as the originator of the information, controls dissemination of the information. All information covered in these items, either requested or discovered by integration and launch personnel, will be handled IAW the following:
 - a. (U) Information that is Special Access and is NOT needed for integration and launch purposes will NOT be decompartmented and provided to the integration and launch community and requests will be denied. This includes, but is not limited to, SV operations data. Anyone discovering this information, either directly, deduced, or implied, will protect it as SECRET, X1, 4, and immediately notify the NRO through secure channels. The NRO will determine the requirement for limited distribution, or any system, facility or personnel access needs.
 - b. (U) Information needed for integration and launch purposes will be decompartmented at the NRO's discretion and provided only when absolutely necessary. This includes, but is not limited to, SV descriptive data, planning/scheduling data, and launch mission profile data. Information will normally be released in OSL/SV SPO endorsed documentation. Other requests for this information should be forwarded to the OSL.
 - c. (U) Information that MAY be required for integration and launch will be determined by the SV SPO when a need for this information has been established. Since some, or all, of this information may be decompartmented and released into the collateral security system or declassified, the protection levels could range from minimal through Special Access.
12. (U) **For Official Use Only Information:** Information that is not classified but can provide insight into NRO SV requirements, characteristics, and operations is designated as "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" or "U//FOUO". FOUO information will be afforded protection in accordance with the FOUO handling instructions in Section IV.
13. (U) **Internet/Intranet Use:** All information maintained on a computer system connected to the Internet has become unclassified public access information. Under no circumstances will any NRO information be posted to the Internet without specific prior approval of the NRO. Unclassified NRO information may be posted on an organization's Intranet, the computer network internal to an organization if the Intranet is behind a protective firewall. Posting of NRO FOUO information to an organization's Intranet will be handled IAW the instructions in Section IV.
14. **Public Release of Information:** Public release of any information, irrespective of classification, regarding the NRO will be at the determination of the DNRO, DD/NRO, or Office of Corporate Communications (OCC). Unilateral public release of information pertaining to the NRO and its SV programs, operations, and launches is expressly prohibited. All NRO related public releases, whether Government or Contractor originated, must be coordinated with the NRO's OCC.

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SECTION I - General Instructions (Continued)**15. Risk Management:**

- a. The Director, NRO, and the Director, NRO/OSL, as OCAs, have established a risk management-based classification system and program protection process. The ultimate goal is effective and, where deemed appropriate, selective application of security countermeasures to protect essential program information, technologies and systems while avoiding extreme costs and operational impacts associated with traditional regulatory requirements.
- b. Numerous factors affect the degree of damage to national security that the compromise of classified information may cause. Also, different elements of information within the same classification level can result in different impacts. Even the time in which classified information is either declassified, downgraded, or compromised during the integration and launch flow can be a significant factor.
- c. Users are not only encouraged, but are expected, to identify system and operational conditions that may be reducing the effectiveness of security protection measures. Early recognition of such conditions may indicate where the risk management process would enhance NRO security programs. These system and operational conditions should be identified to the OSL. (See paragraph 23 of this section.)
- d. From time-to-time it may be necessary for the I&L community to submit a request for waiver and deviation from the classification requirements of this IPG. Rationale for a waiver request will be closely scrutinized and will only be approved (1) if the security infrastructure is not in place to protect information as required, (2) if the program would incur undo cost or schedule impacts to enhance the security infrastructure, and (3) if the NRO determines that assets are not exposed to unacceptable levels of security risk by granting the request for waiver.
 - (1) All requests for waiver shall be directed via secure means to the OSL Director of Security and shall include (a) a reference to the classification call in question, (b) rationale for the requested waiver, (c) an explanation of proposed security methods to be implemented in lieu of the waived security requirement, and (d) a security risk analysis that includes a description of the security measures that will be implemented to ensure an acceptable level of security risk.
 - (2) Requests for waiver must be submitted with sufficient time prior to an operational or implementation requirement, a minimum of 90 days, to allow for coordination with the appropriate NRO SV SPO. Users must comply with all provisions of this IPG until a request for waiver has been granted, in writing, by the OSL or other appropriate authority.

Operations Security (OPSEC): An important part of the NRO's risk management philosophy is the application of OPSEC principles to reduce system vulnerabilities to an acceptable level. OPSEC is the methodology for protecting unclassified operational, administrative, and logistical activities that may reveal classified I&L information. A key element of OPSEC in the I&L environment is the identification and control of unclassified indicators and observables which could provide an adversary with insight into classified NRO SV activities, plans, or operations.

- a. The NRO I&L risk management philosophy includes an OPSEC approach to:
 - (1) Identify NRO I&L activities that compromise classified information or that expose high value hardware to an unacceptable level of risk and that can be observed by knowledgeable adversaries.

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- (2) Determine the indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive classified information in time to be useful to adversaries.
 - (3) Select and implement measures that mask or obscure selected NRO I&L activities and therefore reduce the likelihood of adversary observation.
 - b. The OSL requires all participants in NRO launch related activities to establish a sound security program that incorporates an OPSEC approach consistent with government regulations, the NRO Contract Security Specification (NF4.4702), or other contract security specification (e.g., DD Form 254) as applicable to their organization. Questions related to I&L OPSEC requirements or implementation measures should be directed to the OSL.
17. **Classification Marking:** Classification designations, time limits, derivative marking procedures, and other requirements of EO 12958, are to be applied to information classified pursuant to this guide IAW DoD 5200.1-R/AFI 31-401 and DoD 5220.22-M, *National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual*.
18. **Classification/Declassification Instructions:** Classification designations specified in this guide are identified with "S" for SECRET, and "U" for UNCLASSIFIED. Information handling instructions, such as "SCI" for Sensitive Compartmented Information (see paragraph 11) and "U//FOUO" for UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (see paragraph 12) are also used. Classification tables in Section III assign classification level, identify the appropriate classification reason inappropriate, and provide declassification instructions.
- a. (U) The classification reason is identified as "1.4" (for the amended EO 12958 Section 1.5) plus the letter(s) corresponding to the appropriate classification category in the EO 12958, e.g., 1.5(b). Acceptable categories or reasons for classifying information are:
 - 1.5(a) Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
 - 1.5(b) Foreign government information;
 - 1.5(c) Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
 - 1.5(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
 - 1.5(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
 - 1.5(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and
 - 1.5(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security.
 - b. Declassification instructions are either identified as a specific event or activity or an exemption category if the information has been exempted from automatic declassification. When a specific date or event within 10 years cannot be established, the classifier will apply the date that is 10 years from the date of the original decision. Upon determination that the information must remain classified beyond 10 years, the classifier will apply the letter "X" plus a brief recitation of the exemption category(ies) or the letter "X" plus the number that corresponds to that exemption category(ies) from Section 1.6(d) of EO 12958. Manual Review declassification code should be used when any variety of manual review needs to take place before declassification. Allowable exemptions are information that would:
 - X1 Reveal an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity;

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- X2 Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
 - X3 Reveal information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system;
 - X4 Reveal United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans;
 - X5 Reveal foreign government information;
 - X6 Damage relations between the United States and a foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or seriously undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for a period greater than 10 years;
 - X7 Impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and other individuals for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized; or
 - X8 Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
- c. Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information. Unauthorized disclosures will be reviewed by the OSL to determine appropriate and/or necessary course(s) of action.
19. **Contractor Proprietary Information:** When a contractor releases proprietary information to the Government, the contractor will mark the information appropriately and, if necessary, inform the recipients of required protection measures. The Government has the responsibility to protect the information in accordance with the contractor's guidance.
20. **Previously Generated Information:** This IPG changes the classification requirements for some information items. Archived documents that were created and classified under previous guidance, prior to the effective date of this IPG, need not be remarked. Any newly created documents, including extractions, changes, revisions, and/or updates of documents classified under previous guidance, must have current classification markings, to include use of this IPG as the classification authority.
21. **Compilation of Information:** A compilation or aggregation of items of information which are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association, relationship, or piece of information that meets the standards for classification under the tables contained in this guide and is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. For example, certain information referenced in this IPG when standing alone is unclassified; however, this information may be classified or FOUO when associated with intelligence community overhead reconnaissance or the NRO. It is the individual's responsibility to make compilation classification determinations. When necessary, OSL will assist with any compilation classification decisions.
22. **Classification Recommendations:**
- a. IAW EO 12958, users of NRO information who, in good faith, believe that its classification is improper are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of the information. If progress in any phase of system development indicates that classification changes are appropriate and advisable, documented recommendations, to include informal recommendations, should be submitted to the OSL, which will coordinate with the applicable NRO SV SPO. Assistance in maintaining current, effective and adequate classification criteria is solicited of all participating government and industrial organizations. See paragraph 15d in this section for guidance on one-time waivers.

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
- b. The OSL shall be notified when the accuracy of an assigned classification is questioned. Information shall be protected IAW this guide pending reply to the inquiry. The information shall not be regraded or declassified unless so directed by the OSL, which will coordinate with the applicable NRO SV SPO.
23. **Reporting Program Vulnerabilities and/or Weaknesses:** Individuals who believe they have identified a potential vulnerability or weakness to an NRO SV program will assign a tentative classification of SECRET to the information and immediately contact, via secure communications, the OSL for further guidance. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV SPOs for resolution. The NRO will evaluate the validity of the concern, assign a classification, reason for classification, and downgrading instructions to the information and take other actions as necessary.
24. **Reporting Elicitations:** Participants in the integration and launch of NRO SVs shall report all direct, purposeful, or probing elicitation by any individual, regardless of nationality, to gain insight into classified, FOUO, business proprietary, or non-releasable technical information regarding NRO programs, activities, or operations beyond the scope of their need-to-know. Elicitation attempts may be made by visitors to any of the organizations under the auspices of this guide or when I&L participants are visiting other organizations, either foreign or domestic, or attending symposia, seminar, exhibitions, conferences, etc. The report to NRO/OSL must include the name(s), position, area(s) of interest, date, and place of occurrence, as well as the name and telephone number of the reporting individual.
25. **Classification Conflict Resolution:** This IPG is applicable to the integration and launch of those activities identified in Section II, Category Assignment Table. Conflicts between this and any other guides will be addressed to the OSL. The OSL is the focal point for integration and launch classification issues and will coordinate with NRO SV SPOs for resolution. Pending resolution of the conflict, information will be protected at the highest classification given.
26. **Reproduction and Dissemination:** Local reproduction of this guide is authorized. All program documents, whether classified or unclassified, including this IPG, will be given minimum distribution consistent with operational requirements, need-to-know, and sound security practices.
27. **Classification Currency:** The OSL will make revisions to this guide by distributing corrected pages for insertion in place of superseded pages, issuing pen and ink changes or, when considered appropriate, issuing a completely revised guide.

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SECTION II

Category Assignment Table



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SECTION IV

For Official Use Only Handling Instructions

1. (U) General.

a. (U) "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) is official government information that does not meet requirements for classification but still requires protection. As such, FOUO is an administrative marking that is used to limit dissemination of certain categories of unclassified information from public disclosure.

b. (U) Official government information needed by selected recipients outside the NRO in furtherance of the NRO's mission, may be released at the discretion of the individual holding such information. Such release does not constitute authority for its publication and a disclaimer to that effect should be attached, such as: "The information contained herein is for the exclusive use of (name of recipient) and is not for further distribution." Ultimate responsibility for the protection of FOUO information from public release lies with the user, who will be held accountable.

c. (U) FOUO information may be withheld from the public under exemptions 2-9 of the Freedom of Information Act (U.S.C. 552). Most FOUO information generated or handled in support of the NRO will be exempt from mandatory disclosure under exemptions 3 and/or 5. d. (U) FOUO information may be released to the public; however, the Government must review it prior to its release. FOUO information must be reviewed by the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) and the Contracting Officer's Security Representative (COSR) prior to release.

2. (U) Identification Markings.

a. (U) An unclassified document containing FOUO information will be marked "UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO" on the outside of the front cover (if any), on the first page, on each page containing FOUO information, on the back page and on the outside of the back cover (if any). For convenience, all pages, even those that do not contain FOUO information, may be marked in documents generated by an automated system.

b. (U) Individual portions/paragraphs in unclassified documents that contain FOUO information may be marked with "U//FOUO" to alert users and assist in review. Documents prepared for dissemination outside the NRO must have individual paragraphs and portions marked. In this context, the NRO includes the Government and its contractors.

c. (U) Individual pages within a classified document that contain both FOUO and classified information will be marked at the top and bottom with the highest security classification of information appearing on the page. Individual portions/paragraphs containing FOUO information but no classified information will be marked "U//FOUO".

d. (U) The cover or the first page of unclassified documents containing FOUO information will be marked with the following statement:

*This document contains information
EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
under the FOIA. Exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(5) apply*

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SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

- e. (U) Certain classified material will be downgraded by the Original Classification Authority to UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO. When classified material approved for declassification to U//FOUO is used, extracted, reissued, transmitted and/or updated, it must be reviewed and appropriately marked.
3. (U) Transmission/Dissemination/Storage: Authorized contractors, consultants and grantees may transmit/disseminate FOUO information internally, to each other and U.S. Government components and officials of U.S. Government components who have a legitimate need for the information. The following guidelines apply:
- a. (U) FOUO information may be discussed over non-secure telephones and other electronic instruments. Cordless, cellular and mobile telephones should be avoided.
- b. (U) Secure facsimile is the preferred method of fax transmission; however, FOUO information may be transmitted over non-secure facsimile equipment.
- c. (U) Documents or facsimile transmissions containing FOUO material or with FOUO material attached must be marked to identify any FOUO contents or attachments.
- d. (U) FOUO information may be sent via US Postal Service or commercial carrier as long as the shipping package is not marked as containing FOUO material.
- e. (U) If authorized by the COSR, FOUO information may be transmitted, processed and stored on corporate or private Automated Information Systems, electronic mail, and other similar systems or networks. Requests for authorization should be submitted to the PSO along with justification and a written plan describing how FOUO data will be protected. Holders will not use user-all, general, broadcast or universal mail addresses to distribute FOUO information. FOUO information will not be posted on the Internet on home pages, bulletin boards, or any other public forums. FOUO information may NOT be used with personally owned Internet accounts. See Item 6 below for approval requirements.
- f. (U) FOUO information may be reproduced on unclassified copiers or within designated government or contractor reproduction areas.
- g. (U) During working hours, FOUO information shall be used in a manner that limits access by persons who do not have an official need for the information. During non-working hours and when internal building security is provided, FOUO material may be filed with other unclassified records in unlocked files or desks. When there is no internal building security, locked buildings or rooms will provide adequate after-hours protection or the material can be stored in locked receptacles such as file cabinets, desks, or bookcases.
64. (U) Disposition:
- a. (U) When no longer needed, FOUO information should be disposed of in a manner to hinder reconstruction, e.g. by shredding or tearing each sheet into pieces and placing in a recycle or trash container or by initializing, degaussing or shredding magnetic media.
- b. (U) FOUO material may be recycled. Safeguard the FOUO documents or information until recycling. Recycling contracts must include agreements on how to protect and destroy FOUO material.
- c. (U) Removal of the FOUO status can only be accomplished by the government originator. The COTR and the COSR will review and remove, or authorize the removal of, FOUO status for information.

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SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)

5. (U) **Unauthorized Disclosure.** Government and Contractor personnel must act to protect FOUO information under their control from unauthorized disclosure. Government and Contractor organizations must inform the COTR and the COSR of any unauthorized disclosures of FOUO information. Unauthorized disclosure, intentional disregard or gross negligence in the handling of FOUO information does not constitute a reportable security violation. However, the responsible organization should investigate and, when substantiated, take appropriate disciplinary action. Unauthorized disclosure of FOUO information containing Privacy Act information may also result in civil or criminal sanctions.

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6. (U) **Implementing Instructions for FOUO on Unclassified Systems:** In the event NRO FOUO information is to be placed on unclassified system or network, the requestor will submit written justification and supporting protection plan to the COSR for approval. The plan will detail how FOUO information will be protected from unauthorized access and / or release while resident on the unclassified system. The Protection Plan will include:

- Description. General size and description of the network / unclassified system.
- Location of Network.
- Controlling Authority. Description of Entity controlling network elements.
- Access Controls Employed. Description of administrative procedures, as well as technical mechanisms, used to restrict access to FOUO files / information to authorized users. Note: The network must provide

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Identification &
Authentication
mechanisms to uniquely

identify and authenticate the users. The network structure must define and control access between named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs).

- Internet Connectivity. Description of any connections and controls employed. Note: Data transmission over the Internet will employ commercially available encryption or other similar methodology which can be reasonably expected to prohibit the data from being obtained ("hijacked") by unauthorized users.
- Description of Audit features. Auditing is not a requirement, but describe features if used.

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SECTION V

Definitions

AFI	Air Force Instruction.
AFP	Air Force Program.
AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network. The AFSCN controls over 80 communication, navigation, missile warning, and meteorological satellites and other missions for DoD, NASA, and the United Kingdom. It consists of (1) two operational control nodes located at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, and Onizuka Air Station, CA; (2) 17 TT&C antennas at nine geographical locations worldwide; (3) a communications calibration site at Camp Parks, CA; (4) space vehicle checkout facilities at CCAS, FL, and VAFB, CA; and (5) communications connectivity among these locations.
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment. Any electrical (EAGE) or mechanical (MAGE) ancillary equipment to support the flight hardware. This may include test sets, battery conditioners, or adapters. All equipment, excluding Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE), necessary to support a spacelift system throughout production processing and launch operations.
Applicable Control Node	The spacecraft command and control element that assumes responsibility for the command and control of the spacecraft after launch.
ASE	Aerospace Support Equipment. The ASE consists of the hardware and software that provides the physical and functional interface of the SV and the LV.

(b)(3)

CCAM	Contamination/Collision Avoidance Maneuver.
COMSEC	Communications Security - the protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons' access to information derived from telecommunications of the United States Government related to national security.
DoD	Department of Defense.
EELV	Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle - the Air Force, as the DoD lead agency

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	for expendable launch vehicles, has initiated an EELV program that will eventually replace the current medium and heavy lift vehicles. The EELV Program concept is envisioned to be a single family of launch vehicles with significantly improved reliability, operability, and cost over current US expendable launch vehicles.
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility.
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference. Any EM disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics or electrical equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of electronic warfare, or unintentionally, as a result of spurious emissions and responses, intermodulation products.
EO	Executive Order.
External View	See SV Launch Configuration.
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act. The FOIA requires that Executive Branch agencies respond to requests for information from the public. Requests submitted to the NRO are processed through MS&O/IARC.
FOUO	For Official Use Only.
FTS	Flight Termination System.
GSE	Ground Support Equipment. Ground equipment required to perform spacelift mission operations and maintenance. Consists of AGE and RPIE. GSE can be either common use (e.g., range GSE) or dedicated (e.g., Titan).
I&L	Integration and Launch.
ILC	Initial Launch Capability.
Internet	A set of computers that are networked together throughout the world.
Intranet	A set of computers that are networked together behind an organization's firewall.
IPG	Information Protection Guide.
IRON	Inter-Range Operations Number - a four-digit number used to schedule and identify AFSCN support for booster, launch, and/or on-orbit operations.
Launch Date	Date when a space launch is/was scheduled to occur; year, quarter, month, week or day.
Launch Mission Profile Data	Information that describes the LV mission requirements, e.g., target orbit predicted injection accuracy, LV orbital mechanics, attitude, roll rates, coast maneuvers, SV separation point, state vector, orbit options, etc. In other words, information that describes LV operations.
Launch Time	The planned launch time is usually the opening of the launch window.
Launch Period	A time span (that envelopes the launch window) during which an LV launch is intended to occur. Used to define the beginning and end of area clear and

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	advance warning notices when ships, aircraft, trains, and personnel are prohibited from the restricted hazardous area or zone.
Launch Window	A specified period, including duration and/or time, during which a space launch must occur to satisfy technical constraints and requirements. The launch window is based on LV capabilities and/or SV requirements.
LCO	Launch Communications Office.
LON	Launch On Need.
LSIC	Launch Systems Integration Contractor.
LV	Launch Vehicle - consists of the entire space delivery system including, as appropriate, the booster, core vehicle, upper stage, and the payload fairing.
MCC	Mission Control Center.
Mission Director	Director, OSL, as the Mission Director, is the final authority for all NRO space launch systems Commit to Launch. The Mission Director is accountable for SV launch processing & operations during the launch countdown and successful SV deployment.
Need-To-Know	A determination made by an authorized holder of classified or FOUO information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized function.
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 30px; width: 100%;"></div>	
NROL	National Reconnaissance Office Launch. As used in this document, the term includes both NRO launch activities and the NROL designator. NROL designators are used to identify an NRO launch, NOT an NRO satellite vehicle.
NRO/OCC	National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Corporate Communications. The only office within the NRO with the authority to publicly release unclassified information related to NRO activities.
NRO/OSL	National Reconnaissance Office/Office of Space Launch; the OCA.
OCA	Original Classification Authority. An individual, authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.
OD-4	Operating Division 4, a user of the AFSCN and operator of several AFSCN MCCs.
OPSEC	Operations Security.
OSL	See NRO/OSL.
Pathfinder	A test to verify the compatibility of the LV elements with each other; ground facilities, and AGE.

(b)(3)

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NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

Payload	The hardware item(s) carried into space by the SV to perform an operational, research, or test mission.
Planning and Scheduling Data	Information that provides insight into the operational planning and requirements of a launch flow.
PLF	Payload Fairing - an aerodynamic shell used for environmental protection of the SV during ascent.
POCC	Payload Operations Control Center.
Program	The facilities, equipment, hardware, software, funds, personnel, and activities involved in a concerted effort to achieve a predetermined mission/objective.
Public Access Information	Open source information is publicly available information (i.e., any member of the public could lawfully obtain the information by request or observation), as well as other unclassified information that may have limited public distribution or access. Open source information also includes any information that may be used in an unclassified context without compromising national security or intelligence sources and methods. If the information is not publicly available, certain legal requirements relating to collection, retention, and dissemination may apply.
Real-Time	Refers to the data collected as an event occurs. The resulting data is thereafter referred to as actual or real-time versus planned or theoretical data.
Reflight	Any verbal or written reference to a relationship between one or more launches that provides a definitive statement that two launches carry the same type of SV. Examples of definitive statements are: "NROL-XX SV is the same as of NROL-YY SV" or "The K-XX SV is a reflight of the SV flown on B-25". Inferences or speculations based on LV configuration are not considered confirmation of SV reflight. An LV that consists of a similar configuration (hardware software, procedures, processes, ASE GSE etc.), and that may be supported by the same personnel, as a previously flown LV is an example of LV reflight.
S	SECRET security classification.
SAF/SL	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Space Launch.
SAF/SO	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations.
SAF/ST	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/Science & Technology.
(U) SCG	Security Classification Guide.
(U) SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information.
(U) SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System.
(U) Sensitive Information	Any information, the loss, misuse, or modification of which, or unauthorized access to, could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal Programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 USC 552a (the Privacy Act), but which has not been specifically authorized under criteria

NRO Launch IPG

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Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

	established by an EO or Act of congress to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
(U) SGLS	Space Ground Link Systems.
(U) SMC/AXP	Space and Missile Center, Systems Acquisition Protection Director.
(U) SMC/CL	Space and Missile Center, Launch Programs Office; the SPO for Titan and Atlas LVs.
(U) SMC/CLX	Space and Missile Center, Operations Support and Integration Office.
(U) SMC/TMO	Space and Missile Center, Information Management Office.
(U) SMC/MV	Space and Missile Center SPO for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(U) SOC	Spacecraft Operations Center.
(U) Spacecraft	See SV.
(U) Specific LV	A launch vehicle identified by serial number or sequence number, e.g., K-1, Titan IV1, AC-109, Delta IV-10, or any other identifier.
(U) Specific SV	See SV Identity.
(U) SPO	System Program Office.
(U) Substitute Identifier	Any randomly selected name, number, or other designator used to avoid classification issues related with identifying the SV program.
(U) SV	Satellite Vehicle - the spacecraft bus and its mission enabling payloads.
(U) SV Descriptive Data	Information that describes the SV's shape, mechanical characteristics, and structural dynamics. Information required by the LV mission planners to successfully integrate and launch a satellite will only be released at the NRO's discretion.
(U) SV Envelope	Dimensions of a non-SV shape revealing "box" used to determine the volume that the SV uses or displaces within the payload fairing.
(U) SV Launch Configuration	The SV in its final mechanical state and ready for encapsulation
(U) SV Profile	An outline drawing of the SV that conforms to the SV shape and reveals its physical shape or specific dimensions.
SV Identity	The NRO SV program identity or name. Also see NROL.
SVC	Satellite Vehicle Contractor.
SV Operations Data	Information that is not required by LV mission planners and will not be released. This includes information that describes the SV operational mission in terms of: (1) SV mission, objectives, capabilities, operational limitations, and vulnerabilities; (2) Priorities and plans for space-based intelligence activities; (3) Critical, unique to program, advanced state-of-the-art hardware technology; (4) Satellite constellation health, system needs, and replenishment strategies; and (5) NRO operational infrastructure, elements, and control

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NRO Launch IPG

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Change 1, 7 April 2000**SECTION V - Definitions (Continued)**

	nodes.
Trailblazer	A test to verify the compatibility of the SV and its interfaces with the BV, upper stage, PLF SV ASE and AGE
U	UNCLASSIFIED.
USAF	United States Air Force.
Vulnerability	A weakness, shortfall, or uncorrected deficiency that could be exploited to degrade or defeat the effectiveness of a system.

NRO Launch IPG

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20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION VI

Index

NRO Launch IPG

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~20 July 1999
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SECTION VII

Distribution

Additional distribution is the responsibility of the receiving office.
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(b)(3)


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NRO Launch IPG

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20 July 1999
Change 1, 7 April 2000

SECTION VII - Distribution (Continued)



(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SCG

13 March 1964

BYE 19260-64

Aircraft War Reconnaissance Study

The Honorable Brockway McMillan
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Washington, D.C.

1. The initial briefings given the Aircraft War Reconnaissance Study Group included a summary of the work of the FORECAST Intelligence and Reconnaissance Panel under General Ritland. At the same time, copies of the final report of this Panel were left with the Study Group.
2. Our review during FORECAST, and subsequently, has highlighted the proliferation of special purpose aircraft under the BIG SAFARI Program. Further, the complex and diverse management and operational arrangements in this program make it difficult if not impossible to accurately assess the results achieved against the resources expended. I understand that an annual budget in the order of [] dollars is involved. It is highly probable that all required results can be achieved at a significant saving.
3. It is recommended that the Aircraft War Reconnaissance Study Group be asked to evaluate the BIG SAFARI Program and to include recommendations for its improvement in their final report. I believe that this group is uniquely suited to accomplish this task because of the scope of their effort in the present study and the outstanding qualifications of its members.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

BYE-19260/64

3

5

B. A. SCHRIEVER
General, USAF
Steering Group
Aircraft War Reconnaissance Study

Copy 2 of 3 copies
Page 1 of 1 page

30 FEB 1970

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Control System ✓

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

Director's Note

Number 2003-33


05 September 2003

National Reconnaissance Pioneer Selections for 2003

I am pleased to announce that I have approved the recommendations of this year's Pioneer Selection Board. The National Reconnaissance community will honor the following Pioneers at a ceremony in the Jimmie D. Hill Auditorium on September 23, 2003 at 1:30 PM:

- Mr. Carl L. Ferdensi, Jr., who pioneered algorithms and computer processing techniques for foreign instrumentation signals intelligence data, leading to dramatic improvements in telemetry collection
- Colonel David Raspet, USAF (Ret.), who developed advanced methods of integrating spacecraft into launch vehicles and provided crucial leadership that enabled sustained operation of reconnaissance satellites
- Dr. James W. Stoner, who pioneered techniques for near-real-time processing of electronic intelligence signals and whose algorithm prototyping and quality control were critical to satellite programmatic successes
- Mr. Charles C. Tevis, whose advocacy for space-based signals intelligence collection resulted in the deployment of several innovative systems, and who was instrumental in the founding of the Defense Special Missile & Aeronautics Center

Please join us in congratulating and honoring these pioneers who played a critical role in the early years of national reconnaissance.



Peter B. Teets

From: (MSO)**Sent:**

Tuesday, November 02, 1999 4:38 PM

To:**Cc:****Subject:**

Signature Redactions

classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

I spoke with the FOIA (Hot Line) at the Department of Justice today regarding redaction of signatures of releasable names. DoJ was extremely interested in this issue. DoJ called me back and said we could withhold the signatures under (b)(6). They also said this would hold up in court and are interested in writing new legislation regarding this issue. So I guess we are back "in" the redaction of signatures again.

Cheers,

UNCLASSIFIED

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, November 21, 2003 2:56 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Request for Coordination, MDR E04-0003 --- ~~SECRET//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

[redacted]

Just in case [redacted] hasn't already responded to this - we have no additional redactions. But we think the parts that have been redacted that don't deal with \$\$\$ can be declassified. They reveal no technical detail that we wish to keep classified.

[Document 3] Pg 9, band 1 and 2 receivers also on a pg 9, [Document 5] F3 Specific mission payloads on a pg 8, the term Airborne Instruments Laboratory on a pg 9, [Document 6] pg 19 F-3 and F-4, Pg 20 AIL statement, pg 23 the F3 payload Para, [Document 7] pg 13 F3 payload statement.

these are in chrono order thru the doc from front to back.

[redacted]

Silent Security Classification Management
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2003 3:10 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Cargill; [redacted] Hall
Subject: Request for Coordination, MDR E04-0003 --- ~~SECRET//X1~~

(b)(3)

This E-mail is UNCLASSIFIED when the attachment is separated or otherwise inoperable.


The Declassification Division of the Information Access and Release Center (IARC/DD) requests your coordination NLT 4 December of our review and treatment of the subject MDR case dealing with 25-year-old information. DAGs are included as action addressees for suspense control.

Hard copy staff packages will be delivered to the individuals listed as action addressees. A copy of the coordination sheet is attached for read ahead purposes.

Don't hesitate to let me know if you have questions.



MSO




Declassification: Don't try it at home!

(b)(3)

E04-0003 Coordination Sheet

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: 

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

From: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 2:12 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted] OS-Policy)
Subject: FW: RRG Terms and Code Words — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
Cargill: OS concurs with your proposed changes to the RRG.

[redacted]
OS Security Policy
[redacted]

—Original Message—

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2004 12:48 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RRG Terms and Code Words — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
[redacted]

Enclosed is a minor change in wording to 1.13 (U) Terms and Code Words at page 66 in the NRO Review and Redaction Guide, for OS review and approval. The changes appear in red type face.

This wording change is proposed to clearly identify the project study numbers and code words with the NRO/NRP, and permit release of early, unclassified Air Force, non NRO/NRP terms and project study numbers that might otherwise be redacted under the old wording.

In the event OS agrees with this change, please respond with an email to me to that effect.

Cargill Hall
MSO [redacted]
[redacted]



Terms and Code
Words.doc

This email is unclassified if attachment is withdrawn
Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.
CL By: [redacted]
CL Reason: 1.4(c)
DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, March 01, 2004 5:10 PM
To: [redacted] Hall Cargill
Cc: imint-class
Subject: CIA Referral Document NRO-76-02 ~~SECRET//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

IMINT Classification concurs in the release of subject document (and others that may appear in the future) which relate to the P-camera experiment flown on CORONA mission 9056 in late June 1963 and references to a one foot capability even though no imagery resulted because the door covering the optical port failed to open. A check with NGA revealed no concern concerning the subject. Documents regarding this camera that are releasable do not require referral to IMINT-Class, however, other systems capable of this resolution should be referred for a decision. Thank you for the opportunity to review this document.

[redacted]
IMINT-CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT
"Providing a clearer image of the classification picture"

[redacted]
Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

(b)(3)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 4:53 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (MSO); Hall Cargill
Subject: FW: Appendix G - NRO Review and Redaction Guide ~~SECRET//TALENT~~
~~KEYHOLE//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

[redacted]
I concur with the release information in Appendix G.

[redacted] Manager

(b)(3)

The Secret Of Getting Ahead Is Getting Started!

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 4:03 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] (MSO); Hall Cargill
Subject: Appendix G - NRO Review and Redaction Guide ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

[redacted] - Upon review, the Poppy appendix to our Review and Redaction Guide provides much the same information as you already possess in the guidance memo in your folder. I am forwarding anyway for your perusal. Detailed questions can be sent to [redacted] of Cargill Hall should you have any.

Regards, [redacted]



Appendix G Poppy
Elint Satell...

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

(b)(3)

From:**Sent:**

Friday, March 31, 2000 7:56 AM

To:**Cc:****Subject:**

RE: Redaction action re 303 Committee

classification: ~~SECRET//DYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted] et al:

I have talked with the NSC referral POC. They want to see references to the 303 Committee ONLY in documents that were originated by the White House or the NSC. They indicated the association of the 303 Committee with the NRO is not classified from an NSC standpoint. Therefore, we should not redact references to this body in NRO-generated or owned records. If we find any White House or NSC documents in our records, they are to be cleansed of NRO equities before we send them to the NSC for final disposition.

This e-mail represents interim guidance for treating the 303 Committee. I will change the RRG, but not before the change certification package, currently in Phase I coordination, is approved by the DNRO.

Any questions, give me a call.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

MSO/ IMG/ Information Declassification Review Center (IDRC)

[redacted]

Declassification: It's an art, not a science

-----Original Message-----

From:**Sent:**

Wednesday, March 29, 2000 3:29 PM

To:**Cc:****Subject:**

Redaction action re 303 Committee

classification: ~~SECRET//DYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted] in the retreatment of NRO/NRP Charter docs (IDRC00-0003) which we are completing, there is reference to a 303 Committee role (page 4 of the Agreement for Reorganization of the NRP).

(b)(3)

Section 1.2.2 para b. directs that "any info addressing the fact of the 303 Committee and its role in approving overflight reconnaissance operations" be referred to the NSC. This section is footnoted (26) to an IMG/IDRC discussion with [redacted] in Oct '98. (incidentally, there is no RRG footnote relating to the 303 committee).

I don't know why a question re handling the 303 Committee has not come up before, but I am almost certain that we have not previously referred document's containing ref to that Committee's role in approving overflights. In fact, as an example, on page 243 of the U-2 story (CIA & Overhead Recon) the 303 Committee (and its parentage) and its role are unredacted.

In any event, considering the date and the rather informal nature of the justification for taking action re the 303 Committee, I request that another look be taken at this guidance.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.5(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NRO CG 4.0 14 Oct 95

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.5(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NRO CG 4.0 14 Oct 95

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

From: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 8:12 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: NRO RRG (Declassification Guide) ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~
classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~
Gargill: See [redacted] comment and proceed accordingly. Any questions please call me.

[redacted]
OS Security Policy
[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 8:00 AM
To: [redacted] (OS-SP); [redacted]
Subject: RE: NRO RRG (Declassification Guide) ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~
sorry for the delay...I'd go with your suggested change to "explicit" and I think we're good to go. [redacted] (b)(3)

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 7:32 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: NRO RRG (Declassification Guide) ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~
[redacted] See Cargill's question concerning a decision to change the wording of the RRG re Vulnerabilities.

[redacted]
OS Security Policy
[redacted] (b)(3)

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 6:19 AM
To: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Subject: RE: NRO RRG (Declassification Guide) ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~
[redacted]

Any further word on wording of vulnerabilities for the RRG?

Cargill Hall
MSO/[redacted] IART Declassification
[redacted] (b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2004 3:26 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill
Subject: FW: NRO RRG (Declassification Guide) -- ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

[redacted] I spoke with Cargill today (8 Jul) and he said he had emailed you and left the wording up to the SecPol and the PSOs. For consideration here is my comment: I agree with Cargill's recommendation. I believe the "specific" might be replaced with "explicit" to coincide with the 5.1 Glass Guide excerpt attached.

[redacted]
OS Security Policy
[redacted]

<< File: Excerpt from NRO Class Guide 5.doc >>

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2004 11:40 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: NRO RRG (Declassification Guide) -- ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

[redacted]

Section 1.7, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures, in the NRO Review and Redaction Guide currently reads: "Redact: all information." Consequently, redactors in the IART declassification unit apply this literally and, in their review of records, redact any mention that space and ground systems are vulnerable to attack or deception. The fact that space systems are vulnerable to attack and deception, as you know, is acknowledged in public records already released, and I think we would be unable to defend this kind of generic redaction if it is appealed to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

With your consent, I would like to reword RRG 1.7 to specify vulnerability particulars, as does the NRO Classification Guide at 18.0. That is:

"Redact: all information that identifies specific vulnerabilities of satellite ground and space systems, deception and denial countermeasures to which space systems are susceptible, and defensive countermeasures taken to minimize damage to space systems."

This, or similar wording, would help us avoid the kind of unthinking redactions that have been applied previously.

Let me know if you concur, and, if so, the preferred wording that should be used.

I appreciate your consideration.

Cargill Hall
MSO [REDACTED] ART Declassification

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00
~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

(b)(3)

From: [redacted]
 Sent: Thursday, July 29, 2004 11:47 AM
 To: Hall Cargill
 Subject: RE: SIGINT Declassification Issue—Emitter Location, Non Operational System —
~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Cargill,

We (SIGINT Security) have no problem with releasing 50-100 mile accuracies from 45 years ago (b)(1)

[redacted] Exposure of the ancient capability poses no mission risk. Our motto is "Silence is the only refuge". (b)(3)

[redacted]
 SIGINT Security
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall Cargill
 Sent: Thursday, July 29, 2004 8:52 AM
 To: [redacted]
 Subject: SIGINT Declassification Issue--Emitter Location, Non Operational System — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~ (b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted]
 I need to make a determination to release/redact information regarding the old Air Force SAMOS Pioneer Ferret payloads (F-1 and F-2). The estimated accuracy of these payloads in geolocating emitters was set at "50-100 miles" on a 1958 briefing chart under review. The contemporary (1959) Navy GRAB ELINT emitter location accuracies are releasable (see Note at top of page four, attached boundary document for POPPY).

Given the technology of the day, I suspect that these two early ELINT satellites shared roughly equivalent geolocation accuracies and that the Ferret estimate is also releasable, but need confirmation from SIGINT security. Appreciate your assistance; please advise.

MSO [redacted] Cargill Hall
 IART Declassification (b)(3)

(b)(3)

<< File: Boundary Document

27 Feb 2002.doc >>

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:
CL Reason: 1.4(c)
DECL ON: X1
Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00
~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:
CL Reason: 1.4(c)
DECL ON: X1
Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00
~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

From: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2004 9:56 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements
~~SECRET//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

Cargill: OS concurs with your suggested wording for the change to the RRG re: Hiller Aircraft release.

[redacted]

OS Security Policy

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2004 9:54 AM
To: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Subject: RE: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements

~~SECRET//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

Concur.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (OS-SP)
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2004 9:29 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements

~~SECRET//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

[redacted] Cargill Hall wants OS's blessing to change the language in the RRG to reflect that proposed in Cargill's message below. IMINT concurs and I recommend OS concur.

[redacted]

OS Security Policy

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 9:45 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements

~~SECRET//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

IMINT Security/Classification Management concurs with the RRG change proposed below.

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 3:14 PM

To:
Cc:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Subject: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements -- ~~SECRET//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~

[Redacted]

(OS-SP) 0

The proposed wording that appears below would appear in the 2005 RRG recertification master, not in the 2004 version that is now in Phase I coordination.

Changes in the RRG would be made to Appendix F, CAL Program Information, at 2. Participants and Relationships, Release and Redact.

Under Release at page 148, add paragraph:

"d. (U) Fact that the Hiller Helicopter plant, also known as the Advanced Projects Integration Facility or Advanced Projects Facility (APF), in Palo Alto, California, served until 1969 as a cover in which the CORONA second stage Agena satellites, Itek cameras, EKC film, and General Electric reentry capsules were assembled and tested prior to shipment to Vandenberg AFB."

Under Redact at page 149, modify paragraph a:

"a. ~~(S)~~ Any spacecraft details concerning cover arrangements used by the CIA, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company (LMSC), and Hiller Helicopter Corporation for the leasing, staffing, and operation of the Hiller Helicopter plant in the CORONA Program."

I would appreciate receiving your comments, suggestions, and/or concurrence.

MSO [Redacted] Cargill Hall
[Redacted] IART Declassification

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [Redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

(b)(3)

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 9:45 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements --
~~SECRET//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~
IMINT Security/Classification Management concurs with the RRG change proposed below.

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 3:14 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Proposed Wording of Hiller Helicopter Declassification Elements -- ~~SECRET//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//X1~~
[redacted]

(b)(3)

The proposed wording that appears below would appear in the 2005 RRG recertification master, not in the 2004 version that is now in Phase I coordination.

Changes in the RRG would be made to Appendix F, CAL Program Information, at 2. Participants and Relationships, Release and Redact.

Under Release at page 148, add paragraph:

"d. (U) Fact that the Hiller Helicopter plant, also known as the Advanced Projects Integration Facility or Advanced Projects Facility (APF), in Palo Alto, California, served until 1969 as a cover in which the CORONA second stage Agena satellites, Itek cameras, EKC film, and General Electric reentry capsules were assembled and tested prior to shipment to Vandenberg AFB."

Under Redact at page 149, modify paragraph a:

"a. ~~(S)~~ Any tradecraft details concerning cover arrangements used by the CIA, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company (LMSC), and Hiller Helicopter Corporation for the leasing, staffing, and operation of the Hiller Helicopter plant in the CORONA Program."

I would appreciate receiving your comments, suggestions, and/or concurrence.

Cargill Hall
MSO [redacted] /IART Declassification

(b)(3)



(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: 

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: 

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//X1~~

From: [redacted]
 Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2004 7:18 AM
 To: [redacted]
 Cc: Hall Cargill
 Subject: RE: Classification question — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~
 classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN/TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~
 The fact of a COMINT mission on SAMOS can be released as (U).

(b)(3)

The potential/planned capability should not be (U) if it is described in terms that reveal targets, collection strategy, or expected performance.

[redacted]
 SIGINT Security
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

-----Original Message-----
 From: [redacted]
 Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 2:15 PM
 To: [redacted]
 Cc: Hall Cargill; [redacted]
 Subject: Classification question — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
 classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted] Cargill suggested I get your opinion on a classification question on SAMOS. The text in question (from a 1959 memo to Gen Schriever) reads as follows:

(b)(3)

"The second question is related to the value of subsystem F. The argument here is that 80-90% of elint and comint can be available via aircraft peripheral flights."

Our Redaction Guide states that information about the SAMOS F ELINT payload is releasable. It does not mention COMINT. The guide also states that the "fact of" satellite COMINT collection capability is releasable.

We would like your views on:

1. whether a potential/planned COMINT capability on SAMOS is releasable?
 2. if not releasable, whether the indirect reference above should be redacted.
- If possible, we would appreciate an E-mail response. Thanks in advance.

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 13, 2004 9:49 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: signature redaction -- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Cargill,

(b)(3)

As you and [redacted] suggested, I called OSD declassification [redacted] to find out the classification of OSD signatures. [redacted] told me:

(b)(6)

- They do not redact; they either release in full or retain as classified.
- They do not withhold release on the basis of signatures. They do not consider signatures to be classified.

- He asked me to explain our rationale for withholding signatures and I explained that it related to a concern about document forgeries. He volunteered that he thought this concern a little "far-fetched". (Apparently, he had not heard about Bush's apparently falsified national guard -related records.)

Based on this, I will in the future assure that signatures of non-NRO OSD officials are not redacted. As I told you this AM, the CIA Redactor's guide requires redaction of all signatures of CIA personnel, regardless of whether or not the name is releasable. I have not looked into the signature releasability policies of other agencies.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

From: [redacted]
 Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2004 9:55 AM
 To: [redacted]
 Cc: imint-class; Hall Cargill
 Subject: FW: RRG Question for IMINT — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
 classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

Friends of IMINT,

I don't think there is any particular sensitivity to the 544th at SAC processing NRO film since the "fact of" KH-7 and KH-9 have been declassified. [redacted]

[redacted] If you run into anything that might be questionable, you can always run it by for review.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(5)

Regards,

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
 Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2004 1:47 PM
 To: [redacted]
 Cc: Hall Cargill; [redacted]
 Subject: RRG Question for IMINT — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted]

I'm reviewing several documents on the subject of establishing the 544th at SAC for processing NRO film subsequent to the closure of the Westover AFB facility. The documents are dated 1973. The RRG has several paragraphs related to this subject:

"f. (U) The AFSPPF can be acknowledged as being part of NRO Program A. Located at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, it has been acknowledged as a site for processing CAL program film. (In reality, AFSPPF served as a backup facility for the primary processing facility at Eastman Kodak in Rochester, NY, until it was closed in 1974-75.)^{98,103} (Effective 10/13/03)

Redact:

a. ~~(S//BYE)~~ Any information indicating or suggesting the presence of a covert Air Force processing facility at Eastman Kodak's Rochester facility. This covert Air Force processing facility supported GAMBIT, and only later was it moved and consolidated with the Air Force Special Photographic Processing Facility (AFSPPF) at Westover AFB, Massachusetts.⁸⁰ (Effective 2/7/02)"

Note, however, there is no explicit reference to the role of the 544th at SAC. Please advise on classification of this and related facts, particularly as it relates to an implied connection to G and H. If you need more detail or if you need to review some of the specific documents, I can copy them and get them to you. Thanks.

[redacted]

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

(b)(3)

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 10:22 AM
 To: Hall Cargill
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: RE: RRG changes for ISCAP approval -- SECRET//BYEMAN//X1
 classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
 Cargill,

(b)(3)

The removal of the words [REDACTED] would reduce it to FOUO per [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] para. 12.2, because of the acronym [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall Cargill
 Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 6:56 AM
 To: [REDACTED]
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: RE: RRG changes for ISCAP approval -- SECRET//BYEMAN//X1

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
 [REDACTED]

You are saying that the paragraph would remain classified even if we remove the words [REDACTED] and substitute the words "a specific location" in their place? That is, the paragraph would then refer only to the [REDACTED] (b)(1)
 [REDACTED] (b)(3)
 (If that is the case, we'll have to do some more surgery.) Let me know.

Cargill

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 2:28 PM
 To: Hall Cargill
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: RE: RRG changes for ISCAP approval -- SECRET//BYEMAN//X1

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Cargill,

I concur that the paragraph below, marked "Redact:" should not appear as unclassified. [REDACTED] (b)(3)
 Further, this information, when BYE retires, will become "Control Disseminated, strongly managed need-to-know" and will be limited access controlled by the Program Manager.

V/R,

[REDACTED]
 Program Security Analyst

COMM [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

"Mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent"
 Adam Smith-Economist 1759

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 1:43 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: RRG changes for ISCAP approval ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[REDACTED] Your thoughts?
 Cargill

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 1:28 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Subject: RE: RRG changes for ISCAP approval ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Cargill,
 This is really a COMM call [REDACTED] person).
 My reading of their [REDACTED] says this would be OK but I would forward
 this email to [REDACTED] to be sure. Regards [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 12:08 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RRG changes for ISCAP approval ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[REDACTED]
 Last week [REDACTED] made a change to the RRG in response
 to ISOO recommendations, which I didn't see until after he left. It
 appears below.

Based on our previous discussion, I had not identified [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] in the narrative because it would
 increase the sensitivity of the guide. I propose to substitute the
 words "a specific location" for the words [REDACTED]. This should
 reduce the paragraph to unclassified, does it not?

(b)(3)

Cargill

(b)(1)

Redact:

(b)(3)

~~(S//BYE)~~ Except for the "fact of" in the context
 below, all references to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sensitive information includes,
 but is not limited to, the [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED] when associated with [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] operational reason (s) for activation date and
 time; and details of transfer timelines and functions

transferred to

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2004 3:58 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill; imint-class
Subject: FW: RRG Question — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted] I agree with both of your conclusions.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2004 2:16 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill
Subject: RRG Question — ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

[redacted] I'm reviewing a 1975 NRO document on the AFSPPF (which I believe processed film at Westover AFB). The document refers at length to the processing of color film. The inference is that NRO was flying satellite(s) which used color film in 1975, three years after the last CORONA. We think we need to redact this but we want your view before we do it. [redacted] I agree we should redact it.

Incidentally, the document describes the processing equipment and processing problems in some detail, items not covered in the RRG. We believe this type of information is releasable provided it does not disclose unreleaseable facts about the satellite systems. [redacted] I agree.

Thanks in advance for your help.

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//BYEMAN//X1~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2004 2:51 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: FOIA (IART); Hall Cargill; [redacted] Hall Cargill
Subject: "Fact of SDS" — UNCLASSIFIED
classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

The DDA signed the FOIA appeal letter on 22 December 2004 that officially acknowledges "fact of a Satellite Data System." The original request was received in June 1999 (F99-0072).

The release of any documents related to the program was denied utilizing the Operational File Exemption.

The IART appreciates your expertise and perseverance in bringing this case to a resolution. Thank you.

[redacted]
Information Access and Release Team
[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2005 1:29 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Subject: RE: Unclassified SIGINT Information -- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Cargill,

NSA's SCG states, "The fact that NSA has SIGINT relationships with Third Party nations, without specifying the Third Party nation = (U)", is about as close as you need to get. I think when I wrote the 1998 guide I approximated the NSA guidance and in the 2002 revision I left it out.

[redacted]
SIGINT Security
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2005 10:08 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Unclassified SIGINT Information -- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
[redacted]

I am reviewing the NRO's declassification guide for 2005 and have a question about the Insert below, Item e. Footnote 5 refers to a 1998 SIGINT declass guide that no longer exists, and I cannot find a justification for Item e in the current 2001 guide. Worse, the item is written in a manner that is not clear: does the U.S. government have SIGINT relations, or does SIGINT have relations with foreign governments? Can you recommend a fix: delete, rewrite, whatever.

Appreciate your assistance.

Cargill Hall
IMSC-Information Access and Release Team
[redacted]

Release:

a. (U) "Fact of" satellite SIGINT collection capability.^{3, 5}

- b. (U) "Fact of" satellite COMINT collection capability.⁵
- c. (U) "Fact of" satellite ELINT collection capability.⁵
- d. (U) "Fact of" satellite FISINT collection capability.⁵
- e. (U) Generic references to SIGINT relations with unspecified foreign governments.⁵

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent:

Friday, May 06, 2005 3:52 PM

To:

Subject:

FW: Update on BYEMAN Retirement - ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

F Y I

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~-----Original Message-----~~

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, May 06, 2005 3:23 PM

[REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Update on BYEMAN Retirement - ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

FYI folks

(b)(3)

~~-----Original Message-----~~

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, May 06, 2005 3:06 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Update on BYEMAN Retirement - ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

~~-----Original Message-----~~

From: Announcement Manager

Sent: Friday, May 06, 2005 2:58 PM

To: W31-all; release-me-all

Subject: Update on BYEMAN Retirement - ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

classification: ~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

(C) Effective at the close of business 20 May 2005, the BYEMAN control system retires. For those locations with twenty-four hour operations, implementation becomes effective at mid-night local time. We request that recipients of this message give it the widest possible dissemination. This message will be declassified effective with the date and time of retirement.

(U//FOUO) Enumerated below are the practical changes that will occur as the result of the retirement of the BCS. More detailed information is available in the One Book: Implementation Guidance for Retiring the BYE Control System, on line on GWAN/CWAN a [REDACTED] or on INTELINK by typing BYE Retirement in the GOOGLE (b)(3) Search Engine.

~~(E)~~ The word BYEMAN becomes unclassified.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The tri-graph BYE becomes unclassified.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The BYE access no longer exists and the NRO no longer accepts requests for BYE accesses.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ All personnel sponsored by the NRO for BYE will be virtually debriefed and their existing SI and TK accesses will continue to be sponsored by the NRO. No signed Nda is required for the BYE debriefing.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ All previous data protected in the BYE Control System (BCS), except BYE Special Handling, will be protected in the Talent-Keyhole Control System. All personnel with SI/TK accesses and valid need to know may receive NRO data classified at the SI or TK level.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The Operational SIGINT BYE (OSB) and IMINT BYE (IMB) will cease to exist as subcompartments for information; the trigraphs will continue to exist as data filters on IT systems as necessary to continue to protect electronic dissemination of information. Some BYE trigraphs may continue for a time due to limitations of our electronic dissemination systems.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ All previous BYE Special Handling data will be protected within compartments in the RESERVE Control System. The NRO compartment Program Manager will identify and approve all personnel for access to a RESERVE compartment through an internally managed access request process; external requests for access will not be entertained.

(U) This message authorizes SI/TK as the baseline SCI accreditation for all NRO government and contractor facilities and NRO IT systems. No change to accreditation documentation is required for currently accredited NRO facilities or certified and accredited NRO IT systems. The baseline eligibility for access to NRO facilities becomes SI/TK.

CL REASON: 1.4(c)

DECL ON 20050520

DRV FM NCG 5.1, 1 May 00

(U) All existing SCIF co-utilizations remain valid and no change to documentation is required.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Information and documents previously marked BYE must be remarked with appropriate classification, compartmentation, and dissemination controls when the information or document is no longer at rest in either paper or electronic form.

(U) The classification and compartmentation of protected operational sites and personnel does not change.

(U) The NRO Management Information System (NMIS), Government Wide Area Network (GWAN) and Contractor Wide Area Network (CWAN) will continue to operate as currently configured. Requests for changes to Controlled Interfaces, Firewalls, Network Connections, and other configuration modification, upgrades or rerouting on NRO systems must be approved through the existing processes which include Security Certification Officer (SCO), ISSM/ISSO review and staffing.

(U) Individuals and groups external to the NRO must have NRO/CIO approval for access to or connectivity with the NRO Information Enterprise (NIE).

(U) New classifications guides to reflect changes in classification, compartmentation, and dissemination control markings (release decisions), will be available on line on 23 May at the NRO OS WEB site at [redacted] and on INTELINK at an address to be determined.

(b)(3)

(U) Original Classification Authority for NRO information remains with the Director, NRO.

(U) The Director, NRO Security (NRO/DoS) remains the cognizant security authority for the NRO and NRO accredited SCIFs and NRO owned IT systems. The NRO Chief Information Officer (NRO/CIO) remains the Designated Accreditation Authority (DAA) for NRO IT systems.

(U//FOUO) For copies of the One Book: Implementation Guidance for Retiring the BYE Control System, the Implementation video or other educational materials, please contact the NRO Security Education Division Center hotline at commercial [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: 20050520

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//20050520~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [REDACTED]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

(b)(3)

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL/X1~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 2:38 PM
To: [redacted] Hall Cargill
Subject: FW: RRG changes to respond to iscap

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT~~

~~KEYHOLE//X1~~
classification: ~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 12:45 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill
Subject: RE: RRG changes to respond to iscap

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

classification: ~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

[redacted]

Many thanks for your excellent comments.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Redacted

(S) Information relating to the how NRP systems directly support of U.S. forces and by where NRP systems provide a critical information input to U.S. weapon systems which directly affects the accuracy or lethality of the weapon system. This information includes but is not limited to: NRP collectors, data provided (including formats), communications methods and limitations, recipients, weapon systems supported, planned uses, and vulnerabilities.

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 10:51 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill
Subject: FW: RRG changes to respond to Iscap ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

[redacted] I made some comments on your document titled "RRG Changes" and assigned paragraph classifications as I understood them. If you have any questions, please let me know. Thanks [redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 2:34 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill
Subject: FW: RRG changes to respond to Iscap ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

[redacted] I hate to bother you with this but I need your advice about how to get a quick but competent review of the (large number of) proposed changes to the RRG.(see memo to Cargill below). My MFR on the meeting with ISCAP is included below so you can get the full background. Hope all is going well with you.

(b)(3)

<< File: Meeting with ISCAP reps06061van.doc >>

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 2:25 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RRG changes to respond to Iscap ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Cargill,

Per my MFR dated 6 June, I have developed a draft set of RRG changes to respond to ISCAP comments in the 2 June meeting. These are attached below. One document contains only the changed pages from the draft shown to ISCAP; the other is a completely new draft incorporating all the changes.

I think I've made a good start on what's needed but there's a great deal of work that needs to be done, including:

-Preliminary scrub (both editorial and substantive) by you, [redacted] (Paragraph classification markings need work.)

-Substantive scrub by knowledgeable people in NRO security. (I've tried to base the recent changes on the NRO Virtual Classification Guide. My interpretations strongly need sanity checks from the real experts.)

-Check against the full set of ISCAP-recommended changes.

-Pre-meeting with [] &, possibly with an ISCAP rep.
Also note that [] plans to work on some changes and that [] has contacted someone about the proper classification of the LSG.
I'll be in North Carolina on Monday and Tuesday but I'll be in late morning on Wednesday after a doctor's appointment.
See you then.

[]

(b)(3)

<< File: RRG_ISOO Mods Alpha mr060605.doc >> << File:

rrgchanges061005.doc >>

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: []

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: []

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: []

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: []

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: []

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 11:05 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: imint-class
Subject: RE: IMINT Facility Classification Issue — ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~
classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~
Cargill,

Since we haven't declassified KH-7, KH-8 and KH-9 programatics, I would redact the information and exempt the memo from declassification.

Regards,

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 8:43 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: IMINT Facility Classification Issue — ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

I have a two-page SAF/SS memo for the record in the declass review queue that addresses "film destruction and silver recovery." The subject doesn't offend, but the memo identifies facilities where this activity was taking place in 1977: Earle, Colts Neck Facility (presumably in MD), and the Indian Head Film Destruction Facility (in MD). The RRG has no instructions on this subject.

Although these operations doubtless are long gone with KH-8 and KH-9, I

[redacted] (b)(3)
[redacted] (b)(5)
period. Again, we don't have specific instructions on the subject. Your counsel appreciated. Will adjust the RRG accordingly.

Cargill Hall
IMSC-Information Access and Release Team

[redacted] (b)(3)
Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By: [redacted]

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: X1

Derived From: NCG 5.1 01 May 00

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//X1~~ (b)(3)

From: [redacted] (MSO)
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 4:13 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Redaction of NRO Signatures -- UNCLASSIFIED
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Cargill,

Confirmed as you have stated.

[redacted]

-----Original Message-----
From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 11:43 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Redaction of NRO Signatures -- UNCLASSIFIED

classification: UNCLASSIFIED
[redacted]

[redacted] advise that the Privacy Act on signatures is at variance with the RRG. Will modify the RRG accordingly, but need you to verify that the following guidance is correct.

o Names not currently on the approved list to release will have name and signature redacted.

o Names on the approved list to release will have a line drawn through the signature--signature is altered but not redacted.

Please confirm or change these instructions as needed.

Cargill

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

From: Moffett Page
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 1:38 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Subject: RE: Question of Current Authorities. — UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Cargill, it should read DNI vice DCIA. When the DCI wore both hats, it was easy. Now that the two positions are separated, the DNI is the official responsible for protecting sources and methods. Page

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 10:34 AM
To: Moffett Page
Subject: Question of Current Authorities — UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Page:

The following paragraph in the NRO declassification guide (Review and Redaction Guide) has been revised to account for the role of the DCIA. Should it now read DNI instead of DCIA? Your counsel appreciated.

Cargill Hall
IMSC-Information Access and Release Team



(b)(3)

(U) The NRO serves as the Executive Agent for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) in providing guidance for protecting the non-product aspects of satellite reconnaissance systems. The release of satellite reconnaissance information as described in this guide is consistent with provisions of PDD-49 and with the DCIA's statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods.

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2005 7:40 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc:
Subject: FW: Release of WS-117L R&D Program Identifiers --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
=====

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Cargill: I agree with to release the old references as unclassified.

From:
Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2005 7:32 AM
To:
Subject: FW: Release of WS-117L R&D Program Identifiers --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

I don't see a problem with this list being released at the Unclassified level. The RRG already allows references to the SAMOS Ferret programs, the infrared program became Midas, and the boosters have been acknowledged. The other terms are pretty generic. Recommend approval.

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2005 3:00 PM
To:
Subject: Release of WS-117L R&D Program Identifiers --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



As you know, we have been processing for release numerous WS-117L records. Among them is a July 1958 listing of WS-117L R&D Program Identifiers contained in the Lockheed statement of work, and issued shortly before the various components received formal names (i.e. Sentry, Midas, Discoverer) in August/September 1958. The list, which has raised some questions, appears below.

I see no reason to protect this listing. If you in OSP agree, I will include it in the 2006 RRG. (Program IIA, of course, was CORONA)

Program I, Prototype Development of the SM 65 (Atlas) booster
Program II, Pioneer Visual Reconnaissance - SM 65
Program IIA, Prototype development biomedical recovery - SM 75 (Thor) booster
Program III, Pioneer Ferret Reconnaissance - SM 65
Program IV, Advanced Visual Reconnaissance - SM 65
Program V, Advanced Ferret Reconnaissance - SM 65
Program VI, Visual Surveillance - SM 65
Program VII, Infrared Early Warning - SM 65
Program VIII, Ferret Surveillance - SM 65

Cargill Hall

IMSC-Information Access and Release Team



(b)(3)

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2006 1:46 PM
To: Hall Cargill; [redacted]
Subject: Policy on Redacting Names --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Cargill and [redacted]

I talked with [redacted] about the policy regarding redacting names. She agrees that the basic policy for redacting/release of individual's names who work/have worked for the NRO is that;

- the individuals themselves may verbally acknowledge their involvement with SAF/SP, SAF/SS, SAF/MS or NRO offices according to the instructions provided at the time of the declassification of these entities or subsequently
- for documentation being reviewed by the NRO under the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958/security reviews/mandatory declassification reviews/FOIA reviews which contain NRO individual's names, the **identities of NRO individuals will not be released** unless they are: Directors of the NRO, Deputy Directors of the NRO, former Directors of Program A, B C and D, or individuals appearing in Appendix B of the RRG
- additionally, the description of their duties must be unclassified and consistent with the description in Appendix B. All other NRO individuals will be redacted. This policy is intended to protect the identify of former and current NRO employees unless the NRO has specifically approved their release.
- still to be worked is the issue of faces in videos

This is the policy we are following with an additional consideration that since 1995 we release names of individuals in positions identified in the "Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office" dated April 24, 1995 (basically 44 positions).

If you have any questions or need further clarification, please advise.

[redacted]
OS/Security Policy Staff

"Intelligence collection is the NRO mission; space is the place where we perform our mission"

[redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Sent:

Tuesday, February 14, 2006 7:56 AM

To:

[REDACTED] Hall Cargill

Cc:

Subject:

RE: Classification Guidance ---~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~---

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

All - we have treated "fact of" CSAR support=(U) (we consider this generic SMO) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Facts about remain classified. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIGINT Security
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[redacted]

Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 7:35 AM
To: Hall Cargill
Subject: RE: Security Question --- ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

Although I told [redacted] that current capabilities for real time SIGINT reporting are treated as (U), to go back to the 70s may be a stretch. Check with the IARC guys and see if the RRG allows that, I'm not sure.

[redacted]
[redacted]
SIGINT Security
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

(b)(3)

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 6:55 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Security Question --- ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

[redacted]

Is it permissible to print in an unclassified paper the fact that "signals intelligence satellites that could relay collected electronic signals in near real-time had reached operational status in the 1970s"?

Let me know.

Thanks,

Cargill Hall
IMSC-Information Access and Release Team
[redacted]

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: 25X1

Derived From: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4(c)

DECL ON: 25X1

Derived From: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1~~

(b)(3)

[redacted]
Sent: Friday, April 07, 2006 2:22 PM
To: Hall Cargill; [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Review of FOIA Case --- ~~SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: INCG dated 20120213
Declassify On: 25X1, 20671231
=====

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)

Cargill,

I have reviewed the FOIA case as well, and I agree that there are no issues or cause for redaction. If the program is declassified, then there should be no reason why the cryptonym cannot be declass also.

Nor do I see any issues in the verbage with covert funding. I saw only vague references to the transfer of funds from NASA to NRO; and, I saw no references to the sources or methods used or the amounts transfered.

In my opinon, other than the confirmation of a long standing association between the NASA and the NRO, these documents do not constitute any danger to the cover mechanisms that we currently have in place.

[redacted]
Chief, [redacted]
National Reconnaissance Office
[redacted]

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Friday, April 07, 2006 1:32 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Review of FOIA Case --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Thank you [redacted]

[redacted] will advise us on the covert funding aspect. Since UPWARD is a cryptonym (like CORONA) that referred to the NRO-assisted lunar mapping effort, I see no reason why it, too, cannot be released.

Cargill

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, April 07, 2006 12:03 PM
To: Hall Cargill
Cc: Imint-class
Subject: Review of FOIA Case -- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Importance: High

(b)(3)

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Cargill,

After a thorough review of FOIA Case Number E06-0005, we find no issues or cause for redaction with requested documentation. Only two areas of potential debate/concern are with the release of the BYEMAN Codeword UPWARD and certain NRO covert funding processes. However, in both instances we feel the data can be released without compromise to current NRO security protection methodologies.

Questions or concerns, please don't hesitate to call.

[redacted]
IMINT Security Staff
Classification Management Team
[redacted]

(b)(3)

Decl On: 25X1, 20560103, NRO RRG Dated July 2005
Div From: NRO IMINT PCG 4.0, Dated 06 May 2005

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====
Classification: ~~SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

15 May 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: (U) Declassification of Secretary of the Air Force,
Office of Space Systems and Office of Missile and
Satellite Systems, National Reconnaissance Office
Relationship

(U) This memorandum recommends the declassification of the "fact of" and certain "facts about" the association of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems (SAFSS) and its predecessor Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (SAFMSS). This declassification effort furthers NRO compliance with intent of Executive Order 12958 and is in accordance with current NRO classification criteria and risk mitigation measures to protect sensitive and classified information.

~~(C)~~ From 1961 to April 1995, SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS was the unclassified designator for the staff element of the NRO and performed staff functions for the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO. Personnel assigned to these offices also provided support to the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space) on aircraft reconnaissance and space reconnaissance systems. SAFSS Air Force military and civilian personnel and contractors supporting them, have protected the "fact of" their association and assignments with the NRO as BYEMAN information for over 30 years.

(U) The role of the SAFSS/SAFMSS as the Headquarters staff of the NRO can be declassified now with minimal impact on continuing NRO classified elements, operations, and locations as they are not associated with currently classified NRO information. Ample justification exists to declassify the SAFSS and SAFMSS role within the NRO as a result of the gradual phasing out of SAFSS as an organizational assignment mechanism for NRO personnel. Since 1995 there have been no NRO personnel

CL BY:
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: NCG 5.1; 1 May 2000

(b)(3)

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: (U) Declassification of Secretary of the Air Force,
Office of Space Systems and Office of Missile and
Satellite Systems, National Reconnaissance Office
Relationship

assigned to SAFSS. Further, SAFSS has no current organization,
mission, or function within the Air Force Staff structure.

(C) Identification of SAFSS and its personnel as the NRO
Headquarters staff no longer constitutes a risk to NRO
activities. However, a presumption on the part of persons
knowledgeable of SAFSS that all information concerning SAFSS and
its role in the NRO is now declassified presents a certain
element of risk that should be mitigated. Therefore, to reduce
the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of classified NRO
operations or locations, we have constructed a list of
information about SAFSS that is now UNCLASSIFIED (see
attachment). This information on the limits of the
declassification will be made available to personnel
knowledgeable of SAFSS operations, including SAFSS alumni
(military, civilian, and contractors).

(U) Recommend the declassification of the role of SAFSS as
the staff element of the NRO as a normal progression of NRO
declassification efforts. Also, request your signature on the
attached letter to SAFSS alumni and associates.

Kenneth W. Renshaw
Director of Security

Attachment

APPROVED:

187

Keith R. Hall
Director, National Reconnaissance Office

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

The following "facts about" the association of SAFSS and the National Reconnaissance Office are proposed as unclassified:

- The association between the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems (SAFSS) and its predecessor, the Air Force Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (SAFMSS).
- Fact that SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS was the staff element of the NRO and performed staff functions for the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO.
- Fact that personnel assigned to SAFSS and SAFMSS provided support to the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space) on aircraft reconnaissance and space matters.
- Identities of all former SAFSS and SAFMSS Directors.
- Identification of main organizational elements of SAFSS and SAFMSS, e.g., SS-1, SS-2, etc.
- Identities of key SAFSS and SAFMSS personnel assigned to the major staff offices and elements of SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS, such as chiefs of the key divisions, comptroller, technical advisor, etc.
- Fact of individual assignment to SAFSS and SAFMSS (from 1961 to April 1995) including unclassified duty and staff title, generic description duties (i.e. engineering, technology, comptroller, security, administration, etc.), and period of performance.
- Fact of and individual's assignment to SAFSS and SAFMSS at Los Angeles Air Force Base, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Satellite Control Facility, Sunnyvale, and The Pentagon. These are the only locations to be declassified as associated with SAFSS and SAFMSS.
- General association of SAFSS with CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD, and GRAB.

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

- General description of SAFSS operations and support functions not associated with currently classified NRO information.

~~SECRET//X1~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPACE
SYSTEMS ALUMNI/ALUMNAE

SUBJECT: SAFSS Declassification

I am pleased to announce the declassification of the "fact of" and certain "facts about" the association of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems (SAFSS), and its predecessor Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (SAFMSS). We are now able to acknowledge the contributions of those who have served in SAFSS/SAFMSS in support of the NRO as well as support to the senior leadership of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. This letter is intended to provide alumni/alumnae with broad guidance on the scope and limits of this declassification.

The following "facts about" the association of SAFSS and the NRO are declassified:

- The association between the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Space Systems (SAFSS) and its predecessor, the Air Force Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (SAFMSS).
- Fact that SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS was the staff element of the NRO and performed staff functions for the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO.
- Fact that personnel assigned to SAFSS and SAFMSS provided support to the Secretary, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space) on aircraft reconnaissance and space reconnaissance systems.
- Identification of main organizational elements of SAFSS and SAFMSS, e.g., SS-1, SS-2, etc.
- Identities of all former SAFSS and SAFMSS Directors and key SAFSS and SAFMSS personnel assigned to the major staff offices and elements of SAFSS and its predecessor SAFMSS, such as chiefs of the key divisions, comptroller, technical advisor, etc.
- Fact of individual assignment to SAFSS and SAFMSS (from 1961 to April 1995) including unclassified duty and staff title, generic description duties (i.e. engineering,

technology, comptroller, security, administration, etc.), and period of performance.

- Fact of and individual's assignment to SAFSS and SAFMSS at only the following locations: Los Angeles Air Force Base, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Satellite Control Facility, Sunnyvale, and the Pentagon.
- General association of SAFSS with CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD, and GRAB.
- General description of SAFSS operations and support functions not associated with currently classified NRO information.

If you have questions please contact NRO Security at If you receive requests for interviews, information, or reviews of articles, papers, books, etc. from media, academics, or historians concerning the NRO, we strongly urge you to contact NRO Security so we can assist you with your response.


(b)(3)

/S/
Keith R. Hall
Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force (Space)

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

(U) National Reconnaissance Office



SIGINT Program Classification Guide (U)

24 May 2005

Includes revision as of 25 Aug 2008

Acting Director, SIGINT Systems Acquisitions and Operations, NRO

Classified By:
Classification Reason:
Declassify On:
Derived From:

1.4 (a,c,e,g)
25X1
Multiple Sources (see pg 25)

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//Z5X1~~Record of Changes

Change / Description	Date of Change
Fixed typo that makes the legacy term OSF (U) vice (S)	2 Sep 2005
Corrected omission regarding releasability of SIGINT satellite ephemeris data	18 Oct 05
Corrected note in item V.1.g to include unintentionally omitted dissemination release direction	2 Nov 05
Added a note to item II.1.a.2 explaining the use of cover contract numbers as described in NRO/OC Administrative Note 25, rev 3 of 26 Aug 03 and their classified association with the NRO.	28 Nov 05
	28 Mar 06
Acronym table - change the term POPPY from S//TK to U	12 May 2006
Sec I, Item 1.0,dd - changed to 4 eyes IAW NGA ONIR SCG	9 Jan 2007
Sec I, Item 3.0, j - changed from 3 eyes to 5 eyes to reflect DNI guidance on intel sharing	"
Sec II, Item 3.0, a,b,c&d - changed releasability instructions from 3 eyes to "releasability determined by content of document"	"
Sec III, Item 6.b - 6.c,1,2,3,4 - 6.e changed releasability to 4 eyes IAW NGA ONIR SCG	"
Sec V, Item 1.0,h - changed releasability from 3 to 5 eyes based on current information distribution channels - i.e. - operational reality	"
Sec VII, Item a. and c. - changed releasability from 3 to 5 eyes based on current information distribution channels - i.e. - operational reality	"
	3 Jan 2008
Incorporates global DIDO approval changing releasability of NRO SIGINT information from 3 or 4 eyes to 5 eyes.	25 Aug 2008

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//Z5X1~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**(U) Table of Contents**

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**1.0 (U) GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS****1.1 (U) Purpose**

(U) The SIGINT Classification Guide compiles into one document all guidance for the classification of National Reconnaissance Office information for all SIGINT programs. As such, it is the baseline classification document for SIGINT operations and activities. It provides the basis for maintaining configuration control of classification management decisions. In conjunction with the "Life Cycle Security" process it will function to provide management with a tool for assessing the impact of change.

1.2 (U) Scope

~~(E)~~ The provisions of this guide apply to all SIGINT plans, systems, subsystems, and operations funded by, or under the cognizance of the SIGINT Systems Acquisition & Operations Directorate (SA&OD). This includes research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); application; production; related technology; and operational use of SIGINT systems. The information contained in this guide has been compiled from numerous source documents, which are listed in Section 23. For additional information or assistance in making classification determinations, contact the Program Security Officer (PSO) for the system in question, the SIGINT Security Office, or for contractor personnel, your NRO Contractor Program Security Officer (NCSPO).

2.0 (U) APPLICABILITY & EFFECTIVE DATE

(U) This SIGINT Classification Guide applies to all personnel who have access to information addressed in this guide. It is effective as of the date on the title page.

3.0 (U) APPROACH

(U) The SIGINT classification development team used a "Life Cycle Security Process" to develop this guide. The process included analysis of the program life cycle, threat, open source, program segments, work breakdown structure, sensitive technologies, classification decision tool, risk management, and program protection architecture.

(U) The SIGINT classification development team was comprised of government and contractor personnel. It was coordinated with applicable System Program Offices (SPOs), field sites, contractors, and all Headquarters Directorates and Offices.

~~(S//TK)~~ The SIGINT Classification Guide (CG) [redacted] Security Classification Guides (SCGs). In developing the SIGINT CG all criteria from the previous guides were considered.

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
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6.0 (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

(U) This guide is issued by the NRO SIGINT (SA&OD). The SIGINT CG establishes original classification guidance for NRO SIGINT operations and activities and is approved by the Director, NRO SIGINT (SA&OD).

7.0 (U) CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

(U) The Director, SIGINT SA&OD (an original classification authority) has established the classification level of and control system for some information contained in this guide. Other information is derived from guidance provided/documented in the:

1. National Space Policy, NSC-49, dated September 1996.
2. NRO Security Classification Guide, 1 May 2000.
3. Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems, 8 April 1997.
4. Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR), 26 May 1999.
5. Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated, 1 December 1995.
6. National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
7. Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).

8.0 (U) LEVELS OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

8.1 (U) National Security Classification Levels

(U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause ~~exceptionally grave damage~~ to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) ~~SECRET~~ shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause ~~serious damage~~ to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) CONFIDENTIAL shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

8.2 (U) Control Systems:

8.2.1 (U) Collateral Material

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(U) All national security information classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET under the provisions of an Executive Order 12958 for which Intelligence Community systems of compartmentation [such as, Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI)] are not formally established. NRO has authority to classify within the collateral classification protocol.

8.2.2 (U) COMINT

(U) The COMINT Control System (SI) is a SCI control system expressly authorized for handling or transmitting communications intelligence derived from satellite surveillance and other sources.

8.2.3 (U//~~FOUO~~) TALENT-KEYHOLE

(U//~~FOUO~~) TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) is a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Sensitive Compartmented Information control system which protects technical data used in collection tasking; imagery or signals processing/exploitation techniques for collected data; and intelligence products derived from overhead reconnaissance programs. Some exceptions to satellite SIGINT related data include COMINT (Note: when COMINT is identified as satellite collection, it is handled jointly as SI/TK), operational ELINT (Operational Electronic Intelligence - OPELINT), and some technical ELINT (TECHELINT). Generally TALENT-KEYHOLE protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines:

- 1) (U) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), [REDACTED]
- 2) (U) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), [REDACTED]
- 3) (U) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), [REDACTED]
- 4) (U) Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), and
- 5) (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

(b)(3)

8.2.4 (U//~~FOUO~~) RESERVE (RSV) Control System

See RESERVE Security Manual for Guidance

8.3 (U) Proper Compartmentation of Information.

(C) The decision to compartment information in the TK Control System should be made using the guidelines and tables in this guide, as well as the program classification guides. Proper compartmentation is critical in order to interact effectively with our mission partners/users.

(S) BYEMAN (BYE) was a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) control system that defines protection requirements for sensitive sources and methods used in the research, development and operation of space-based reconnaissance systems. This included certain program budget and funding details; integration of spacecraft with sensor platforms; certain command and control operations; key design and development details; and survivability and vulnerability of systems. The DCI delegated security policy formulation authority for the BYEMAN Control System to the Director of Center for CIA Security, CIA (D/CCS/CIA). The Director of Security NRO (DOS/NRO) was responsible, however, for implementation and was the senior security advisor to the DNRO. The BYEMAN Control System was managed by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The DCI retired the BYEMAN control system effective 21 May 2005. For SIGINT the following marking changes resulted:

Before BYEMAN Retirement

BYE//REL TO 3 EYES
BYE-OSB//REL TO 3 EYES
BYE//NF

After BYEMAN Retirement

TK//REL TO 3 EYES
TK//REL TO 3 EYES
TK//NF

(U//~~FOUO~~) With the retirement of the BYEMAN control system, almost all information about NRO systems is controlled in the Talent Keyhole control system. Automatic dissemination of this information based solely on possessing TK access is not sound OPSEC. Apply need-to-know principles before sharing information about NRO systems with those not directed involved with the NRO.

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

8.4 (U) CLASSIFICATION OR CONTROL SYSTEM CONFLICT RESOLUTION

~~(C)~~ The classification tables in this guide specify classification and control system(s) for information related to SIGINT systems and their products. Where control system or classification is not readily apparent from the table, or if a user believes conflicting, inaccurate, or unclear guidance has been provided, protect the information, products or activities at the highest applicable level pending resolution. Request guidance from the responsible SIGINT Program Security Officer or the NRO Director of SIGINT Security. A control system and classification review will be made by the NRO for TK matters under the cognizance of the NRO and the functional program managers within DIA, NIMA, NSA, National SIGINT Committee and the MASINT Committee for TALENT-KEYHOLE information that does not originate or belong to the NRO but falls under the data ownership of these organizations.

(U) The fact that classified information has been inadvertently disclosed or released does not mean that it is automatically declassified. Unauthorized disclosures will be reviewed by the SIGINT SA&OD and other Directorates and Offices to determine appropriate and/or necessary courses of action.

8.5 (U//~~FOUO~~) Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

(U//~~FOUO~~) Classified intelligence information relating to intelligence sources and methods is often NOFORN. Release of NRO-related classified information to foreign governments or individuals whether collateral, COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE must be in accordance with arrangements between NRO, National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery & Mapping Agency (NIMA), and CIA/Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff (CRES). Potential data release must also satisfy the applicable requirements outlined in Director, Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, DCID 6/7, DCID 6/3, Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR)s Volumes I/II, Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National Reconnaissance Materials [MASINT Policy Series (MPS)], and the Imagery Policy Series. Release of unclassified NRO-related satellite technology is subject to export controls as established by the Departments of Commerce and State, in coordination with Department of Defense. Certain organizations/agencies have authorized memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or other agreements that permit the release of classified intelligence information to foreign nationals. Release of information is bound by the specific terms of the agreements and may supersede other caveats and restrictions.

(U) In accordance with DCID 1/7, intelligence information that bears no restrictive control markings may be released to foreign governments, international organizations or coalition partners provided that:

(U) A positive foreign disclosure decision is made by a Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official in accordance with procedures in DCID 6/7;

(U) No reference is made to the originating agency or to the source of the documents on which the released product is based; and

(U) The source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence (including analytic judgements or techniques), and/or the location where the intelligence was collected (if relevant to protect sources and methods) is not revealed and cannot be deduced in any manner.

(U) SIGINT may be sanitized or otherwise altered to permit foreign release consistent with DCID 5/5, 6/7, NDP-1, and other DNI guidance. See Signals Intelligence Security Manual (SISR) for further detailed guidance.

8.6 (U) Bilateral Agreements.

~~(S)~~ SIGINT and related information (methodologies and techniques), even when not marked "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" (NOFORN), will not be released to foreign governments (except for Second Parties), organizations, or persons other than under the provisions of this regulation. Authorized exchanges of COMINT will be conducted in accordance with bilateral agreements established under the provisions of DCID 5/5 and DCID 6/7 and in consonance with U.S. policy on information sharing with foreign nations. In particular, SIGINT on the foreign recipient's country will not be shared except in rare cases. The Director, NSA, must be consulted in advance in all such cases.

8.7 (U) Second Parties

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(b)(3)**8.8 (U) Third Parties**(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Information identifiable as SIGINT may be released to foreign nations other than the Second Parties only under the terms and conditions of formal SIGINT agreements, either national or military-to-military. Such bilateral agreements will be established by the Director, NSA, in conjunction with the Department of State, appropriate U.S. military commands and services, the Special Assistant to the DNI for Foreign Intelligence Relationships, and the appropriate CIA COS. With regard to Third Party organizations, SIGINT may be disseminated by SOICs to only COMINT-indoctrinated persons for whom access is authorized in approved sharing agreements.

8.9 (U) Authorized for Release to [name of country (ies)/international organization] (REL or REL TO e.g., GBR...).

(U) This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has determined to be releasable or has been released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country (ies)/international organization(s) indicated. Further foreign dissemination of the material (in any form) is authorized only after obtaining permission from the originator and in accordance with DCID 6/7, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and National Disclosure Policy - 1 (NDP-1). This marking may be abbreviated REL (abbreviated name of country (ies)/international organization.) It is not authorized for use in conjunction with the: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN) control marking.

9.0 (U) COMPILATION/AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION

(U//FOUO) In some instances, the combination of several items of information produces a synergistic effect, i.e., the classification of all items of a similar type, when combined together generate a new piece of information that is classified higher than either of the originals. When originating documents, emails, etc. be aware of issues that may be created when associating information. While portion markings should reflect the classification of the relevant portion headers and footers can be at a higher level if a compilation issue has been created.

10.0(U) ADMINISTRATION**10.1 (U) Visits by Representatives of State/Federal Governments**

(U) The appropriate SIGINT Program Security Officer (PSO) will be notified of any contemplated visits by members of any legislative or Executive Branch of any State or Federal Government to any contractor or government agency if any portion of the visit could involve SIGINT Programs. The notification will include name, position, and area of interest of each visitor and the date of the proposed visit.

10.2 (U) Visits by Foreign Citizens or Representatives of Foreign Governments or Organizations

(U) The SIGINT cognizant Program Security Officer (PSO) will be notified of any contemplated visits by foreign citizens or representatives of any foreign governments, space agencies, or contractors to any United States contractor or government agency if any portion of the visit could involve access to any SIGINT Program information. The notification will include name, position, and area of interest of each visitor and the date of the proposed visit.

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11.0(U) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION

(U) NO NRO information relative to a NRO SIGINT contract will be publicly released unless the company is specifically authorized to release it in writing by the authorized NRO Contracting Officer for that contract. Prime and associate contractors are responsible for ensuring their subcontractors are aware of and comply with, this requirement. Unilateral public release of information pertaining to the NRO and its SV programs, operations, and launches is expressly prohibited.

12.0(U) USE OF THIS GUIDE

~~(C)~~ The Guide is classified SECRET and is controlled within the COMINT//TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly. The following guidelines will be strictly enforced:

(U) Reproduction of this document or any part is permitted for use in program activities. Requests for copies for other uses should be directed to the SIGINT Program Security Officer (PSO).

(U) Dissemination of this guide to organizations outside the security cognizance of the NRO must be approved by the SIGINT PSO and NRO Office of Security Policy and Operational Support.

(U) Government program management personnel, PSOs, and contractor security personnel will ensure strict adherence to the DNRO's "must-know" access requirement policy. PSOs and security officers may extract information from this guide to tailor security classification guidance for tasks, as needed.

(U) CAUTION! Exact situations and classifications cannot always be specified in advance. Protect the information and refer questions to Program security. Any deviation from this guide must be approved by the SIGINT Program Director or PSO.

(U) How to request changes to this guide.

(U) As circumstances or policies change, there will be a requirement to change information in this guide. The form below should be completed by individuals and forwarded through your security organization. They in turn will forward it by secure means to the SIGINT Security Office for review and comment.

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**SIGINT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
CHANGE REQUEST**

(to be filled out by Program Office PSO)

TO: SIGINT CLASSIFICATION AND POLICY UNIT

FROM: _____ (PSO P.O.C.) _____ (Office)

Originator: _____
(name, organization, _____
functional activity) _____

Date: ____/____/____ Proposed Change: New Item ____ Modification ____ Challenge ____

Item/Listing: _____
(guide section, item number, page) _____

Change description: _____
(include other _____
items affected) _____

Rationale: _____

(to be completed by the SIGINT Classification and Policy Unit)

Date: ____/____/____

Action Officer: _____

Request approved: Yes No
(circle one)

If NO state justification: _____

Coordinated with: _____

Final Classification Determination: _____

Date approved by OCA: ____/____/____ Name of OCA: _____

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**13.0(U) NRO DoD PROGRAM DESIGNATOR**

(b)(3)

14.0(U) NRO LAUNCH DESIGNATOR

(b)(3)

15.0(U) SUBSTITUTE IDENTIFIER

~~(S)~~ Replacing the SV program name, number, or an NRO DoD program designator, with any substitute identifier in order to avoid classification of budgets, analyses, hardware, engineering processes, tests and associated documentation must meet the criteria listed in the paragraphs below. Information relative to SV mission, capability, vulnerability and operations can NOT be declassified through disassociation. Those items that can be handled as unclassified when disassociated from a specific SV program are explicitly identified in the classification tables.

(U) A substitute identifier may be any combination of numbers, letters, or an unclassified name. However, the substitute identifier must be randomly selected for the sole purpose of being used as a substitute identifier with no derivable unclassified relationship between the substitute identifier and the program, satellite vehicle contractor (SVC), or the NRO DoD program designator.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(U) DoD collateral usage of substitute identifiers must be approved by the OSL prior to implementation. All other usage of substitute identifiers must be approved by the applicable NRO Directorate or Office.

16.0(U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) All users of this guide are encouraged to assist in improving and maintaining its currency and relevancy. Comments and recommendations should be forwarded through security offices to the Program Security Officer (PSO) or to the NRO, Director of Security. (See change request form in Section 12.0).

17.0(U) CLASSIFICATION TABLE LAYOUT AND EXPLANATION

(U) The following table provides security guidance itemized by program segments. The table is not and cannot be all inclusive. Absence of a particular item does not imply that the item can be considered UNCLASSIFIED. Refer questions to the Program Security Officer (PSO). If the table indicates that an item of information can be protected in more than one security control system, use the guidelines in section 8.3 (Choice of Control Systems).

(U) The classification column contains the classification level, the control system column contains the symbol for a control system if applicable. The Rationale/Remarks column will contain a rationale for the classification level and other comments.

~~(C)~~ The following key is provided for understanding the symbols used in the classification tables:

EO 12958 CLASSIFICATION LEVELS

TS - TOP SECRET

S - SECRET

CONTROL SYSTEMS

RSV - RESERVE

TK - TALENT KEYHOLE

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C - CONFIDENTIAL

SI - COMINT

OTHER DATA

U - UNCLASSIFIED
 FOUO - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
 NF - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN)
 LIMDIS - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
 SHI - SPECIAL HANDLING INFORMATION
 REL TO
 USA/AUS/
 CAN/GBR/NZL - RELEASABLE TO USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL
 CRYPTO - CRYPTOGRAPHIC
 OCA - ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

(b)(3)

18.0(U) REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION

(U) Under the provisions of E.O. 12958, the reason(s) for a classification decision must be documented. To meet this requirement, the E.O. specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category (ies) described in Section 1.4 of E.O. 12958 plus the letter(s) that correspond to the category (ies) should be listed. The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are listed below:

- (a) "Military plans, weapons systems, or operations."
- (b) "Foreign government information."
- (c) "Intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology."
- (d) "Foreign relations or activities of the United States, including confidential sources."
- (e) "Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security."
- (f) "United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities."
- (g) "Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security."

19.0(U) DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

(U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 specifies that the original classification authority will apply a date, not to exceed 10 years, or event for declassification that corresponds to the lapse of the information's national security sensitivity. Individuals with original classification authority may determine that certain information must remain classified beyond 10 years. In this case, the information must be annotated with the letter "X" plus a numerical designation that corresponds to a specific exemption category or set of exemption categories described in Section 1.6 of E.O. 12958 (e.g. 25X1 equates to: Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptology system or activity). The X markings and corresponding declassification exemptions are as follows:

- 25X1 - "Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activities or a cryptology system or activity."
- X2 - "Reveals information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."
- X3 - "Reveals information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system."
- X4 - "Reveals United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans."
- X5 - "Reveals foreign government information."
- X6 - "Would damage relations between the United States and foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for period greater than in paragraph (b)."
- X7 - "Would impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and or other individuals for whom proactive services, in the interest of national security, are authorized."
- X8 - "Would violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

20.0(U) PORTION MARKING

(U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 mandates that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified. The NRO has been granted a limited waiver from the requirement to portion mark information. The NRO is not required to portion mark information that will be maintained internal to the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally must be

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the security cognizance of the Director of the NRO.

(U) Documents that are not portion marked may not be cited as source documents for derivative classification. These documents shall be marked "Warning this document shall not be used as a source for derivative classification." This "warning" marking will be prominently placed on the first page of the document.

21.0(U) REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

1. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, Classified National Security Information, dated 17 April 1995.
2. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, dated 22 February 1995.
3. (U) NRO Classification Guide, Version 6, 20 May 2005.
4. (U) National Space Policy, NSC-49, dated, September 1996.
5. (U) Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated, 1 December 1995.
6. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/1, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), 1 Mar 95.
7. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/5, Conduct of SIGINT Liaison with Foreign Governments and the Release of U.S. SIGINT to Foreign Governments, dated May 1983.
8. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/7, Intelligence Disclosure Policy, dated 20 Apr 2001.
9. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information, dated 30 Jun 98.
10. (U) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR), 26 May 1999.
11. (U) DOD Freedom of Information Act Program, DoD 5400.7-R, dated May 1997.
12. (U) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy, DoD TS-5105.21-M-2, July 1985.
13. (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
14. (U) National Reconnaissance Office Security Manual (NSM) Volume 1 - Industry, June 16, 2000.
15. (U) The Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, 24 April 1995.
16. (U) Further Declassification of NRO Contractor Associations, 1 August 1997.
17. (S) SOCOMM message, "Declassification of NRO Launch and Associated Facts," 072114 March 1997, Cite 8496, aka Policy Notice 001/97.
18. (U) Implementation Plan for NRO Launch Declassification, 1 March 1997.
19. (U) OPNAL Notice 5510 (Limited Dissemination Controls) 29 Dec 89.
20. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
21. [REDACTED] (b)(3)
22. [REDACTED]
23. [REDACTED]
24. [REDACTED]
25. (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
26. (U) Data Communications Group Classification Guide, 25 September 1997.
27. (U) Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems, 8 April 1997.
28. (U) Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).
29. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
30. (U) Declassification of the terms "TALENT-KEYHOLE" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, February 23, 1995. (b)(3)
31. (U) Intelligence community Classification and Control Markings Implementation Manual, 30 Jun 1999.
32. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
33. [REDACTED] (b)(3)
34. [REDACTED]
35. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**22.0(U) RATIONALE**

(U) The following list is the rationale used to decide what type of information would be revealed by a compromise of data. The number which corresponds to the appropriate rational appears in the classification table in the rationale/remarks column.

1. (U) Reveals a covert or classified relationship.
2. (U) Reveals vulnerability or survivability.
3. (U) Reveals total system design to include communications network and connectivity details.
4. (U) Reveals technology advances in state-of-the-art capabilities or unique new capabilities.
5. (U) Reveals system design and communications network details.
6. (U) Reveals sub-system design and communications network details.
7. (U) Reveals system performance not needed for product analysis.
8. (U) Integration information revealing design details or mission.
9. (U) Reveals intelligence mission.
10. (U) Reveals command and control techniques heightening vulnerability.
11. (U) Launch schedules and logistics revealing system design details, capabilities, or mission.
12. (U) Contractual or administrative information revealing system design details, communications network infrastructure, capabilities or mission.
13. (U) Reveals contractor or other relationship that is covert, compartmented, or classified.
14. (U) Reveals program sponsor (i.e., the NRO).
15. (U) Reveals sensitive sources and methods.
16. (U) Reveals operational, system, communications network or other information which may lead to degradation or negation of mission objectives.
17. (U) Reveals information which may allow an adversary to gain technical competence or advantage.
18. (U) Reveals details of collection capability over denied area that cannot be attributed to any sensor other than a satellite.

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~**ACRONYM LIST (U)****NOTE: ASTERISKED ITEMS ARE CONTROLLED WITHIN S//TK CHANNELS WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.**

		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)AFP	Air Force Program.	
(U)AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network.	
(U)AFSPACECOM	Air Force Space Command.	
(U)AFSPC	Air Force Space Command.	
(U)AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment.	
(U)AOTES	Automated Operational Technical Exchange System.	(b)(1)
(U)ARV	Aerospace Research Van.	(b)(3)
(U)AS&TD	Advanced Systems & Technology Directorate.	
(U)ASE	Aerospace Support Equipment.	
(U)ASPO	Army Space Program Office.	
(U)ATP	Advanced Tracking Prototype.	
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)BV	Booster Vehicle.	
(U)BYE	(U) BYEMAN.	
(U)CAAS	Contract Advisory & Assistance Services.	
(U)CALS	Computer Aided Logistics Support.	
(U)CALVAN	Calibration Van Group.	
(U)CCO	COMINT Channels Only.	
(U)CDRL	Contract Data Requirements Lists.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.	(b)(3)
(U)CIA/OD&E	Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Development & Engineering.	
		(b)(1)
(U)CMCC	Command Management Control Center.	(b)(3)
(U)COMINT	Communications Intelligence.	
(U)COMSEC	Communications Security.	
(U)CONOPS	Concept of Operations.	
(U)CONUS	Continental United States.	
(U)CPEG	Cross Program ELINT Geolocation.	
(U)CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications Systems.	
(U)CSTC	Consolidated Space Test Center.	
(U)CW	Continuous Wave.	
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.	
(U)DCI	Director of Central Intelligence.	
(U)DCID	Director Of Central Intelligence Directive.	
(U)DEFSMAC	Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center.	
(U) DNI	Director National Intelligence.	
(U)DNRO	Director of the National Reconnaissance.	
(U)DOD	Department of Defense.	
(U)DRSP	Defense Reconnaissance Support Program.	
(U)DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System.	
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications System.	

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

(U)EAGE	Electrical Aerospace Ground Equipment.	
(U)ECI	Exceptionally Controlled Information.	
(U)ELINT	Electronic Intelligence.	
(U)Elsets	Element sets. A set of six numbers (mean motion, eccentricity, inclination, right ascension of the ascending node, argument of perigee, and mean anomaly) that make up the element set and describe the satellite's orbit). The orbital elements are used by the satellite owner/operator and the space surveillance sites to track space objects.	
(U)ELV	Expendable Launch Vehicle.	
(U)EMC	Electro-magnetic Compatibility.	
(U)EMI	Electro-magnetic Interference.	
(U)EMP	Electro-magnetic Pulse.	
(U)AEPDS	Army Electronic Processing Data System.	
(U)ER	Eastern Range.	
(U)ERP	Effective Radiated Power.	
(S// TK)FARRAH (F-I, F-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	
(U)FOC	Final Operational Capability.	
(U)FOSC	Facility Operations Support Center(s).	
(U)FOUO	For Official Use Only.	(b)(1)
(U)GEO	Geostationary/ Geosynchronous Earth Orbit.	(b)(3)
(S// TK)GLORIA (G-I, G-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	
(U)GTG	Ground Terminal Group.	
(U)HEMP	High Energy Magnetic Pulse.	
(U)HEO	Highly Elliptical Orbit.	
(U)HULTEC	Hull to Emitter Correlation.	
(U)I&W	Indications and Warning.	
(U)ICEBOX	Improved communication Equipment Enclosure.	
(U)ILC	Initial Launch Capability.	(b)(1)
(U)IMINT	Imagery Intelligence.	(b)(3)
(U)IRON	Inter-range Operations Numbers.	(b)(1)
(U)LCO	Launch Communications Office.	(b)(1)
(U)LEO	Low Earth Orbit.	(b)(3)
(U)LEO SPO	System Program Office for Low Altitude Programs.	
(U)LMCC	Launch Management Control Center.	
(U)LOCC	Launch Operations Control Center.	
(S// TK)LORRI (L-I, L-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	
(U)LPO	Launch Program Office.	
(U)LSI SPO (SAF/SP)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SAF/SP).	
(U)LSI SPO (SMC/IMO)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SMC/IMO).	
(U)LSI SPO (SAF/SL)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SAF/SL).	
(U)LSIC	Launch Systems Integration Contractor.	
(U)LV	Launch Vehicle.	
(U)MAGE	Mechanical Aerospace Ground Equipment.	
(U)MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence.	
(U)MCC	Mission Control Center.	
(U)MCS	Mission Control Station.	
(U)MECO	Main Engine Cut-Off.	

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

(U)DMGS	Mission Ground Station	
(U)MS&O	Office of Management, Services & Operations.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)NAVSOC	Navy Space Operations Center.	(b)(1)
(U)NAVSPACMD	Navy Space Command.	(b)(3)
(U)NCST	Navy Center for Space Technology.	
(U)NRL	Naval Research Laboratory.	
(U)NRO	National Reconnaissance Office.	
(U)NROC	NRO Operations Center	
(U)NRP	National Reconnaissance Program.	
(U)NSA	National Security Agency.	
(U)NSG	Naval Security Group.	
(U)NSOC	National Security Operations Center.	
(U)NSRL	National SIGINT Requirements List.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)OBP	On-board Processing.	
(U)OCA	Original Classification Authority.	
(U)OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center.	
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)OPELINT	Operational Electronic Intelligence.	
(U)OPSCOMM	Operational Communications.	
(U)OPSEC	Operations Security.	
(U)OSF	Operations Support Facility.	
(U)OSL	Office of Space Launch.	
(U)OSO	Operational Support Office.	
(U)P&A	Office of Plans & Analysis.	
(U)P/L	Payload.	
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)P-989*	Inactive Program Name.	
(U)PADS	Prototype Analysis Display System.	
(U)PARAGON	Prototype Air Reporting and Ground Operating Node.	
(U)Pathfinder	A test to verify the compatibility between the SV and its facilities.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)PAWS	Prototype Analyst Work Station.	
(U)PD-14 (OLD SPAWAR-40)	Program Directorate - 14.	
(U)PDEC	Product Development Evaluation Center.	
(U)PDMS	Payload Data Management System.	
(U)PLF	Payload Fairing.	
		(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)POCC	Payload Operations Control Center.	
(U)POPPY	Inactive Program Name.	
(U)PRI	Pulse Repetition Interval.	
(U)PROFORMA	Machine to machine signals.	
(U)PSO	Program Security Officer.	
(U)R&D	Research & Development.	
(S//TK)RAQUEL (R-I, R-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
(U)RF	Radio Frequency.	
(U)RFP	Requests for Proposal.	
(U)RRC	Regional Reporting Center.	

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(U)RSOC	Regional SIGINT Operations Center.	
(U)RSV	RESERVE Control System	
(U)S	Collateral Secret.	(b)(1)
(U)S//BYE	(U) SECRET BYEMAN.	(b)(3)
(U)S/C	Spacecraft.	
(U)S//TK	SECRET//TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)SAF/SL	Secretary of the Air Force /Space Launch.	(b)(1)
(U)SAF/SO	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations	(b)(3)
(U)SAF/SP	Secretary of the Air Force/Special Projects.	
(U)SAF/SS	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Systems.	
(U)SAO	SIGINT Applications Office	
(U)SAF/ST	Secretary of the Air Force /Science & Technology.	
(U)SBS	Spacecraft Bus System.	(b)(1)
(U)SCC	Space Classified Catalog.	(b)(3)
(U)SCC	Spacecraft Control Center.	
(U)SCG	Security Classification Guide.	
(U)SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information.	
(U)SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.	
(U)SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System.	
(U)SE/GE	Space Element/Ground Element.	
(U)SECDEF	Secretary of Defense.	
(U)SED	Signal External Data.	
(U)SELORS	Ship Emitters Location Report.	
(U)SETO	Systems Engineering Technology Office	
(U)SETA	Support Engineering and Technical Assistance.	
(U)SGLS	Space Ground Link System.	
(U)SH	Special Handling.	
(U)SI	Special Intelligence.	
(U)SIGINT	Signals Intelligence.	
(U)SMC/CL	Space Missile Center/Launch Programs Office.	(b)(1)
(U)SMC/CLM	Space Missile Center/Atlas Program Office.	(b)(3)
(U)SMC/CLX	Space Missile Center/Operations Support & Integration Office.	
(U)SMC/IMO	Space Missile Center/Information Management Office.	
(U)SOCOMM	Special Operations Communications.	
(U)SOI	Signals of Interest.	
(U)SOW	Statements of work.	
(U)SPO	Systems Program Office	
(U)SSD/IMO	Space Systems Division/Information Management Office.	
(U)SSD/OD-1	Space Systems Division/Operating Division - 1	
(U)SSIC	Space Segment Integration Contractor.	
(U)SSPO	Space Systems Program Office.	
(U)STS	Space Transportation System.	
(U)SV	Satellite Vehicle.	
(U)SV SPO	Satellite Vehicle, Systems Program Office.	
(U)SVC	Satellite Vehicle Contractor.	
(U)TAXDIS-B	Tactical Data Information Exchange System Broadcast.	
(U)TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities.	(b)(1)
(U)TEP	Tactical ELINT Processor.	(b)(3)
(U)TK	TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)T-K	TALENT-KEYHOLE.	

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~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

(U)TLD	Titan Launch Dispenser.	
(U)TMGS	Transportable Mobile Ground Station.	
(U)TOPS	Tactical On-Board Processing System.	
(U)Trailblazer	A test to verify the compatibility of the SV and its interface with the L.V.	(b)(1)
(U)TS	TOP SECRET.	(b)(3)
(U)TS/BYE	(U) TOP SECRET/BYEMAN.	
(U)TS/SI	TOP SECRET/COMINT.	
(U)TS//TK	TOP SECRET//TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)TSF	Technical Support Facility.	
(U)TT&C	Telemetry, Tracking & Commanding.	
(U)TUDE	Teletype User Data Entry.	
(S//TK)URSALA (U-I, U-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	
(U)USA	U.S. Army.	
(U)USAF	U.S. Air Force.	
(U)USMC	U.S. Marine Corps.	
(U)USN	U.S. Navy.	
(U)VRK	Very Restricted Knowledge.	
		(b)(1)
		(b)(3)
Table above is classified S//TK.		

~~SECRET//COMINT//TALENT KEYHOLE//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR//25X1~~

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[redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 1:48 PM
To: Hall Cargill; [redacted]
Subject: RE: Current Name Policy --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
=====

(b)(3)

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Correct

From: Hall Cargill
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 1:38 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Current Name Policy --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
[redacted]

Point of clarification: Under the terms of the revised policy, we can leave photo portraits of persons in a declassified and released history (e.g., The Corona Story) as long as we redact the person's name from beneath his/her photo, correct?

Cargill

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 1:27 PM
To: [redacted] Hall Cargill;
Subject: FW: Current Name Policy --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Good catch. I have modified the video tape policy to include films and photographs.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2006 11:36 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Hall Cargill; [redacted]
Subject: FW: Current Name Policy --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
[redacted]

Policy as outlined in your memo below does not explicitly address the issue of faces in documents. I would assume that these are releasable per items 1 and 2 of the video tape policy in your memo below. Thanks to [redacted] for independently raising this issue.

We will assume that these are releasable unless we hear otherwise from you.

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 10:28 AM
To: [REDACTED]; Hall Cargill
Cc: security-policy
Subject: Current Name Policy --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)

classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

As you know, the NRO has a statute (10 U.S.C. 424) that protects from release:

- the organization or any function of the organization, and
- the number of persons employed by or assigned or detailed to the NRO or the name, official title, occupational series, grade or salary of any NRO person

To maintain the viability of this statute, this email reiterates the current policy for redacting names:

1. Names of Director and Deputy Director government personnel in NRO headquarters Directorates, Offices and Staffs are releasable
 - Names below the Deputy Director level will be redacted
 - Where the position cannot be determined, the name will be redacted
2. Names in Appendix B of the RRG are releasable. Names will only be added to Appendix B if individuals are selected for public recognition by the DNRO/PDDNRO/DDNRO
3. Contractor names will be redacted
4. SAF/SS, SAF/SP, Program B, C and D personnel are not releasable unless they fit the above criteria

Video tape policy

1. Faces are not considered to identify the individual and do not have to be redacted
2. Name tags or captions identifying individuals must be redacted
3. Retirement/award videos intended for the recipients do not require redaction

Current authors requesting prepublication reviews

Full names of authors publishing current documents at the unclassified level are releasable

Public points of contacts for NRO conferences/technical seminars, etc.

1. First name and last initial
2. Email addresses that do not contain the last name

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, February 08, 2007 11:32 AM
To: Hall Cargill; [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Old Sigint goals --- UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
=====

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1-20570208~~ RRG dated July 2005
FYI

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 08, 2007 7:11 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Old Sigint goals --- ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1-20570208~~ RRG dated July 2005

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1-20570208~~ RRG dated July 2005

[REDACTED] continued protection of a goal 5 miles geolocation accuracy in the 1960s would be difficult to rationalize. I don't think we need to redact this fact.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

SIGINT Security
"Silentium est unicus castellum"

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 5:26 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Old Sigint goals --- ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1-20570206~~ RRG dated July 2005


(b)(3)

classification: ~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1-20570206~~ RRG dated July 2005

Good Afternoon,

My name is [REDACTED] and I work with Cargill Hall in the Information Access and Release Team over at [REDACTED]. I came across a 1960 USIB document entitled "Intelligence Requirements for Satellite Reconnaissance Systems of Which SAMOS is an Example." Under the heading "Operational Requirements" is this statement:

"e. The system should incorporate a direction finding capability that will permit location of electronic emitters withing a five mile CEP;..." Now as our redaction guide only permits *acknowledging* a much broader locating ability, should this goal statement be redacted? Any assistance would be appreciated.



Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

DECL ON: 25X1 20570206 RRG dated July 2005

Derived From: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1 20570206 RRG dated July 2005~~

(b)(3)

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

DECL ON: 25X1 20570208 RRG dated July 2005

Derived From: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1 20570208 RRG dated July 2005~~

Warning: This document may not be used as a source of derivative classification.

DECL ON: 25X1 20570208 RRG dated July 2005

Derived From: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//25X1 20570208 RRG dated July 2005~~

=====
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Rel to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~**Security Note**

November 18, 2002

**SUBJECT (U) Declassification of KH-7 Surveillance
System Imagery and KH-9 Mapping System
Imagery**

(U) Background: The Director of Central Intelligence authorized the declassification of almost the entire film record of the KH-7 surveillance camera system and the KH-9 mapping camera system. On 20 September 2002 the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) sponsored the "Historical Imagery Declassification Conference" and transferred the film record to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for release to the public. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(U) Purpose: The purpose of this note is to advise NRO [REDACTED] points of contact about the conference, the information officially released, and the information mentioned but not officially released. Recommend further dissemination and changes to [REDACTED] security guides as appropriate.

(b)(3)

(U) Contact: Questions may be directed to the NRO point of contact [REDACTED] of the Office of Policy, [REDACTED] via appropriate channels. Local open phone: [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(U) Attachment: FACT SHEET: KH-7 Surveillance System & KH-9 Mapping System.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Rel to USA, AUS, Can and GBR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Rel to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~**FACT SHEET****(U) KH-7 Surveillance System and KH-9 Mapping System****(U) Information Officially Released:****(U) KH-7 Surveillance Camera System:**

The high-resolution KH-7 surveillance satellite imaging camera system operated from July 1963 to June 1967, during which it monitored key targets such as ICBM complexes, radar systems, and other areas of interest. Mission durations were of one to eight days and each mission returned a single bucket of film. This system also provided the key cartographic information from which the Department of Defense produced accurate, large-scale (1:50,000) maps.

The KH-7 camera returned 19,000 frames totaling 43,000 linear feet of imagery on 34 of 38 missions (mission numbers 4001 – 4038). Thirty of the missions provided imagery that was usable for analysis. The camera also returned some color imagery from missions 4024 and 4030. The KH-7 camera was capable of imaging areas 12 nm wide ranging from five nm to 400 nm long. The initial best ground resolution was approximately 1.2 meters (4 feet) and by 1966 improved to approximately 0.6 meters (2 feet).

(U) KH-9 Mapping Camera System:

The low-resolution KH-9 frame/mapping camera system was devoted exclusively to gathering information for mapping, charting, and geodesy and collected imagery from March 1973 to October 1980. Geodetic data, including precise geopositioning, elevation, and other information provided the DoD with accurate point locations for air, sea, and ground operations. The KH-9 provided Level 1 Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) and other data to make 1:200,000 scale maps.

The KH-9 mapping camera returned film in a single bucket; operated on 12 missions (mission numbers 1205 – 1216) with mission durations of 42 to 119 days; and acquired a total ground coverage of approximately 104 million square nautical miles. Each frame of KH-9 mapping imagery covered a ground "footprint" of approximately

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Rel to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Rel to USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~

70nm by 140 nm with some stereo and some trilap coverage of the ground area. Additionally, the "fact of" mission numbers 1201-1204 and 1217-1220 were officially released as KH-9 missions. However, the imagery from these missions was not declassified, nor was any system information associated with them.

(U) KH-7 & KH-9 Mapping System Coverage

Together, these two systems acquired approximately 50,000 images on approximately 93,000 linear feet of film.

(S) Information Not Officially Released:



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~Rel to USA, AUS, Can and GBR~~

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN~~

Office of Strategic Communications
 National Reconnaissance Office
 Chantilly, VA - [REDACTED]
 OSC Front Office, Chantilly, VA. - [REDACTED]




Office of Strategic Communications

Weekly Report: 18-22 February 2008

(For additional info go to [REDACTED])

(b)(3)

Legislative Liaison Activities



our leadership does not intend to declassify any further details about the activity or the spacecraft.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Corporate Communication Activities

~~(TS//FK//NF)~~ 20 February [REDACTED] Engagement Press Release:

(b)(1)

(U) At 10:26 p.m. EST Feb. 20, 2008, a U.S. Navy AEGIS warship, the USS Lake Erie (CG-70), fired a single modified tactical Standard Missile-3 hitting a non-functioning National Reconnaissance Office satellite over the Pacific Ocean at 133 nautical miles in space. The objective of the mission, to rupture the hydrazine fuel tank, appears to have been successful. Nearly all of the debris will burn up upon reentry within 24-48 hours, and the remaining debris should re-enter within 40 days.

(b)(3)

(U) Many recent news stories have noted the upcoming re-entry and decision to engage an NRO experimental satellite. Due to concern for public safety and the risk to human life, DNRO Scott Large had asked other agencies for assistance with ideas for other courses of action. As was reported, the President made a decision to engage the satellite in hope of alleviating the toxic threat posed by onboard hydrazine.

(b)(1)

~~(TS//TK//NF)~~ The DNRO declassified several facts about the [REDACTED] satellite to allow meaningful public announcements, but does not intend to reveal anything more at this time. Declassified material includes: the uncontrollable NRO experimental satellite was launched on 14 December 2006, it weighed approximately 5000 lbs, and analysis indicated about 2500 lbs of satellite debris would survive re-entry with 1000 lbs of toxic hydrazine in the fuel tank.

(b)(3)

DECL ON: 25X1 20330208 RRG dated July 2005
 DRV FROM: NCG 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN~~*Future Activities*

- (U) 26 February – NRO Overview Brief to incoming
- (U) 3 March – HPSCI Staffer Day
- (U) 5 March – HASC-Strategic Forces Space Activities Hearing
- (U) 6 March – HPSCI FY09 National Intelligence Program (NIP) Budget Brief
- (U) 7 March – HASC Staffer Day
- (U) 11, 13 March – Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Staffer Days
- (U) 13 March – SSCI FY09 IMINT/ICA Budget Hearing
- (U) 13 March – Overhead Architecture Hearing (NIP/MIP)
- (U) 13 March – Facilities and Infrastructure in the IC Hearing (HPSCI)

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

Director's Note

Number 2008-22

30 April 2008

~~(S//REL)~~ DECLASSIFYING "FACT OF" NRO RADAR SATELLITE
RECONNAISSANCE

~~(S//REL)~~ I have recently received concurrence from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to implement our plan to declassify the "fact of" NRO radar satellite reconnaissance. The effective date for declassification will be upon completion of the implementation plan on 9 June 2008.

~~(S//REL)~~ The declassification of NRO radar satellite reconnaissance from SECRET//REL to UNCLASSIFIED is limited to "fact of" only, not to "facts about." Remaining classified are details regarding past, current and future capabilities, specific satellites, mission numbers, program names, performance, and technologies employed. No formal public announcement is planned.

(U) The declassification implementation plan includes formal notifications to oversight elements and other appropriate stake holders. Additionally, the plan provides security guidance and education, classification guide changes, public affairs/communication plans, procedures and points of contact for questions and to monitor implementation.

(U) During the implementation period, all current classification rules will remain in effect. Additional information regarding implementation, training, and education may be obtained through your directorate or office security staff. The lead office for the implementation is the IMINT Security Staff [] along with NRO/OS&CI Policy Branch []

(b)(3)

//signed//
Scott F. LargeDECL ON: 25X1, 205804XX, RRG dated July 2005
DRV FROM: NRO Classification Guide 6.0. 21 MAY 2005~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

~~SECRET//TK//NF~~



(U) NRO Classification Guide

Version 6.0

May 21, 2005
(22 February 2008)

Classified By: Kenneth W. Renshaw, NRO, Director of Security
CL Reason: 1.4 (c) Intelligence Sources and Methods
Declass. On: DCI Only
Derived From: Multiple Sources

Page 1 of 43

~~SECRET//TK//NF~~

~~SECRET//TK/NF~~**(U) Table of Contents**

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~~SECRET//TK//NF~~**(U) Change Log**

(U) As approved changes are made to the NRO Classification Guide, the text will be updated appropriately and a summary of the change will be logged here.

REQUEST FOR CHANGE (RFC) NUMBER	CHANGE DATE	PARAGRAPH(s) AFFECTED	GENERAL CHANGE DESCRIPTION
2008-001	29 Jan 08	1.38.2	Per SIGINT PCG Line 1.0.t and 1.0.y, this information is classified REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
2008-001	29 Jan 08	1.47, 1.47.1	Added information concerning piece parts
2008-002	22 Feb 08	Table of Contents Table 22.0	Added information concerning Systems, Applications and Products (SAP) Classification Guidance
2008-002	22 Feb 08	Header/Footer	Removed declassification field from the classification banner lines

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~~SECRET//TK//NF~~**(U) Change Page**

(U) Recommendations for changes to this Guide may be made by completing the form below and forwarding it to the Office of Security Policy through your security organization.

NRO CLASSIFICATION GUIDE CHANGE REQUEST			
TO: Security Policy Staff		Date:	
FROM: (PSO)		Originator:	
		(Name, organization & functional activity)	
Proposed Information Change/Challenge:	Information		Challenges
	New <input type="checkbox"/>		Declassify <input type="checkbox"/>
	Remove <input type="checkbox"/>		Decompartament <input type="checkbox"/>
	Modify <input type="checkbox"/>		Reclassify <input type="checkbox"/>
Item/Listing:	Item Number:	Page Number:	
Change Description (include other items affected):			
Rationale:			
(To Be Completed by Security Policy Staff)			
Action Officer:		Date:	
Request Approved:	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>	
If "No", state justification:			
Coordinated with:			
Final Determination:			

~~SECRET//TK//NF~~

~~—SECRET//TK//NF~~**(U) FOREWORD**

(U) National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Classification Guide 6.0 provides authoritative classification and compartmentation guidance for NRO information based on criteria established in Executive Order 12958, as amended, Director of Central Intelligence Directives, and classification guidance of other Intelligence Community members.

(U) The overall objective of this guide is to ensure that proper classification and compartmentation determinations are made for NRO information in order to protect the NRO's people, operations, assets and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Also, as NRO systems are integrated into tactical operations, we must strive to classify and compartment our data at a level that is most usable to the customer.

(U) This guide is designed to be the capstone for all NRO program classification guides and the focal point for NRO classification guidance. Should there be discrepancies between this guide and NRO program classification guides or contractual specifications, the program specific guides and current contracts take precedence until resolved by the NRO Director of Security (DOS). Similarly, the DOS will also resolve discrepancies between this document and other agency classification guidance pertaining to the security of the NRO.

(U) The NRO Director of Security is responsible for maintaining the currency of this guide. Discrepancies or conflicts regarding classification issues must be brought to the attention of your Program Security Officer (PSO) and, if appropriate, referred to the Security Policy Staff in order that the classification guidance may be properly amended. Once the cognizant program security office determines that there is cause for changing the NRO Classification Guide, those recommended changes would be appropriately coordinated and incorporated. Questions or comments should be directed to the Security Policy Staff by phone [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(U) Effective 21 May 2005, the NRO Classification Guide 6.0 is approved for use by all NRO government and contractor personnel as well as members of the Intelligence Community who are authorized access to NRO program information.

Kenneth W. Renshaw
Director, Office of Security
National Reconnaissance Office

~~—SECRET//TK//NF~~

~~—SECRET//TK//NF~~**A. (U) PURPOSE**

(U) This Guide provides general classification guidance for information, products, and activities relating to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Personnel engaged in security classification and compartmentation determinations in the TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK), and COMINT (SI) control systems should use this Guide. This Guide complements specific NRO program classification guides as well as relevant Intelligence Community imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) guides.

(U) The absence of an item in the classification table of this Guide does NOT suggest that the item should be considered UNCLASSIFIED. Consult the relevant NRO program classification guide or an NRO Program Security Officer if classification is unclear or not addressed in this guide.

B. (U) RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

(U) The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is responsible for the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods including those related to the NRO in accordance with the *National Security Act of 1947* and *Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49, National Space Policy, 14 September 1996*. The DCI is the only authority for declassifying NRO program information per the "National Space Policy".

(U) The Director, NRO (DNRO), as a Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC), is the equivalent of the head of a Cognizant Security Agency (CSA) for the purpose of protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and for implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). The DNRO, as head of an Executive Agency, is responsible for establishing a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding and granting access to national security information generated in support of the NRO activities (5 U.S.C. 105, Executive Order (EO) 12958, (as amended), and EO 12968). In this capacity, the DNRO also has the authority and responsibility to protect classified information generated in support of non-Sensitive Compartmented Information (non-SCI) NRO activities, i.e., collateral information.

(U) The Director of Security, NRO, (DOS/NRO) is responsible for developing and implementing security policies for the protection of NRO sensitive sources and methods in accordance with DCI Memorandum to the DOS/NRO, dated 10 February 2005, subject: *Delegation of Central Intelligence Agency Security Authorities in Support of National Reconnaissance Office Activities*. The DOS/NRO is also responsible for providing a secure mission environment by protecting NRO people, operations and assets with realistic, innovative security solutions developed through partnership with our customers.

(U) The TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) Control System is a DCI SCI control system jointly managed by the Director, NRO; Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Chairman, National SIGINT Committee; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Directorate for MASINT Technical Collection. Changes and modifications to the system require coordination by each Director/Chairman and approval of the DCI/Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Detailed classification and compartmentation procedures for IMINT and MASINT are contained in relevant classification manuals. The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) manages the COMINT control system for the DCI. The Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISRs) constitute the basic implementation of the TK system for satellite originated SIGINT tasking, collection and product information. Changes and modifications to the COMINT control system require coordination by DIRNSA and approval of the DCI/DDCI.

~~—SECRET//TK//NF~~

~~—SECRET//TK//NF~~**C. (U) COMPARTMENTATION CRITERIA AND OTHER MARKINGS**

(U) TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK) protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), [REDACTED]
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), [REDACTED]
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), [REDACTED]
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

(b)(3)

(U) NRO data protected within the TK system includes: relationships and data relating to satellite research & development (R&D), engineering design, specifications, algorithms, interface controls, test plans, operations manuals, and reference documents; satellite capabilities and vulnerabilities; equipment and information technology equipment involved in the operation of the satellite systems to include spacecraft, sensor(s), and mission ground station equipment; software programs used to operate hardware to include spacecraft maintenance, command and control, targeting, sensor operation, data conversion, processing, and exploitation operations, as well as the overall and detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the NRO satellite collection systems.

(U) The COMINT Control System (SI or Special Intelligence) is a DCI SCI control system expressly authorized for handling or transmitting communications intelligence derived from satellite surveillance and other sources.

Communications Intelligence (COMINT)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), (most ELINT is SECRET collateral)
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)

(U) **Proper Compartmentation of Information.** The decision to compartment information should be made using the guidelines and tables in this guide as well as specific program classification guides. Proper compartmentation is critical in order to interact effectively with our mission partners/users. Defaulting to the TK Control System is not acceptable as it may result in over-compartmentation.

(U) **Collateral Material.** National security information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended, or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET to indicate its classified status when in documentary form. NRO has authority to classify within the collateral classification system.

(U) **Classification Categories.** The E.O. 12958, as amended, states that national security information may only be classified in one of the three categories:

(U) **TOP SECRET:** applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *exceptionally grave damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe;

(U) **SECRET:** applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *serious damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe; and

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(U) **CONFIDENTIAL**: applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) **UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO)**. U//FOUO is an administrative marking available for use under certain circumstances to limit dissemination of information. It does NOT afford classified protection, but it does flag material that meets one of the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) criteria for exemption from public release. NRO Directive 50-12a and NRO Instruction 50-9a provides guidance both for deciding when to use the marking and for directions for proper handling of the material so marked.

(U) **Authorized For Release To [country(ies)/international organization trigraph] (REL TO)**. This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has determined to be releasable or has been released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country(ies)/international organization(s) indicated. Further foreign dissemination of the material (in any form) is authorized only after obtaining permission from the originator and in accordance with DCID 6/7, and National Disclosure Policy-1 (NDP-1).

(U) **Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals (NOFORN)**. The NOFORN marking is used to identify classified intelligence that may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, foreign organizations, or non-US citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with provisions of DCID 6/7 and NDP-1.

D. (U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION

(U) **Classification or Control System Resolution**. The classification tables in this guide specify the classification and/or control system for information relating to NRO systems, products and data. Where the control system or classification of an item of information is not listed in, or readily apparent from, the table in this guide or other program classification guides, such information, products, relationships and activities will be protected at an appropriate classification level with the most limited distribution, pending a review by the Program Security Office in conjunction with NRO/Security Policy Staff. As a general rule, the level of detail revealed will determine the classification and compartmentation. NRO/Security Policy Staff will also coordinate as necessary with the respective DIA, NSA or NSA functional program managers for TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT and collateral classification matters under their original classification authority.

(U) **Compilation/Aggregation of Information**. As stated in E.O. 12958, as amended, 1.7(e) Compilations of items of information that are individually *unclassified* may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that (1) meets the standards for classification under this order and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. As used in the Order, "compilation" means an aggregation of pre-existing unclassified items of information. If a classified document contains certain portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions will be marked as unclassified and the page will be marked with the highest classification of any information on the page. The reason for classifying the compilation must be stated at an appropriate location at or near the beginning of the document.

(U) **Classification Authority**. In accordance with E.O. 12958, as amended, only a limited number of NRO officials have Original Classification Authority (OCA). All remaining NRO personnel classify information derivatively. In establishing the information categories and classification of an item of information, E.O. 12958, as amended, further directs that the OCA must be able to identify

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or describe why unauthorized disclosure would result in damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

(U) Reason for Classification. Under the provisions of EO 12958, as amended, information may not be considered classified unless it falls under one or more of the categories listed below and the reason(s) for a classification decision documented. To meet this requirement, the EO specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category(ies) described in Section 1.4 of E.O. 12958, as amended, plus the letter(s) that correspond to the category(ies) should be listed. The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are listed below.

- (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
- (b) foreign government information;
- (c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
- (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
- (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
- (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or
- (h) weapons of mass destruction.

(U) Declassification Instructions

(U) Original Classification. E.O. 12958, as amended, specifies that when determining the duration of classification in the first instance, i.e. original classification, the original classification authority have four choices:

- a date or event less than 10 years from the date of the decision
- a date 10 years from the date of the decision
- a date greater than 10 years and less than 25 years from the date of the decision; or
- a date 25 years from the date of the decision.

(U) The NRO has a short list of individuals who have original classification authority.

(U) Derivative Classification. All individuals have derivative classification responsibility. NRO classified documents, media, and materials that are sources of derivative classification will use the following Declassification Date Markings.

- Exemption Category (e.g., 25X1 (replaces X1)); or
- Specific Date (e.g., YYYYMMDD) (used when a specific date or event for the declassification can be determined based upon the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information.)
- Manual Review (MR) (Used in cases where EO 12958 requirements are superseded by statute, treaty, or other agreement and can only be used in the document header and footer and not on the "Declassify On" line.)

(U) Declassification Exemptions

(U) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a) of section 3.3 of EO 12958, as amended, specific information, the release of which could be expected to:

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- (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method;
- (2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
- (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
- (4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system;
- (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
- (6) reveal information, including foreign government information, that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
- (7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized;
- (8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating to the national security;
or
- (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

(U) Classification Sources. For completeness, this guide contains items of information classified and compartmented by other agencies as well as NRO Program Offices. These items were derivatively classified after consulting a number of documents to identify the Original Classification Authority for the specific items of information. The documents are listed below.

- Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 49, "National Space Policy," dated September 1996.
- Executive Order 12958, as amended, Classified National Security Information, dated 23 March 2003.
- Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, 22 February 1995.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Imagery Policy Series, Section 5, Part A.
- Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated 1 December 1995.
- Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR) dated May 26, 1999.
- NRO approved Program Classification Guides:
 - IMINT Classification Guide (CG)
 - SIGINT Classification Guide (CG)
 - Communications Classification Guide (CG)
 - Office of Space Launch Information Protection Guide (IPG)
 - NRO Operations Squadron (IPG);
- Implementation Plan for Further Declassification and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, April 24, 1995.
- DCI memo titled, "Declassification of Specified Information Relating to the National Reconnaissance Office," dated September 15, 1992, and Secretary of Defense approval, dated September 17, 1992.
- Implementation Plan for NRO Launch Declassification dated 1 March 1997.
- Declassification Guide for CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD Programmatic Data, dated 2 August 1996.

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~~—SECRET//TK//NF~~**E. (U) INFORMATION SHARING**

~~(S//NF)~~ All NRO classified information must be marked either REL TO (Authorized for Release to [country(ies)/international organization trigraph]) or NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals). The President has emphasized the need to ensure the timely and efficient flow of information to our closest US allies. [redacted] Accordingly, the use of restrictive markings should be the rare exception rather than the rule. The presumption of disclosure and release should be the primary consideration in the preparation and dissemination of classified defense information and intelligence information relating to the circumstances set forth below.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(U) Release and Disclosure. The NRO Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) must approve the release and/or disclosure of NRO intelligence information to foreign nationals by in accordance with NRO Directive 50-8a and NRO Instruction 50-4a. The NRO DIDO is the only NRO official who can authorize the disclosure and/or release of NRO intelligence information. If the intelligence information originates from another Intelligence Community agency or is classified military information, the requestor must seek guidance from the NRO Office of Policy (OP) prior to the disclosure and/or release of that information as well.

F. (U) PORTION MARKING

(U) Executive Order 12958, as amended, mandates that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified. The NRO has been granted a limited waiver from the requirement to portion mark information. The NRO is not required to portion mark information that will be maintained internal to the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally must be portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the cognizance of the DNRO.

G. (U) REQUESTS FOR CHANGE TO CLASSIFICATION

(U) The NRO Classification Guide is intended to be a living document and changes will occur as necessary to keep it current. Any and all requests for changes and/or challenges to classification and/or compartmentation must be submitted to NRO Security Policy Staff by using the Change Page form (see page 4). Requests for change will be evaluated and vetted prior to acceptance or rejection. The requestor will be notified of the final decision and the change will be incorporated into the guide.

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(U) Acronym List

ACRONYM	EXPLANATION
	NOTE: * SECRET WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. ** SECRET//TK WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. *** U WHEN ONLY GENERICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.
(U) AFB	Air Force Base
(U) AFP	Air Force Program
(U) AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network
(U) AS&TD	Advanced Systems & Technology Directorate
(U) CCAS	Cape Canaveral Air Station
(U) C	CONFIDENTIAL
(U) CAAS	Contractor Advisory and Assistance Services
(U) CAL	Corona, Argon and Lanyard
(U) CG	Classification Guide
(U) CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
(U) CIA/OD&E	CIA/Office of Development & Engineering
(U) CIA/CRES	CIA/Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff
(U) COMINT	Communication Intelligence
(U) COMM	Communications
(U) DDSE	Deputy Director Systems Engineering
(U) DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
(U) DCID	Director, Central Intelligence Directive
(U) DDNRO	Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
(U) DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
(U) DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
(U) DNRO	Director, National Reconnaissance
(U) DoD	Department of Defense
(U) DOPS/CIA	Director of Personnel Security/CIA
(U) DOS	Director of Security
(U) DRSP	Defense Reconnaissance Support Program
(U) DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
(U) DSPO	Defense Support Program Office
(U) EELV	Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(U) ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
(U) EO	Executive Order
(U) ESD	Ephemeris Support Data
(U) FIA	Future Imagery Architecture
(U) FISINT	Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
(U) FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
(U) U//FOUO	Unclassified//For Official Use Only

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ACRONYM	EXPLANATION
	NOTE: * SECRET WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. ** SECRET//TK WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. *** U WHEN ONLY GENERICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.
(U) GEO	Geostationary Earth Orbit
(U) GPS	Global Positioning System
(U) HANU	High Accuracy Navigation User
(U) I&W	Indications & Warning
(U) IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
(U) IOSA	Integrated Overhead SIGINT Architecture
(U) LEO	Low Earth Orbit
(U) LV	Launch Vehicle
(U) MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
(U) MCS	Mission Control Station
(U) MGS	Mission Ground Station
(U) MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
(U) MSD	Measurement Support Data
(U) MS&O	Management Services & Operations
(U) MWCSE	Midwest COMM Support Element (Schriever AFB, Co. Springs, CO)
(U) NAM	National Reconnaissance Office Acquisition Manual
(U) NAVSECGRU	Naval Security Group
(U) NAVSECGRUCOM	Naval Security Group Command
(U) NAVSUPSYSCOM	Naval Support Systems Command
(U) NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(U) NOPS	NRO Operations Squadron
(U) NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
(U) NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
(U) NROL	National Reconnaissance Office Launch
(U) NRP	National Reconnaissance Program
(U) NSA	National Security Agency
(U) NSC	National Security Council
(U) NSCP	National Space Communications Program
(U) NWFCU	Northwest Federal Credit Union
(U) OAS	Onizuka Air Station
(U) OCA	Original Classification Authority
(U) OCI	Office Counterintelligence
(U) OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center
(U) OH	Overhead
(U) OPELINT	Operational Electronic Intelligence
(U) OSL	Office of Space Launch
(U) OSO	Operational Support Office

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ACRONYM	EXPLANATION
	NOTE: * SECRET WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. ** SECRET//TK WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. *** U WHEN ONLY GENERICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.
(U) R&D	Research & Development
(U) ROM	Resources Oversight & Management
(U) RSEN	Risk Sensitive
(U) S	SECRET
(U) SAD	SOCOMM Address Designator
(U) SAF/SD	Secretary of the Air Force/Office of Space Systems
(U) SAF/SL	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Launch
(U) SAF/SN	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Space)
(U) SAF/SO	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations
(U) SAF/SP	Secretary of the Air Force/Special Projects
(U) SAF/SS	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Systems
(U) SAF/ST	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Technology
(U) SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
(U) SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(U) SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System
(U) SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
(U) SETA	Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance
(U) SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
(U) SISR	Signals Intelligence Security Regulations
(U) SOCOMM	Special Operations Communications
(U) SOIC	Senior Official of the Intelligence Community
(U) SPA	Special Procurement Activity
(U) SPAWARSSYSCOM	Navy, Space Warfare Systems Command
(U) STS	Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle)
(U) SV	Satellite Vehicle
(U) TK	TALENT-KEYHOLE
(U) TS	TOP SECRET
(U) TT&C	Telemetry, Tracking and Control
(U) U	UNCLASSIFIED
(U) USAF	United States Air Force
(U) VAFB	Vandenberg Air Force Base
(U) VDC	Visual Design Center

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~~SECRET//TK//NF~~**(U) Definitions**

(U) Air Force Program (AFP) Number: Unclassified number assigned by the Office of Space Launch, when it is necessary to mask program name or identity.

(U) Classified: Information or material that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security. This material consists of three categories:

- 1) **TOP SECRET** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- 2) **SECRET** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- 3) **CONFIDENTIAL** - applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Security classification judgments must be made based on an approved Classification Guide (CG) or by an original classification authority (OCA), in accordance with the rules for such determinations set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended.

(U) Collateral: All national security information classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET under the provisions of an Executive Order for which special Intelligence Community systems of compartmentation (such as, sensitive compartmented information) are not formally established.

(U) COMINT Control System: A Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Sensitive Compartmented Information Control System expressly authorized for handling or transmitting technical and intelligence information derived from the monitoring of foreign communications signals by other than intended recipients from satellite intelligence and other sources. The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) manages the COMINT Control System.

(U) Confidence Ellipse: A measure of the uncertainty in the location of an emitted signal described in the parameters of an ellipse (for example, length of the semi major axis and semi minor axis and the compass heading for either axis).

(U) Derivative classification: The incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classifications based on classification guidance.

(U) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: For Official Use Only (FOUO) is an administrative marking available for use under certain circumstances to limit dissemination of information. It does NOT afford classified protection, but it does flag material that meets one of the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) criteria for exemption from public release.

(U) The For Official Use Only (FOUO) marking limits the dissemination of information, including E-mail, to official channels. The originator may use this marking whenever unclassified, non-sensitive intelligence or information does not warrant a national security classification but does require some limitation in dissemination. FOUO is not a classification and must not be used as a substitute classification, nor does it guarantee that information will be withheld from release. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), only information that meets categories 1-9 below may be officially exempt from disclosure. Unclassified information, with or without the FOUO marking, that does not meet one of the exemptions, will most likely be released to the public if requested through the FOIA. Therefore, the FOUO marking should only be used on

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Information that will not have an impact on the NRO or its operations if released. If there is an identifiable impact, the information should be evaluated for a classification decision.

(U) For Official Use Only categories exempt from public disclosure:

- 1- Classified Records
- 2- Internal Personnel Rules and Practices
- 3- Other Statutes (such as sources and methods statutes under which NRO and other members of intelligence community have general and specific protection)
- 4- Confidential Commercial Information
- 5- Inter- or Intra-Agency Records
- 6- Invasion of Personal Privacy
- 7- Investigative Records
- 8- Financial Institutions
- 9- Wells (Records with geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells)

(U) **Imagery Intelligence (IMINT):** The collection and analysis of photography and electronic imaging across the electromagnetic spectrum, to include visual, radar, infrared, and ultraviolet data.

(U) **Inter-Range Operations Number (IRON):** Number assigned by AFSPC for identifying satellites in the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN).

(U//FOUO) **Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT):** MASINT is technically derived intelligence (excluding traditional imagery and signals intelligence) which, when collected, processed and analyzed, results in intelligence that locates, tracks, identifies or describes the signatures (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. MASINT includes the advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from overhead and airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems.

(U) **Mission:** The NRO mission of the satellite; the fact of and details revealing the collection capabilities of a specific NRO mission.

(U) **Mission Number:** The four-digit identifier for individual NRO satellites. Each NRO satellite system is assigned a series of four-digit numerical series associated with that collection system. These numbers are primarily chosen for use by the collection/tasking/user community to identify NRO satellites.

(U) **NRO Launch (NROL) Designator:** Unclassified identifier used to distinguish an NRO launch, NROL-1, NROL-2, etc. NROL Designators have taken the place of Air Force Program numbers in identifying NRO launches. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(U) **Operational ELINT (OPELINT):** The category of electronic intelligence concerned with the introduction, disposition, movement, utilization, tactics, and activity levels of known foreign noncommunications emitters and, where applicable, associated military systems.

(U) **Operations Number:** Unclassified number used to identify an activity or operation on the launch site, range or inter-range.

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(U) **Original classification authority (OCA):** An individual authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.

(U) **Signals Intelligence (SIGINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from exploitation of foreign electronic emissions; includes COMINT, ELINT, FIS and PROFORMA (machine to machine communications). The interception, analysis and reporting of information comprising either individually or in combination, all COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. SIGINT includes both raw data and the analysis product of that data. Subsets of SIGINT include:

1.) **Communications Intelligence (COMINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT does not include information from the monitoring of plain text public broadcasts. Special Intelligence (SI) is the unclassified term, which is used to identify COMINT in the unclassified environment.

2.) **Electronic Intelligence (ELINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign electromagnetic non-communications transmissions by other than intended recipients, and foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiation emanations from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.

3.) **Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT):** Technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept of foreign instrumentation signals (i.e., electromagnetic emissions) associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and sub-surface systems. Signals include telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, tracking/ fusing/ arming/ command systems, and video data links.

~~(S)~~ **Special Communications:** Special Communications support high priority clandestine operational and intelligence gathering, and other national and tactical requirements including covert/clandestine communications [redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(1)

(U) **TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System:** A DCI SCI control system jointly managed by the Director, NRO; Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Chairman, National SIGINT Committee; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Directorate for MASINT Technical Collection. Changes and modifications to the system require coordination by each Director/Chairman and approval of the DCI/Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Detailed classification and compartmentation procedures for IMINT and MASINT are contained in relevant classification manuals. The Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) manages the COMINT control system for the DCI. The Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISRs) constitute the basic implementation of the TK system for satellite originated SIGINT tasking, collection and product information. Changes and modifications to the COMINT control system require coordination by DIRNSA and approval of the DCI/DDCI.

(U) **TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK)** protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), (most IMINT is SECRET collateral)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), (most ELINT is SECRET collateral)
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

(U) NRO data protected within the TK system includes: relationships and data relating to satellite research & development (R&D), engineering design, specifications, algorithms, interface controls, test plans, operations manuals, and reference documents; satellite capabilities and vulnerabilities;

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equipment and information technology equipment involved in the operation of the satellite systems to include spacecraft, sensor(s), and mission ground station equipment; software programs used to operate hardware to include spacecraft maintenance, command and control, targeting, sensor operation, data conversion, processing, and exploitation operations, as well as the overall and detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the NRO satellite collection systems. The TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System is managed jointly by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, the Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Director, National Security Agency; and the Chairman, MASINT Committee for the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI).

~~SECRET//TK//NF~~

~~SECRET//TK//NF~~**(U) Attachment #1****MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE****(U) NRO Revised Delegation of Original Top Secret Classification Authority, dated 6 November 1998**

In accordance with Section 1.4 (c) (2) of Executive Order 12958, dated 17 April 1995, I respectfully request that you delegate original Top Secret classification authority to the following National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) officials:

Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Deputy Director for Military Support
Chief of Staff
Deputy Director for National Support
Director, IMINT Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate
Director, SIGINT Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate
Director, Communications Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate
Director, Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate
Director, Management Services and Operations Office
Director, Operational Support Office
Inspector General
Director, Office of Contracts
Director, Office of Security
Deputy Director of Security for Security Policy and Operational Support
Director, Office of Space Launch
Director, Systems of Systems Architecture (SOSA)
Chief Information Officer (CIO)

The NRO officials occupying these positions, include those individuals in an "Acting" capacity, have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this original classification authority.

This memorandum supersedes DNRO memorandum, 7 November 1995, ER 95-4819, subject as above.

/s/ Garnett Stowe
for Keith Hall

Attachment:

Delegation of Original Top Secret Classification memo, dated 7 Nov 1995

DCI Decision:

/s/ Initials Approved

Page Denied

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
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~~SECRET//NF VERSION~~

**(U) TRANSFORMATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE (TCA)
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (SCG)**

VERSION 1.2

7 November 2005



Classified By:
Reason: 1.4 (c) and (g)
Declass. On: 25X1
Derived From: Original Classification Authority and Multiple Sources

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(U) TRANSFORMATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE CLASSIFICATION GUIDE CHANGE

(U) A viable process and procedures for formal classification guide changes is in place. Experience has shown that in the weeks following the revision publication of a classification guide, the audience of readers/reviewers will identify or suggest changes—desired or essential. Please send all comments to the Director of and to the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) Security's Classification Analyst. Refer to page 9 of this guide for contact numbers.

(b)(3)

(U) The family of TCA Classification Guides is intended to be a set of living documents. Changes will be incorporated as necessary to keep the guides current. Any and all requests for change or challenges to a finished TCA Program Classification Guide (PCG) document must be submitted to the TCA Director of Security. The submittal must use the Change Request (CR) form. Refer to the template on page 3 of this document. The submittal will be evaluated and appropriately vetted prior to disposition (acceptance or rejection). The individual or component submitting the change item will be notified of the decision with appropriate details on any subsequent actions to be undertaken.

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TCA CLASSIFICATION GUIDE CHANGE REQUEST FORM

TO: ☐ Director of Security

FROM: _____ (PSO/POC) _____ (Office/Component)

Originator: _____ Telephone: _____
(name, organization, and functional activity)

Facsimile: _____

Date: _____ Proposed Change: New Item ☐ Modification ☐ Challenge ☐

Item/Listing: Guide Section: _____ Item Number: _____ Page Number: _____

Change Description (include other items affected): _____

Rationale: _____

(To Be Completed by ☐ Security Office PSO)

Date: _____

Action Officer: _____

Request Approved (check one): Yes ☐ No ☐

If "No," state justification: _____

Coordinated with: _____

Final Classification Determination: _____

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~**(U) CHANGE LOG**

(U) As approved changes are made to the TCA Classification Guide, the text will be updated appropriately and a summary of the change will be logged here.

(U) Change Log for the TCA Classification Guide

REQUEST FOR CHANGE (RFC) NUMBER	CHANGE DATE	PARAGRAPH(S) AFFECTED	GENERAL CHANGE DESCRIPTION
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	Globally	(U) Change wording of the statement "(U) The <i>Information to be Protected</i> " is in itself classified SCI. For clarification, see the TCA SCI version of this guide" to read "(U) The <i>Information to be Protected</i> " is protected in an SCI compartment. For clarification, see the TCA SCI version of this guide.
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	1.5.3	(U) Change dissemination control from "REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR" to "NOFORN."
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	3.3.1 through 3.3.3	
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	3.11	
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	3.11.1	
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	3.11.4	(S//NF) Reword for clarity: "(U) Environmental and lifetime qualification testing and evaluation efforts and results that would be common to [redacted]"
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	3.11.5	(U) Insert new paragraph for clarification: "(U) Environmental and lifetime qualification testing and evaluation efforts and results associated only with the [redacted]"
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	4.8.1	

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REQUEST FOR CHANGE (RFC) NUMBER	CHANGE DATE	PARAGRAPH(S) AFFECTED	GENERAL CHANGE DESCRIPTION
			Justification: accuracy.
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	4.9.6	Justification: clarity.
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	4.9.7 and 4.9.9	(U) Change classification to read: "See Table 4.1." Justification: clarity and accuracy.
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	Table 4.1	(U) Change the NRO/IC portion of [redacted] implementation of and architecture design and development from: "(U) The <i>"Information to be Protected"</i> is in itself classified SCI. For clarification, see the TCA SCI version of this guide to read: "(U) NRO/IC discussions as to possible intentions for implementation of and architecture design and development are addressed in the SCI version of this guide."
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	7.5 and new 7.5.1	(U) Add "ground sites" and make 7.5 read: (S//NF)
RFC #3	7 Nov 2005	7.7 and new 7.7.1 through 7.7.3	(S//NF) Change 7.7 to read: " (S//NF) Design details of [redacted] Add 7.7.1 through 7.7.3 to clarify classification of design details of satellite, ground, and [redacted]"
RFC #2	15 July 2005	3.6.4	(U) Insert new paragraph 3.6.4 to correct inadvertent omission in V1.0.
RFC #2	15 July 2005	3.7	(U) Insert new paragraph 3.7 to correct inadvertent omission in V1.0.
RFC #2	15 July 2005	3.10.2	(U) Change portion marking from (U) to (S//REL). Justification: accuracy.
RFC #2	15 July 2005	9.2.6	(U) Insert new paragraph 9.2.6 to correct inadvertent omission in V1.0.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~**(U) FOREWORD**

(U) The *Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) Security Classification Guide (SCG)* provides classification and compartmentation guidance for the next generation National Security Space Satellite Communications (SATCOM) capability and associated terrestrial interfaces, both defense- and civil agency-managed. The [] responsible for developing this guidance, is comprised of a team of representatives from the defense, intelligence, and civil space communities working together to integrate what were previously separate activities.

(b)(3)

(U) The classification guidance for this guide is based on criteria established in Executive Order 12958 (E.O. 12958{Amended}); Presidential Decision Directive NSC-49 "National Space Policy;" Director of Central Intelligence Directives; National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Security Directives; NRO Communications Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate (COMM) Directorate documentation; and *Department of Defense (DoD)* Directives including guidance from *Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)*, *National Security Agency (NSA)*, *National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)*, and related classification guidance of other Intelligence Community (IC) members and mission partners.

(U) The overall objective of this guide is to ensure that the correct and appropriate classification and compartmentation determinations are made for the ongoing TCA effort. The overarching purpose of all classification guides must be to protect our people, operations, assets, and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. As the TCA effort continues to integrate its systems into tactical operations, TCA-related data should be classified and compartmented at an appropriate level that is most usable to the diverse customer community.

(U) Critical information, as identified by the program managers, is protected by strongly controlled dissemination. Such information is identified under the appropriate subject in this guide and marked: *"Additional information regarding this subject is under controlled dissemination. Need to Know (NTK) is under the purview of the designated program manager who must approve further disclosure as may be required. Access to this information may be permitted for second parties in accordance with the Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) approval on a NTK basis as determined by the owning program manager."* Until the reader has contacted the program manager, who establishes the NTK, further access to the subject will not be granted.

(U) The transformational nature of the TCA drives the need to not only understand the classification of a particular subject, but also the *context of what is being protected* given a diverse user community of multiple directorates, groups, and organizations. The reader should fully appreciate the *challenge and need* to protect all classified and sensitive aspects of a critical architecture so that the end product—*intelligence*—will be available to our national and allied customers with greater fidelity and confidence.

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
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(U) The COMM [redacted] is responsible for maintaining the currency of this guide and to resolve differences between this guide and other IC and program classification guidance. Discrepancies or conflicts regarding classification issues should be brought to the attention of the respective Program Security Officers (PSOs). Any PSO questions or comments should be directed to one of the following: COMM [redacted] NRO COMM, Security by phone [redacted] Secure); Secure Telephone Unit (STU)-III [redacted] or by secure fax [redacted] or to the [redacted] on [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(U) Effective 7 November 2005, this guide is approved for use by all NRO, IC, DoD, and Government contractor personnel affiliated with TCA who are authorized access to NRO SCI program information.



Donald M. Kerr
Director, National Reconnaissance Office and
Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force
(Intelligence Space Technology)

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I. (U) GENERAL

A. (U) PURPOSE AND SCOPE

A.1 (U) Security Classification Guide Purpose

(U) The purpose of this Security Classification Guide (SCG) is to protect an integrated intelligence, defense, and civil space community TCA. This guide provides security classification guidance for making decisions in protecting TCA-related information, products, activities, and operational mission. This guide is intended for use by cleared, TCA-affiliated personnel engaged in security classification and determinations of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Control System. Within this guide, no distinction has been made between original or derivative classification guidance other than the listed references.

B. (U) RESPONSIBILITY/AUTHORITY

B.1 (U) Classification Responsibility

(U) As both a DCI and Department of the Air Force Original Classification Authority (OCA) the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (DNRO) is responsible for determination of what constitutes (defines the scope of) Talent Keyhole (TK) information; determination of classification (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) of information; and, the publication of classification guides. The [redacted] Security Director is responsible for resolving any differences between this guide and other mission partner and program classification guidance. (b)(3)

B.2 (U) Classification Authority

(U) In accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 (Amended), only a limited number of officials have OCA. All other personnel classify information derivatively. In establishing the information categories and classification of an item of information, the E.O. 12958 (Amended) further requires that the OCA be able to identify or describe why unauthorized disclosure would result in damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

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(U) In cases where there is significant doubt about the appropriate classification of an item of information, the Program Security Officers (PSO) or Security Director should be contacted. Further, the *TCA Classification Guide Change Request Form* on page 3 of this guide should be completed for documentation purposes and to ensure an update of the document if determined appropriate.

(b)(3)

C. (U) CLASSIFICATION AND PROTECTIVE MARKINGS

C.1 (U) "Collateral" Material

(U) Collateral material is all national security information classified Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret under the provisions of E.O. 12958 (Amended) for which Intelligence Community (IC) systems of compartmentation (such as SCI) are not formally established.

C.2 (U) Classification Categories

(U) E.O. 12958 (Amended) states that information may only be classified in one of the four following categories:

- **TOP SECRET:** Classification applied to information. The unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally *grave damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- **SECRET:** Classification applied to information. The unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *serious damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- **CONFIDENTIAL:** Classification applied to information. The unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- **UNCLASSIFIED:** Classification applied to information. The unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause *no damage* to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~**C.3 (U) For Official Use Only**

(U) For Official Use Only (FOUO) is an administrative marking available for use under certain circumstances to limit the dissemination of information. The FOUO marking is not a classification and must not be used as a substitute for classification; however, it does flag material that meets one of the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) criteria for exemption from public release. The FOUO marking limits the dissemination of information including electronic-mail (e-mail) to official channels. The originator may use this marking whenever unclassified, non-sensitive intelligence, or other information does not warrant a national security classification but does require some limitation on dissemination.

(U) Specific FOUO review authorities may only release material so marked.

C.4 (U) Portion Marking

(U) E.O. 12958 (Amended) requires that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified.

C.5 (U) Compilation/Aggregation of Information

(U) In some instances, the combination of several items of information produces a synergistic effect (i.e., the classification of all items of a similar type, when combined together warrants a higher level of classification than that of the individual items). Certain information in this guide is designated unclassified; however, this information may become classified when associated with overhead reconnaissance or the IC. Users of this guide need to be sensitive to issues of compilation/aggregation.

C.6 (U) Technology Transfer to Foreign Nationals

(U) Nothing in this guide should be construed as a waiver or exempting any of the intelligence information, systems, and/or technologies discussed from being subject to applicable technology transfer laws and regulations and intelligence data sharing agreements/restrictions (e.g., *The Export Administration Act*, *The Arms Export Control Act*, and the *International Trafficking in Arms Regulation*) should a reader desire to export the intelligence information, systems, and/or technologies discussed to foreign nationals.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~**C.7 (U) Authorized For Release To**

(U) The marking "Authorized For Release To [Name of Country (ies)/International Organization] (REL or REL TO e.g., GBR...)" is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator has determined to be releasable or has been released, through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country (ies)/international organization(s) indicated. Further foreign dissemination of the material (in any form) is authorized only after obtaining permission from the originator and in accordance with DCID 6/7, Intelligence Disclosure Policy and National Disclosure Policy-1 (NDP-1). This marking may be abbreviated REL (abbreviated name of country (ies)/organization). It is not authorized for use in conjunction with the Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals (NOFORN) control marking.

D. (U) SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION CRITERIA**D.1 (U) Talent Keyhole and Examples**

(U//FOUO) Talent Keyhole (TK) protects certain information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines:

- a. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) (most IMINT is SECRET collateral)
- b. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- c. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) (most ELINT is SECRET collateral)
- d. Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT)
- e. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

D.1.1 (U) Talent Keyhole Systems

(U) NRO data protected within the TK system include the following:

- a. Relationships and data relating to satellite Research & Development (R&D)
- b. Engineering design and engineering specifications
- c. Algorithms
- d. Interface controls
- e. Test plans
- f. Operations manuals

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~

- g. Reference documents
- h. Satellite capabilities and vulnerabilities
- i. Equipment and information technology equipment involved in the operation of the satellite systems including spacecraft, sensor(s), and Mission Ground Station (MGS) equipment
- j. Software programs used to operate hardware including spacecraft maintenance; command and control; targeting; sensor operation; data conversion; processing; and exploitation operations
- k. Detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the NRO satellite collection systems

E. (U) CLASSIFICATION TABLE LAYOUT AND EXPLANATION

E.1 (U) Classification Table

(U) The classification table on page 21 of this guide provides program classification guidance itemized by categories. The table is not to be considered all-inclusive. Absence of a particular item does not imply that the item is considered *unclassified*. Refer questions to the COMM Program Security Office.

E.2 (U) Item to be Protected

(U) The first column (left to right) contains the items of information to be protected.

E.3 (U) Classification

(U) The second column contains the classification level of the information to be protected. The following key is provided for understanding the symbols used in the classification table:

- a. TS = Top Secret
- b. S = Secret
- c. C = Confidential
- d. U = Unclassified

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~**E.4 (U) SCI System**

(C) The third column contains the SCI control system or other release markings found in this guide:
TK = Talent Keyhole, SI = Special Intelligence = COMINT.

E.5 (U) Dissemination Control

(U) The fourth column specifies the level of dissemination for the information protected including:

- a. REL TO = Release To
- b. NOFORN = No Foreign Dissemination
- c. FOUO = For Official Use Only

E.6 (U) Reason for Classification

(U) The fifth column specifies the pertinent classification category (ies) described in Section 1.4 of E.O. 12958 as amended, and the letter(s) that correspond(s) to the category (ies). The classification categories, preceded by their corresponding letter designators, include the following:

- a. "Military plans, weapons systems, or operations."
- b. "Foreign Government information."
- c. "Intelligence activities, (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology."
- d. "Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources."
- e. "Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism."
- f. "United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities."
- g. "Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism."
- h. "Weapons of mass destruction."

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~~—SECRET//NOFORN//25X1—~~**E.7 (U) Declassification Instructions**

(U) The sixth column specifies information, which an OCA has determined, must remain classified beyond 10 years. The information must be annotated with the letter "X" plus a numerical designation that corresponds to a specific exemption category or set of exemption categories described in Section 3.3 of E.O. 12958 as amended. The "X" markings and corresponding declassification exemptions are for information whose release could reasonably be expected to:

- a. 25X1 "Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States."

Note: The marking for an exemption for the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source shall be "MR" (manual review). "25X1-human" shall be listed in the E.O. 12958 Class/Declass block. This information is not subject to automatic declassification.

- b. 25X2 "Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."
- c. 25X3 "Reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities."
- d. 25X4 "Reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system."
- e. 25X5 "Reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect."
- f. 25X6 "Reveal information, including foreign government information, that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the U.S. and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the U.S."
- g. 25X7 "Reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and other officials for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized."
- h. 25X8 "Reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or projects relating to the national security."
- i. 25X9 "Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

~~—SECRET//NOFORN//25X1—~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~**E.8 (U) Original Classification Authority**

(U) The seventh column specifies which intelligence organization has OCA for the specified information to be protected. Information elements, which are marked in the OCA column as "NRO COMM," require approval from the owning NRO Directorate prior to any change in compartmentation, classification, or dissemination. Please contact the Director of Security Communications Directorate regarding information elements in this guide.

E.9 (U) Special Access Programs

(U) Access to information considered to be particularly sensitive is controlled through a range of special access programs, which involve access controls and security measures typically in excess of those normally required for access to classified information contained in the three-tiered collateral classification system.

(U) President Eisenhower approved the establishment of the TK Security Control System, to protect satellite reconnaissance information and products, on 26 August 1960. The Byeman (BYE) Control System was established, to control information regarding sensitive reconnaissance satellite design, acquisition, and operations on 20 December 1961. The Byeman Control System was officially retired 20 May 2005.

(U) The BYE and TK Security Control Systems were instituted to protect critical satellite reconnaissance systems and programs through the research, development, acquisition, operations, and exploitation phases. Selective system/sensor data, which included general capabilities of the systems, was made available in both control systems. The TK user community used this information for satellite tasking and intelligence product analysis. To assist in making classification decisions, and in response to the user community, the first Byeman/Talent Keyhole Classification Guide was published in November 1970.

(U) The classification policy for National Reconnaissance Programs (NRP) evolved as the NRP and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) became increasingly "overt." President Carter admitted the "fact of" satellite photo-reconnaissance in October 1978.

(U) The unclassified provisions of National Security Decision Directive-42 and National Security Directive-30 on National Space Policy revealed certain "facts about" satellite reconnaissance.

(U) The Acting Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum on 18 September 1992 that declassified the existence of the NRO and certain facts about its organization and the NRP.

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(U) The end of the Cold War and the "globalization" of space technologies also caused a broadening of U.S. national security strategy, a changed focus of overhead collection, and a reassessment of the nature and scope of defense intelligence needs. These changes served as a basis to re-examine the Byeman Security Control System.

(U) The Byeman Control System was re-examined after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. To comply with the horizontal integration movement across the IC, the NRO had decided to retire the Byeman Control System so they could share its intelligence information with the rest of the IC.

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II. (U) INTENT

(U) Regardless of how much classification guidance is provided it cannot cover all situations. Therefore, in reading and applying the guidance in the following tables, it is important to understand why we are classifying information regarding TCA. Perhaps the following captures the intent of what this country is trying to protect most clearly:

(U) "Prematurely releasing information on future capabilities could advance our adversaries mission denial/degradation efforts virtually concurrent with US systems' acquisition and fielding. As the lives of our servicemen and women, national intelligence, and civil operations will depend on these communications, we must undertake prudent measures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of our transformational capabilities."

Honorable John Stenbit, 19 June 2002
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer

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III. (U) TRANSFORMATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TABLE

A. (U) CONCEPTS TO DESIGNS

(S) During the development of the TCA, [REDACTED] options, many of which, because they were only options, have been documented in unclassified briefings and papers. Also, there are only so many options [REDACTED] [REDACTED] however, the TCA has reached a level of maturity and specificity where the options have spiraled down to a design-to-build architecture.

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(b)(1)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]
stated intent.

What follows is the current classification guidance, consistent with the

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*WARNING: Do NOT use this index for classification guidance.
Some words and acronyms are classified when in context.*

ACRONYMS

AFSCN

AF Satellite Control Network

(b)(3)

C

Confidential

(b)(3)

COMM

Communications Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate

CR

Change Request

DCI

Director of Central Intelligence

DIDO

Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official

DISA

Defense Information Systems Agency

DoD

Department of Defense

ELINT

Electronic Intelligence

(b)(3)

FISINT

Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence

(b)(3)

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

FOUO

For Official Use Only

(b)(3)

IC

Intelligence Community

IMINT

Imagery Intelligence

IRONs

Inter-Range Operations Numbers

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*WARNING: Do NOT use this index for classification guidance.
Some words and acronyms are classified when in context.*

MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MGS	Mission Ground Station
MJPO	MILSATCOM Joint Program Office
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDP	National Disclosure Policy
NOFORN	No Foreign Dissemination
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NRP	National Reconnaissance Programs
NSA	National Security Agency
NTK	Need to Know
OCA	Original Classification Authority
PCG	Program Classification Guide
PSOs	Program Security Officers
POC	Point of Contact
R&D	Research & Development
REL TO	Release To
RFC	Request For Change
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SCG	Security Classification Guide
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
[Redacted]	
TCA	Transformational Communications Architecture
[Redacted]	
TK	Talent Keyhole
TS	Top Secret
U	Unclassified
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(U) National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
(U) Imagery Systems Acquisition and Operations
Directorate (IMINT)



(U) IMINT Program Classification Guide
(IPCG)

Version 4.0
21 May 2005

//Signed//

Scott F. Large

(U) Director, Imagery Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate

CL By:

CL Reason: 1.4c

DECL On: 25X1

DRV From: NRO CG 5.1
1 MAY 2000

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(U) Section I**1.0 (U) Record of Change**

4.0	May 2005	Re-Baseline Document

Changes to this document are yellow highlighted to indicate where changes from the previous version were made.

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
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1.1 (U) How to Use This Guide

(U) The IMINT Program Classification Guide (IPCG) was not designed to be read from cover to cover. The IPCG was designed with the expectations of it being a softcopy document (Adobe Acrobat document), thus users would use the relatively powerful "Find" & "Find Again" functions to locate the specific information they desired. However, for those who prefer to, or must work with a hardcopy document (*NOT RECOMMENDED - SINCE THE IPCG IS A LIVING DOCUMENT AND IS CONSTANTLY UPDATED*), the IPCG was designed exactly as most books and reference documents you would commonly use. It has a comprehensive "Table of Contents" and a very detailed "Index" to aid users in locating a specific topic.

(U) It is recommended that you treat this guide as you would any other reference document, utilizing the "Table of Contents" or "Index" to locate the topic of interest. The IPCG is broken down into eight sections, with the core of the document contained between Section III & Section VII. These five sections contain classification tables, which are divided into specific segments. This will assist you in navigating and searching through the many categories of information, and in locating specific topics contained within the guide.

1.2 (U) Foreword

(U) The security objectives of the IMINT Directorate are to streamline and modernize the security policies and practices and to incorporate risk management strategies. Each classification decision must recognize the necessity of classifying only the information that requires protection. Executive Order 12958, as amended, dictates that the classification, or declassification, of our activities must be guided by clear goals and principles based on the identified threat. The classification level of the elements contained in the classification tables in this guide were chosen only after taking a number of factors into account - the changing national security environment and the issuance of Executive Order 12958, as amended, being the primary drivers.

(U) The use of an item in this guide to classify a document is considered a derivative classification decision. Should there be discrepancies between this guide and program contractual specifications, the current contracts take precedence. For classification decisions on information not referenced in this guide, users should coordinate with an IMINT Program Security Officer (PSO) and, if appropriate, submit a Request For Change (RFC) to update this document.

1.3 (U) Introduction

1.3.1 (U) Preface

(U) This IMINT Program Classification Guide establishes the general classification guidance relating to the IMINT Program including detailed guidance for IMINT System(s)/subsystem(s), Computer Software Configuration Items (CSCIs), Hardware Configuration Items (HWCIs), and relationships between those

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components, as well as organizational relationships during the total life cycle of IMINT Program phases and activities.

(U) A significant change in this guide was caused by the retirement of the BYEMAN Control System. All information formerly marked as BYEMAN has been recompartmented to the TALENT KEYHOLE control system. The term BYEMAN is obsolete at the close of business 20 May 2005, and has been declassified. The term may still be seen on older intelligence information, but must be changed to TALENT KEYHOLE with appropriate dissemination controls before the information can be redistributed.

1.3.2 (U) Purpose

(U) The purpose of this document is to ensure the proper classification determinations for IMINT activities in order to protect sensitive satellite intelligence sources and methods within the TALENT KEYHOLE security control system. It serves to standardize categories of information and to promote uniform implementation of the TALENT KEYHOLE Security Control System consistent with intelligence sources and methods protection.

1.3.3 (U) Scope

~~(S//REL)~~ This document ensures the proper classification determinations for all IMINT activities, including but not limited to, relationships and data relating to IMINT Research & Development (R&D), engineering design, specifications, algorithms, interface controls, test plans, operations manuals, and reference documents; equipment and computers involved in the operation of the IMINT System to include launch vehicle(s), spacecraft, sensor(s), and mission ground station equipment; computer programs used to operate IMINT hardware to include launch, spacecraft maintenance, command and control, targeting, sensor operation, image data conversion, processing, and exploitation operations, as well as the overall and detailed funding profile for both the development and operation of the IMINT System.

1.4 (U) Overview - Background

1.4.1 (U) Rethinking Classification

(U) There have been serious efforts in recent years to improve classification management practices. Part of that effort is a growing recognition of the need to replace a risk avoidance approach, which seeks to anticipate all risks in the protection of assets, with a risk management approach which attempts to concentrate limited resources on those assets, the loss of which would have the most profound effect on the mission. The number of special access programs and compartments designed to provide additional protection beyond the CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET levels have been reduced. Progress has been made in moving large quantities of information out of the remaining compartments/programs and into the three classification levels, where a broader range of "customers" more easily uses it.

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(U) A meaningful assessment of the need for protection over the long term requires revisiting the initial decision to classify throughout the period in which the information is of value (throughout the life cycle of that information). This life cycle approach recognizes that both classified and unclassified information exists throughout a life span in which decisions must be made with respect to creation, management and use, and final status (destruction/preservation/release). The management of classified information should include the important initial consideration of whether the information should be classified at all. The "life-cycle risk assessment" of classified information should encompass an analysis at each stage of the information's "life" of whether the information requires protection, given the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities, as well as the cost of protecting or declassifying the information. It is understood that this approach may lead to different results at different stages of the life cycle.

1.4.2 (U) Executive Order 12958, as amended

(U) Executive Order 12958, as amended, like prior executive orders, lays out the rules governing the identification and protection of information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause "damage to the national security." What distinguishes this order from those of the past is its emphasis on declassification. The (03/25/03) Amendment [known as EO 13292] continues the emphasis on declassification, but has given the community an extension to the automatic declassification guidance provided in the original executive order. The new declassification deadline is 31 December 2006 and affects all records that are currently 25 years old or older and are determined to have historical value. Previous executive orders focused on classification, how to make original classification decisions and how to continue classification into out years.

(U) Even though Executive Order 12958, as amended, emphasizes declassification, it defines categories of information that should be considered for classification. Again, what distinguishes this executive order from those of the past is that for the first time, EO 12958, as amended, includes thresholds for classification. In previous executive orders, any information concerning the "foreign relations and foreign activities of the United States" could be considered for classification. Under EO 12958, as amended, such information is still eligible for classification, but only if it would impair those "relations" or "activities," theoretically requiring classifiers to make a reasoned evaluation of whether the information truly warrants classification. The EO amendment uses slightly different words, but the intent is the same.

1.4.3 (U) The Levels of Classification

(U) When it has been decided to classify a piece of information, the level of classification of that information must be determined. Executive Order 12958, as amended, preserves the three classification levels of Confidential, Secret and Top Secret that have long served as the foundation for protecting classified information. While the specifics of these three classification levels have varied over time, their basis has remained based on the concept of "damage" since the

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1950s. EO 12958, as amended, requires classifiers to be able to "identify and describe" the damage to the national security if the information were disclosed.

(U) The amount of "damage" caused by the unauthorized disclosure of information determines the classification level assigned to that information. The damage descriptions and associated classifications are detailed in paragraph 1.2.2.

(U) The dissemination of classified information is intended to be limited to those who both (1) hold the appropriate clearance(s), and (2) need the information to properly perform their duties. The extent to which the "need-to-know" principle is adhered to is becoming more and more difficult to enforce with the advent of the "information highway." Intelink, which allows cleared personnel access to a wide range of classified information, is a notable example of how need-to-know is becoming harder to enforce in the "Information Age."

1.4.4 (U) Special Access Programs

(U) Access to information considered to be particularly sensitive is controlled through a range of special access programs, which involve access controls and security measures typically in excess of those normally required for access to classified information contained in the three-tiered collateral classification system.

(U) President Eisenhower approved the establishment of the TALENT KEYHOLE (TK) Security Control System, to protect Satellite reconnaissance information and products, on August 26, 1960. The BYEMAN (BYE) Control System was established, to control information regarding sensitive reconnaissance satellite design, acquisition and operations, on December 20, 1961. The BYEMAN Control System was officially retired 20 May 05.

(U) The BYEMAN (BYE) and TALENT KEYHOLE (TK) Security Control Systems were instituted to protect critical satellite reconnaissance systems and programs - through the research, development, acquisition, operations and exploitation phases. Selective system/sensor data, which included general capabilities of the systems, was made available in both control systems. The TALENT KEYHOLE (TK) user community used this information for satellite tasking and intelligence product analysis. To assist in making classification decisions, and in response to the user community, the first BYEMAN/TALENT KEYHOLE Classification Guide was published in November 1970. The guide was updated in August 1977, April 1994, September 1994, August 1995, and October 1995.

(U) The classification policy for National Reconnaissance Programs evolved as the NRP and NRO became increasingly "overt."

- President Carter admitted the "fact of" satellite photoreconnaissance in October 1978.

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- The unclassified provisions of National Security Decision Directive-42, and National Security Directive-30 on National Space Policy revealed certain "facts about" satellite reconnaissance.
- The Acting Secretary of Defense issued a Memorandum on September 18, 1992 that declassified the existence of the NRO and certain facts about its organization and the NRP.

(U) The end of the Cold War and the "globalization" of space technologies also caused a broadening of U.S. national security strategy, a changed focus of overhead collection and a reassessment of the nature and scope of defense intelligence needs. These changes served as a basis to re-examine the BYEMAN Security Control System.

(U) The BYEMAN Control System was also re-examined after the terrorist attacks of Sep 11th. To comply with the Horizontal Integration movement across the Intelligence Community the NRO decided to retire the BYEMAN Control System so its intelligence information could be shared with the rest of the community.

1.5 (U) Security and Classification

1.5.1 (U) Classification or Control System Resolution

(U) The classification tables in this guide specify the classification and/or control system pertaining to information relating to IMINT systems, products, relationships and data. Where the security control system or classification is not readily apparent from the table(s) or other information in this guide – information, products, relationships and activities will be protected at the applicable level with the most limited distribution, pending a control and classification system review.

1.5.2 (U) Classification Levels

(U) Executive Order 12958, as amended, states that information may only be classified at one of three levels: Top Secret – applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe; Secret – applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe; and Confidential – applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

1.5.3 (U) Classification Authority

(U) With the implementation of Executive Order 12958, as amended, only a limited number of NRO officials have Original Classification Authority. All remaining NRO personnel have the authority to classify information derivatively. In establishing the information categories and classification levels of an item of information, the EO further directs that the Original Classification Authority must

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be able to identify or describe why unauthorized disclosure would result in either damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

1.5.4 (U) Classification Sources

(U) For completeness, this IMINT Classification Guide contains information that deals with programs outside the management and cognizance of the Director of Imagery Systems Acquisition and Operations. These items were derivatively classified after consulting a number of documents to identify the Original Classification Authority for the specific items of information. The documents are listed in Section 2.

1.5.5 (U) Reason for Classification

(U) Under the provisions of Executive Order 12958, as amended, information may not be considered classified unless it falls under one or more of the categories listed below. Additionally, the reason(s) for the classification decision must be documented. To meet this requirement, EO 12958, as amended, specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category or categories described in Section 1.4 of the Executive Order plus the letter or letters that correspond to the category or categories should be listed. The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are:

- (a) "Military plans, weapons systems, or operations."
- (b) "Foreign government information."
- (c) "Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology."
- (d) "Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources."
- (e) "Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism."
- (f) "United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities."
- (g) "Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism."
- (h) "Weapons of mass destruction."

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(U) Executive Order 12958, as amended, maintains the automatic declassification requirement, but has given the community an extension to the deadline imposed by the original executive order. The new deadline is 31 December 2006. This affects all records that are currently 25 years old or older and are determined to have a historical value. Individuals with Original Classification Authority may determine that certain information must remain classified beyond the date specified in the Executive Order. In those cases, the information must be annotated with the letter "X" plus a numerical designation that corresponds to a specific exemption category or set of exemption categories described in Section 3.3 of EO 12958, as amended. The NRO uses the number 25 in front of the X exemptions to depict that the information is further exempted from being automatically declassified after 25 years. (See: NRO Director of Security Note 03-009, 18 Dec 2003, for implementing instructions). The X markings and corresponding declassification exemptions are:

- X1 "Reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human intelligence source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method."
- X2 "Reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."
- X3 "Reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities."
- X4 "Reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system."
- X5 "Reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect."
- X6 "Reveal information, including foreign government information, that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States."
- X7 "Reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized."
- X8 "Reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or project relating to the national security"

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X9 "Violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

On 15 June 2000, the IPSCOM ([DCI's] Imagery Policy and Security Committee) approved a standard marking convention for all NTM imagery and annotated NTM imagery. The new policy indicates that the reason for classification is "EO 12951," and that only the DCI is authorized to declassify the data. Those Information Elements in the guide referring to primary imagery/imagery products reflect the above nomenclature in the appropriate columns.

1.5.7 (U) Portion Marking

(U) Executive Order 12958, as amended, mandates that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified. The NRO has been granted a limited waiver from the requirement to portion mark information. The NRO is not required to portion mark information generated and maintained within the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally must be portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the management cognizance of the Director of the NRO. Prior to disseminating this classification guide to an organization external to the NRO, permission from the Director of IMINT Security must be obtained.

1.5.8 (U) Original Classification Authority (OCA)

(U) "Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice President in the performance of executive duties, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.

(U) The Director Central Intelligence (DCI), has delegated the following officials from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with original classification authority:


- (a) Director, National Reconnaissance Office (D/NRO)
- (b) Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DD/NRO)
- (c) Chief of Staff (CoS)
- (d) Deputy Director for Military Support (DDMS)
- (e) Deputy Director for National Support (DDNS)
- (f) Deputy Director Business Plans and Operations (BPO)
- (g) Deputy Director for System Engineering (DDSE)
- (h) Director, IMINT Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate (IMINT)

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- (i) Director, SIGINT Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate (SIGINT)
- (j) Director, Communications Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate (COMM)
- (k) Director, Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate (AS&T)
- (l) Director, Management Services and Operations Office (MS&O)
- (m) Director, Operational Support Office (OSO)
- (n) Inspector General (IG)
- (o) Director, Office of Contracts (OC)
- (p) Director, Office of Security (DOS)
- (q) Director, Office of Space Launch (OSL)

1.5.9 (U) Releasability / Disclosure Instructions

(b)(3)

~~(S//NF)~~ Entries that are marked NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) may not be released or disclosed under any circumstances without prior approval

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from the NRO Designated Intelligence Disclosure Official (DIDO) in accordance with DCIDs 6/6, 6/7.

~~(S//NF)~~ Information is to be considered NOFORN if it falls into the following categories:

- (a) Information that reveals information about the recipient country derived from U.S. Intelligence collection
- (b) Information that reveals information obtained from a liaison service without prior approval of that country
- (c) The information contradicted U.S. laws, agreements, or treaties
- (d) The information constitutes intelligence on a U.S. person
- (e) The information jeopardizes a liaison relationship or diplomatic, intelligence, national security, or law enforcement activities
- (f) The information jeopardizes HUMINT sources, methods, plans and targets
- (g) The information reveals details of SIGINT, IMINT or MASINT activities expected to jeopardize collection opportunities
- (h) The information reveals U.S. Counterintelligence activities
- (i) The information could be used against the U.S. or jeopardize U.S. sources and methods
- (j) Intelligence that would jeopardize the safety and welfare of individuals connected to an intelligence activity
- (k) Information that could be reasonably expected to be acquired by a hostile entity
- (l) Information that reveals NRO budget data in totality and/or substantial subsets
- (m) Information protected in the RESERVE compartment that foreign nationals do not have the need-to-know
- (n) Information that pertains to a classified association that parties do not wish to reveal
- (o) Information that reveals vulnerabilities of an entire NRO system or architecture

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- (p) Information that contains operational or mission specific details, which would reveal sensitive U.S. activities
- (q) Information that pertains to the application of leading edge technologies that are beyond the scope of existing cooperation guidelines

1.5.10 (U) Compilation / Aggregation of Information

(U) *Executive Order 12958, as amended, Classified National Security Information;*

1.7 (e) Compilations of items of information that are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information. As used in this order, "compilation" means an aggregation of pre-existing unclassified items of information.

- (U) Documents

In some instances, certain information that would otherwise be unclassified when standing alone may require classification when combined or associated with other unclassified information. When classification is required to protect a compilation of such information, the overall classification assigned to the document shall be conspicuously marked or stamped at the top and bottom of each page and on the outside of the front and back covers, if any. The reason for classifying the compilation shall be stated at an appropriate location at or near the beginning of the document. In this instance, the portions of a document classified in this manner need not be marked.

- (U) Portion of a Document

If a classified document contains certain portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions shall be marked as unclassified, the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on the page, and a statement shall be added to the page, or to the document, to explain the classification of the combination or association to the holder. This method of marking may also be used if classified portions on a page, or within a document, will reveal a higher classification when they are combined or associated than when they are standing alone.

Note: (U) Users of this guide need to be sensitive to issues of compilation / aggregation. It is the individual's responsibility to make compilation classification determinations. When necessary, IMINT Security will assist with any compilation classification decisions.

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~**1.5.11 (U) What Are We Protecting ?**

(U) The information contained within this section describes in basic terms what we are trying to protect by classifying a specific item.

- ~~(S//REL)~~ **National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)**

Now that the NRO is an openly acknowledged organization, many facts, including its structure and purpose have been placed in the public domain as unclassified. We continue to protect detailed organizational specifics, some personnel affiliations and some relationships

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- ~~(S//REL)~~ **Satellite System Designators & Codewords**

IMINT mission numbers and codewords have been downgraded to SECRET.

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Earlier KH designators are unclassified, while those of later (some retired) systems remain classified (GAMBIT, HEXAGON); rule of thumb is if the program is classified, so is the designator.

- (U) **Miscellaneous Facts**

Many "general facts" about what IMINT does are unclassified. Specifics of how we do it, and how successfully, are invariably classified. It is also easy to assume something is unclassified just because it's a familiar subject or the information has been "published" that may in fact not be the case; even though it may be an "open secret," it may be classified. The other caution is that of association. Two (or more) totally unclassified statements may reveal classified information when associated.

- (U) **Contracting**

In the past, all contract actions were protected as BYEMAN (*officially retired*). In today's more "open" environment, (in many instances) the fact of a contract and the identity of the contractor are unclassified. The details of the contract (scope, statement of work and dollar value) are still usually classified, but not necessarily under the TALENT KEYHOLE umbrella. Since the contracting process varies, and changes from time to time, one should consult with the appropriate Program Security Officer or Contracting Officer for specifics.

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- (U) Contractor Roles/Identities
Even though more and more contractors have unclassified relationships with IMINT, at various levels, some relationships remain classified. Identities and locations of those contractors are often protected to hide classified/sensitive missions, operating locations or even an advanced or specialized technological expertise. Since this varies from contractor to contractor, one should consult with the Program Security Officer or Contracting Officer for guidance.
- (U) Acquisition Documentation
Detailed IMINT acquisition documentation and associated activities are almost always classified – the level of classification depending on factors such as level of detail, technology involved, IMINT/contractor association, etc. System/segment development and/or design specifications are usually TALENT KEYHOLE because of the detailed technical content. Many procedural documents are SECRET or UNCLASSIFIED, however depending on the capabilities they reveal, they may be protected in the TK compartment. It should be noted that FIA employs a new acquisition process and care must be used not to confuse the “traditional” acquisition documentation with that used by FIA.
- (U) Funding
Specific Program cost and budget figures, including system/subsystem costs are almost always classified, although the level of classification usually is dependent on the particular program/system. Funding levels can reveal particular interest or increased activity in a unique area, and/or may indicate a potential new technology, source and method, etc. Since this varies from project to project, one should consult with the Program Security Officer or Contracting Officer for guidance.
- (U) Plans, Schedules and Status
Detailed engineering specifications and documentation are generally protected in TALENT KEYHOLE channels. Detailed transition, integration, etc. plans are usually in the TK compartment. Many “high-level” schedules are classified SECRET. Generally if the level of detail reveals (fairly reliable) dates of new capabilities, schedule slips that may reveal “gaps” in capabilities, health of systems, or information that reveals (potential) vulnerabilities, the information is protected in SCI channels.
- ~~(S//REL)~~ Satellite Systems Information
KH-1 through KH-6 systems have been declassified; KH-7 imagery and KH-9 mapping camera imagery have also been declassified; but all programmatic data [e.g., capabilities] pertaining to these systems remain classified at the TALENT KEYHOLE level, as does everything about the KH-8 system except the program designator GAMBIT and mission numbers which are SECRET. Capabilities of current systems, such as

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exact response times, etc. are usually protected at TK; future systems/capabilities are TK and technical/engineering details of current and future systems are usually TALENT KEYHOLE. These "rules of thumb" often don't hold true due to the classification/declassification processes that are sometimes lengthy - some items in the guide are awaiting declassification.

- ~~(S//TK//REL)~~ Capabilities and Limitations

System capabilities and limitations are almost always classified

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- ~~(S//TK//REL)~~ Payloads and Sensors

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- ~~(TS//TK//REL)~~ Operational Data

As a general rule, operational data is classified.

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- (U) Reliability, Availability and Maintainability

System reliability and availability information is generally protected at the TK level, the reasoning being that some in the user community need that type of data for planning purposes. Maintenance related data (MTBF [mean time between failure], etc.- that could possibly reveal vulnerabilities in the form of downtimes, and/or related outages is generally protected as TALENT KEYHOLE. Any specific anomalies are almost always TK (fact of, return to service, info, etc.) in order to communicate to the user community need these details.

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- (U) Launch Data

Future IMINT launch dates are classified; dates to the nearest year are usually SECRET, while dates to the nearest month and years are typically S//TK.

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- ~~(TS//TK//REL)~~ Collection Information

The great majority of classified information in this category is classified

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- (U) Mission Ground Stations

The fact that IMINT operates satellite mission ground stations is unclassified. Information that reveals general locations of those facilities is SECRET. If the specific location of the ground station is revealed, that data is treated as S//TK.

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- ~~(TS//TK//REL)~~ Imagery/Product

"Standard" IMINT products are classified SECRET. Those same products when associated with technical support data may be classified at a higher level.

are generally S//TK or TS//TK because they reveal a technical capability deserving protection.

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
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- ~~(S//TK//REL)~~ Product Dissemination

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
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- (U) Exploitation


The "standard" IMINT product is SECRET (due to the need to make the product available to the "warfighter"). Generally speaking, the exploitation of the product is done at the SECRET level.



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- (U) Communication (IMINT Related)

The communications infrastructure supporting IMINT

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Relay Satellites are necessary for near real-time IMINT operations – the fact that we need and use them is unclassified. The identification of a specific relay used by an IMINT system is protected in the TK compartment.

- (U) Up Link

IMINT command frequencies and characteristics are protected in the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment

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
- (U) Down Link

IMINT telemetry frequencies/characteristics are protected in the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment

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- ~~(S//TK//REL)~~ Cross Link

Cross-links are communications paths between IMINT mission satellites and relay satellites. The fact that we have and need them is unclassified.

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
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
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- **(U) Terrestrial Communications**

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(b)(3)

- **(U) Cryptographic Equipment (Use on the Program)**


Classification varies from UNCLASSIFIED (the fact that the NRO uses crypto equipment) to TALENT KEYHOLE (information/details related to techniques, design or implementation of such equipment). Generally

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
- **(U) FIA Activities**

FIA is a future IMINT system and as such is generally protected in TK channels. However, since the user community, developed the FIA requirements as active participants during pre-acquisition activities, some FIA details normally protected at TK may be treated as SECRET or even unclassified.

- **(U) EIS Activities**

The IMINT Program Office, as a rule, protects future activities and capabilities in the TALENT KEYHOLE compartment. The majority of the Information Elements in this section are classified SECRET or TOP SECRET TALENT KEYHOLE because EIS is a future system/capability. Much of the information will not be protected in the TK compartment  and will be classified generally at the SECRET level, in order to make operational data available to a wider audience.

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
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1.6 (U) Classification Criteria

(U) In some instances IMINT information may be Unclassified or UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Classified information about IMINT and its systems may be exclusively TALENT KEYHOLE (TK), or SECRET COLLATERAL. As a general rule, products, product characteristics and information revealing, or contributing to an understanding of, general program capabilities for collection tasking purposes should be classified SECRET. Future capabilities information is most often controlled within the TALENT KEYHOLE (TK) Control System.

1.6.1 (U) BYEMAN (BYE)

(U) BYEMAN was an SCI compartment used to protect information revealing sensitive sources and methods used in the research, development and operation of space-based reconnaissance systems; program/project budget and funding details; command and control capabilities and operations; key design, development and technological details; and survivability and vulnerability of systems. BYEMAN officially retired 20 May 2005, all data that was marked BYEMAN has been reclassified into the TALENT KEYHOLE control system.

1.6.2 (U) TALENT KEYHOLE (TK)

(U) Information controlled in the TALENT KEYHOLE Control System includes budget and funding details, specific capabilities and related collection targeting and tasking, data, and certain products of overhead collection.

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~**1.6.3 (U) A Note About FOUO**

(U) FOUO – For Official Use Only – is an administrative marking that is used to limit dissemination of certain categories of unclassified information. It is not a classification category, and does not afford any protection of classified information. Its use should never be used, as a substitute for classification and the marking can never be attached to information that is not otherwise UNCLASSIFIED.

- (U) The NRO guidance for the use of FOUO is contained in (NRO) Policy Directive 50-12.

1.7 (U) Changes to this Guide

(U) The IMINT Program Classification Guide is under IMINT Configuration Control (IMCCB). Changes to the document may only be made via the RFC process, and submitted through the normal CCB process.

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(U) Section II

2.0 (U) Reference Documents

(U) The following documents are applicable to the IMINT security program as stated herein.

2.1 (U) Executive Orders¹

2.1.1 (U) Executive Order 12356

(U) (April 1982 – Effective August 1982) National Security Information.
Prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying and safeguarding national security information.
(Revokes EO 12065 – June 1978)

2.1.2 (U) Executive Order 12951

(U) (February 1995) Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems.
Declassifies all imagery from CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD.
Is used as the authority for imagery marking and declassification

2.1.3 (U) Executive Order 12958, as amended

(U) (March 25, 2003) Classified National Security Information.
Prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. EO 12958, as amended, provides the guidance used to produce this document.

2.2 (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs)¹

2.2.1 (U) DCID 6/6

(U) (April 1995) Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information.
Provides a policy statement that reflects a risk management approach to the dissemination of intelligence. Eliminates NOCONTRACT and WNINTEL.

2.3 (U) DoD Documents

1. (U) DoD Guide to Marking Classified Documents, DoD 5200.1-PH

2.4 (U) NRO Related Documents

1. (U) NRO Classification Guide, Version 6.0

¹ Note: Although, there are numerous Executive Orders and DCIDs, only the ones applicable to this document have been sighted above.

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~**2.5 (U) Classification Sources:**

1. (U) National Geospatial-Intelligence-Agency Imagery Policy Series
2. (U) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR)

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4. (U) Security Implementation Plan for BYEMAN Compartmentation Restructure, November 18, 1993
5. (U) Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, April 24, 1995
6. (U) Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Reconnaissance Systems, February 22, 1995
7. (U) Declassification of the terms "TALENT KEYHOLE" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, February 23, 1995
8. (U) Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49 & NSTC-8: National Space Policy September 14, 1996

2.6 (U) Program Document(s)

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~**(U) Section VIII Appendixes****8.0 (U) Acronyms**

~~(S//TK//REL)~~ Classifying acronyms can sometimes be a tough call; therefore, we have removed the portion markings from the acronym list. Acronyms are classified when the "context" in which they are used reveal a classified fact, association, term, source and/or method.

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If you have questions on whether or not to

classifying an acronym, consult your Program Security Officer (PSO).

SD	(U)	Demand Driven Dissemination of Digital Data
A/D	(U)	Analog to Digital
AFP	(U)	Air Force Program
AFSCN	(U)	Air Force Satellite Control Network
AFT	(U)	Array Flight Test
AFWA	(U)	Air Force Weather Agency
AMP	(U)	All-Mode Processor
API	(U)	Activity Planning Item

ASPAM	(U)	Atmospheric Slant Path Analysis Model
AWBC	(U)	Alternate Wideband Communications (System)
BUCS	(U)	Backup Control System

BYE	(U)	BYEMAN (<i>officially retired as an SCI control system</i>)
C	(U)	CONFIDENTIAL
CAAS	(U)	Contracted Assistance and Advisory Service
CAS/PCD	(U)	Collection Activity Schedule/Processing Control Data

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CCF	(U)	Communications Control Facility
CCS	(U)	Command and Control System

CIA	(U)	Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/OD&E	(U)	Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Development & Engineering
CIO	(U)	Central Imagery Office – now known as CITO (Central Imagery Tasking Office), a component of NGA
CMG	(U)	Control Moment Gyro
COMIREX	(U)	Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation – no longer exists, function(s) performed by NGA
COMM	(U)	Communications

(b)(3)

COTS	(U)	Commercial-Off-the-Shelf
CPAT	(U)	Collection Planning and Targeting
CPCI	(U)	Computer Program Configuration Item

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CSCI (U) Computer Software Configuration Item
 CSD (U) Covariance Support Data




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D/A (U) Digital to Analog



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DCI (U) Director of Central Intelligence
 DCID (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive
 DDP (U) Defense Dissemination Program
 DDS (U) Defense Dissemination System
 DEM (U) Digital Elevation Model
 DMSP (U) Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
 DNRO (U) Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
 DoD (U) Department of Defense
 DPE (U) Data Provider Element
 DP/F (U) Data Processing/Facility
 DSCS (U) Defense Satellite Communications System
 DSM (U) Data System Modernization
 ECS (U) Enhanced Collection System
 EELV (U) Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
 EIS (U) Enhanced Imaging System
 EO (U) Electro Optical
 EO (U) Executive Order
 ESD (U) Exploitation Support Data
 ESD (U) Ephemeris Support Data
 ESR (U) Engineering Study Request



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FIA (U) Future Imagery Architecture
 FOC (U) Final/Full Operating Capability
 FOUO (U) For Official Use Only
 GCP (U) Ground Collection Planning (and Targeting)
 GEO (U) Geostationary/Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
 GGIS (U) Global Geospatial Information Services
 GPE (U) Ground Performance Evaluation
 GPS (U) Global Positioning System/Satellite
 GPU (U) Ground Privacy Unit
 GRA (U) Gyro Reference Assembly
 GRD (U) Ground Resolved Distance
 GRT (U) Ground Real-Time (Support)
 GSD (U) Ground Sample Distance
 GSR (U) Glint Smear Reduction
 HANU (U) High Accuracy Navigation User (GPS)
 HEO (U) Highly Elliptical Orbit
 HQ USAF / (U) U.S. Air Force Weather Agency
 XOW



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I & W (U) Indications and Warning



IS (U) Imaging Satellite

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ICA	(U)	Image Chain Analysis
IDP	(U)	Imagery Derive Product

IMINT	(U)	Imagery Intelligence
IMPS	(U)	Imagery Partial Segment
IOC	(U)	Initial Operating Capability
IPCD	(U)	Image Process Control Data

JWICS	(U)	Joint Worldwide Intelligence/Integrated Communications System
KH	(U)	KEYHOLE

LDT	(U)	Large Diameter Target
LEO	(U)	Low Earth Orbit
LIR	(U)	Laser Image Reconstructor/Recorder

LV	(U)	Launch Vehicle
MASINT	(U)	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MC&G	(U)	Mapping, Charting & Geodesy
MCC	(U)	Mission Control Center/Complex
MCS	(U)	Mission Control Station
MGS	(U)	Mission Ground Station
MIND	(U)	Mission Integration and Development
MLE	(U)	Mean Life Estimates
MMD	(U)	Mean Mission Duration
MSD	(U)	Measurement Support Data
MOA	(U)	Memorandum of Agreement
MSK	(U)	Medium Shift Keying

NASA	(U)	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NGA	(U)	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGA/IA	(U)	NGA Imagery Analysis Office (formerly NPIC)
NIIRS	(U)	National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale
NIS	(U)	New Imaging System
NOFORN	(U)	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NPIC	(U)	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NRO	(U)	National Reconnaissance Office
NROL	(U)	National Reconnaissance Office Launch
NRP	(U)	National Reconnaissance Program
NSA	(U)	National Security Agency
OCA	(U)	Original Classification Authority
OD-4	(U)	Operating Division 4
ODPE	(U)	Optical Data Provider Element

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
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
OS	(U)	Optical Sub-system
OSL	(U)	Office of Space Launch
OSO	(U)	Operational Support Office
P/L	(U)	Payload
P0	(U)	Payload Zero
PDC	(U)	Processing and Distribution Center



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PP/F	(U)	Photographic Production Facility
PSO	(U)	Program Security Officer
PVM	(U)	Pixel Variability Map
R/F	(U)	Receive Facility
R/S	(U)	Relay Satellite



RF	(U)	Radio Frequency
RMS	(U)	Requirements Management System
RMS IDMF	(U)	Requirements Management System Integrated Development & Maintenance Facility

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
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RSEN	(U)	Risk Sensitive (formerly RUFF Sensitive)
S	(U)	(Collateral) Secret
S//TK	(U)	SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE

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
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SCG	(U)	Security Classification Guide
SCI	(U)	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF	(U)	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SECDEF	(U)	Secretary of Defense
SETA	(U)	Support Engineering and Technical Assistance
SGLS	(U)	Space Ground Link System
SIDS	(U)	Secondary Imagery Dissemination System
SIGINT	(U)	Signals Intelligence
SOCOMM	(U)	Special Operation Communications
SOW	(U)	Statement of Work
SPO	(U)	System Program Office



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STS	(U)	Shuttle Transportation System
SYERS	(U)	Senior-Year Electro-Optical Reconnaissance System (See IPCG/ETP)
SV	(U)	Satellite Vehicle
TAS	(U)	Transmission Activity Schedule

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
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TDPS (U) Transducer Data Processing Subsystem

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TK	(U)	TALENT KEYHOLE
TOT	(U)	Time Over Target
TPAS	(U)	Target Planning and Scheduling
TPED	(U)	Tasking, Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination
TS	(U)	TOP SECRET
TWT	(U)	Traveling Wave Tube
TWTA	(U)	Traveling Wave Tube Assembly
U	(U)	UNCLASSIFIED
USIGS	(U)	United States Imagery and Geospatial Information System
VAFB	(U)	Vandenberg Air Force Base
WBCS	(U)	Wideband Communications System
WBID	(U)	Wideband Image WBID - Wideband Image Data

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~**8.1 (U) Definitions****8.1.1 (U) Security Terms***(Table is UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~)*

Access to Classified Information	The ability and opportunity for an individual to obtain knowledge of information that has been determined pursuant to EO 14291, or any successor order, EO 12951, or any successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure (EO 12968, Sec. 1.1(d))
Accreditation	The formal approval of a specific place, referred to as a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), that meets prescribed physical, technical, and personnel security standards. (DCID 6/1, Glossary) Also, official management authorization to operate an Automated Information System (AIS) under various conditions. (DCID 6/3, Annex C)
Agency	Any "Executive agency," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, the "military departments," as defined in 5 U.S.C 102, and any other entity within the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified information, including DIA, NSA, and the NRO. (EO 12968, Sec. 1.1 (a))
Automated Information Systems	An assembly of computer hardware, software, or firmware configured to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store, or control data or information. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 4.1(f))
Automatic Declassification	The declassification of information based solely on (1) the occurrence of a specific date or event as determined by the original classification authority or (2) the expiration of a maximum time frame for duration of classification established under EO 13292. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 3.3(a))
BYE Security Control System	A former DCI Security Control System that protects key, specific and fragile details of reconnaissance satellite design and operation. <i>Officially retired - May 20, 2005</i>
Classification Guide	A documentary form of classification guidance issued by an original classification authority that identifies the elements of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level and duration of classification for each such element. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1(g))
Classified National Security Information	Information that has been determined pursuant to EO 12958, as amended or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1(h))

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(Table is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)

Codeword	Any of a series of designated words or terms used with a security classification to indicate that the material classified was derived through a sensitive source or method. Constitutes a particular type of SCI, and is therefore accorded limited distribution. (DoD S-5105.21-M-1)
Collateral Information	Information identified as National Security Information under the provisions of EO 12958, as amended but which is not subject to enhanced security protection required for Special Access Program Information (DoD 5200.1-R)
Compartment	A system which strictly controls the dissemination, handling and storage of a specific class of classified information, limiting access to individuals with a specific need to know, in order to protect sources and methods. (NSA/CSS Classification Manual 123-2, Chapter 1)
Compromise	Unauthorized disclosure of classified information (DoD 5200.1-R)
CONFIDENTIAL	Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 1.2 (a))
Damage to the National Security	Harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the US from the unauthorized disclosure of information, to include the sensitivity, value, and utility of that information. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (j))
Declassification	The authorized change in the status of information from classified information to unclassified information. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (k))
Declassification Authority	The official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position; The originator's current successor in function; A supervisory official of either, or Officials delegated declassification authority in writing by the agency head or the senior agency official. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (l))
Declassification Guide	Written instructions issued by a declassification authority that describes the elements of information regarding a specific subject that may be declassified and the elements that must remain classified. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1(m))
Derivative Classification	The incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. It includes the classification of information based on classification guidance. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec 6.1(n))

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~*(Table is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)*

Decompartmentation	The removal of information from a compartmentation system without altering the information to conceal sources, methods, or analytical procedures. (SISR, Vol. I, Section 1)
Downgrading	A determination by a declassification authority that information classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (p))
Intelligence Community	Refers to the following agencies or organizations: CIA; NSA; DIA; the offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs (including NRO); Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, FBI, Treasury, and Energy; and the staff elements of the DCI. (EO 12222, 3.3(f))
Intelligence Sources and Methods	The classified sources and methods the DCI protects under Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and EO 12333. (DoD S-5105.21-M-1)
Mandatory Declassification Review	The review for declassification of classified information in response to a request for declassification that meets the requirements under Section 3.6 of EO 13292. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (w))
National Security	The national defense or foreign relations of the US. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 1.1(a))
ORCON	"Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator." This marking may be used only on classified intelligence that clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of intelligence sources or methods that are particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify or measurably reduce their effectiveness. (DCID 6/6, Section 10.1)
Original Classification	The initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (b))
Original Classification Authority	An individual authorized in writing, either by the President or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance that, in the interest of national security, requires protection against unauthorized disclosure. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (c))
Safeguarding	Measures and controls that are prescribed to protect classified information. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 4.1(a))

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~~TOP SECRET//TALENT KEYHOLE//RSEN,NOFORN//25X1~~*(Table is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)*

SCI Control System	The system of procedural protective mechanisms used to regulate or guide each program established by the Director of Central Intelligence as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). A Control System provides the ability to exercise restraint, direction, or influence over or provide that degree of access control or physical protection necessary to regulate, handle, or manage information or items within an approved program. (DCID 6/1)
SECRET	Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 1.2 (a))
Special Access Programs	A program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (k))
TK	TALENT KEYHOLE. A DCI special access control system for compartmentation of information related to, or derived from, satellite reconnaissance systems, and products. (SISR, Vol II, Section II)
TOP SECRET	Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 1.2 (a))
Unauthorized Disclosure	A communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient. (EO 12958, as amended, Sec. 6.1 (n))

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National Reconnaissance Office (U)



SIGINT Program Classification Guide (U)

September 16, 1998

*(Signed)**Original copy on file in the SIGINT Office of Security*

Dennis D. Fitzgerald, Director
SIGINT Systems Acquisition & Operations Directorate (U)

Classified By:
Classification Reason: 1.5 (a,c,e,g)
Declassify On: X1
Derived From: Multiple Sources (see pg 20)

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1.0 (U) GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1.1 (U) Purpose

(U) The SIGINT Classification Guide compiles into one document all guidance for the classification of National Reconnaissance Office information for all SIGINT programs. As such, it is the baseline classification document for SIGINT operations and activities. It provides the basis for maintaining configuration control of classification management decisions. In conjunction with the "Life Cycle Security" process it will function to provide management with a tool for assessing the impact of change.

1.2 (U) Scope

(U) The provisions of this guide apply to all SIGINT plans, systems, subsystems, and operations funded by, or under the cognizance of the SIGINT Systems Acquisition & Operations Directorate (SA&OD). This includes research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); application; production; related technology; and operational use of SIGINT systems. The information contained in this guide has been compiled from numerous source documents, which are listed in Section 23. For additional information or assistance in making classification determinations, contact the Program Security Officer (PSO) for the system in question, the SIGINT Security Office, or for contractor personnel, your BYEMAN Industrial Facility Security Control Officer (BIFSCO).

2.0 (U) APPLICABILITY & EFFECTIVE DATE

(U) This SIGINT Classification Guide applies to all personnel who have access to information addressed in this guide. It is effective as of the date on the title page.

3.0 (U) APPROACH

(U) The SIGINT classification development team used a "Life Cycle Security Process" to develop this guide. The process included analysis of the program life cycle, threat, open source, program segments, work breakdown structure, sensitive technologies, classification decision tool, risk management, and program protection architecture.

(U) The SIGINT classification development team was comprised of government and contractor personnel. It was coordinated with applicable System Program Offices (SPOs), field sites, contractors, and all Headquarters Directorates and Offices.

(S/B) The SIGINT CG [redacted] and draft
[redacted] In developing the SIGINT CG all criteria from the previous guides were considered.

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5.0 (U) OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

(U) This guide is issued by the NRO SIGINT (SA&OD). The SIGINT CG establishes original classification guidance for NRO SIGINT operations and activities and is approved by the Director, NRO SIGINT (SA&OD).

6.0 (U) CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

(U) The Director, SIGINT SA&OD (an original classification authority) has established the classification level of and control system for some information contained in this guide. Other information is derived from guidance provided/documentated in the:

1. National Space Policy, NSC-49, dated September 1996.
2. NRO Security Classification Guide, Version 4.0, dated 15 Oct 95.
3. Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems, 8 April 1997.
4. Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR), "Review Comment and Coordination DRAFT," 29 April 1997.
5. Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated, 1 December 1995.
6. National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
7. Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).

7.0 (U) LEVELS OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

7.1 (U) National Security Classification Levels

(U) ~~TOP SECRET~~ shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **exceptionally grave damage** to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(U) ~~SECRET~~ shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause **serious damage** to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

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(U) **CONFIDENTIAL** shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

7.1.1 (U) Control Systems:

7.1.1.1 ~~(S)~~ BYEMAN Control System.

~~(C)~~ BYEMAN is a DCI sensitive compartmented information (SCI) control system which protects sensitive sources and methods used in the research, development and operation of space-based reconnaissance systems; some relationships; integration of launch and sensor platforms; command and control operations; key design and development details, acquisition documentation and plans, budget; and, survivability and vulnerability of systems.

7.1.1.2 (U) The TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System.

(U) A DCI SCI control system which protects technical data used in collection tasking, imagery or signals processing/exploitation techniques for collected data, and intelligence products derived from overhead reconnaissance programs. Generally, TALENT-KEYHOLE protects information, products, and activities relating to the following intelligence disciplines:

1. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT),
2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),
3. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
4. Communications Intelligence (COMINT),
5. Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT); and,
6. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

(b)(3)

7.1.1.3 (U) The COMINT Control System.

(U) A DCI SCI control system expressly authorized for handling or transmitting communications intelligence derived from satellite surveillance and other sources.

8.0 (U) CHOICE OF CONTROL SYSTEMS

~~(S/B)~~ The intended user community for the information is of key consideration when deciding which control system(s) to use for control of classified information. Some information may be handled by either the BYEMAN Control System or the TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System. Wherever practical, T-K should be the system of choice. Unless the information is in a category of information requiring BYEMAN protection exclusively, or unless there is a valid, well established reason for maintaining the information within BYEMAN system, T-K should be used. Care should be exercised to avoid BYEMAN controls on a document simply because a BYEMAN platform identifier (e.g. a codeword like) was used when a T-K mission number would have served the same purpose.

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~~(C)~~ For example, sensor sub-system design information is handled in the BYEMAN Control System by contractors building the space vehicle. Specific collection subsystem performance information may be handled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System by analysts, planners and tasking personnel. The classification tables in this guide have several such examples. Just because the classification tables indicate an item may be protected within multiple control systems does not mean a document containing that item must be marked for joint handling. Use the control system most appropriate to the context and intended audience. Avoid joint handling, except when necessary.

~~(C)~~ There will be some instances when joint handling is appropriate. Suppose that for clarity it is necessary that a document include items of information one of which is exclusively controlled in the BYEMAN system while another item is exclusively controlled in the T-K system. Originators of classified documents should be careful to not unnecessarily cause joint handling and thereby needlessly restrict dissemination.

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~~SECRET~~**9.0 ~~(S)~~ CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FOR BYEMAN INFORMATION**

9.1 ~~(S)~~ The following categories of BYEMAN information are considered "TOP SECRET":

- a. ~~(S)~~ System survivability or vulnerability information, including satellites and ground facilities; susceptibility to countermeasures; and measures employed by these threats to the system. This particular set of data may be additionally protected by the BYEMAN Special Handling (SH) restrictions to distribution (see paragraph 10.0).
- b. (U) Information or material, from which, the total system design can be determined.
- c. ~~(S)~~ Technology advances in the state-of-the-art capabilities or unique use of new capabilities for obtaining additional valuable intelligence. This information may be Special Handling (SH) protected.

9.2 ~~(S)~~ The following categories of BYEMAN information are considered "SECRET":

- a. (U) Operations data which would reveal system design details.
- b. (U) Information describing general performance of the system not needed for product analysis.
- c. (U) Technical design information or material pertaining to a classified subsystem, e.g., engineering reports, drawings, specifications, etc., which reveal specific subsystem design details.
- d. (U) Integration information, which would reveal facts about the system.
- e. (U) Contractual or administrative information about the system.
- f. (U) Identity of participants, e.g., contractors, when identified with the Program.
- g. (U) Data, material, or information which would reveal the identity of the program sponsor.

10.0 ~~(S)~~ BYEMAN SPECIAL HANDLING (SH) INFORMATION

~~(S)~~ Selected BYEMAN information that is critical to the mission may be designated for "SPECIAL HANDLING (SH)". When an NRO Program Director determines that certain BYEMAN information meets the specified conditions of sensitivity and the Director of the NRO concurs, all BYEMAN information relating to that especially sensitive information will be incorporated under the "SPECIAL HANDLING (SH)" restrictions. The sensitivity of BYEMAN SPECIAL HANDLING (SH) information may be based on various considerations, including, but not necessarily limited to the following:

1. (U) Cooperation with other organizations and/or governments when disclosure of such cooperation might prove damaging to those organizations, governments, the national security, or to the U.S. Government.
2. (U) Compromise of the successes of a particular activity could gravely impair our collection efforts or continued success.
3. (U) Sophisticated or otherwise sensitive efforts, methods, techniques, or technological phenomena, when related to reconnaissance collection activities that warrant such protection.
4. (U) Information obtained from other programs (SAP/SAR as an example).
5. (U) Vulnerability information on the total system, including the satellites; ground facilities; susceptibility to countermeasures; and measures employed to avoid these threats to the system.
6. (U) Intentionally uncorrected deficiencies that, under certain circumstances, result in vulnerabilities or inability to perform mission.

~~(S)~~ If persons involved in SIGINT Programs generate information they believe meets the criteria for "SPECIAL HANDLING (SH)," they should tightly control the information and advise the Program PSO for interim guidance. Requests to nominate BYEMAN information for "SPECIAL HANDLING" must be forwarded through the Program Director, coordinated through the Director of Security then to the Director or Deputy Director of the NRO for approval.

11.0 (U) CLASSIFICATION OR CONTROL SYSTEM CONFLICT RESOLUTION

~~(S)~~ The classification tables in this guide specify classification and control system(s) for information related to SIGINT systems and their products. Where control system or classification is not readily apparent from the table, or if a user believes conflicting, inaccurate, or unclear guidance has been provided, protect the information, products or activities at the highest applicable level pending resolution. Request guidance from the responsible SIGINT Program Security Officer or the NRO Director of SIGINT Security. A control system and classification review will be made by the NRO for BYEMAN matters and the functional program managers within DIA, NIMA, NSA, National SIGINT Committee and the MASINT Committee for TALENT-KEYHOLE matters.

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(U) The fact that classified information has been inadvertently disclosed or released does not mean that it is automatically declassified. Unauthorized disclosures will be reviewed by the SIGINT SA&OD and other Directorates and Offices to determine appropriate and/or necessary courses of action.

12.0(U) COMPILATION/AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION

(C) In some instances, the combination of several items of information produces a synergistic effect, i.e., the classification of all items of a similar type, when combined together is a higher level of classification than that of the individual items. For example, in the classification tables, classification of a single subsystem design is S/B, but if you have the design of all subsystems (i.e., the Satellite Vehicle (SV) design spec) the classification is TS/B. The higher classification is warranted due to the specificity and completeness of the information that could permit an adversary to completely avoid detection by this system. Users of this guide need to be sensitive to issues of compilation/aggregation.

13.0(U) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) Information that has not been given a security classification pursuant to the criteria of an Executive Order, but which may be withheld from the public for one or more of the reasons cited in the Freedom of Information Act exemptions 2 through 9 shall be considered as being for official use only. No other material shall be considered or marked "For Official Use Only" and FOUO is not authorized as an anemic form of classification to protect national security interests. See DOD 5400.7-R DOD Freedom of Information Act Program and Policy Directive 001/97 - NRO Policy on use of "For Official Use Only", for addition guidance.

14.0(U) NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN)

(C) All classified intelligence information relating to intelligence sources and methods is NOFORN. Release of NRO-related classified information to foreign governments or individuals at the COLLATERAL, COMINT, TALENT-KEYHOLE or BYEMAN level must be coordinated with the NRO security staff and with CIA/CRES/IPG. Potential data release must also satisfy the applicable requirements outlined in DCID 1/7, DCID 5/6, SISR's Volumes I/II, and the Imagery Policy Series. In addition to its SIGINT responsibilities, CRES is the DCI-designated single focal point for all imagery-related intelligence community disclosures to foreign officials. Release of NRO-related satellite technology which is unclassified is subject to export controls established by the Departments of Commerce and State with DoD coordination.

(C) For each BYEMAN project, a record is maintained by the NRO security staff on information releasable to specific countries. Where the U. S. and a second party are involved in [redacted] integrated activity, U.S. personnel must be aware of the disclosure limits pertaining to the specific BYEMAN project, as well as any limitations concerning TALENT-KEYHOLE, COMINT, or COLLATERAL information.

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NOTE: Certain organizations or agencies have authorized memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or other agreements allowing the release of non-BYEMAN classified intelligence information to foreign nationals. Release of information is bound by the specific terms of the agreements and supersede NOFORN caveats and restrictions.

15.0(U) ADMINISTRATION**15.1 (U) Visits by Representatives of State/Federal Governments**

(U) The appropriate SIGINT Program Security Officer (PSO) will be notified of any contemplated visits by members of any legislative or Executive Branch of any State or Federal Government to any contractor or government agency if any portion of the visit could involve SIGINT Programs. The notification will include name, position, and area of interest of each visitor and the date of the proposed visit.

15.2 (U) Visits by Foreign Citizens or Representatives of Foreign Governments or Organizations

(U) The SIGINT cognizant Program Security Officer (PSO) will be notified of any contemplated visits by foreign citizens or representatives of any foreign governments, space agencies, or contractors to any United States contractor or government agency if any portion of the visit could involve access to any SIGINT Program information. The notification will include name, position, and area of interest of each visitor and the date of the proposed visit.

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15.3 (U) Public Release of Information

(U) Only the NRO Office of Corporate Communications (NRO/OCC) may release information pertaining to SIGINT Programs. Prime and associate contractors are responsible for ensuring their subcontractors are aware of and comply with, this requirement. Unilateral public release of information pertaining to the NRO and its SV programs, operations, and launches is expressly prohibited.

15.4 (U) How to request changes to this guide.

(U) As circumstances or policies change, there will be a requirement to change information in this guide. The form below should be completed by individuals and forwarded through your security organization. They in turn will forward it by secure means to the SIGINT Security Office for review and comment.

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(to be filled out by Program Office PSO)
TO: SIGINT CLASSIFICATION AND POLICY UNIT

FROM:

(PSO P.O.C.)

(Office)

Originator:
(name, organization,

functional activity)

Date: ____/____/____ Proposed Change: New Item____ Modification____ Challenge____

Item/Listing:
(guide section, item number, page)

Change description:
(include other
items affected)

Rationale:

(to be completed by the SIGINT Classification and Policy Unit)

Date: / /

Action Officer:

Request approved: Yes No
 (circle one)

If NO state justification:

Coordinated with:

Final Classification Determination:

Date approved by OCA:

Name of OCA:

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~~—SECRET—~~**16.0(U) USE OF THIS GUIDE**

~~(S)~~ The Guide is classified SECRET and is controlled within the BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Systems Jointly. The following guidelines will be strictly enforced:

(U) Reproduction of this document or any part is permitted for use in program activities. Requests for copies for other uses should be directed to the SIGINT Program Security Officer (PSO).

(U) Dissemination of this guide to organizations outside the security cognizance of the NRO must be approved by the SIGINT PSO and NRO Office of Security Policy and Operational Support.

~~(S)~~ The BYEMAN compartmentation restructure continues the requirement of each accessed individual to be personally responsible to determine the "need-to-know" of another BYEMAN accessed person before revealing Program information. Government program management personnel, PSOs, and contractor security personnel will ensure strict adherence to the DNRO's "must-know" access requirement policy. PSOs and security officers may extract information from this guide to tailor security classification guidance for tasks, as needed.

(U) CAUTION! Exact situations and classifications cannot always be specified in advance. Protect the information and refer questions to Program security. Any deviation from this guide must be approved by the SIGINT Program Director or PSO.

17.0(U) NRO DOD PROGRAM DESIGNATOR

(b)(3)

18.0(U) NRO LAUNCH DESIGNATOR

(b)(3)

19.0(U) SUBSTITUTE IDENTIFIER

~~(S)~~ Replacing the SV program name, number, or an NRO DoD program designator, with any substitute identifier in order to avoid classification of budgets, analyses, hardware, engineering processes, tests and associated documentation must meet the criteria listed in the paragraphs below. Information relative to SV mission, capability, vulnerability and operations can NOT be declassified through disassociation. Those items that can be handled as unclassified when disassociated from a specific SV program are explicitly identified in the classification tables.

(U) A substitute identifier may be any combination of numbers, letters, or an unclassified name. However, the substitute identifier must be randomly selected for the sole purpose of being used as a substitute identifier with no derivable unclassified relationship between the substitute identifier and the program, satellite vehicle contractor (SVC), or the NRO DoD program designator.

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(U) DoD collateral usage of substitute identifiers must be approved by the OSL prior to implementation. All other usage of substitute identifiers must be approved by the applicable NRO Directorate or Office.

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~~SECRET~~**20.0(U) SECURITY AND CLASSIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS**

(U) All users of this guide are encouraged to assist in improving and maintaining its currency and relevancy. Comments and recommendations should be forwarded through security offices to the Program Security Officer (PSO) or to the NRO, Director of Security. (See change request form in Section 14.0).

21.0(U) CLASSIFICATION TABLE LAYOUT AND EXPLANATION

(U) The following table provides security guidance itemized by program segments. The table is not and cannot be all inclusive. Absence of a particular item does not imply that the item can be considered UNCLASSIFIED. Refer questions to the Program Security Officer (PSO). If the table indicates that an item of information can be protected in more than one security control system, use the guidelines in section 8.0 (Choice of Control Systems).

(U) The classification column contains the classification level, the control system column contains the symbol for a control system if applicable. The Rationale/Remarks column will contain a rationale for the classification level and other comments.

(C) The following key is provided for understanding the symbols used in the classification tables:

EO 12958 CLASSIFICATION LEVELS

TS - TOP SECRET
S - SECRET
C - CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL SYSTEMS

B - BYEMAN
TK - TALENT-KEYHOLE
SI - COMINT

OTHER DATA

U - UNCLASSIFIED
FOUO - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NF - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN)
LIMDIS - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
SHI - SPECIAL HANDLING INFORMATION
5 EYES - US/UK/NZ/CAN/AUS
CRYPTO - CRYPTOGRAPHIC
OCA - ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

(b)(3)

22.0(U) REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION

(U) Under the provisions of E.O. 12958, the reason(s) for a classification decision must be documented. To meet this requirement, the E.O. specifies that, at a minimum, reference to the pertinent classification category(ies) described in Section 1.5 of E.O. 12958 plus the letter(s) that correspond to the category(ies) should be listed. The classification categories preceded by their corresponding letter designators are listed below:

- (a) "Military plans, weapons systems, or operations."
- (b) "Foreign government information."
- (c) "Intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology."
- (d) "Foreign relations or activities of the United States, including confidential sources."
- (e) "Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security."
- (f) "United States programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities."
- (g) "Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security."

23.0(U) DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

(U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 specifies that the original classification authority will apply a date, not to exceed 10 years, or event for declassification that corresponds to the lapse of the information's national security sensitivity. Individuals with original classification authority may determine that certain information must remain classified beyond 10 years. In this case, the information must be annotated with the letter "X" plus a numerical designation that corresponds to a specific exemption category or set of exemption categories described in Section 1.6 of E.O. 12958 (e.g. X1 equates to: Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptology system or activity). The X markings and corresponding declassification exemptions are as follows:

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- X1 - "Reveals an intelligence source, method, or activities or a cryptology system or activity."
- X2 - "Reveals information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."
- X3 - "Reveals information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system."
- X4 - "Reveals United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans."
- X5 - "Reveals foreign government information."
- X6 - "Would damage relations between the United States and foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for period greater than in paragraph (b)."
- X7 - "Would impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and or other individuals for whom proactive services, in the interest of national security, are authorized."
- X8 - "Would violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

24.0(U) PORTION MARKING

(U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 mandates that all classified information, regardless of its physical form, indicate which portions are classified. The NRO has been granted a limited waiver from the requirement to portion mark information. The NRO is not required to portion mark information that will be maintained internal to the NRO by its government staff and/or contractors. Information produced by the NRO that is disseminated externally must be portion marked. In this case, the term external is defined as any organization or entity outside the security cognizance of the Director of the NRO.

(U) Documents that are not portion marked may not be cited as source documents for derivative classification. These documents shall be marked "Warning this document shall not be used as a source for derivative classification." This "warning" marking will be prominently placed on the first page of the document.

25.0(U) REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

1. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, Classified National Security Information, dated 17 April 1995.
2. (U) Executive Order (E.O.) 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, dated 22 February 1995.
3. (U) NRO Classification Guide, Version 4.0, 14 October 1995.
4. (U) National Space Policy, NSC-49, dated, September 1996.
5. (U) Declassification of the "Fact of" Overhead SIGINT, The National SIGINT Committee memorandum, dated, 1 December 1995.
6. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/19, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and its accompanying Security Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems (Attachment A).
7. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/5, Conduct of SIGINT Liaison with Foreign Governments and the Release of U.S. SIGINT to Foreign Governments, dated May 1983.
8. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy, dated 30 Jun 98.
9. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information, dated 30 Jun 98.
10. (U) Signals Intelligence Security Regulations (SISR), "Review Comment and Coordination DRAFT," July 1998.
11. (U) DOD Freedom of Information Act Program, DoD 5400.7-R, dated May 1997.
12. (U) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy, DoD TS-5105.21-M-2, July 1985.
13. (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.
14. ~~(C)~~ BYEMAN Security Manual, 8 June 1993. (Interim)
15. ~~(C)~~ Security Implementation Plan for BYEMAN Compartmentation Restructure, 18 November 1993.
16. (U) The Implementation Plan for Further Decompartmentation and Declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office, 24 April 1995.
17. ~~(C)~~ The BYEMAN Restricted Knowledge (BRK) for BYEMAN Special Handling Information, 14 October 1993.
18. (U) Further Declassification of NRO Contractor Associations, 1 August 1997.
19. ~~(S/B)~~ SOCOMM message, "Declassification of NRO Launch and Associated Facts," 072114 March 1997, Cite 8496, aka Policy Notice 001/97.
20. (U) Implementation Plan for NRO Launch Declassification, 1 March 1997.

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21. (U) OPNAL Notice 5510 (Limited Dissemination Controls) 29 Dec 89.

22. [Redacted]
 23. [Redacted]
 24. [Redacted]
 25. [Redacted]
 26. [Redacted]

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27. (U) National Imagery and Mapping Agency Policy Series, Section 5, Part A, Classification Tables, dated 17 Sep 97.

28. (U) Data Communications Group Classification Guide, 25 September 1997.

29. (U) Security Classification Guide for Integration and Launch of NRO Satellites on the Titan and Atlas Launch Vehicle Systems, 8 April 1997.

30. (U) Security Control Manual and Classification Guide for National MASINT Reconnaissance Materials (MASINT Policy Series).

31. (U) Declassification of the terms "TALENT-KEYHOLE" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, February 23, 1995.

32. [Redacted]

33. (U) Declassification of the terms "TALENT-KEYHOLE" and the satellite mission designator "KH" and their general relationship to intelligence, February 23, 1995.

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 (b)(3)

26.0(U) RATIONALE

(U) The following list is the rationale used to decide what type of information would be revealed by a compromise of data. The number which corresponds to the appropriate rational appears in the classification table in the rationale/remarks column.

1. (U) Reveals a covert or classified relationship.
2. (U) Reveals vulnerability or survivability.
3. (U) Reveals total system design to include communications network and connectivity details.
4. (U) Reveals technology advances in state-of-the-art capabilities or unique new capabilities.
5. (U) Reveals system design and communications network details.
6. (U) Reveals sub-system design and communications network details.
7. (U) Reveals system performance not needed for product analysis.
8. (U) Integration information revealing design details or mission.
9. (U) Reveals intelligence mission.
10. (U) Reveals command and control techniques heightening vulnerability.
11. (U) Launch schedules and logistics revealing system design details, capabilities, or mission.
12. (U) Contractual or administrative information revealing system design details, communications network infrastructure, capabilities or mission.
13. (U) Reveals contractor or other relationship that is covert, compartmented, or classified.
14. (U) Reveals program sponsor (i.e., the NRO).
15. (U) Reveals sensitive sources and methods.
16. (U) Reveals operational, system, communications network or other information which may lead to degradation or negation of mission objectives.
17. (U) Reveals information which may allow an adversary to gain technical competence or advantage.
18. (U) Reveals details of collection capability over denied area that cannot be attributed to any sensor other than a satellite.

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NOTE: ASTERISKED ITEMS ARE CONTROLLED WITHIN S/TK CHANNELS WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO. DOUBLE ASTERISKED ITEMS ARE S/B WHEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NRO.

(U)AFP	Air Force Program.	(b)(1)
(U)AFSCN	Air Force Satellite Control Network.	(b)(3)
(U)AFSPACECOM	Air Force Space Command.	
(U)AFSPC	Air Force Space Command.	
(U)AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment.	
(U)AOTES	Automated Operational Technical Exchange System.	
(U)ARV	Aerospace Research Van.	
(U)AS&TD	Advanced Systems & Technology Directorate.	
(U)ASE	Aerospace Support Equipment.	(b)(1)
(U)ASPO	Army Space Program Office.	(b)(3)
(U)ATP	Advanced Tracking Prototype.	
(U)BV	Booster Vehicle.	(b)(1)
(S/B)BYE	(S/B) BYEMAN.	(b)(3)
(U)CAAS	Contract Advisory & Assistance Services.	
(U)CAL S	Computer Aided Logistics Support.	
(U)CALVAN	Calibration Van Group.	(b)(1)
(U)CCO	COMINT Channels Only.	(b)(3)
(U)CDRL	Contract Data Requirements Lists	
(U)CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.	(b)(1)
(U)CIA/OD&E	Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Development & Engineering.	(b)(3)
(U)Classic Wizard*	UNCLASSIFIED Program Name.	
(U)CMCC	Command Management Control Center.	
(U)COMINT	Communications Intelligence.	
(U)COMSEC	Communications Security.	
(U)CONOPS	Concept of Operations.	
(U)CONUS	Continental United States.	
(U)CPEG	Cross Program ELINT Geolocation.	
(U)CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications Systems.	
(U)CSTC	Consolidated Space Test Center.	
(U)CW	Continuous Wave.	
(U)DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.	(b)(1)
(U)DCI	Director of Central Intelligence.	(b)(3)
(U)DCID	Director Of Central Intelligence Directive.	
(U)DEFSMAC	Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center.	
(U)DNRO	Director of the National Reconnaissance.	
(U)DOD	Department of Defense.	
(U)DRSP	Defense Reconnaissance Support Program.	
(U)DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System.	
(U)DSP	Defense Support Program.	
(U)DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications System.	(b)(1)
(U)EAGE	Electrical Aerospace Ground Equipment.	(b)(3)
(U)ECI	Exceptionally Controlled Information	

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(U)ELINT	Electronic Intelligence.
(U)Elsets	Element sets. A set of six numbers (mean motion, eccentricity, inclination, right ascension of the ascending node, argument of perigee, and mean anomaly) that make up the element set and describe the satellite's orbit). The orbital elements are used by the satellite owner/operator and the space surveillance sites to track space objects.
(U)ELV	Expendable Launch Vehicle.
(U)EMC	Electro-magnetic Compatibility.
(U)EMI	Electro-magnetic Interference.
(U)EMP	Electro-magnetic Pulse.
(U)EPDS	Electronic Processing Data System.
(U)ER	Eastern Range.
(U)ERP	Effective Radiated Power.
(S/B)FARRAH (F-I, F-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.
(U)FOC	Final Operational Capability.
(U)FOSC	Facility Operations Support Center(s).
(U)FOUO	For Official Use Only.
(U)GEO	Geostationary/ Geosynchronous Earth Orbit.
(S/B)GLORIA (G-I, G-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.
(U)GTG	Ground Terminal Group.
(U)HEMP	High Energy Magnetic Pulse.
(U)HEO	Highly Elliptical Orbit.
(U)HULTEC	Hull to Emitter Correlation.
(U)I&W	Indications and Warning.
(U)ICEBOX	Improved communication Equipment Enclosure.
(U)ILC	Initial Launch Capability.
(U)IMINT	Imagery Intelligence.
(U)IRON	Inter-range Operations Numbers.
(U)ILCO	Launch Communications Office.
(U)LEO	Low Earth Orbit.
(U)LEO SPO	System Program Office for Low Altitude Programs.
(U)LMCC	Launch Management Control Center.
(U)LOCC	Launch Operations Control Center.
(S/B)LORRI (L-I, L-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.
(U)LPO	Launch Program Office.
(U)LSI SPO (SAF/SP)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SAF/SP).
(U)LSI SPO (SMC/IMO)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SMC/IMO).
(U)LSI SPO (SAF/SL)	Launch Systems Integration Systems Program Office (SAF/SL).
(U)LSIC	Launch Systems Integration Contractor.
(U)LV	Launch Vehicle.
(U)MAGE	Mechanical Aerospace Ground Equipment.
(U)MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence.
(U)MCC	Mission Control Center.
(U)MCS	Mission Control Station.

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(U)MECO	Main Engine Cut-Off.	
(U)MGS	Mission Ground Station.	
(U)MOSC	Mission Operations Support Center at NRL (Bldg 259).	
(U)MRC	Midway Research Center.	
(U)MS&O	Office of Management, Services & Operations.	
(U)MSF	Mission Support Facility.	
(U)NAVSOC	Navy Space Operations Center.	
(U)NAVSPACMD	Navy Space Command.	
(U)NCST	Navy Center for Space Technology.	
(U)NRL	Naval Research Laboratory.	(b)(1)
(U)NRO	National Reconnaissance Office.	(b)(3)
(U)NRP	National Reconnaissance Program.	
(U)NSA	National Security Agency.	
(U)NSG	Naval Security Group.	
(U)NSOC	National Security Operations Center.	
(U)NSRL	National SIGINT Requirements List.	
(U)OBP	On-board Processing.	
(U)OCA	Original Classification Authority.	
(U)OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center.	
(U)OPELINT	Operational Electronic Intelligence.	
(U)OPSCOMM	Operational Communications.	
(U)OPSEC	Operations Security.	
(U)OSF	Operations Support Facility.	
(U)OSL	Office of Space Launch.	
(U)OSO	Operational Support Office.	
(U)P&A	Office of Plans & Analysis.	(b)(1)
(U)PL	Payload.	(b)(3)
(U)P-989*	Inactive Program Name.	
(U)PADS	Prototype Analysis Display System.	(b)(1)
(U)PARAGON	Prototype Air Reporting and Ground Operating Node.	(b)(3)
(U)Pathfinder	A test to verify the compatibility between the SV and its facilities.	(b)(1)
(U)PAWS	Prototype Analyst Work Station.	(b)(3)
(U)PD-14 (OLD SPAWAR-40)	Program Directorate - 14.	
(U)PDEC	Product Development Evaluation Center.	
(U)PDMS	Payload Data Management System.	
(U)PLF	Payload Fairing.	
(U)POCC	Payload Operations Control Center.	
(S)POPPY	Inactive Program Name.	
(U)PRI	Pulse Repetition Interval.	
(U)PROFORMA	Machine to machine signals.	
(U)PSO	Program Security Officer.	
(U)R&D	Research & Development.	
(S)RAQUEL (K-I, K-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	(b)(1)
(U)RF	Radio Frequency.	(b)(3)
(U)RFP	Requests for Proposal.	

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(U)RRC	Regional Reporting Center.	
(U)RSOC	Regional SIGINT Operations Center.	
(U)S	Collateral Secret.	(b)(1)
(C) S/B	(C) SECRET BYEMAN.	(b)(3)
(U)S/C	Spacecraft.	
(U)S/TK	SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)SAF/SL	Secretary of the Air Force /Space Launch.	(b)(3)
(U)SAF/SO	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Operations	
(U)SAF/SP	Secretary of the Air Force/Special Projects.	
(U)SAF/SS**	Secretary of the Air Force/Space Systems.	
(U)SAO	Space Applications Office	
(U)SAF/ST	Secretary of the Air Force /Science & Technology.	
(U)SBS	Spacecraft Bus System.	(b)(1)
(U)SCC	Space Classified Catalog.	(b)(3)
(U)SCC	Spacecraft Control Center.	
(U)SCG	Security Classification Guide.	
(U)SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information.	
(U)SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.	
(U)SCTS	Space Cargo Transportation System.	
(U)SE/GE	Space Element/Ground Element.	
(U)SECDEF	Secretary of Defense.	(b)(1)
(U)SED	Signal External Data.	(b)(3)
(U)SELORS	Ship Emitters Location Report.	
(U)SEO	Systems Engineering Office	
(U)SETA	Support Engineering and Technical Assistance.	
(U)SGLS	Space Ground Link System.	
(C) SH	Special Handling.	
(U)SI	Special Intelligence.	
(U)SIGINT	Signals Intelligence.	
(U)SMC/CL	Space Missile Center/Launch Programs Office.	(b)(1)
(U)SMC/CLM	Space Missile Center/Atlas Program Office.	(b)(3)
(U)SMC/CLX	Space Missile Center/Operations Support & Integration Office.	
(U)SMC/IMO	Space Missile Center/Information Management Office.	
(S) OCOMM	Special Operations Communications.	
(U)SOI	Signals of Interest.	
(U)SOW	Statements of work.	
(U)SPO	Systems Program Office	
(U)SSD/IMO	Space Systems Division/Information Management Office.	
(U)SSD/OD-1	Space Systems Division/Operating Division - 1	
(U)SSIC	Space Segment Integration Contractor.	
(U)SSPO	Space Systems Program Office.	
(U)STS	Space Transportation System.	
(U)SV	Satellite Vehicle.	
(U)SV SPO	Satellite Vehicle, Systems Program Office.	
(U)SVC	Satellite Vehicle Contractor.	
(U)TAXDIS-B	Tactical Data Information Exchange System Broadcast.	(b)(1)

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		(b)(1)
(U)TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities.	(b)(3)
(U)TEP	Tactical ELINT Processor.	
(U)TK	TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)T-K	TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)TLD	Titan Launch Dispenser.	
(U)TMGS	Transportable Mobile Ground Station.	
(U)TOPS	Tactical On-Board Processing System.	
(U)Trailblazer	A test to verify the compatibility of the SV and its interface with the LV.	(b)(1)
(U)TS	TOP SECRET.	(b)(3)
(C) TS/B	(C) TOP SECRET/BYEMAN.	
(U)TS/SI	TOP SECRET/COMINT.	
(U)TS/TK	TOP SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLE.	
(U)TSF	Technical Support Facility.	
(U)TT&C	Telemetry, Tracking & Commanding.	
(U)TUDE	Teletype User Data Entry.	
(S) URSALA (U-I, U-II, etc.)	Satellite nickname.	
(U)USA	U.S. Army.	
(U)USAF	U.S. Air Force.	(b)(1)
(U)USMC	U.S. Marine Corps.	(b)(3)
(U)USN	U.S. Navv.	
(U)VRK	Very Restricted Knowledge.	
		(b)(1)
Table above is classified S/B/FK .		(b)(3)

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11 August 1965

AGREEMENT FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMA. The National Reconnaissance Program

1. The NRP is a single program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U. S. technology and all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to the Government's intelligence needs and objectives.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program shall be responsive directly and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. Targeting requirements and priorities and desired frequency of coverage of both satellite and manned aircraft missions over denied areas shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval of the 303 Committee.

B. The Secretary of Defense will:

1. Establish the NRO as a separate agency of the DoD and will have the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP;

2. Choose a Director of the NRO who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions;

3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy Director of the NRO who will report to the DNRO and be responsive to his instructions;

4. Review and have the final power to approve the NRP budget;

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, when necessary, to reach decisions on issues on which committee agreement could not be reached.

Excluded from automatic regrading
DoD Dir. 5200.10 does not apply.

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~~TOP SECRET~~**C. The Director of Central Intelligence will:**

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP operations and the establishment of their frequency of coverage;
2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and recommend, if appropriate, steps for improving such results;
3. Sit as a member of the Executive Committee;
4. Review and approve the NRP budget each year;
5. Provide security policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the whole NRP area.

D. National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee

1. An NRP Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, is hereby established to guide and participate in the formulation of the NRP through the DNRO. (The DNRO will sit with the Executive Committee but will not be a voting member.) If the Executive Committee can not agree on an issue the Secretary of Defense will be requested to sit with the Committee in discussing this issue and will arrive at a decision. The NRP Executive Committee will:

a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP in response to reconnaissance requirements provided by USIB and in the light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

b. Approve or modify the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program and its budget.

c. Approve the allocation of responsibility and the corresponding funds for research and exploratory development for new systems. Funds shall be adequate to ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both CIA and DoD.

d. Approve the allocation of development responsibilities and the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs with a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of the Government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical competence to

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undertake the assignment. It will also establish guidelines for collaboration between departments and for mutual support where appropriate. Assignments of responsibility for engineering development of sensor subsystems will be made to either the CIA or DoD components in accordance with the above criteria. The engineering development of all other subsystems, including spacecraft, reentry vehicles, boosters and booster interface subsystems shall in general be assigned to an Air Force component, recognizing however, that sensors, spacecrafts and reentry vehicles are integral components of a system, the development of which must proceed on a fully coordinated basis, with a view to ensuring optimum system development in support of intelligence requirements of overhead reconnaissance. To optimize the primary objective of systems development, design requirements of the sensors will be given priority in their integration within the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.

e. Assign operational responsibility for various types of manned overflight missions to CIA or DoD subject to the concurrence of the 303 Committee.

f. Periodically review the essential features of the major program elements of the NRP.

2. The Executive Committee shall meet on the call of either Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence. All meetings will be attended by the DNRO and such staff advisors as the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence consider desirable.

E. National Reconnaissance Office

1. To implement the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish the NRO as a separate operating agency of the DoD. It shall include the SOC which shall be jointly manned.

2. The Director of the NRO shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Director NRO will:

a. Subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee as set forth in Section D above, have the responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP.

b. Subject to review by the Executive Committee and the provisions of Section D above, have authority to initiate, approve modify, redirect or terminate all research and development programs in the NRP. Ensure, through appropriate recommendations to the Executive Committee for the assignment of research and development responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that the full potentialities of agencies of the Government concerned with reconnaissance are realized for the invention,

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improvement and development of reconnaissance systems to meet USIB requirements.

c. Have authority to require that he be kept fully completely informed by all Agencies and Departments of the Government of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP.

d. Maintain and provide to the members of the Executive Committee records of the status of all projects, programs and activities of the NRP in the research, development, production and/or operational phases.

e. Prepare a comprehensive budget for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

f. Establish a fiscal control and accounting procedure to ensure that all funds expended in support of the National Reconnaissance Program are fully accounted for and appropriately utilized by the agencies concerned. In particular, the budget shall show separately those funds to be applied to research and exploratory design development, systems development, procurement, and operational activities. Funds expended or obligated under Public Law 110 shall be administered and accounted for by CIA and will be reported to DNRO in accordance with agreed upon procedures.

g. Sit with the USIB for the matters affecting the NRP.

3. The Deputy Director NRO shall be appointed by the DCI with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall serve full time in a line position directly under the Director NRO. The Deputy Director shall act for and exercise the powers of the Director, NRO during his absence or disability.

4. The NRO shall be jointly staffed in such a fashion as to reflect the best talent appropriately available from the CIA, the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO staff will report to the DNRO and DDNRO and will maintain no allegiance to the originating agency or Department.

F. Initial Allocation of Program Responsibilities

1. Responsibility for existing programs of the NRP shall be allocated as indicated in Annex A attached hereto.

(signed) Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

(signed) W. F. Rabon
Director of Central Intelligence

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~~TOP SECRET~~ANNEX A

The following assignments for the development of new optical sensor subsystems are made to take full advantage of technical capability and experience to the agencies involved.

1. The CIA will develop the improvements in the CORONA general search optical sensor subsystems.
2. Following the selection of a concept, and a contractor, for full-scale development, in the area of advanced general search, the CIA will develop the optical sensor subsystem for that system.
3. The Air Force (SAFSP) will develop the G-3 optical sensor subsystem for the advanced high-resolution pointing system.
4. SAFSP will develop the optical sensor subsystems (manned and unmanned) for the MOL program.

The Director, NRO will, in managing the corresponding overall systems developments, ensure that:

1. The management of and contracting for the sensors is arranged so that the design and engineering capabilities in the various contractors are most efficiently utilized.
2. The sensor packages and other subsystems are integrated in an over-all system engineering design for subsystem, with DNRO having responsibility for systems integration of each over-all system.

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(U) NRO MGS Declassification Guide

15 OCT 2008


RALPH HALLER
Principal Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office

DECL ON: 25X1,20580915, RRG dated July 2005
DRV FROM: Original Classification Authority

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~~SECRET//TK//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(U) FOREWORD

(U) The declassification of National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Mission Ground Stations (MGS) has resulted in many changes to how the NRO's association with its MGSs are classified. This guide provides authoritative classification and compartmentation guidance for NRO information based on criteria established in Executive Order 12958, as amended, Intelligence Community Policy Memorandums (ICPM) and classification guidance of other Intelligence Community members.

(U) The overall objective of this guide is to ensure that proper classification and compartmentation determinations are made for NRO information in order to protect the NRO's people, operations, assets and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Also, as NRO systems are integrated into tactical operations, we must strive to classify and compartment our data at a level that is most usable to the customer.

~~(S//TK//REL)~~ This guide is designed to be a focused guide dedicated to specific near-term information protection issues that have resulted from the decision by the DDNI to declassify the location of the NRO [] MGSs and acknowledge a NRO presence at RAFMH in the UK and JDFPG in Australia effective 15 October 2008. Due to the scope of possible changes, there may be discrepancies between other NRO program classification guides and the guidance provided herein. As of 15 October 2008, THIS GUIDE TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OTHER GUIDES. Other guides will be modified in an expeditious manner, but until further notice, information related to the MGS declassification will be classified as specified in the classification table of this guide.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(U) The NRO Director of Security for System Operations (SO) is responsible for maintaining the currency of this guide. Discrepancies or conflicts regarding classification issues must be brought to the attention of your Program Security Officer (PSO) and, if appropriate, referred to the Security Policy Staff in order that the classification guidance may be properly amended. Once the cognizant program security office determines that there is cause for changing this Classification Guide, those recommended changes would be appropriately coordinated and incorporated. Questions or comments should be directed to the SO Security Staff by phone [] (Secure) or by secure fax [] (DSN 838).

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(U) Effective 15 Oct 2008 this guide is approved for use by all NRO government and contractor personnel, as well as members of the Intelligence Community who are authorized access to NRO program information.


Bob Harney

Acting Director, Office of Security and CounterIntelligence
National Reconnaissance Office

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(U) Mission Ground Station Naming Convention

(b)(1)
(b)(3)



TERMS

1. (S//TK//REL) [Redacted] Note: (U) [Redacted] S//TK//REL	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
2. (S//TK//REL) [Redacted] Note: (S//TK//REL) These terms are retired, effective 15 Oct 2008 [Redacted] These terms remain unclassified, their routine use (post 15 Oct 2008) in official correspondence is prohibited. Government legacy documentation should be modified to replace legacy terms with the approved MGS identifiers only when documentation is revised. Modification of legacy/archived contractor provided	U					

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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Dissem On	OCA
documentation should be approved by the CO before any charges are incurred. Archived documents should not be revised to reflect new names. If archived documents need to be put back into circulation, new versions should be created and the new [redacted] MGS names should be used.						
3. (S//TK//REL)						
Note: (S//TK//REL) This term is retired, effective 15 Oct 2008.						
This term remains classified, its routine use (post 15 Oct 2008) in official correspondence is prohibited. Government legacy documentation should be modified to replace this legacy term with the approved MGS identifier when documentation is revised. Modification of legacy/archived contractor provided documentation should be approved by the CO before any charges are incurred. Archived documents should not be revised to reflect new names. If archived documents need to be put back into circulation, new versions should be created and the new [redacted] MGS names should be used.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO

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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	REL	Disc. Control Release Date ID	EO	Exemptions	DOA
4. (S//TK//REL) [redacted] New name is ADF Colorado (ADF C). Note: (S//TK//REL) [redacted] is not to be revealed at the unclassified level. Therefore, the fact that [redacted] is classified S//TK//REL.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
5. (U) Menwith Hill Station (MHS). Note: (U) This is a term uniquely used by NSA for their location on RAFMH. The base's name is Royal Air Force Menwith Hill (RAFMH).	U					
6. (S//TK//REL) [redacted] Note: (S//TK//REL) [redacted]	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
7. (S//TK//REL) [redacted] Note: (S//TK//REL) [redacted]	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
FACTS ABOUT						
8. (U) Fact that NRO has multi-mission MGSs	U					
9. (U) Fact that the NRO has three MGSs – ADF E, ADF C and ADF SW.	U					

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(b)(3)(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Declass On	OCA
10. (S//REL) [REDACTED]	S		USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
11. (U) Fact of United Kingdom (UK), Australian (AUS), Canadian (CAN) or New Zealand (NZL) personnel residing in NRO Headquarters.	U					
12. (U) Fact of United Kingdom (UK), Australian (AUS), Canadian (CAN) or New Zealand (NZL) personnel residing in NRO MGS.	U					
13. (U) Total number of NRO government personnel assigned to any or all NRO MGSs. Note: (S//TK//REL) [REDACTED]	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
14. (S//TK//REL) The association of an individual's name with the fact that they are assigned at and work for the NRO [REDACTED]	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
15. (U) Mission statement for ADF (E,C,SW) is: The ADF (E,C,SW) is a multi-mission ground station responsible for supporting worldwide defense operations and multi-agency collection, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence information. it provides data to defense, intelligence, and civil agencies supporting the U.S. Government and its allies.	U					
16. (U) Location of ADF East on Ft Belvoir, VA. Note: (S//TK//REL) [REDACTED]	U					
17. (U) ADF East as a NRO MGS	U					

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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Declas On	OCA
18. (U) ADF East as a System Operations MGS that may include IMINT, SIGINT, COMM missions	U					
19. (S//TK//REL) (now ADF EAST) @ Ft Belvoir, VA Note: (S//TK//REL) Associating ADF E with the term post 15 Oct 2008 is classified S//TK//REL TO USA, FVEY.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
20. (U) Location of ADF Colorado on Buckley AFB (BAFB).	U					
21. (U) ADF Colorado as an NRO MGS	U					
22. (U) ADF Colorado as a System Operations MGS that may include IMINT, SIGINT, COMM missions	U					
23. (S//TK//REL)	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
24. (U) Location of ADF Southwest on White Sands Missile Test Range. Note: (S//TK//REL)	U					
25. (U) ADF Southwest as an NRO MGS	U					
26. (U) ADF Southwest as a System Operations MGS that may include IMINT, SIGINT, COMM missions	U					
27. (S//TK//REL)	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
28. (U) Fact that NSA and NSA are present at ADFs,	U		FOUO			
29. (U) Fact that CIA is present at ADF E	U					
30. (S//REL)	S		USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	CIA
31. (U) "Fact Of" a PRESENCE of the NRO at	U					

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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Declass On	OCA
RAFMH and JDFPG						
OPERATIONS INFO						
32. (U) Mission Statement for NRO presence at RAFMH and JDFPG: “(U) The NRO supports the joint missions at JDFPG and RAFMH through the provision of technical systems and shared research and development. The NRO’s participation is achieved with the consent of the Host governments and contributes to the national security of the countries involved.”	U					
33. (U) Specific –INT association with an ADF Note: Mission statement: The ADF (E,C,SW) is a multi-mission ground station responsible for supporting worldwide defense operations and multi-agency collection, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence information. it provides data to defense, intelligence, and civil agencies supporting the U.S. Government and its allies.	U					
34. (U) Acknowledgement of support (post 15 Oct 2008) to a specific operation/mission (e.g. GWOT, counter-narcotics, named military operations, e.g. Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom) at an ADF. Note: Classification of “fact-of” an ADF’s support (post 15 Oct 2008) must be consistent with the classification of the “fact of” the mission being supported. If the support reveals a satellite’s system performance, that support will be protected as S//TK//REL USA, FVEY.	U See Note					

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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Declass On	OCA
35. (U) Details of how the satellite system(s) controlled by the MGS contributed to the support of the operation/mission.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
36. (U) Successful support at an ADF described in terms of an INT's (post 15 Oct 2008) general contribution to specific aspects of the operation not revealing other classified information. Note: General contribution can be explained in terms of using an ...int to provide information. For example, "ADF C assisted in the successful recovery of a downed airman by provide real time SIGINT collection support to the extraction team."	U					
37. (U) Type of ...INT that may be supported at an ADF (post 15 Oct 2008).	U					
38. (U) "Fact of" failure/limitation of any system to support an operation. Note: (U) Details that describe the inability of collection support related to an inherent performance limitation of overhead collectors shall be protected as TS//SI//TK//REL.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
39. (U) Scope of support						
i. (U) Number of satellites in the total NRO constellation	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
ii. (U) Number of satellites in either the COMM, IMINT or SIGINT constellations	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
iii. (U) Number of intercepts/images collected in support of an operation if that number reveals the performance, timeliness or throughput of a system. Note: (U) Numbers that are generalized	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO

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such that they cannot be used to derive performance metrics may be UNCLASSIFIED. Consult your local PSO for specific guidance.						
iv. (U) Health and status of any NRO satellite	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
1. (U) Technical details of why a satellite is less than 100% ready	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
2. (U) Corrective action taken to restore a malfunctioning subsystem.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	
3. (U) Identification of a subsystem nogo as a cause for an outage.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
4. (U) Date and time a subsystem was restored to operational system.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
40. (U) Technical details that describe Satellite operations Note: This refers to information that reveals how satellite operators command/control the satellite, including the collection payloads	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
41. (U) Country location of targets. Note: (U) For performance reports use only, only the countries of Iraq and Afghanistan may be acknowledged as a target.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
CONTRACT INFO						
42. (S//TK//REL) [REDACTED]	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO

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INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Declas On	OCA
43. (S//TK//REL) [redacted] Note: (S//TK//REL) The fact that ADFs are NRO MGSs doesn't mean that [redacted]	U					
44. (U) Contract numbers starting with NRO-	U					
45. (U//FOUO) Contract numbers starting with NRO associated with the geographic locations ADF F.C.SW. [redacted] Note: (S//TK//REL) The content of any unclassified documentation [redacted]	U		FOUO			
46. (S//TK//REL) [redacted] Note: (S//TK//REL) When/if existing [redacted] are renewed, a determination will be made if they are to [redacted]	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO
47. (U) Contractor unclassified project names/numbers (e.g. P81, P642, DIAMOND, etc) associated with unclassified MGS names. Note: (S//TK//REL) If challenged as to their association with the NRO MGS, contractor unclassified substitute [redacted]	U					

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SECRET//TK//REL TO USA, FVEY

INFORMATION TO BE PROTECTED	Class	SCI System	Dissem Control Releasable to	E.O. 12958	Dissem On	DCA
identifiers						
48. (U) Contractor unclassified project names/numbers (e.g. P81, P642, DIAMOND, etc) associated with legacy unclassified MGS names.	S	TK	USA, FVEY	1.4(c)	25X1	NRO

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(b)(3)

	ADF E	ADF C	ADF SW	RAFMH*	JDFPG*
NRO	U	U	U	U Presence Only	U Presence Only
	U	S//REL TO USA, FVEY	S//REL TO USA, FVEY	S//REL TO USA, FVEY	S//REL TO USA, FVEY
	U	U	U	U//FOUO	U//FOUO
	U	U	U	U//FOUO	U//FOUO
* Note					

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)**Organizational Associations**